The Core for Games with Cooperation Structure

Abstract : A cooperative game consists of a set of players and a characteristic function that determines the maximal profit or minimal cost that each subset of players can get when they decide to cooperate, regardless of the actions of the rest of the players. The relationships among the players can modify their bargaining and therefore their payoffs. The model of cooperation structures in a game introduces a graph on the set of players setting their relations and in which its components indicate the groups of players that are initially formed. In this paper we define the core and the Weber set and the notion of convexity for this family of games.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01395957
Contributor : Alexandre Skoda <>
Submitted on : Saturday, November 12, 2016 - 10:21:52 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, March 27, 2018 - 11:48:04 AM

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Inés Gallego, Michel Grabisch, Andres Jiménez-Losada, Alexandre Skoda. The Core for Games with Cooperation Structure. Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2016, 978-3-662-52885-3. ⟨10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_12⟩. ⟨halshs-01395957⟩

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