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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Post Keynesian Economics Année : 2010

Are conventions solutions to uncertainty? contrasting visions of social coordination

Résumé

In recent years, there has been an increase in research on conventions motivated by the game-theoretic contributions of the philosopher David Lewis. Prior to this surge in interest, discussions of convention in economics had been tied to the analysis of John Maynard Keynes's writings. These literatures are distinct and have very little overlap. Yet this confluence of interests raises interesting methodological questions. Does the use of a common term, convention, denote a set of shared concerns? Can we identify what differentiates the game theoretic models from the Keynesian ones? This paper maps out the three most developed accounts of convention within economics and discusses their relations with each other in an attempt to provide an answer.
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halshs-01278287 , version 1 (24-02-2016)

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John Latsis, Guillemette de Larquier, Franck Bessis. Are conventions solutions to uncertainty? contrasting visions of social coordination. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 2010, 32 (4), ⟨10.2753/PKE0160-3477320402⟩. ⟨halshs-01278287⟩
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