Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Conference papers

Financing and advising with (over)confident entrepreneurs: an experimental investigation

Abstract : We test in the laboratory how entrepreneurs' skill perceptions influence the design of financing and advising contracts. Our theoretical framework proposes that selfconfident entrepreneurs prefer issuing debt whereas low self-confident ones prefer equity which induces strong investor assistance. The prevalence of overconfidence makes investors more reluctant to accept debt offers and constrains self-confident entrepreneurs to finance through mixed securities. Experimental results show that self-confident entrepreneurs issue more debt-like securities and receive less assistance. We also show that entrepreneurs learn not to offer pure debt and that initial ignorance of their own skills reinforces entrepreneurs' ability to learn through risky choices.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Taï Dao Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, December 16, 2016 - 2:38:07 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, May 27, 2021 - 3:36:34 AM


  • HAL Id : halshs-01418222, version 1


Laurent Vilanova, Nadège Marchand, Walid Hichri. Financing and advising with (over)confident entrepreneurs: an experimental investigation. 5th Annual Lithuanian Conference on Economic Research, Jun 2016, Vilnius, Lithuania. ⟨halshs-01418222⟩



Record views