Referenda Under Oath

Nicolas Jacquemet (1, 2) , Alexander James (3) , Stéphane Luchini (4) , Jason Shogren (5)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 PSE - Paris School of Economics
3 University of Oxford
4 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
5 Departement of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming

Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a popular elicitation mechanism promoted in non-market valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we observe that people who sign an oath are significantly less likely to vote for the public good in a hypothetical referenda. We complement this evidence with a self-reported measure of honesty which confirms that the oath increases truthfulness in answers. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab and beyond.

Mots clés: Dichotomous Choice Mechanism; Preference revelation; Oath; Hypothetical bias

Domaines: Economies et finances

Nicolas Jacquemet, Alexander James, Stéphane Luchini, Jason Shogren. Referenda Under Oath. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2017, 67 (3), pp.479-504. ⟨10.1007/s10640-016-0023-5⟩. ⟨halshs-01301784⟩