Lucy Hutchinson and puritan education
Mark Burden

To cite this version:

HAL Id: halshs-01421139
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01421139
Submitted on 21 Dec 2016

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.
Introduction

Scholars are perhaps most accustomed to thinking about Hutchinson’s views on education as they are expressed in the preface to her Lucretius translation. In this text, dedicated to a modern–day “Mæcenas”, Hutchinson summarises the development of her views on classical literature, indicates that she worked on the translation in her children’s schoolroom, and writes of her persuasion that “the Encomiums giuen to these Pagan Poets & Philosophers, wherewith Tutors put them into the hands of their pupils, yet vnsetled in Principles of Devine Truth, is one greate means of debauching the learned world”.1 In the preface to Order and Disorder Hutchinson returns to this problematic of the necessity of achieving classical knowledge in order to understand and reject its pernicious influence. Once again, she invokes the trope of the “vanity of youth” as a reason for beginning to translate an ideologically challenging poem, and she contrasts the dangers of translating Lucretius with the necessity of Christian education. In this text, she disclaims “all doctrines of God and his works, but what I have learnt out of his own word”, and describes it as “a very unsafe and unprofitable thing” for the young, before their faith is fixed, to “exercise themselves in the study of vain, foolish, atheistical poetry”.2 These comments may of course be taken to refer directly to aspects of Lucretius’s thought, to seventeenth–century Lucretianism more broadly, or to classical literature in general. But whichever critical position is adopted, their tenor remains hard to square with Hutchinson the poet who, like Milton and so many other classically–inspired early modern writers, excoriated their learning in order to utilise it.3

The most common critical response to the apparently contradictory nature of early modern writers’ opinions of ancient knowledge is to point out the ubiquity with which classical stories are used by them as emblems, fables, parallels, allegories, or foreshadowings of Judaeo–Christian scriptures. While this is undoubtedly true, it is less clearly understood that the intellectual forcefields which both directed and were directed by such parallels could also be shaped by differences in theology and church government. Any sustained investigation of such discursive dynamics in relation to Hutchinson requires engagement with the complementary underbelly of her comments on education in the prefaces to De rerum natura and Order and Disorder – namely, the notion that education is a settling in the
principles of divine truth, in order to the fixing of a person’s faith. These ideas, which provide the foundation for Hutchinson’s manuscript treatise on “The Principles of the Christian Religion”, emerge from the educational practices described and inscribed in her autobiographical and biographical writings; yet they appear in their fullest and most developed form in her translation of John Owen’s major educational text, *Theologoumena Pantodapa* (1661), a distinctively Calvinist and Congregational excursus on the history and interrelation of theology and philosophy.

**Hutchinson’s Memoirs and the Changing Contours of Early Modern Schooling**

In Hutchinson’s *Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson* the narrative of her future husband John’s education opens with a description of the “universall habit of grace” wrought in souls by the “regenerating spiritt of God”, whereby a creature is “resign’d up into the devine will and love”, such that its actions become designed for “obedience” to the glory of its maker. These themes of grace, regeneration, love, and obedience are ubiquitous in Hutchinson’s writings, but her conception of grace as a “habit”, which owes much to her understanding of university logic, has a direct parallel in a passage from Owen’s *Theologoumena*, which she translates by stating that “No morall act is good or usefull to the doer, except it proceed from a new principle, or gratious habitt, infusd into the heart.”

For Hutchinson, as for Owen, this infused habit of grace lays the foundation both for ethical action and, more immediately, for religious instruction. In the *Memoirs*, Hutchinson writes that John had an inquisitive spirit in his early years, which manifested itself as “a reverence of God”, and “a seeking after the knowledge of him”. This inquisitiveness she classifies as an aspect of his “natural understanding”, which she contrasts with his “acquisition of learning”. This duality was most frequently invoked to explain the centrality of philosophy in educational practices, but in Hutchinson’s mind nature and learning are mutually reinforcing principles of religious knowledge. Indeed, Hutchinson describes her husband’s first studies as attempts to establish in himself the “principles of religion”, a phrase which resonates so firmly across Hutchinson’s oeuvre that the editors of the 1817 collection of her writings adopted it as the title for the treatise she wrote to her daughter Barbara. John, she writes, was exposed to devotional texts from a very young age, and she explains that his maid read Lewis Bayly’s *The Practise of Pietie* to him before he could read himself. Hutchinson herself describes this text as “the universall grammar of devotion”, through which her future husband “began to apprehend . . . something of eternity and of sinne”. Her language here reflects the tension in early modern educational thought between the utility and
insufficiency of books: “grammar” in Hutchinson’s usage is at once structure, method, system, and language – both the object of study, and a tool with which to study higher truths. If this particular “grammar of devotion” is only operative through a degree of “natural understanding”, then it both reveals the practice of religion, and conceals the truth of its principles – it leads to the beginnings of apprehension, but can only gesture towards the comprehension of eternity.

Hutchinson’s narratives of her future husband’s school experiences enable her to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful educational practices. She begins by describing the free school in Nottingham, where John spent two brief spells as a teenager.11 During the first period, his teacher was Robert Theobald, a Cambridge–educated cleric (1601–9, ordained 1614) who had been master at the school since 1616. Hutchinson uses the episode to highlight the perennial truism that good academics make bad teachers: she writes that Theobald was an “excellent scholar”, but having “no children some wealth and a little living”, he “first grew Lazie and after left off his schoole”.12 When Hutchinson explores John’s return to the school shortly before going to university, she describes his new master as “a very honest man”, who advances John’s learning by more affective (and, by implication, effective) methods – he treats his charges “with respect”. Her account of this new master enables Hutchinson to advocate the role of “familliar kindness” in educational practice; a similar notion is reflected in the importance she attaches to selecting a good nurses for ensuring the suitable education of children. However, her recognition that gentleness can lead to a lack of rigour reflects a widespread anxiety among early modern parents – in her surviving letter to the Congregational minister and tutor Robert Ferguson, she questions whether she has been too soft on her son Lucius, and admits that her acquaintances have blamed her for holding back his learning.13 Ideally, she suggests, tutors and nurses should be both reliable and intelligent – “carefull and dilligent”, but not “of a meane understanding”; in other words, kindness, reliability, and intelligence are all essential attributes of educators. However, Hutchinson does concede that John’s personality particularly suited him to a gentler method of instruction: the Nottingham school, she writes, “tied him to no observation”, and “restrein’d him from no pleasure”, because he did not require it – he was “so moderate when he was left to his free liberty that he needed no regulation.”14

Sandwiched between her accounts of John’s two stints at the Nottingham school, Hutchinson outlines his experiences at the free school at Lincoln, where he was tutored by John Clarke (c.1596–1658), master since 1622, and teacher at a school in Fiskerton from 1634.15 When John Hutchinson knew him, Clarke was still a relatively young man and an
M. Burden

inexperienced teacher, although he was probably already working on a series of educational books which later made his name. The disjunction between Clarke’s inexperience as a tutor and his fame as a scholar once again helps to explain Hutchinson’s hostile characterisation of him – he was, she writes, “a master very famous for learning and piety”, but “such a supercilious pedant, and so conceited of his owne pedantique forms, that he gave Mr. Hutchinson a disgust of him, so that he profited very little there.” However, there may also have been ideological reasons for Lucy’s later disapproval. Clarke’s reputation came under the spotlight when his former student William Walker described him as “my ever to be honoured Master, the very Reverend and Learned Mr. John Clarke”. Walker and the Hutchinsons had different religious principles – in the 1640s both Hutchinson and her husband adopted Baptist opinions on the divine ordinances, and thus are likely to have been even less impressed by Walker’s defences of the Church of England sacraments than they were by Clarke’s Erasmian tendencies. Hutchinson’s description of the Lincoln free school, then, serves as a reminder that the early modern dialectic between scholarship and teaching was chiefly operative in relation to the perceived ideological value of the beliefs enshrined within such scholarship. The same dialectic even contributes to Hutchinson’s framing of the death of John’s brother at the Lincoln school – she asserts that the school’s intellectual severity helped to cause his initial distemper, and claims that the catastrophe which followed was a contributory factor in John’s subsequent temptation by “a foolish youth”.

The moral, theological, and physiological perils of grammar schools such as those at Nottingham and Lincoln are a recurring theme of Hutchinson’s biographical and autobiographical writings. Given these perceived dangers, it is hardly surprising that many gentry families hired private chaplains and tutors to provide an education which was both formal and domestic; it is in such a context that Hutchinson’s claim to have worked on her Lucretius translation in her children’s schoolroom should be understood. That home schooling was an important educational principle for the Hutchinsons is suggested by comments in the memoirs that John “spared not any cost for the education of both his sons and daughters in languages, sciences, music, dancing, and all other qualities befitting their father’s house”, and was himself “their instructor in humility, sobriety and all godliness and virtue, which he rather strove to make them exercise with love and delight than by constraint”. Anxious to avoid a perpetuation of the unhappiness brought upon him by his own schooling, John made it a main part of his business “to attend the education of his children”. His death in 1663 left Hutchinson with a significant gap to fill, both in terms of the practicalities of providing appropriate tuition and schooling for her children, and in terms
of the moral and educational principles with which she required them to be instilled. The most significant literary outcomes of Hutchinson’s absorption of the imperative for moral instruction were the *Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson* and “The Principles of the Christian Religion”.

**Hutchinson’s “Principles”: Patterns of Domestic Instruction**

Hutchinson’s treatise on “The Principles of the Christian Religion”, addressed to her daughter Barbara, is her most important instructional work, and one which shares several pedagogic methods and functions with the *Memoirs*. As in the *Memoirs* Hutchinson emphasises that human souls must be established upon “certeine and safe grounds”: she apologises to Barbara for “neglect of fixing” her daughter’s principles by “precept & example”. However, in this text Hutchinson puts her educational ideas to more direct use, extolling the value of “summary” as an educational tool and demonstrating how information could be “methodically collected” from other books for educational purposes. It is a text whose structure performs the very progression it seeks to theorise, from theological principles (the first half of the text) to religious practice (the second, shorter half). The most important educational authority in the “Principles” is the Bible, which acts as a repository of sound truths, an internal/external referencing system operating through marginalia, and a self–authorising body of proofs which underpin both doctrines and duties. Perhaps most eye–catchingly, the “Principles” is Hutchinson’s most significant foray into the arena of gendered educational production, being a text which redefines the genre of the “mother’s legacy” by encroaching on a typically masculine theological specificity.

Recent studies of gender difference in early modern education have travelled considerably beyond the lazy assertion that girls were denied their brothers’ access to public and private schools and the universities. Similarly, the role played by women in both formal and informal educational arenas is no longer analysed primarily in terms of whether they or their husbands were in charge. Instead there has been a shift to consider the extent to which gendered discourses of instruction can be performative or substitutive of educational practice. One route into this debate is to consider the important (if slightly nebulous) concept of informal educational conversation, a notion which has gained particular traction in critical discussion of codes of politeness and sociability in eighteenth–century novels and conduct literature. The educational importance of conversation in early modern England is less well explored, despite its pedagogical ubiquity and its presence as an underlying assumption of educational textbooks. In the earlier period the word “conversation” already carried the wider
meanings of social intercourse and appropriate conduct, speech, and communication with God through meditation and prayer. Hutchinson shows great interest in both the utility and ethics of conversation, a word which appears ten times in the “Principles”. Hutchinson writes of “spiritual converse with Christians of other judgements”, the need “to regulate our conversation in Christ”, the believer’s delight in conversation with others who love God, and the believer’s weariness of “that conversation where God is seldomly slightly or ever remembered”. She warns against those pretenders to the love of God whose “conversations savour nothing of God”, and argues that believers are instructed “to deny our selves in our whole lives and conversations”; she cites Philippians 3:20 where “the Apostle saith our conversation is in heaven”; and she states that the keeping of God’s commandments is required not merely for worship but “for all godly conversation”. Hutchinson asserts the necessity to “sequester our selves alone with God to get our souls into a frame for conversation with others” and writes of obedience being the mortification of sin in conversation as well as the inward affections.

However, to describe these modes of conversation as “informal” would be to miss not merely the devotional context but also the implied intertextuality of all such instructional encounters. Texts of various kinds – whether scripture, catechisms, theological and devotional works, or philosophical and philological treatises – routinely underlie Hutchinson’s description of familial discussion and ministerial tutoring. Her re-inscription of the existing genre of the mother’s legacy as a doctrinal as well as devotional work fits this model, whereby accepted forms of female education are provided with a textual history that defies easy taxonomy. It is this model which enables her in the “Principles” to explore the educational potential for the laity of William Perkins’s Complete Cases of Conscience, while adopting words and phrases from François de Sales’s Introduction to the Devout Life in order to make oblique reference to his specifically female Ordo visitationis. It also explains why she can build her doctrinal claims simultaneously on the official publications of the Westminster Assembly, her own paraphrases of passages from Calvin’s Institutes, early seventeenth-century translations of William Ames’s Medulla theologiae, and a brief redaction of Ames by Thomas Shephard. For Hutchinson, the process of familial instruction is not merely dialogic, but also dialectical – she claims that she has “by that meanes learnt more then by all my hearing and study”, but it is clear from the process of textual composition that her private studies have shaped the very wording of her treatise to Barbara. Not only are large chunks of the text borrowed directly from her own statements of faith, but she also
writes into the text a request that Barbara punctuate the book herself and add additional scriptural references.  

Yet it is not the genres of theological system or devotional writing but catechistical instruction which Hutchinson chooses to compare most directly to her text. Hutchinson’s quotations from the Westminster Assembly catechisms make her apparently self-effacing comparison of her work to a “twopennie catechize” typically slippery and disingenuous. Once again there is an ideological dimension to Hutchinson’s intertextuality, since the debate over puritan family instruction had shifted considerably following the publication of the Westminster Assembly confession, shorter catechism, and larger catechism in the 1640s. As Hutchinson herself admits, this cheap devotional substitute for her imperfect treatise would have to be a “sound catechize”, one which matched Westminster Calvinist principles with at the very least an ability to encompass Congregational practice. Here, as in her two Calvin paraphrases, Hutchinson does not recognise any easy distinction between theological doctrine and church government. Like many puritans, Owen among them, Hutchinson perceives that the “Common principles & grounds” of religion lead in and of themselves to Congregational beliefs, which must therefore be comprehended within a national church settlement, in order to protect against the twin evils of Roman Catholic church polity and radical sectarianism. Yet the process of understanding the connections between principles and practice should occupy our entire lives: “wee ought to be taught these things the first that wee are taught”, so that they “hold vs learning all our liues”, and “att euery review wee shall find our understandings grow in them”. Slightly later in the treatise she notes that the “first principles of religion”, taught “when wee are children”, are later scorned by many people, “as if wee should againe be set to schoole to learne our A.B.C.” Yet the “childish rudiments” of the alphabet provide more “misterie of learning” than the common reader is capable of understanding, and the same is true of the religious principles found in catechisms.

It is, in Hutchinson’s opinion, a failure to lay these grounds – the “foundation truths” – that leads to the rise of religious sects. Fixing the judgment in fundamental principles means that the religious practices thence derived will be less mutable. Following arguments in the Pauline epistles, she asserts that her own sex is open to particular reproach for mutability: seducers in religion, she says, “lead about silly weomen who are euer learning and neuer able to come to the knowledge of the truth”; “our sex”, she asserts, has the greater “ignorance and weakenesse of judgement”. Speaking personally, she claims that a great occasion of her wavering in religion was “ignorance in principles” and exhorts Barbara to “examine [her faith]”, laying a foundation for “holy practise”. Hutchinson is particularly
exercised by the ill effects of “not pondering and examining doctrines as wee ought”, an omission originating in “hastinesse” and leading to “error”.41 Ironically, these mistakes can result from instruction in the wrong principles. Hutchinson invokes the commonplace that there “neuer was a time when the truth was more clowded with mists of error then att this day”.42 She compares errant seventeenth–century souls to those early Christian preachers who were “carried away with the mistakes of those that preach’d false doctrines in the point of iustification”.43 The preponderance of sects, both in the past and today, illustrates the necessity of an education in religious fundamentals. These sects, she writes, are the result of bad intellectual husbandry: Satan’s policy of twisting scripture results in “many new stalks growing vpon euery old poysonous roote”.44 Against the authority of “sectmasters” she invokes the authority of the Bible, arguing that the Apostle had ruled that “wee should not haue the faith of Christ with respect of persons”; these persons are not to be followed “further then they are followers of Christ”, who is the author of “vndisputable precept”.45 True education, then, is a bulwark of sound truths against the “errors of the times”.46 The pedagogic purpose of her little treatise is “that it may lie by [Barbara] as a witnesse of those sound truths” and as Hutchinson’s “last exhortation”; the wider function of this spiritual education is twofold: to prevent her daughter from being “seducd to factions and parties in religion”, and to achieve “the pure glory of God [and] the advancement of the kingdome of Jesus Christ”.47

There is, however, another side to Hutchinson’s gendering of education. The “Principles” begins with the Calvinist division between knowledge of God and knowledge of ourselves. The same distinction appears in her description of the early life of her husband. She states in the Memoirs that he “labour’d” for the “knowledge of God . . . by a diligent examination of the scripture”.48 In the address to her children which opens the Memoirs she also admits the necessity of studying the “severall doctrines of greate men”, but insists that John was “convinc’d and establisht much in the way of Mr. Calvin”; this she writes, was not on account of Calvin’s fame, but because he showed “the way of God”.49 Hutchinson’s two redactions of Calvin into a manuscript usually described somewhat misleadingly as her “religious commonplace book” may thus be viewed in part as an attempt to emulate her husband’s interest in the Institutes. The value of Calvin for the Hutchinsons lies in his emphasis upon the power of scripture, rather than in his tendency towards systematisation of doctrine or church polity. In the same passage of the Memoirs, Hutchinson uses the biblical phrase “hay and stubble” to describe “man’s inventions in God’s worship”; the phrase “hay and stubble” also appears in the longer statement of “Faith and Attainment” copied into the
The Seventeenth Century

religious notebook, and in the letter to Barbara prefacing the “Principles” manuscript. An important purpose of education for Hutchinson is to limit the power of such inventions over the individual by increasing his or her awareness of their corrosive effects. By contrast with the hay and stubble of human invention, she writes, is the necessity to apply oneself “wholly . . . to the Scriptures”, those “sweete counsellors” who provided such consolation to her husband John during his imprisonment. Historians are left, then, with a paradox. Hutchinson’s educational writings encourage us to consider the education of young men and young women as very different in form; and yet she continually encourages parallels between her husband’s principles, and her own recommendations for Barbara. In the “Principles” she appears to be both following her husband’s practice, and attempting to recreate the principles of that practice in her own image.

Hutchinson’s “Academical System”? – from Theologoumena Pantodapa to “Of Theology”

Hutchinson’s most audacious foray into the masculine arenas of theological doctrine and exegesis is her translation of John Owen’s Theologoumena Pantodapa (1661), an extended Latin treatise on the history of theological ideas. The importance of Owen to Hutchinson’s later intellectual development has been widely recognised, although his influence upon her devotional prose and poetry has perhaps been overstated. Given the resurgence of interest in Owen in recent years, it is strange that there are so few studies of Hutchinson’s translation of what is admittedly one of the most surprising, verbose, and impenetrable of his texts. Owen began researching it while he was vice-chancellor at Oxford University, but by the time of its publication in 1661 his circumstances had changed very considerably – he no longer held office at the university, and he had witnessed the ejection of many of his university colleagues following the Act for the Confirming and Restoring of Ministers (1660). By this point the text could no longer hope to achieve the scholarly or pedagogic influence Owen had intended, although its publication at Oxford highlights the continuing interest of tutors and many of the more advanced students in scholarly research providing support for Calvinist doctrines.

Hutchinson’s translation of Parts One and Two of the Theologoumena is her only foray into literature expressly designed for perusal by English university students. Like her translation of Lucretius, Hutchinson’s “Of Theology” shows sustained engagement with a text which was known to university tutors but which on account of its religious and scientific principles could not hope to achieve widespread intellectual credibility. The Theologoumena
M. Burden

is comparable to Hutchinson’s *De rerum natura* and *Order and Disorder* in its fascination with origins; Hutchinson’s translation of Owen’s text is therefore part of a life-long interest in divine creation, providence, and Genesis/genesis. Another aspect of Owen’s and Hutchinson’s shared parlance is the text’s thinly-disguised commentary on ecclesiastical and political hierarchy, contrasting in heated fashion the “specious and honourable titles” of those who are “most potent and numerous”, with “the lesser or oppressed numbers” called “factions”. While Owen’s primary purpose was to provide a historical account of the development of theology as a concept (the “theologoumena” of the title), his text can also be situated productively in the emerging genre of the history of philosophy. It shares aspects of its structure and content with near-contemporary works by Bochart, Stanley, and Stillingfleet. Owen’s text also exercised a considerable influence on the next generation of Congregational intellectuals, including his enthusiastic disciple Theophilus Gale. Owen, Gale, and Hutchinson all shared a concern with investigating the development of philosophy within a Calvinist framework which viewed post-lapsarian knowledge as imperfect and emphasised the limits of human reason. The *Theologoumena* was of particular importance to Owen as a contribution to reform of the universities, since it decentred Aristotelian learning and attempted to redraw the boundaries between the academic disciplines of logic, ethics, theology, and philology; most fundamentally, it sought to demonstrate the contingency of Platonic and peripatetic philosophy on its own imperfect sources in the philosophies of the “gentiles”, which were themselves (for Owen and other contributors to the genre) demonstrably corruptions of divine inspiration and Jewish history.

Scholarship on dissenting philosophical manuscripts has tended to focus on the role of such texts in formal teaching, or on surviving drafts for printed works. Hutchinson’s translation of the *Theologoumena* is different because it does not seem to have been intended for study in a formal academic setting. The exact functions of Hutchinson’s translation have yet to be established, and identifying them is made particularly difficult by the loss of the autograph or holograph manuscript – scholars are reliant on a nineteenth-century printed transcription which demonstrably alters Hutchinson’s spelling (sometimes in the direction of archaism rather than modernisation), adjusts her punctuation, and misreads the text. Nevertheless, Hutchinson’s method is fairly clear. With a few exceptions, her version remains close to the structure of Owen’s work, and she translates most of his Latin text word by word. On the other hand, while she retains Owen’s biblical citations as marginal notes, she strips out almost the entirety of his dense forest of scholarly references, and simplifies many of his sentences. The result is a predominantly lucid and readable text which presents
fewer difficulties to the amateur theological autodidact than Owen’s erudite but abstruse original. As such, Hutchinson’s text undermines easy distinctions between the realms of masculine and feminine knowledge, and may be considered an early example of dissenting attempts to present works generally associated with Latin learning in a manner which can be adopted as a form of personal instruction, or educational conversation in the vernacular.60

Nevertheless, by reducing and simplifying Owen’s text, Hutchinson also manages to reinforce its structure as an educational text. The work’s 1817 title, “Of Theologie”, could be editorial; it is certainly a very imperfect translation of Owen’s Theologoumena Pantodapa. In any case, the first heading of the 1817 edition, “OF | THEOLOGIE IN GENERALL.”, could lead an unwary reader to assume that what follows would be a textbook defining the discipline of theology, before exploring specific aspects of Calvinist doctrine. The division of a textbook into “general” and “specific” sections, the second being much the greater part, was common practice in the seventeenth century, and became associated with attempts to mould Aristotelian methods to new or developing knowledge; in such circumstances the general part of a text served by way of prolegomena to the specific.61 Latin works designed to provide undergraduates with an introduction to natural philosophy adopted this structure across Europe; in the late seventeenth century, similar works appeared in English, sometimes adopting the traditional structure while adding brief references to recent scientific experiments. Meanwhile, standard Latin textbooks in logic and pneumatology (the study of the soul) were being translated in abridged forms, often by dissenters; these “brief systems” of learning, inspired by the traditional practice of studying a Latin “systema brevius” at the universities, were designed to meet changing educational expectations from a range of audiences, including academy students, gentlemen, and women.

Hutchinson’s engagement with the formal conventions of manuscript systems of learning is most clearly evident in her treatment of his ninth chapter, which is a refutation of Bellarmine’s fifteen notes on the true church, and in her rendition of Owen’s first and lengthy digression “On Universal Grace”. As was common among authors of short manuscript redactions of printed texts (i.e. “breviates”), Hutchinson was less interested in a word–by–word translation of his more obviously controversial passages, providing instead a pared–down version, combining literal translation with paraphrase, summary, and omissions. In her version of the ninth chapter, Owen’s responses to Bellarmine’s fourth and fifth notes are considerably compressed; she omits the second half of his critique on the ninth note; she ignores the final sentences of several of Owen’s more virulent paragraphs and she scraps the second half of his comments on Bellarmine’s thirteenth note.62 Owen’s digression following
M. Burden

his sixth chapter is framed as a series of arguments for and against the doctrine of universal grace. The 1661 text presents the two sets of arguments somewhat haphazardly in alternating italic/roman typography; Hutchinson accentuates the text’s value as an educational *summa* by explicitly framing it as a dialogue between an objector and a respondent—so in doing, she draws attention to the text’s parallels in oral university disputations, while simultaneously highlighting its conversational features. For example, in the second full paragraph of p. 46, the 1661 typesetter does not mark the opposing viewpoint by italics—by marking it “Op.”, Hutchinson is emending Owen’s structure in order to clarify his argument. A similar intervention, rendering a faulty interpretation of Acts 14:16–17 in the voice of the opponent, considerably clarifies Owen’s indeterminate “considerationem”. Again, a non–italicised passage near the end of the digression is correctly identified as “Op.” by Hutchinson on the basis of Owen’s “Restat adhùc Argumentum”. However, at another point she does not choose to render Owen’s “Etenim aliqui” as “Op.” but as “men”. Hutchinson cuts many of Owen’s introductory remarks, so that the digression focuses on the opponent’s initial (and from Owen and Hutchinson’s perspective, faulty) assertion that “God wills that those adult men, who want his word, should be saved”. The differences between Hutchinson’s dialogue structure and Owen’s discursive text are particularly prominent at the end of the digression. At this point, Hutchinson’s translation has a Socratic flavour, whereas Owen’s text rather gives the appearance of compression.

In other parts of the text, both Owen and Hutchinson exploit the structural conventions of philosophical systems in order to rewrite their expected contents. The first chapter, on terms, eschews an easy definition of the word “theology”, instead pointing out that it is not a scriptural term, and that its usage by scholastic philosophers is inconsistent with gospel simplicity. The text then proceeds to attack the traditional peripatetic method by which a discipline is defined as either an art or a science, as theoretical or practical, and then distinguished according to its genus, species, and end. In Hutchinson’s translation, such attempts to write a systematic theology are expressed as the “impertinences” of disputing divines who mix “philosophy with Christian simplicity”, thereby “accommodating the understanding of it to the rules of art”. Her translation of Owen’s text pointedly refers to the “principles, theoremes, and conclusions” of “schoole–devinity”, a term which “cannot properly passe” under that name. Instead, divinely–appointed knowledge, wisdom, prudence, and learning is, for Owen and Hutchinson, the very definition of scripture. In another early passage of which the rationally–minded Hutchinson would have taken particular notice, Owen points out how easy it is to confuse “every thing that is knowne” with
“the faculty and power of mind whereby wee apprehend it”, namely, the intellect. This confusion, whereby apprehension and verity are muddled, has important doctrinal consequences once it is recognised that theological knowledge is not immediate, but dependent upon revealed truth, which is an act of the divine will. God, then, is the only being with perfect (self–) knowledge; theology, being divine truth as revealed by God, is the principle of all divine worship. It follows, for both Owen and Hutchinson, that a “theologus, a student or professor of theologie”, is one who is “endued with the H. G., initiated and instructed in Christian principles by Him”, and that “Theologie being conversant about these things, becomes the principle of all devine worship, faith, and obedience”; given that this is the case, it is necessary that theology should be “of devine originall, from heaven and not of men; selfe–authorizing, and in itselfe worthy of credence”. Hutchinson’s adoption of these Calvinist epistemological principles is demonstrated by the frequency with which she writes and rewrites them in her theological notebooks. And yet, as we have seen, there are important differences between Hutchinson’s personal adoption of the word “principles” and her use of it to translate the Latin word principia in Owen’s text – she is less ready than Owen to critique its association with scholastic “propositions”, “evident reasons”, and “conclusions”, since she wishes to emphasise the value of doctrinal principles as a guide to practice. To take one subtle example, Hutchinson is content to render Owen’s “Oculatiores” as “more discerning” – a shift which reflects a difference in epistemological emphasis from observation to rational apprehension.

This focus on the role of the mind in the pursuit of doctrinal truth and religious practice encourages Hutchinson to explore the connections between reason and passion as mental operations within the faculties of the intellect and the will. At first sight, Hutchinson’s translation in chapter 7 of Owen’s definition of the philosopher, “Palpando Deum quærere”, as “by feeling to seek after God” looks a little loose, and yet if variations in the 1817 typography in any way reflect Hutchinson’s own practice, this was a concept which was important to her – two paragraphs earlier the word “FEELING”, meaning an exploration of the operations of the understanding, is printed in italic capital letters by her nineteenth–century editors. Hutchinson takes full advantage of the morally ambiguous role of “feeling”, in philosophical thought, translating Owen’s somewhat awkward construction “Residuæ illius Theologiæ . . . quasi surculus est, Philosophia” as “Philosophy . . . is the sprowtings forth of the relliques of that theologie concreated with man, and amplified by revelation”. Slightly later in the text, she writes of those sinners who “endeavourd, by feeling after him, to find out the Lord and Creator”, translating “dominum & Creatorem palpando invenire quæsiverunt
M. Burden

peccatores”. Philosophy, then, is the consequence of the corruption of theology by the fallen mind, for which emotion and intellect are fatally intertwined. It is this dual element of feeling as both passionate reason and reasoned passion through which Hutchinson interprets Owen’s narrative of the vainglorious arrogation of philosophy by the Greeks, despite their borrowings from even more ancient civilisations. Here again she clarifies Owen’s critique and emphasises the institutional implications, locating the derivative nature of Greek learning “in their schools, and after in their bookes”, while powerfully compressing his comments on the lust, ambition, and ostentation of philosophy teachers. Hutchinson also develops Owen’s comments on classical philosophy to fit their shared theological predilections more closely – she translates “index” as “directory”, giving the term a Westminster flavour; Owen’s “obscurâ . . . & tenui . . . famâ seu notitiâ” becomes “obscure or slender notion or tradition”, linking the comment to other examples of anti–Catholic rhetoric in the text; his “Theologie . . . primigeniae” is paraphrased as “primitive innate theologie” (my italics).

Hutchinson’s purposes in producing the translation may be elucidated further by considering a passage she added to chapter 8 of Owen’s text. During Owen’s discussion of superstition and idolatry Hutchinson feels a compulsion to “take notice, how like themselves the wicked are in all times”; these wicked people include “proud wise fooles” who think that nothing can be seen which their “blind misty eies cannot discerne”. Such beliefs encourage these persons to descend to easy practices, and please themselves in “pageantry and painting rotten posts”, reducing religion to a mere outside. Yet this is more than an attack on the supposedly formal religion of Church of England clerics; in typical Hutchinson fashion, she proceeds to link ceremonialism to the belief that knowledge of God’s mysteries is unnecessary. By contrast, it is essential to Hutchinson’s branch of Calvinism that the “misteries of the decrees and counccells of God”, and “the properties and operations of the divine nature”, are to be made available to the laity; it is not enough for them to live honestly, charitably, and obediently. She notes that much of the laity would itself be resistant to such knowledge, since many people believe that “hard things belong to schollars”; yet such knowledge of God’s will and operations would overthrow all of their “iustice and honesty”. Good deeds cannot make people good, but a contemplation and embracing of God’s grace makes us capable of bringing forth good fruit. In this addition to the Theologoumena, Hutchinson shows herself in agreement with both Owen and Calvin that knowledge of God is necessary to mitigate worldly wisdom. This broad aim is a self–educative as much as a pedagogic one, which explains its presence across Hutchinson’s theological writings, from the notes on the Institutes and her confessions of faith, to her treatise on the “Principles” of
Christian religion and her translation of the first sections of the *Theologoumena*. Yet Hutchinson takes a step back from Owen by emphasising the necessity of a rationalist basis for theological inquiry – her principles may be predominantly scriptural rather than scholastic or systematic, but she is nevertheless insistent on a connection between Christian practice and humanity’s inevitably flawed conception of divine attributes and operations.

**Conclusion**

To suggest that Hutchinson provided any new theories of knowledge or instruction would be to misread the purpose of her writings on these subjects. Instead, her approach in both the “Principles” and “Of Theology” was to modify existing educational frameworks to reflect her particular interest in the relation between principles and practice. Hutchinson’s account of the structure and acquisition of knowledge through educational practices – while deliberately not systematic in a theological sense – is more ordered than her claims to lack “method” would suggest. It is true that her overt attempt in the “Principles” to “reduce my discourse to some method” heralds her adoption of Perkins’s *Cases of Conscience* in order to provide a structure for her discussion of religious practice. However, it is entirely consistent with Hutchinson’s beliefs in the role of women in educational discourse that she should adopt the contours of a text by a pivotal figure in the development of English Calvinism while expanding the contents dramatically with her own scripturally-inflected ideas. Furthermore, she is quite prepared to modify the key terms of her sources in order to clarify developments in Calvinist thought or to apply them to the context of female instruction.

We may conclude by asking whether Hutchinson perceived the distinction between doctrinal knowledge and practice to be as firm as some of her puritan contemporaries suggested. Hutchinson is openly equivocal about the distinction, at one point inscribing an opposition between “practicall” and “doctrinall” principles, and proceeding a few pages later “to trace you some practicall principles” out of the “prescript” of God’s “holy word”. One solution to this puzzle is to view Hutchinson’s conception of “principles” as one which can include both Calvinist doctrine and Congregational practice. The “fundamentalls” of both doctrinal and practical principles cannot be considered an “vnconcerning study”, but they must be based on the authority of scripture alone rather than misty human apprehension, as Hutchinson’s approach to Owen’s *Theologoumena* emphasises. However, it would be wrong to view Hutchinson’s project of translating texts into the vernacular, assaulting the theological value of scholarship, and adopting a familiar puritan anticlerical rhetoric to be a democratisation of knowledge through educative texts. Her readership was small, and her
aims were in general connected to personal piety and family devotion rather than public
performance. She retained a high regard for masculine educational authority, where such
authority chimed with her own principles, affected her personal circumstances, or altered the
terms of theological debate. Moreover, her very conception of the term “principles” reflects
her ongoing belief in the power of the intellect and its operations. It is here, in the necessity
and inability of the post–lapsesrian intellect to comprehend, direct, and regulate the grammar
of religious practices, that one of the central conundrums in Hutchinson’s educational
writings may be located.

1 Hutchinson, Works, I, cvii–cxxiv, 7–15; for another recent case study in early modern women translators, see
Allen, Cooke Sisters.
3 In Hutchinson’s case, this amounted to translating a range of classical texts, and copying long sections of other
poets’ translations: Nottinghamshire Archives, MS DD/HU1; see de Groot, “John Denham”; 147–63.
4 Northamptonshire Archives, MS Fitzwilliam 793; hereafter F793.
5 Hutchinson’s translation appears with the editorial title “Of Theology” in Principles, ed. Julius Hutchinson;
hereafter “Of Theology”; Hutchinson’s original manuscript is lost.
6 Hutchinson, Memoirs, ed. Sutherland, 5; hereafter Memoirs.
7 “Of Theology”, 241.
8 Memoirs, 5–6.
9 Also featuring in her treatise to Barbara is a careful distinction between principles and practice. Hutchinson
clearly saw this as essential to the education of young people, noting an autobiographical fragment that her
parents were “pious and vertuous in their owne conversation, and carefull instructors . . . not only by precept but
example” (Memoirs, 282). As in the “Principles”, Hutchinson expresses a degree of guilt in her autobiography
that she has had neither “leisure” nor “ability” to transmit what she has learnt from her family to her own
posterity.
10 Memoirs, 21. Bearing in mind that John was born in 1615, this was a relatively new text; the earliest extant
dition, the second, dates from 1613.
11 Memoirs, 22. Since 1513 the school had been operating on an endowment from the local philanthropist Agnes
Mellers, who had also helped to draw up ordinances for managing the school; it was governed by the mayor and
corporation, who would appoint two teachers and two schoolwardens. John spent two periods at this school. In
the nineteenth century it was renamed Nottingham High School for boys, and still survives; see Thomas,
Nottingham High School, 35–54. More general accounts of puritan education include Morgan, Godly Learning;
Greaves, Puritan Revolution; Green, Humanism.
12 Memoirs, 22. Theobald’s departure from the school can be dated to approximately 1627, when he became
rector of Colwick; at this date, John would have been about 12.
13 The National Archives, MS SP29/361/8.
14 Memoirs, 22.
15 Memoirs, 22; see also Hill, Lincoln, 109–27.
16 For example, Transitionum formulæ (1628), Holy Oyle (1630); an edition of Erasmus’ Colloquiorum (1631);
Dux grammaticus (1633); Phraseologia puellaris, Anglo–Latina (1638); Paroemiologia Anglo–Latina (1639).
17 Memoirs, 22.
18 Walker, Idiomatology Anglo–Latina, “Preface”.
19 Walker, Modest Plea, and Doctrine of Baptisms; for Hutchinson’s changing views on Baptists, see Memoirs,
39, 168–70, and Nottinghamshire Archives, MS DD/HU3, 51; hereafter DD/HU3.
21 Memoirs, 283, 288.
22 For a comparable case of an early modern father seeking to direct the course of his children’s education, see
Lord Philip Wharton’s letters to Theophilus Gale: Bodleian Library, Rawlinson Letters 49–54; also instructive
is the nonconformist minister Philip Henry’s education of his children: Matthew Henry, Philip Henry, 72–94.
24 F793, 1.
25 F793, 10–103, 103–53.
Hutchinson was not quite alone in taking this line – women frequently made sermon notes, and occasionally composed private devotional works, sometimes with quite heavy theological content; see, for example, Ann Cromwell’s notebook, British Library, Harley MS 2311, containing prayers, comparisons of the Old and New Testament, a description of the Trinity, and holy ejaculations and meditations. For the “mother’s legacy”, see Brown, *Women’s Writing*; Heller, *Mother’s Legacy*; Charlton, *Women, Religion and Education*, 188–240.

For example, O’Day, *Education and Society*.


F793, 113, which as Elizabeth Clarke will argue in Hutchinson, *Works*, II may be drawing specifically on the 1662 English edition of de Sales, *An Introduction to a Devout Life*.


F793, 7.


F793, 9; there is no evidence that Barbara made any such additions to the extant copy of the text.

F793, 5, from which the next five quotations are also taken; see also Green, *Christian’s ABC*.

F793, 7.

F793, 5.

F793, 6; compare, for example, 1 Timothy 2:9–15.

F793, 7.

F793, 2.

F793, 3; “mist” is one of Hutchinson’s favourite images: compare F793, 12, 42, 130; DD/HU3, 13, 250–249 rev; “Of Theology”, 218, 250, 257, 288, 292–3.

F793, 3, leading into a discussion of Apollos.

F793, 3; contrast the description of Christ as the “living roote”, F793, 59.

F793, 4.

F793, 3.

F793, 1–2.

Memoirs, 234.

Memoirs, 6.

Memoirs, 5–14, 264, 270. Among the most important passages of scripture for Lucy and John Hutchinson was the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, which features prominently in their extant collection of biblical commonplaces: Nottinghamshire Archives, MS DD/HU4.

The intellectual connections between Owen and Hutchinson were first explored in detail in the introduction to Hutchinson, *Order and Disorder*, ed. Norbrook; for evidence that Hutchinson attended some of Owen’s sermons, see DD/HU3, 190–6.

As well as contributing somewhat belatedly to puritan discussions of the reform of the universities, Owen’s text achieved an international audience; it was republished as a memorial volume at Bremen in 1684 (shortly after Owen’s death), and again at Franeker in 1700.

“Of Theology”, 297.


Gale, *Court of the Gentiles*; Gale is probably “T. G.”, the author of a prefatory poem to *TP*, sig. ***4r–v.


Most obviously in the very un–Hutchinsonian error “Clemens, Alexandrinus” (“Of Theology”, 286).

I am using this phrase rather than “word–for–word”: Hutchinson regularly substitutes words which diverge from Owen’s meaning.

For another example, see the dissenting tutor Charles Morton’s manuscript logic system, printed in *Aristotelian & Cartesian Logic*, ed. Kennedy, 139–254.

A good example may be found in Morton, *Compendium Physicae*, ed. Hornberger, 1–220.

e.g. *TP*, 118, “Of Theology”, 306; *TP*, 120–1, “Of Theology”, 308; compare *TP*, 54–5, “Of Theology”, 222, where Hutchinson also cuts a section of Owen’s text.

Here, she was following Owen’s designation “Resp.”, appearing on *TP*, 41, and “R.”, appearing on *TP*, 57.

However, it is not clear how fully Hutchinson engaged with the intellectual sources and contexts for Owen’s digression; judging by a strange lapse early in the text, in which Owen’s “Belgis” (i.e. the Netherlands) becomes
Germany” (“Of Theology”, 189), she was at this point in her theological journey less than confident in distinguishing between different continental schools of theology.

68 TP, 48, “Of Theology”, 211.
69 “Of Theology”, 189.
71 This is a slightly different sense of accommodation to that adopted in the “Principles”, where she discusses specifically biblical images of God’s attributes as a means to represent the unrepresentable: F793, 21.
72 “Of Theology”, 150.
73 “Of Theology”, 153.
75 “Of Theology”, 148.
76 “Of Theology”, 143–4.
78 TP, 61, “Of Theology”, 230.
79 TP, 70, “Of Theology”, 246.
80 TP, 61, “Of Theology”, 231.
81 TP, 61, “Of Theology”, 232.
83 TP, 63, “Of Theology”, 233; this does not stop her from translating “Notitia Dei naturalis” as “naturall knowledge of God” only a few sentences later (TP, 64, “Of Theology”, 234).
84 TP, 63, “Of Theology”, 234.
85 “Of Theology”, 288–9.
86 Compare F793, 25–6, 48, 61–8, 103a, 137, 139.
87 “Of Theology”, 288–9.
88 F793, 1, 60, 103.
89 F793, 111.
90 F793, 126–30, 137–40.
91 Most interestingly, altering Perkins’s third virtue of internal worship from “patience” to “Submission”, a term discussed by Perkins, but not afforded the same prominence: F793, 126, 141–7; Perkins, Cases of Conscience, 258–60.
92 Compare, for example, Cradock, Knowledge and Practice, which appeared in multiple editions.
93 F793, 91, 103.
94 F793, 28, 154.

Bibliography

Manuscripts:
British Library, Harley MS 2311: Ann Cromwell’s notebook.
Northamptonshire Archives, MS Fitzwilliam 793: Hutchinson’s treatise on religion addressed to her daughter (“Principles”)
Nottinghamshire Archives, MS DD/HU1: Lucy Hutchinson’s literary commonplace book in verse and prose, including Virgil translations.
Nottinghamshire Archives, MS DD/HU3: Religious commonplace book in Hutchinson’s hand.
The National Archives, MS SP29/361/8: Letter from Lucy Hutchinson to Robert Ferguson, 27 April 1674.
The Bodleian Library, MSS Rawlinson Letters 49–54 (Philip Wharton correspondence).

Printed Books:


