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An Emergentist Argument for the Impossibility of Zombie Duplicates

Abstract : Some influential arguments in the metaphysics of consciousness, in particular Chalmers’ Zombie Argument, suppose that all the physical properties of composed physical systems are metaphysically necessitated by their fundamental constituents. In this paper I argue against this thesis in order to debate Chalmers’ argument. By discussing, in non-technical terms, an EPR system I try to show that there are good reasons to hold that some composed physical systems have properties which are nomologically necessitated by their fundamental constituents, i.e., which emerge in the sense of the socalled ‘nomological supervenience’ views.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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Submitted on : Tuesday, January 3, 2017 - 4:02:59 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, March 17, 2022 - 10:08:21 AM
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FMSH-WP-2016-120 Bernal.pdf
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  • HAL Id : halshs-01425545, version 1



Reinaldo José Bernal Velasquez. An Emergentist Argument for the Impossibility of Zombie Duplicates. 2016. ⟨halshs-01425545⟩



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