Managing relational contracts - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2019

Managing relational contracts

Résumé

Relational contracts are typically modeled as being between a principal and an agent, such as a firm owner and a supplier. Yet in a variety of organizations relationships are overseen by an inter- mediary such as a manager. Such arrangements open the door for collusion between the manager and the agent. This paper develops a theory of such managed relational contracts. We show that managed relational contracts di_er from principal-agent ones in important ways. First, kickbacks from the agent can help solve the manager's commitment problem. When commitment is di_cult, this can result in higher agent effort than the principal could incen- tivize directly. Second, making relationships more valuable enables more collusion and hence can reduce e_ort. We also analyze the principal's delegation problem and show that she may or may not benefit from entrusting the relationship to a manager.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
wp_2001620_2.pdf (927.74 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-01370408 , version 1 (22-09-2016)
halshs-01370408 , version 2 (15-07-2019)
halshs-01370408 , version 3 (23-04-2021)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-01370408 , version 2

Citer

Marta Troya-Martinez, Liam Wren-Lewis. Managing relational contracts. 2019. ⟨halshs-01370408v2⟩
409 Consultations
478 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More