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Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath

Abstract : Real economic commitment (or the lack of it) of others affects a person's preferences to cooperate. But what if the commitment of others cannot be observed ex ante? Herein we examine how a classic non-monetary institution– a solemn oath of honesty –creates economic commitment within the public goods game. Commitment-through-the-oath asks people to hold themselves to a higher standard of integrity. Our results suggest the oath can increase cooperation (by 33%)– but the oath does not change preferences for cooperation. Rather people react quicker and cooperate, taking less time to ponder on the strategic free riding behavior.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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Submitted on : Tuesday, October 11, 2016 - 9:54:28 AM
Last modification on : Friday, April 29, 2022 - 10:13:03 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Friday, January 13, 2017 - 10:20:33 PM


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  • HAL Id : halshs-01379060, version 1



Jérôme Hergueux, Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini, Jason F Shogren. Leveraging the Honor Code: Public Goods Contributions under Oath. 2016. ⟨halshs-01379060⟩



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