Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs

Emilie Dargaud (1) , Armel Jacques (2)

1 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
2 CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien

When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements on different markets, they may wish to compartmentalize their agreements managing them with different individuals in order to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Sometimes the leniency programs are effcient to defeat this strategy and to induce CEO to launch internal investigations and report the obtained hard evidence to the antitrust authority. However these programs may have pro-collusive effects for centralized firms.

Mots clés: Collusion; antitrust policy; leniency programs; multimarket contact; organizational form

Domaines: Economies et finances

Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques. Endogenous firms' organization, internal audit and leniency programs. European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, EARIE, Aug 2016, Lisbonne, Portugal. ⟨halshs-01418174⟩