Ownership structure, Voting, and Risk

Amrita Dhillon Silvia Rossetto 1
1 Finance
CRM - Centre de Recherche en Management
Abstract : We analyze the determinants of a firm's ownership structure when decisions over risk are taken by majority vote of risk-averse shareholders. We show that when a fraction of small, diversified shareholders abstains from voting, mid-sized blockholders may emerge to mitigate the conflict of interests between one large shareholder, who prefers less risky investments, and these small, non-voting shareholders. The paper offers a novel explanation for the puzzling observation that many firms have multiple blockholders. The paper develops numerous empirical implications, for example on the link between ownership structure and risk choices and on the relative size of blocks.
Keywords : Finance
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Review Financial Studies, 2015, 28 (2), pp.521-560. 〈10.1093/rfs/hhu071〉
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01398605
Contributeur : Corinne Schaffner <>
Soumis le : jeudi 17 novembre 2016 - 14:55:37
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:27:04

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Amrita Dhillon, Silvia Rossetto. Ownership structure, Voting, and Risk. Review Financial Studies, 2015, 28 (2), pp.521-560. 〈10.1093/rfs/hhu071〉. 〈halshs-01398605〉

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