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The Choice of voting structure for privatizing a Company

Abstract : We study the role of security-voting structure when a government wants to privatize a company. Our results show that the one share–one vote structure is optimal for allocating control rights to the most efficient pretender. However, this structure is not always optimal for maximizing the sale’s revenue.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01309050
Contributor : Christian At Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, April 28, 2016 - 6:22:33 PM
Last modification on : Monday, October 11, 2021 - 10:04:46 AM

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01309050, version 1

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Christian At, Pierre-Henri Morand. The Choice of voting structure for privatizing a Company. Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2000, 68 (3), pp.287-292. ⟨halshs-01309050⟩

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