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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Financial Economics Année : 2015

Equilibrium fast trading

Résumé

High speed market connections improve investors׳ ability to search for attractive quotes in fragmented markets, raising gains from trade. They also enable fast traders to obtain information before slow traders, generating adverse selection, and thus negative externalities. When investing in fast trading technologies, institutions do not internalize these externalities. Accordingly, they overinvest in equilibrium. Completely banning fast trading is dominated by offering two types of markets: one accepting fast traders, the other banning them. Utilitarian welfare is maximized with (i) a single market type on which fast and slow traders coexist and (ii) Pigovian taxes on investment in the fast trading technology

Dates et versions

halshs-01400252 , version 1 (21-11-2016)

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Bruno Biais, Thierry Foucault, Sophie Moinas. Equilibrium fast trading. Journal of Financial Economics, 2015, 116 (2), pp.292 - 313. ⟨10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.03.004⟩. ⟨halshs-01400252⟩
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