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Article Dans Une Revue Annals of Operations Research Année : 2017

A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games

Résumé

We provide a strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule (Béal et al. in Theory Decis 79:251–283, 2015). Precisely, we design a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the sequential equal surplus division outcome of a superadditive rooted tree TU-game. This mechanism borrowed from the bidding mechanism designed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, 2001), but takes into account the direction of the edges connecting any two players in the rooted tree, which reflects some dominance relation between them. Our proofs rely on interesting properties that we provide for a general class of bidding mechanisms.

Dates et versions

halshs-01381379 , version 1 (14-10-2016)

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Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal. A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games. Annals of Operations Research, 2017, 253 (1), pp. 43-59. ⟨10.1007/s10479-016-2290-5⟩. ⟨halshs-01381379⟩
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