What is wrong about Pereleman-Toulmin's opposition between Legal Reasoning and Logic?

Abstract : Around the 1960's, C. Perelman / L. Olbrechts–Tyteca and S. Toulmin endorsed the separation between argumentation and logic. In fact, both assumed a gap between everyday reasoning, closer to legal reasoning, and scientific reasoning based on mathematics. The main claim was that both paradigms are incommensurable, since the legal paradigm makes use of the notion of formality, that has a procedural nature with roots on a conversational and dialectical practice, and logic is based on the notion of form, that involves static (and syntactic) features. I will contest the incommensurability of both paradigms, as J. van Benthem (2009) did already, and plea that what we need is more rather than less logic. There are no juridical solutions to logical problems, if the problem is related to reasoning, then the solution relates to inferences drawn on the basis of juridical knowledge.
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Shahid Rahman. What is wrong about Pereleman-Toulmin's opposition between Legal Reasoning and Logic?. Al-Mukhatabat. Trilingual Journal for Logic, Epistemology and Analytic Philosophy, éditions Arabesques, 2014. ⟨halshs-01226186⟩

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