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The sales of small firms : a multidimensional analysis

Abstract : This paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. At the opposite, if he wants to sell his firm to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.
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Contributor : Christian At Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, April 28, 2016 - 6:15:09 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 13, 2022 - 11:58:21 AM


  • HAL Id : halshs-01309043, version 1



Christian At, Pierre-Henri Morand. The sales of small firms : a multidimensional analysis. Economic Theory, Springer Verlag, 2003, 22 (4), pp.927-933. ⟨halshs-01309043⟩



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