GREECE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR THE VIEW FROM THE WESTERN ARCHIVES: DOCUMENTS
Dionysios Chourchoulis, Christos Christidis, Vaios Kalogrias, Periklis-Stelios Karavis, Manolis Koumas, Sofia Papastamkou

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GREECE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR

THE VIEW FROM THE WESTERN ARCHIVES: DOCUMENTS

Edited by:
Dionysios Chourchoulis, Christos Christidis, Vaios Kalogrias, Periklis-Stelios Karavis, Manolis Koumas & Sofia Papastamkou

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Δηλώνω υπεύθυνα και εν γνώσει των συνεπειών του νόμου ότι το παραδοτέο «Έκδοση τόμου ταξινομημένων και πρωτότυπων εγγράφων» αποτελεί πρωτότυπο έργο και δεν έχουν χρησιμοποιηθεί άλλες πηγές πέρα από αυτές στις οποίες γίνεται αναφορά. Όπου υπάρχει αναπαραγωγή δεδομένων, πινάκων και παραθεμάτων, αυτό δηλώνεται ρητά.

Ο επιστημονικά υπεύθυνος,
Καθηγητής Νικόλαος Μαραντζίδης
GREECE DURING
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Παραδοτέο έργο στα πλαίσια του ερευνητικού προγράμματος ΘΑΛΗΣ - Η Ελλάδα από τον Β’ Παγκόσμιο στον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο: Διεθνείς Σχέσεις και εσωτερικές εξελίξεις (MIS: 380436).

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<td>Archivio Storico e Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri</td>
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<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
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<td>MAE</td>
<td>Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères</td>
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<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives and Record Administration</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>NATO Archives</td>
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<td>Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (Berlin)</td>
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Prologue

Greece’s relation with the West during the Cold War era has constantly attracted the attention of Greek and international scholarship. In this relationship, continuities and breaks become evident. The postwar era was marked by the continuation of the agonizing Greek effort to integrate in the West. Thus, there was an effort to bring relations with the major Western European states (Britain, France, West Germany, Italy) back to a kind of normalcy. This, as could be expected, was a particularly demanding endeavour, especially regarding the former Axis powers, against which Greece had fought during the Second World War. The Cold War provided a context or a medium which facilitated the rebuilding of bilateral contacts.

There also were breaks, or at least novelties, pointing to the ascent of a new era of international relations. The US-Greek special relationship, forged during the difficult years of the Greek civil war but also burdened by the memories of US penetration in Greek policy-making in 1947-52, was a salient novel element. Greece’s participation in NATO was an unprecedented event: this was the first time that the country allied formally with the major powers of the West. Last but not least, Athens’s ambition to participate in supranational European integration resulted in the 1961 Association Agreement with the European Economic Community, and opened new roads for Greece’s internal development and international relations.

This volume presents archival material from the West German, French, Italian, British and US national archives, as well as from the NATO Archives, addressing important aspects of this historical phenomenon. This multi-archival research was undertaken by a large number of scholars, in the context of the Thalis project on Greece and the Cold War, coordinated by the University of Macedonia: Konstantina E. Botsiou, Dionysios Chourchoulis, Christos Christidis, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Vaios Kalogrias, Periklis-Stelios Karavis, Manolis Koumas, Sofia Papastamkou, and Ioannis Sakkas. All researchers also suggested documents for possible publication, thus creating a large pool of archival material. The editors then made the final selection and prepared this volume.

This volume cannot, of course, tell the whole story of Greece’s relationship with the West in the postwar era. It aims to highlight important landmarks or perspectives, as seen by the other Western capitals. It is hoped, however, that it will contribute to a widening of the debate on one of the most important aspects of contemporary Greek history.

The editors
Introduction

Greece’s relationship with the West during the Cold War is one of the most hotly-debated issues of contemporary Greek history. Although much remains to be done, there is an extensive and growing bibliography on this subject, from the Greek civil war until the country’s accession to the EEC in the late 1970s. Recently, attempts are also being made to expand the discussion in the Greek 1980s. Needless to say, this bibliography has evolved through time. Initially, the focus was on the role of the Great Powers (the title of the book by Stephen G. Xydis in 1963), and the conceptual approach was compatible with the “orthodox” school of thought, prevalent at that time in the West. Later on, new approaches rose. The Greek “revisionism” in the late 1960s and early 1970s focused on the alleged role of the United States in the imposition of the Colonels’ dictatorship, and thus again reproduced the omnipresent, in Greek debates, concept of a small country, suffering the interventions of the infamous “foreign factor” (or, more amusingly in the Greek language, “foreign finger” – ξένος δάκτυλος). The Junta caused a huge setback for Greek historical perceptions and culture. The hopeful efforts of other scholars – seeking to interpret developments as processes rather than as instances of imposition, and bring into the equation the role of the Greeks or the regional, mostly Balkan, actors themselves – were largely sidelined. It was only later, with the advent of new generations of historians during the 1990s and later, that this more functional approach was revived and to some extent expanded. We are now in a new era, in which the role of the Great Powers is being acknowledged, but the importance of Greek or regional actors is also underlined; developments are being interpreted as dynamic interactions rather than as static incidents; and the international perspective – the wider picture – allows scholars to advance more balanced assessments regarding Greece’s Cold War experience.

The Greek attitudes towards diplomatic (or, even more ominously, “secret”) documents could not but reflect these dispositions. In the past, lacking access to Greek archival sources, but also firmly believing in the omnipotence of the “foreign factor”, many Greek analysts tended to view foreign diplomatic documents as opportunities for the “revelation” of sinful contacts and of the sinister role of the

Great Powers. The security classification “secret” or “top secret” on a foreign document could create nervous breakdowns in a Greek public debate which did not always fully comprehend the nature of these sources. Admittedly, there was also a tendency to try to look at the “dirty laundry” of the West in order to point to its sinister deeds against the unsuspecting Greeks. Publications proudly declared in their titles that “the secret documents of the Foreign Office reveal” various secrets (real or, more often, imagined), and each December, at the time of the declassification of new British documents, the Greek media used to send journalists to the (then) Public Record Office in London, seeking to find sensational details about what the “foreigners” were saying about “us” thirty years earlier or about what Greek politicians were saying to the aforementioned foreigners. I was doing research for my Ph.D. in December 1989, when the 1959 British documents (thus including the ones on the Cyprus agreements) were about to be released; the mass arrival of eager Greek journalists, including a Greek television crew, rather surprised the staff of the PRO, who, for a few strange days, found themselves in the unenviable position of innocent bystanders at their own work stations. Needless to say, these thirty year-old records were being read according to the perceived needs of the Greek political debates of the time of their declassification, and not in their own historical context: witness, for example, the significantly stronger interest for documents referring to the role of politicians who were alive and active at the time of declassification, but not of politicians who had a larger role thirty years ago, but who had since either died or withdrawn from public life. The search for “sell outs”, which could be “proved” through foreign “secret” documents, was dominant, and in these situations the greatest danger is that one will find what one seeks, whether or not it is there. The researcher was seen as something between a Sherlock Holmes and an Attorney General, ready to announce who “did it” and pass a sentence on the guilty. These attitudes reflected a rather static perception of international affairs, by a small nation who had indeed suffered foreign intervention in the past, and tended to view itself as the victim of successive impositions by the Great Powers. It was a tangible manifestation of what James Miller (the editor of the valuable Foreign Relations of the United States volumes on Greece) described as the “underdog mentality” of modern Greeks regarding their perception of their own history and the role of the Great Powers.4

Since then, much water has flown under the bridges of the Thames or the Potomac. The economic and social development of Greece – described by one of the leading historians of all times in a magnificent book which, tellingly, was not translated into Greek5 – formed a basic background which allowed for a gradual, if incomplete, maturing of attitudes. Moreover, in international scholarly debates on the Cold War, post-revisionism (followed by the new historiography on the Cold War) settled the disputes over methodology: research in primary sources is indispensable

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and indeed multi-archival research is now considered as absolutely necessary; moreover it is important for the scholar to be able to view his/her sources critically, to question and cross-check them, and to advance convincing interpretations of a Cold War world which was becoming increasingly complicated and interdependent.

The increasing availability of Greek archival sources also aided an evolution of mental attitudes. The publication of the 12-volume series of the Karamanlis Archive in 1997 made available a large quantity of material, and proved a turning point. Researchers could also consult the Karamanlis archive itself, which naturally includes much more material than the 1997 publication. After 2000, other personal archives became available, including the papers of Nikolaos Plastiras, Sophocles Venizelos, Evangelos Averoff, Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, Constantinos Tsatsos and others. In the second half of that decade, the Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry became accessible (it is now open up until 1967), while the archive of the Greek Palace can be consulted at the General Archives of the State. As usually happens, the availability of Greek documents allowed for a more healthy relationship with the foreign archives, which were no longer our only, desperately sought sources. It is no coincidence that the boom of Greek bibliography on the Cold War took place exactly then, after the late 1990s. The effects of the recent financial crisis have caused, admittedly, a setback in this process of maturing towards reassessing the Greek past, but – at least in academic debates – have not reversed it.

Contemporary scholars are thus able to have a more balanced attitude towards the archival sources, especially the Western ones. The present volume, edited by a group of members of this younger generation of scholars, is an indication of this evolution of our attitudes. The documents presented here do not focus on specific “major” events either of the Cold War or of the Cyprus question (although the latter is also prominent in the wider analysis). Most are comprehensive reports about postwar Greece, and tend to reflect the attitudes (often conflicting) of the Western powers towards their Southeast European ally. The documents deal both with Greek foreign policy options and with internal and social developments and attitudes, which formed the background of the foreign policy options. They point to the role of Greece’s allies as perceptive observers of the Greek scene, rather than as imaginary back-seat drivers. The volume, therefore, is a tangible indication of the tendency to go beyond the previous, rather flat perception of the sources, and to trace the interactive character of the early postwar world.

Multi-archival research always poses important conceptual challenges. It mostly points to the different perspectives adopted even by like-minded officials of different states or organizations. Marc Trachtenberg has provided a telling example, examining the Soviet, American, British and French records of the Potsdam discussions, and showing that, while these records describe the same deliberations, their accounts are at least partially different.6 This is, to some extent, the case of the material

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presented in this volume as well. The documents from the various national archives reflect the national perspectives and interests of their authors, who were officials in their national administrations. The reader can trace the divergences, which can sometimes appear quite sharp. Thus, British documents of 1956-7 reflect the growing hostility between Athens and London at the time of the Cyprus dispute, as well as the personal hostility of the Ambassador, Sir Charles Peake, and the Counsellor, Anthony Lambert, towards the Karamanlis government. It is notable that Peake and Lambert also appear quite critical towards the Americans, whom they accuse of failing to provide “leadership” to the Greeks.

The two reports by the American Counsellor, James Penfield, in November 1957 and April 1958 discuss the same subject – Greek foreign policy – and the same problems from a different angle. Penfield produced an admirable analysis of the trends of Greek public perceptions and foreign policy, but was mostly concerned with the rise of neutralism in the country and sought ways to arrest it, rather than to block the Greek claim for Cypriot self-determination. He tended to see the development of a more independent Greek policy as a healthy phenomenon, but his remarks of November 1957 were leaked and misinterpreted by Greek opposition politicians and contributed to the collapse of the Karamanlis government in February 1958. Penfield’s second report of April 1958 was much more carefully worded, although it reached roughly similar conclusions regarding the dynamics of Greek foreign policy. Another American document, reporting the analysis of the Greek Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff, regarding the bases of Greek foreign policy, presents the Greek perspective in this debate.

The West German perspective was that of a country which had a similar geopolitical position as Greece – both were frontline states of the West – and was deeply concerned over the prospect of a Greek drift from NATO. West Germany, which was not a UN member at that time, and thus had not voted against the Greek appeals over Cyprus, played a crucial role in stabilizing Greece in the West during the difficult era of the Cyprus question, especially in the agonizing hours of autumn 1958, when Karamanlis’ visit to Bonn proved decisive in this endeavour. Although gravely weakened by the Second World War, France was a European leader and a laboratory of European ideological developments. The French documents describe bilateral relations and the special importance of French cultural (soft) power; the deep social cleavages of civil war Greece; the dilemmas of decolonization which led the two countries to adopt conflicting positions in the pivotal problems of Cyprus and Algeria. At the same time, the French reports provide interesting insights regarding Greece’s attitude towards the movement of European integration which emerged, under French leadership, during that same period. They also point to the impact in Greece of Charles de Gaulle, one of the leading European statesmen of the Cold War period. Last but not least, the Italian documents reflect the attitudes of a major Western state

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which had a special geopolitical position vis-à-vis Greece. Italy is Greece’s Western neighbour, while the two countries had found themselves in opposing camps during the Second World War. The Italian documents present Rome’s vivid interest in the internal situation of Greece during the civil war in the late 1940s, as well as in the course of military operations. They also point to the Italian interest in regional developments in the aftermath of the civil war – including the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and the entry of the two countries in NATO – and in the normalization of Greek-Italian relations after 1952.

All these countries were leaders of the West, and had converging interests especially towards the Soviet bloc; but their perspectives differed, partially but in a crucial manner. It is also interesting to see the change in British attitudes, which becomes more pronounced if one compares Peake’s valedictory dispatch and Sir Roger Allen’s “first impressions of Greece” (both documents of 1957), with the latter’s valedictory dispatch of 1961. By the early 1960s, the solution of the Cyprus question, the normalization of Greece’s position within NATO, and the country’s association with the EEC had given rise to a different picture of stability, although the uncertainties of the internal Greek political situation were hotly debated in the Embassies of the allies.

This volume also presents, for the first time, NATO archival material on Greece. This is a qualitatively different source, since NATO documents were agreed between the member-states. Thus, they do not represent the point of view of another national actor, but the common denominator of the alliance members regarding the situation of the Greek armed forces and finance. These documents also can become the pivot to understand the workings of the Western alliance in connection with Greece, one of its smaller and more exposed members, as well as the role of Greece within NATO. The annual reviews of the Greek armed forces provide a very interesting, almost complete, picture both of the state of the Greek defence effort, but also of the difficulties of the country in keeping up with the demands of alliance military planning during an era when rapid technological developments were calling for a constant readjustment. NATO analysis of the relationship between Greek defence potential and the state of the Greek economy point to the complicated realities – economic, financial, societal, technological – during the “long haul” of the Cold War. It is also a subject for debate whether the Greek public service had the know-how to engage in such an elaborate analysis. Arguably, on this level (as well as on others) NATO played the role of a catalyst in the transfer of governmental know-how to its smaller members, including Greece. At the same time, the Greek perspective is evident in Athens’ submissions to the alliance on various subjects, including the burning issue of aid to the Greek defence effort and the Greek economy. The NATO perspective is now slowly being integrated in Greek historiography, and there are many subjects which wait for a detailed study and assessment.

It goes without saying that the present volume is not a “history” or even an account of Greece’s relations with the West during the early Cold War. It aims to contribute to the scholarly debate by pointing to the complexity and the dynamic
nature of relations between Greece and its Western partners. The volume shows the multiple perspectives of archival sources, and invites a widening of the debate on the perennial question of Greece's relation with the West. This is a well-researched subject, but the historian’s work is far from being complete. We have gone beyond the initial, somehow simplistic, approaches of previous eras, but there is a lot more to be done.

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou
Bundesrepublik Deutschland
PA AA, B 10, 250

Eindrücke von einem mehrwöchigen Besuch in Griechenland

Berlin, den 21 April 1950

Der Abend

Eine Zeitung für Berlin
Redaktion

Hans Schumacher
Ressort-Leiter für Außenpolitik
Berlin, den 21 April 1950

Aufzeichnung
für den Herrn Bundeskanzler
Dr. Konrad Adenauer

Betrifft: Eindrücke von einem mehrwöchigen Besuch in Griechenland


In der durch die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Kommunismus bestimmten gegenwärtigen Weltlage stelle die Deutsche Bundesrepublik einen bedeutenden Faktor dar. Auf Grund seiner eigenen schmerzlicher Erfahrungen seit Dezember 1944 wisse Griechenland Deutschlands Rolle und Aufgabe verständnisvoll zu würdigen. Berlins Abwehrkampf während der Zeit der Sowjetblockade habe die alten Sympathien breiter griechischer Kreise für das deutsche Volk neu belebt.

Tsaldaris deutete mehrfach an, daß er nicht nur den politischen und wirtschaftlichen, sondern auch einen militärischen Beitrag der Bundesrepublik zur europäischen Verteidigung als unerläßlich betrachte. Zunächst hoffe er, daß die Bundesrepublik bald im Europa-Rat an der europäischen Einigung mitwirken werde. Dafür habe er sich in Straßburg mit Nachdruck eingesetzt.

Ich halte es für sicher, erwiderte Tsaldaris, daß die Bundesregierung in naher Zukunft fortschreitend volle Hoheitsrechte erlange.


Wiederholt gab Tsaldaris in sehr herzlicher Weise seiner Freude darüber Ausdruck, zum ersten Mal seit Kriegsende wieder einen deutschen Journalisten in Athen begrüßen zu können.


Unmittelbar nach den Wahlen empfing mich der inzwischen an die Regierung gelangte neue Ministerpräsident und Außenminister Plastiras.

Griechenland brauche enge Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Deutschland und messe diesen erstrangige Bedeutung bei, versicherte mir der General. Er hoffe, daß der Handel zwischen den beiden Ländern schon in nächster Zeit stärker als bisher wiederaufleben und zum gegenseitigen Besten eine wesentliche Ausweitung erfahren werde.


Der Wunsch, nach Beendigung des griechischen Bürgerkriegs Jugoslawien auf dem Weg über die Wiederannäherung zwischen Athen und Belgrad allmählich stärker an den Westen zu binden, hat zweifellos den amerikanischen Druck zu Gunsten eines Koalitionskabinettens unter Plastiras mitbestimmt. Ob dieser die Erwartungen der USA erfüllen kann, bleibt abzuwarten. Einmal verfügt die Dreierkoalition zwischen der Plastiras-Partei, den Liberalen (Venizelos) und Papandreou (Sozialdemokraten) auch nur über eine Parlamentsmehrheit von elf Sitzen. Dann sind auch die beiden letztgenannten Parteien nicht frei von Mißtrauen gegenüber dem neuen Premier. Gehen sie auch nicht so weit wie die Rechtskreise, die mit Besorgnis vermerkten, daß der sowjetische Rundfunk die griechischen Wähler in den ländlichen Wahlbezirken zur Stimmabgabe für den General aufforderte, halten sie diesen doch nicht für eine im eigentlichen Sinne politische Persönlichkeit mit wirklich klar umrissener Konzeption.
Sie fürchten den Einfluss anonymer Ratgeber in der Umgebung des Generals und sind nicht sicher, ob nicht der linke Flügel seiner Partei Entscheidungen durchsetzt, die sich ungünstig auf die Entwicklung der inneren Lage des Landes auswirken könnten.

Sehr starke Bedenken äußern die Rechtskreise gegen die Amnestierung der Kommunisten. Nach ihrer Ansicht würde eine derartige Maßnahme Griechenlands innere Sicherheit von neuem gefährden. Sie bezweifeln zwar nicht die Ehrenhaftigkeit und die guten Absichten des neuen Premiers und seinen ehrlichen Wunsch, den inneren Ausgleich zu fördern, befürchten jedoch, daß ihm das Heft aus der Hand gleiten könnte.


Unter dem Druck der öffentlichen Meinung dürfte auch Plastiras die Annäherung an Jugoslawien nur dann durchführen können, wenn Belgrad eindeutig auf seine Aspirationen auf Griechisch-Mazedonien verzichtet und die 12 000 nach Jugoslawien verschleppten griechischen Kinder entläßt.


„Wir wissen, daß Deutschland geschichtlich einen wichtigen Faktor Europas darstellt“, erklärte mir Pipinellis im offiziellen Teil unserer Unterredung für die von mir vertretene Zeitung. „Dieser Faktor muß auf der Grundlage der Demokratie zum gemeinsamen Wohle Europas wieder aktiviert werden“. Pipinellis gab der Zuversicht Ausdruck, daß die gemeinsame antikommunistische Abwehrbereitschaft Deutschlands und Griechenlands zur Vertiefung der wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Beziehungen zwischen beiden Ländern führen werde.

Weit wichtiger war jedoch das, was mir der Minister vertraulich sagte, „für Ihre Regierung gewissermaßen“. Auf meine Frage, ob er mich ermächtige, seine Ausführungen dem Herrn Bundeskanzler zu übermitteln, falls ich Gelegenheit dazu haben sollte, antwortete er mit sehr betonter Zustimmung. Nach seinen Worten darf ich annehmen, daß die Weitergabe seiner Erklärungen ausdrücklich von ihm beabsichtigt war.

Gewiss gab es in Griechenland noch schmerzliche Erinnerungen an die Kriegsjahre. Vor allem habe kein Griech verstanden, warum Deutschland Bulgariens Ansprüche auf Thrazien unterstützt habe. Mehr als alles andere habe diese Frage in der griechischen Öffentlichkeit Erbitterung ausgelöst.


Wiederholt fragte man mich, wann wieder diplomatische oder zumindest konsularische Vertreter Deutschlands, das heißt der Bundesrepublik, in Griechenland erscheinen, und wann die alten deutschen Kulturinstitute wieder errichtet würden. Man bedauerte, daß es in Griechenland noch nicht wieder deutsche Bücher, Zeitungen und Filme gebe.

ablehnt, setzt es sich vor allem Menschen guten Willens im Unrecht!“ betonte
dagegen Herr Roccanas, Sekretär im Griechischen Außenministerium.
Ein Versuch, Griechenlands gegenwärtige Situation auch nur annähernd zu umreißen,
mußte den Rahmen einer gedrängten Aufzeichnung sprengen. Ich beschränke mich
auf einige kurze Anmerkungen.

Armee, Luftwaffe und Marine machen einen sehr guten Eindruck. Sie
verkörpern nicht nur symbolisch das stärkste Element der Stabilität. Auch nach
Auffassung ausländischer Beobachter ist die griechische Wehrmacht heute in der
Lage, jedes etwaige Wiederaufleben der kommunistischen Unruhertätigkeit schnell zu
ersticken.

Nach allgemeiner Ansicht könnte nur ein Einfall von außen eine erneute
Kampftätigkeit auslösen. Wie die Dinge liegen, stünde eine derartige Aktion allenfalls
von Bulgarien aus zu erwarten. Denn nur dort befinden sich noch größere Reste der
Partisanenverbände. Der griechische Generalstab ist jedoch davon überzeugt, jeden
derartigen Versuch rasch vereiteln zu können. Daß er überhaupt unternommen wird,
gilt nicht als wahrscheinlich. Dagegen hält man es weiterhin nicht für ausgeschlossen,
daß von den Kominformstaaten aus bewaffnete Aktionen gegen Jugoslawien
unternommen werden.

Die Neigung zu militärischer Zusammenarbeit mit Belgrad ist in Athen
gering. Allerdings schloß Marschall Papagos in einem Interview diese Möglichkeit
nicht rundweg aus. Größeres Interesse besteht an einem militärischen Bündnis mit der
Türkei, dem sich möglicherweise Italien anschließen könnte.

Ausländische Beobachter bezeichnen die griechische Wehrmacht auch nach
ihrer Bewaffnung als den bedeutendsten militärischen Faktor auf der Balkanhalbinsel.
An den großen Linien der griechischen Politik dürfte sich auch unter General Plastiras
nichts ändern. Dies nicht nur, weil die anderen Parteien Plastiras gewissermaßen
beaufsichtigen, sondern auch deshalb, weil Plastiras, selbst, wenn er wollte, nicht auf
die amerikanische Wirtschaftshilfe verzichten kann.

Das griechische Verkehrsnetz ist wiederhergestellt. Handel und Wandel
vollziehen sich regelmäßig. Überall im Lande kann man sicher und ungestört reisen.
Äußerlich sind die Spuren des Bürgerkriegs im wesentlichen nur noch in den
Kampfgebieten selbst bemerkbar. Das Vertrauen zur Drachme wächst wieder, obwohl
die Geschäftswelt bei ihren Kalkulationen und Abschlüssen immer noch in
Goldpfund rechnet. Die Versorgung ist ausreichend. Zum ersten Mal seit 1941
haben die Bauern allenhalten wieder ihre Felder bestellt.

Griechenland kann jedoch seine Wirtschaftsprobleme nicht allein von der
Landwirtschaft her lösen. Nur 25% der Gesamtobrfläche eignen sich zur
landwirtschaftlichen Nutzung. Schon immer mußte es auf Auslandsanleihen und die
„unsichtbaren Einkünfte“ der Zahlungsbilanz zurückgreifen, um das Defizit seiner
Handelsbilanz ausgleichen zu können.

Der Zweite Weltkrieg und der Bürgerkrieg gegen die Kommunisten mit allen
ihren Folgen haben diese Probleme noch verschärft. Griechenland will daher die
USA-Hilfe nicht nur dazu benutzen, die unmittelbaren Schäden zu heilen, die Frage
der 750 000 Flüchtlinge zu lösen und allgemeine soziale Reformen zu verwirklichen. Es will durchgreifende Veränderungen der ganzen Wirtschaftsstruktur in Richtung auf die Nutzung der Wasserkräfte und Bodenschätze (Lignit, Eisenerz, Bauxit, Blei, Zink, Antimon, Chrom, Magnesit, Mangan und Nickel), also auf eine stärkere Industrialisierung, durchführen.


Hans Schumacher
Ressortleiter für Außenpolitik

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PA AA, B 10, 284

Griechenland und der Kommunismus
Athen, den 12 Februar 1954

Abschrift

Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Athen, den 12.2.1954

212 Ber. No. 187/54
3 Durchdrucke

Griechenland und der Kommunismus
I. Erfolgreiche innere Abwehrmaßnahmen
II. Griechische Reaktion auf den Ausbruch des Koreakrieges
III. Normalisierung der Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion und den Satellitenstaaten
IV. Ost-West Handel
V. Schlußfolgerung: Ungebrochener Abwehrwille

An das Auswärtige Amt
Bonn
Die Erfahrungen Griechenlands mit dem Kommunismus im Dezemberaufstand 1944 in Athen und im Krieg gegen die kommunistischen Banden 1946-1949 haben im Bewusstsein des griechischen Volkes tiefe Eindrücke hinterlassen.

1. Innere Abwehrmaßnahmen:
Bis auf eine ganz kleine Minderheit linksstehender Ideologen ist die griechische Nation von der Notwendigkeit der Wachsamkeit gegenüber der sowjet-kommunistischen Gefahr fest überzeugt.
Hervorragend sind die Leistungen der griechischen Polizei in der Aufdeckung und Bekämpfung des unterirdischen Kommunismus. Ihr ist es zu verdanken, dass die Spitzenkommunisten Bellojanis und Ploumbidis verhaftet, ihr Agentennetz zerschlagen und ein Sabotagering in der griechischen Luftwaffe unschädlich gemacht werden konnte.

II. Griechische Reaktion auf den Ausbruch des Koreakrieges

III. Normalisierung der Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion und den Satellitenstaaten
Im Bewusstsein des festen Standorts Griechenlands als Eckpfeiler der freien Welt, der durch UN-Zugehörigkeit, Teilnahme am Nordatlantik- und Ankara-Pakt, sowie durch Abschluss des USA-griechischen Stationierungsabkommens und nicht zuletzt durch Unterhaltung einer Armee von 10 Divisionen gekennzeichnet wird, hat die

1. Die Hoffnung auf Rückkehr von 3.000 im Bandenkrieg gefangen genommenen regulären griechischen Soldaten,
2. die Hoffnung auf Rückkehr wenigstens eines Teiles der Zivilverschleppten, insbesondere der Kinder und
3. die Hoffnung auf Verwirklichung des im Friedensvertrag Griechenland zuerkannten Reparationsanspruches von 45 Millionen Dollar gegen Bulgarien.

Der Gefahr, dass mit der Zulassung von weiteren diplomatischen Vertretungen der Ostblockstaaten in Athen neue Zentralen der kommunistischen Subversionstätigkeit entstehen, ist sich die Griechische Regierung bewusst. Sie glaubt aber, mit Hilfe ihres ausgezeichneten Überwachungsapparates die Tätigkeit dieser Vertretungen unter Kontrolle halten zu können.

Anerkannt werden muss, dass die Griechische Regierung mit Nachdruck betont hat, sie werde etwaigen Anträgen der Sowjetischen Besatzungszonenregierung, zweiseitige Verträge zu schliessen oder die Errichtung einer Handelsvertretung in Athen zu gestatten, mit Rücksicht auf ihr Verhältnis zur Bundesregierung entgegentreten.

IV. Ost-West Handel

dieses Gesetzes durch ein Verbot des Anlaufens der nordkoreanischen und kontinentalchinesischen Häfen durch griechische Schiffe Rechnung getragen.

Was die Handelsbeziehungen mit der Sowjetunion selbst anbelangt, so hat sich der griechischen Handelskreise eine starke Enttäuschung darüber bemächtigt, dass nach Durchführung der griechischen Lieferungen aufgrund des Handelsvertrages vom 28.7.1953 die Sowjetunion mit der Durchführung der Gegenlieferungen im Verzuge ist.

V. Schlussfolgerung

Abschliessend kann das Urteil dahin zusammengefasst werden, dass trotz einer ausserordentlichen Aktivität der Sowjetbotschaft, die hier eher abstösst, in Athen ernstliche Anzeichen für eine gelungene Unterminierung des griechischen Abwehrwillens im Kampf gegen den Sowjetkommunismus nicht ersichtlich sind.

Gez. Cordt

PA AA, B 26, 19
Haltung Griechenlands gegenüber dem Ostblock
Bonn, den 8. Oktober 1957

Referat 304
Ref.1.V.: LR Dr. Mertes
Bonn, den 8. Oktober 1957

Aufzeichnung

Betr.: Haltung Griechenlands gegenüber dem Ostblock


Der Zypern-Konflikt hat zwar zu einer starken Entfremdung von Großbritannien und der Türkei, jedoch niemals zu einer Abwendung vom Freien Westen insgesamt oder gar zu einer irgendwie gearteten Hinwendung zum Ostblock – auch nicht in der Form des Neutralismus – geführt, obwohl sich gerade die Sowjets und ihre Satelliten bis in die jüngste Zeit hinein mehrfach solidarisch mit Griechenlands Zypernanliegen


Der Vorschlag des rumänischen Ministerpräsidenten Stoios auf Einberufung einer Konferenz der 6 Balkanstaaten Rumänien, Albanien, Bulgarien, Jugoslawien, Türkei und Griechenland hat Athen abgelehnt.


Für die griechische Jugoslawienpolitik waren und sind ähnliche Gründe maßgebend wie für die Jugoslawienpolitik z.B. der Bundesrepublik: Kräftigung des (für Griechenland lebenswichtigen) nicht-sowjetischen Balkanraumes; Förderung jedes Nationalkommunismus als desintegrierendes Element des Sowjetblocks; Isolierung Albaniens, des nördlichen Nachbarn Griechenlands.

Wirtschaft

Die klare griechische Außenpolitik wird belastet durch die Wirtschaftsprobleme des Landes, das 35 bis 40 % seines Staatshaushaltes der Verteidigung opfert. Das größte soziale Problem ist die Arbeitslosigkeit und Unterbeschäftigung der Landbevölkerung.

Zahlungsbedingungen die westliche Konkurrenz vom griechischen Markt zu verdrängen. Der Verlauf der Messe von Saloniki im September 1957, auf dem die Bundesrepublik zum großen Bedauern der Griechen nur mit einem Informationsstand vertreten war, hat gezeigt, daß die Staaten des Ostblocks auf dem griechischen Markt unaufhaltsam vordringen.


Die Bundesregierung muß aus politischen Erwägungen an einer gesunden Wirtschaft Griechenlands ein besonderes Interesse haben; dabei kann die politische und militärische Bedeutung dieses und des türkischen Verbündeten mit der der übrigen Entwicklungsländer nicht verglichen werden.


Hiermit
Über Herrn Dg 30
_Herr D 3_
weistungsgemäß vorgelegt.
PA AA, B 26, 65
Athen, den 7. November 1958

Der Botschafter der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Athen, den 7. November 1958

Lieber Herr Müller-Roschach,


1. Gefühl über die Isolierung – Enttäuschung über die NATO


2. Vorhandensein eines Vakuum und dadurch grosse Möglichkeiten für Deutschland


Wir sollten uns hierbei bewusst sein, dass wir diese Aufgabe nicht nur im Interesse einer weiteren Vertiefung der deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen sehen und erfüllen müssen; alles, was Deutschland in dieser Richtung unternimmt, geschieht in einem höheren, weit über die deutsch-griechischen Beziehungen hinausgehenden Interesse für die gesamte NATO-Gemeinschaft und den Westen schlechthin. In diesem Zusammenhang wurde von griechischer Seite etwa geäußert: Ihr Deutschen seid im Augenblick die einzigen, die uns wieder das Gefühl geben können, dass wir in der westlichen Gemeinschaft voll verstanden und unterstützt werden.


3. Zwangslage der Griechischen Regierung

In den Unterhaltungen der letzten Tage wurde mir weiter immer wieder gesagt, die Freunde Griechenlands müssten zu verstehen versuchen, in welcher ausgesprochenen Zwangslage sich die Griechische Regierung zur Zeit befinde. Einerseits sehe sich Griechenland einem starken Druck von aussen und in den westlichen Ländern einem zunehmenden Mangel an Verständnis für die Situation der Griechischen Regierung gegenüber. Andererseits habe die Tatsache, dass die immer neuen griechischen Konzessionen zu keinem entsprechenden Einlenken der anderen Seite geführt hätten, einen von Tag zu Tag zunehmenden innerpolitischen Druck auf die Regierung erzeugt, der der Vorwurf gemacht werde, das nationale Anliegen der Cypernsache nicht entschieden genug zu vertreten.

In diesem Zusammenhang wiederholten meine Gesprächspartner immer wieder: Allem Anschein nach sei man sich fast in allen westlichen Hauptstädten der besonderen […]die sich hierbei aus den spezifischen Eigenschaften des leicht erregbaren griechischen Volkscharakters und der griechischen Mentalität ergäben, nicht hinreichend bewusst. Wenn das griechische Volk das Gefühl habe, dass ihm Unrecht geschehe und es keinen anderen Ausweg sehe, komme es leicht dahin, dass

4. Die Einstellung des Mannes auf der Straße

Mit den besten Grüßen
Ihr

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In ihrem Feldzug hat die kommunistische Propaganda sich der Masseverbreitung periodischer Druckschriften der Athener Sowjetbotschaft und anderer Ostblockvertretungen bedient. In diesem Monat sollte eine Filmfestwoche der sowjetzonalen DEFA der kommunistischen Kulturpropaganda dienen. Der Sowjetbotschafter legt besonderes Gewicht darauf, bei seinen Reisen durchs Land mit der Bevölkerung persönlich Fühlung zu nehmen und sich durch kleine Geschenke an die Kinder beliebt zu machen.

Wirtschaftlich haben die Sowjetunion und ihre Sattelitenstaaten bei den Absatzschwierigkeiten Griechenlands für seine agrarischen Produkte und insbesondere für Tabak ideale Ansatzpunkte, um durch günstige bilaterale Angebote die Bedeutung des östlichen Marktes darzutun. Der Sowjetbotschafter scheute sich nicht, am 11.d.M. vor griechischen Pressevertretern die Wirtschaftspolitik der Griechischen Regierung öffentlich anzugreifen und seine Verwunderung darüber zum Ausdruck zu bringen, dass „Griechenland seine Handelsbeziehungen zu den Ländern..."
des Ostblocks nicht weiter fördern“. „Wir bieten“, fuhr er fort, „Erzeugnisse im Austausch mit den Ihren an, ohne dass Sie Devisen aufwenden müssten. Es gibt sowjetische Produkte, wie landwirtschaftliche Geräte, Erdölzeugnisse und Rohmaterialien aber auch noch viele andere, zu weit niedrigeren Preisen als jene der anderen Länder. Es genügt, die Tatsache zu verzeichnen, dass die anderen Länder ihre Preise sofort auf die Hälfte reduzierten, als unser Land dem Ausland Erdölprodukte anbot“. Was die Ausfuhr griechischer Citrusfrüchte nach der Sowjetunion anlangte, werde sie sich bereits in nächster Zukunft weiter steigern. Dann forderte der sowjetische Botschafter, dass der Fremdenverkehr zwischen den beiden Ländern dadurch gefördert werde, dass griechische Touristen künftig ungehindert nach der Sowjetunion reisen könnten, „die ihre Tore weit offen halte“. „Im Mai werden übrigens 600 Sowjettouristen ihr Land besuchen“. 


Mit Karamanlis an der Spitze reagierte die Griechische Regierung gegen diese sowjetischen Machenschaften konsequent und energisch. In Erkenntnis der Anfälligkeit einer wirtschaftlich schwachen Bevölkerung für die Ideen des


Trotz aller Bemühungen Sowjetrußlands um ein erneutes stärkeres Eindringen in Griechenland, haben die Gemeindewahlen vom 5. April mit ihrer Zurückdrängung der kommunistischen EDA gezeigt, dass die konsequente und gegenüber dem Kommunismus harte Politik von Karamanlis von der überwiegenden Mehrheit des griechischen Volkes gebilligt wird. Soll aber dieser Erfolg stabilisiert werden, so ist es unerlässlich, dass die griechische Regierung Hilfe von auswärts bekommt. Die Regierung Karamanlis ist nicht zuletzt Deutschland deshalb so dankbar, weil sie sich von uns in dem gemeinsamen Abwehrkampf gegen Sowjetrußland verstanden glaubt und die wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Zusagen vom November v.J. als einen echten, aber auch notwendigen Beitrag empfindet, um die latent gefährdete Lage Griechenlands zu halten.
Die Bedeutung Griechenlands für die Verteidigung des Westens
Bonn, den 3. März 1960

Referat 301

(LR Dr. Dietrich)

Bonn, den 3. März 1960

An die Abteilung 2/Referat 206

Betr.: Direktorenbesprechung über Griechenland am 9. März 1960
hier: Die Bedeutung Griechenlands für die Verteidigung des Westens
Bezug: Dortige Zuschrift vom 19.2.1960 – 206-83.00/1422/60-

1. Dank seiner geographischen Lage nimmt Griechenland eine wichtige Riegelstellung im Verteidigungssystem des Westens gegenüber dem Ostblock ein.
   Die entschlossene und mutige anti-kommunistische Einstellung der griechischen Regierung hatte das Land trotz der Armut seiner Bevölkerung zu einem zuverlässigen Partner in dem Verteidigungsbündnis der NATO gemacht.

gebundenen Truppen dazu verwenden, den Druck z.B. gegenüber der Türkei zu verstärken.


PA AA, B 26, 68
Griechenlands Beziehungen zu seinen Nachbarländern
Athen, den 14. März 1960

Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Athen, den 14. März 1960
Streng vertraulich

An das Auswärtige Amt
Bonn

206-83/94.08-Bericht Nr. 354/60
Betr.: Griechenlands Beziehungen zu seinen Nachbarländern

Anlässlich des Besuchs von Bundesverteidigungsminister Strauss gab der griechische Äußerenminister Averoff am 11. März im Aussenministerium in kleinstem Kreise eine Übersicht über die Beziehungen Griechenlands zu seinen Nachbarländern, die er mit folgenden allgemeinen Betrachtungen einleitete:

Entscheidung aufgeschoben habe. Der Sowjetdruck auf Griechenland sei aber nicht nur geblieben, sondern hätte sich sogar noch verstärkt.

Hinsichtlich der einzelnen Länder nahm Aussenminister Averoff wie folgt Stellung:

1. Türkei


2. Jugoslawien

Hinsichtlich der jugoslawischen Haltung habe die griechische Regierung klare und sichere Vorstellungen: Jugoslawien verfolge eine völlig unabhängige Politik. Es wolle auf alle Fälle neutral bleiben und nur kämpfen, wenn es gezwungen werde, seine Unabhängigkeit zu verteidigen. Die griechische Auffassung gründe sich nicht auf Annahmen, sondern auf viele Tatsachen, die sich im Laufe der langjährigen Freundschaft ergeben hätten.


Die Anerkennung der Sowjetzone durch Tito erklärte Averoff wie folgt: Tito sei der Feind Nr. 1 von Sowjetrussland, da er bewiesen habe, dass man als unabhängiger Kommunist auch die Gegnerschaft Sowjetrusslands überleben könne. Um sich aber als Kommunist zu beweisen, müsse Tito manchmal solche Zugeständnisse wie die Anerkennung der Sowjetzone machen.

3. Albanien

Mit Albanien bestünden schlechte Beziehungen, keinerlei Grenzverkehr, keine diplomatischen Beziehungen. Albanien habe eine gewisse militärisch-strategische

4. Bulgarien

5. Italien
Die Beziehungen zu Italien seien sehr gut; die Erinnerung an den Krieg sei vergessen.

6. Ägypten
Griechenland habe schon aus dem einen Grund ein besonderes Interesse an guten Beziehungen zu Ägypten, weil dort etwa 100 000 Griechen lebten. Die Zeit der grossen Gewinne sei allerdings vorbei; die Geschäfte blühten nicht mehr wie früher, aber die griechische Kolonie in Ägypten lebe jedenfalls besser, wie irgendeine andere ausländische Kolonie in Ägypten. Die Griechen in Ägypten seien griechische Bürger und verstünden sich durchaus mit den Ägyptern, da sie nicht snobistisch seien.

in Jugoslawien der erste Besuch Nassers in einem westeuropäischen Staate sei. Man habe die Absicht, diesen Besuch gross aufzuziehen.

Gerade weil die Beziehungen der griechischen Regierung zu Nasser so gut seien, könne sie mit Nasser ganz offen sprechen und ihm auch einige Wahrheiten sagen, so wie man bei dem Treffen in Brioni im Juli 58 ganz offen über die Israel-Frage diskutiert habe.


Die Übersicht des griechischen Aussenministers zeigt, über welch wertvolle Beziehungen besonderer Art Griechenland verfügt, die bei der derzeitigen grossen deutsch-griechischen Freundschaft sich auch für uns als wertvoll erweisen können.
France
Au moment où vous arriverez dans votre poste, vous trouvez en Grèce une situation politique des plus confuses.

L'anarchie, la guerre civile et l'intervention étrangère ont bouleversé le pays de votre résidence depuis la libération du territoire hellénique jusqu'à la signature de l'accord dit de Varkiza, le 12 février 1945, et y ont malheureusement laissé des traces sanglantes et profondes. L'opposition violente des partis, la haine qui dresse en particulier la droite monarchique contre la gauche communiste ont rendu impossible toute stabilité gouvernementale. Après M. Papandreou, le général Plastiras et l'amiral Vougaris n'ont pu se maintenir longtemps au pouvoir et Mgr Damaskinos auquel le Roi Georges II a confié la Régence s'est vu contraint récemment, devant l'impossibilité de trouver un nouveau Ministère, d'assurer lui-même la présidence du Gouvernement. Celui-ci bornera vraisemblablement son ambition et son activité à assurer, tant bien que mal, l'administration du pays jusqu'aux prochaines élections dont la date est fixée au 20 janvier 1946.

Ainsi que vous le savez, le Gouvernement français a accepté l'offre qui lui a été faire par les gouvernements britannique et américain de participer à la Commission de Contrôle qui s'efforcera de veiller à ce que les volontés du peuple grec puissent s'exprimer en toute liberté. La responsabilité que nous avons assumée de ce fait et que le Gouvernement soviétique a, quant à lui, refusé de partager apparaît lourde.

L'atmosphère de la consultation populaire qui se déroulera bientôt dans ce pays durement éprouvé par la guerre, en proie à des passions politiques déchaînées et en plein chaos économique risque fort, en effet, d'être dépourvue de sérénité. La tâche de la mission française dont la direction sera sans doute confiée au Colonel Laparra qui, pour la circonstance, serait nommé général à titre provisoire, ne s'en trouvera pas facilitée.

Quels que doivent être les résultats des élections, il importe pourtant au plus haut point, et il vous appartiendra d'y veiller, qu'on ne puisse nous reprocher de nous être immiscés dans la politique intérieure grecque et d'avoir fait preuve de partialité à l'égard d'une faction quelconque. L'unique désir du Gouvernement de la République est que le peuple hellène puisse désigner librement le régime et le gouvernement auquel il entendra confier ses destinées. Le gouvernement français ne veut pas
intervenir, si peu que ce soit, pour orienter ou pour influencer ce choix. C'est dire que le rôle de la mission française devra être strictement limité à l'observation des faits et du contrôle des élections. La plus grande circonspection est de rigueur à cet égard car il n'est pas certain que les missions américaine et britannique seront animées d'un désintéressement égal au nôtre. Si leur attitude doit susciter des critiques, il convient que celles-ci ne puissent pas nous être adressées et la neutralité des représentants français demeure constamment au-dessus de tout soupçon.

La politique étrangère du gouvernement grec rendra également délicat l'exercice de votre mission.

Le peuple hellénique qui a conscience d'avoir apporté à la victoire des nations unies une contribution efficace et héroïque ressent une profonde amertume de l'attitude adoptée à son égard par ses grands alliés. Il se plaint vivement, non sans quelqu'apparence de raison, d'avoir été tenu à l'écart de la négociation du traité de paix avec l'Italie dont il ne peut oublier la perfide et brutale agression. Il constate avec irritation que ses plus légitimes revendications ne sont pas encore satisfaites et il souffre impatiemment l'indulgence que les Anglo-saxons témoignent à l'Italie aussi bien que celle dont les soviets font preuve à l'égard de la Bulgarie.

Les relations avec celle-ci sont empreintes d'une inimitié non déguisée. Les Grecs ne peuvent pardonner aux Bulgares les atrocités et les destructions qu'ils ont commises durant l'occupation. La haine séculaire qui oppose ces voisins ennemis s'aggrave de leurs convoitises réciproques. Si Sofia n'a pas renoncé à l'espoir d'obtenir, au détriment de la Grèce, un accès à la mer Égée, Athènes souhaite, de son côté, une rectification de frontière qui lui donnerait certaines crêtes des Monts Rhodopes indispensables, estime-t-elle, à sa sécurité. Elle réclame aussi de la Bulgarie six cent millions de dollars à titre de réparations.


Les relations gréco-soviétiques sont des plus froides. On craint en effet à Athènes que le Kremlin ne soit décidé à appuyer les projets d'extension territoriale de la Bulgarie et l'accroissement de la Macédoine en direction de Salonique. Dans certains milieux, on nourrit en outre de sérieuses appréhensions sur le succès de la propagande communiste secrètement encouragée par Moscou. Ces préoccupations expliquent que bien qu'une partie de l'opinion publique demeure hostile à l'occupation britannique l'alliance avec l'Angleterre soit soit considérée comme indispensable par la majorité des Grecs, également favorables, pour les mêmes raisons, à l'amitié des États-Unis. Les démocraties anglo-saxonnes ne sont-elles pas du reste seules susceptibles d'aider la Grèce à sortir de la très grave crise économique dont elle souffre et à obtenir que
ses revendications envers l'Italie et la Bulgarie ainsi que ses demandes de réparations à l'Allemagne, à l'Italie et à la Bulgarie reçoivent satisfaction.

Ce rapide tableau de la politique extérieure hellénique donne un aperçu de la complexité et de la difficulté des problèmes avec lesquels le gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité se trouve confronté. Du moins aucun de ces problèmes n'intéresse-t-il directement la France. Vous bénéficierez, de ce fait, d'une situation privilégiée puisque vous ne serez saisi d'aucune réclamation pressante et qu'étranger aux débats, vos avis et vos conseils seront certainement sollicités.

Votre expérience vous permettra certainement de faire d'utiles suggestions aux dirigeants du pays de votre résidence et je ne doute pas que vous ne vous attiriez ainsi leur gratitude. Vous serez naturellement le meilleur juge de ce qu'il conviendra de dire à vos interlocuteurs sans perdre de vue l'intérêt de ne pas vous départir de la neutralité souhaitable lorsque vous serez consulté sur des questions intéressant à la fois nos amis anglais et nos alliés soviétiques. La rivalité et la lutte d'influence auxquelles se livrent en Grèce les uns et les autres vous placera dans une position embarrassante. Il est évident par exemple que si nous pouvons soutenir sans arrière-pensée, ni inconvénient sérieux, les revindications grecques sur le Dodécanèse Italien, il n'en vas pas de même des prétentions helléniques sur les Rhodopes, l'Épire du Nord et sur Chypre.

Par contre, il nous est plus facile d'appuyer, au moins dans le principe, le point de vue grec au sujet des réparations. Dans certains cas sans doute vos bons offices seront requis. Il vous appartiendra d'estimer s'il est plus opportun d'accepter ou de repousser de telles propositions.

L'attitude amicale que vous adopterez à l'égard de la régence devrait incliner celle-ci à réserver à nos demandes légitimes un accueil favorable.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous rappeler l'importance de nos intérêts culturels. Vous vous heurterez sur ce point à la concurrence croissante des Anglo-saxons et à la volonté des autorités locales de réserver une part de plus en plus grande à l'enseignement de la langue grecque. Une adaptation est sans doute nécessaire mais elle ne doit pas nuire à une étroite et efficace collaboration franco-hellénique.

Nos intérêts économiques ont subi, depuis la libération, un préjudice considérable. Je cite pour mémoire la situation faite à la maison française Tekvorian et à la Compagnie franco-hellénique des Chemins de Fer. Le Chef du Gouvernement provisoire de la République a appelé récemment sur l'ensemble de ces affaires l'attention de Mgr. Damaskinos. Celui-ci a promis au Général de Gaulle de les examiner dans un esprit favorable. Vous voudrez bien veiller à ce que cette promesse soit tenue et intervenir.
avec toute la fermeté nécessaire en vue d'un règlement équitable des questions qui nous intéressent.

Signé : Dejean

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MAE, Europe, Grèce, 1944-1949, 23
Fédération internationale démocratique des femmes au Ministre des Affaires étrangères
5 février 1946

Au nom de la Fédération internationale démocratique des femmes, nous nous permettons d'attirer votre attention sur la situation des femmes de la résistance en Grèce qui, ayant été arrêtées après la libération du pays se trouvent toujours en prison. Nous nous permettons, Monsieur le Ministre, de vous transmettre la copie de la lettre des femmes de la Résistance en Grèce, ainsi que la copie de la lettre que nous envoyons aujourd'hui au Gouvernement Grec par l'intermédiaire de Monsieur le Ministre de Grèce à Paris.

Nous vous demandons, Monsieur le Ministre, d'intervenir auprès du Gouvernement Grec dans le but d'accélérer l'enquête et la libération de toutes celles qui pendant des années ont lutté pour l'indépendance de leur pays et pour la paix du monde.

Nous avons l'honneur de vous informer que nous adressons la même demande aux Gouvernements de Grande-Bretagne, des États-Unis, de Chine et de l'Union soviétique.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, l'expression de notre haute considération.

Pour la Fédération internationale démocratique des femmes,

La présidente E. Cotton
La Secrétaire générale Marie-Claude Vaillant-Couturier

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MAE, Europe, Grèce, 1944-1949, 23
1er mars 1949

Monsieur le Ministre,
Le Bureau de la Confédération Générale du Travail a été profondément ému et indigné par l'annonce de l'assassinat de Dimitri Paparigas, Secrétaire général de la Confédération Générale du Travail de Grèce.
Nous élevons une vénémente protestation contre ce nouvel attentat aux droits démocratiques et humains.
Nous vous prions d'intervenir auprès de la Représentation, à Paris, du Gouvernement grec pour souligner l'émotion des travailleurs devant l'assassinat de ce héros, tombé dans la lutte pour la défense de l'indépendance de son pays et des droits des Peuples.
Nous vous demandons d'agir énergiquement auprès du Gouvernement grec pour que soit écartée la menace de mort qui pèse sur des centaines et des milliers de patriotes grecs, qui tous ont été des héros de la lutte contre les barbares nazis.
Nous vous prions de bien vouloir nous informer de la suite donnée par le Gouvernemennt français à notre demande et de la réponse faite par le Gouvernement grec.
Veuillez croire, Monsieur le Ministre, à l'assurance de notre considération distinguée.

Pour le Bureau confédéral,
L'un des Secrétaires Généraux,

A. Le Leap

MAE, Europe, Grèce, 1949-1955, 114
Télégramme 405/406, Vaux Saint Cyr
12 mai 1950

Les commentaires succincts de la presse donnent une image très imparfaite de l'intérêt qu'a suscité à Athènes la proposition de Votre Excellence.

J'ai recueilli dans les 48 heures de nombreux témoignages de la satisfaction qu'éprouvent aujourd'hui dans tous les partis politiques ceux qui, conscients de l'importance que présente pour la Grèce l'organisation de l'Europe, craignaient que l'état des relations franco-allemandes ne s'opposât au succès de tout projet constructif.
Le Président du Conseil notamment, que j'ai vu hier soir au Palais, a tenu à me dire qu'il se félicitait de voir fait par la France le premier pas pour la création d'une Europe unie, seule capable d'assurer la défense de la civilisation occidentale contre les dangers qui la menacent de l'Orient.

MAE, Europe, Grèce, 1949-1955, 114
Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire : Note pour le Directeur Général de la Sûreté Nationale ; no 10001
28 octobre 1952
Objet : Compte-rendu de mission en Grèce

J'ai l'honneur de vous exposer ci-dessous les résultats de la mission que je viens d'effectuer du 14 au 18 octobre à Athènes en exécution de l'ordre de mission ministériel du 3 octobre 1952.

BUT DE LA MISSION :
Elle avait pour objet d'envisager et si possible de mettre sur pied une liaison étroite et rapide entre la D.S.T. et les services correspondants de la Police Hellénique pour la lutte commune contre les entreprises du Kominform. Il était apparu en effet, dans le courant de l'année, qu'une liaison effective et directe aurait permis de traiter beaucoup plus efficacement et complètement, aussi bien en France qu'en Grèce, des affaires communes aux deux pays.

DÉROULEMENT DES CONVERSATIONS :
A mon arrivée à Athènes, où j'ai été accueilli par le premier Secrétaire de notre Ambassade et par les représentants du Directeur Général de la police et Directeur des Étrangers (Service qui a le plus de points communs avec la D.S.T.) entouré de ses adjoints, et en réunions d'informations avec les Directeurs MM. Kokkinos, Karabeltsos et Rakitzis.

Elles se sont conclues par un accord complet sur le principe d'une liaison étroite entre nos services sur les bases du mémorandum ci-joint que j'avais soumis et qui a été entièrement accepté.

En conséquence les autorités grecques et françaises échangeront directement des informations sur les agissements, déplacements et d'une manière générale toutes entreprises visant leur pays d'agents des services de renseignements des pays d'obédience communiste ou d'agitateurs du Kominform.
MODALITÉS DE LA LIAISON :
1. Dans l'immédiat les notes entre les deux services seront transmises indifféremment par le canal des deux valises diplomatiques étant donné la fréquence insuffisante de la valise française ;
2. Il est prévu l'établissement d'une liaison radiotélégraphique en code, entre les deux services pour les renseignements à caractère urgent. Dans ce but un spécialiste de la radio et du chiffre de la sûreté grecque doit venir sous peu à Paris pour mettre au point les détails techniques de cette liaison ;
3. Le principe du détachement à l'Ambassade de Grèce à Paris d'un fonctionnaire de la police grecque a enfin été retenu. Il s'agira vraisemblablement du Commissaire Divisionnaire Kelenis, déjà venu en liaison à Paris. Toutefois il ne pourra pas venir avant un mois et demi environ, des élections étant proches en Grèce et le gouvernement se bornant à expédier les affaires courantes sans engager de nouvelles dépenses.

La police grecque ayant dans ses attributions la recherche du renseignement à l'étranger j'ai évidemment demandé que ce fonctionnaire s'abstienne de toute activité de cet ordre, désir auquel M. Vlastaris a aussitôt accédé.

La liaison D.S.T. - Sûreté grecque devant surtout être profitable à la Grèce, étant donné qu'il y a en France des ressortissants grecs ayant des activités au profit du Kominform nuisibles à leur pays et que l'inverse n'existe pas, il n'est pas nécessaire d'envisager le détachement d'un policier français à notre ambassade d'Athènes.
M. Baelen auquel j'ai exposé les résultats de nos conversations et suggéré qu'un membre de notre Ambassade puisse éventuellement discuter avec la sûreté grecque certaines questions nous intéressant plus spécialement a été tout à fait d'accord sur ce point et a pensé à charger M. Laporte, conseiller de cette tâche. Ce dernier qui était absent d'Athènes et que je viens de voir à Paris est tout à fait disposé à s'en charger.

CONCLUSION :
Si les modalités pratiques de cette liaison ne soulèvent, en ce qui le concerne, aucune objection de la part du Quai d'Orsay, elle doit pouvoir fonctionner sans délai dans de bonnes conditions et être intéressante.

Toutefois pour les raisons que j'ai indiquées plus haut, elle sera sans doute plus profitable à la Grèce qu'à nous-mêmes. De plus, ce pays sort pratiquement de la guerre et l'organisation de ses services de sûreté et plus particulièrement de contre-espionnage semble assez confuse. Les autorités grecques avaient à faire face à une tâche immédiate qui ne leur a sans doute pas laissé le loisir de mettre sur pied un service suffisamment centralisé, condition première du contre-espionnage de la non-ingérence, et à liaisons intérieures rapides.
Toutefois l'exposé succinct que j'ai fait de notre organisation a vivement intéressé M. Vlastaris qui a aussitôt réalisé l'importance d'une centralisation effective et d'une
exploitation rationnelle du renseignement, et décidé de créer un bureau plus spécialement chargé de ces tâches.

Roger Wybot, Directeur de la Surveillance du Territoire

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MAE Europe, Grèce, 1949-1955, 154
Note de la Sous-direction d'Europe méridionale
31 janvier 1955

Pays de la Démocratie, où naquit l'éloquence, la Grèce est aussi la terre d'élection des dissensions internes et des interventions étrangères.

A sa libération le pays se trouvait dans une situation proprement chaotique ; gangrené par le communisme, il a été gouverné successivement par des coalitions de royalistes, de conservateurs et de libéraux qui ne s'entendaient pas, puis à partir de 1950 par des gouvernements composés de deux parts dont le principal trait d'union consistait en une démagogie ruineuse. À cette désunion, l'institution successive d'une régence, puis d'une monarchie, l'organisation progressive d'élections libres n'apportèrent que de faibles remèdes.

C'est au Maréchal Papagos, fort de ses victoires militaires et de l'appui des Alliés, que revient le mérite d'avoir tenté le premier effort réel en vue de mettre fin aux désordres et aux frais des régimes précédents. Son plan de quatre ans a permis l'épuration et la réforme de l'administration et la mise en route de l'économie par l'exécution de grands travaux d'équipement, la stabilité politique nécessaire étant assurée par la création « du rassemblement hellénique ».

Au moment où vous êtes appelé à prendre vos fonctions, ce gouvernement semble déjà avoir perdu beaucoup de sa cohésion ; en avril 1954, M. Markezinis, Ministre de la Coordination, qui en était la cheville ouvrière, était contraint de donner sa démission, suivie en décembre de la même année de celle de ses principaux séides.

Enfin, les dernières élections ne semblent pas avoir été un succès pour le Maréchal, à qui l'opinion reprochait la hausse du coût de la vie et la dureté de la législature sociale.
Actuellement l'impuissance de l'opposition n'est due qu'à son incapacité de se regrouper et l'avenir du gouvernement paraît incertain.

Ce climat dissolvant est à l'origine du fait que la politique grecque, depuis la dernière guerre mondiale, subit profondément l'influence des puissances étrangères : à la
libération, les 4/5 du pays se trouvent sous l'obédience soviétique et le premier gouvernement Papandreou, qui contrôle péniblement le reste du territoire, n'est qu'un fantoche aux mains des Britanniques. Dès l'année 1947, les États-Unis se substituent à l'Angleterre dans la prise en charge de la Grèce, les missions américaines s'installent dans le pays et le plan Marshall commence à fonctionner. Jusqu'en 1952 la tutelle américaine est totale et saute aux yeux des moins avertis. Elle est, aujourd'hui, moins visible mais vous noterez entre autres faits que l'Ambassadeur de USA qui assiste aux réunions du Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale est parvenu à imposer, malgré l'opposition des Britanniques, le Chef d'État-major aérien de son choix. Jusqu'aux plus bas échelons, l'armée grecque est noyautée par des instructeurs américains. L'Allemagne elle-même, grâce à sa puissance politique économique, joue son rôle et c'est en partie à la suite d'une petite trahison de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que M. Markezinis a été contraint de donner sa démission.

Les rapports franco-grecs
En présence de tels rivaux, il peut paraître difficile à un Ambassadeur de France de jouer un rôle de premier plan. Vous disposez pourtant pour le succès de votre mission d'atouts qui ne sont pas négligeables ; en premier lieu les sacrifices consentis par la France dans le domaine économique peuvent être inscrits dans son actif.

1. Relations économiques franco-grecques
Depuis 1945, deux préoccupations essentielles ont inspiré nos relations commerciales et financières avec la Grèce : aider un pays ami, économiquement pauvre, à relever les ruines accumulées par la guerre étrangères, puis la guerre civile, permettre à nos industries exportatrices de retrouver sur le marché grec des débouchés intéressants.

Cette politique nous a conduits à développer considérablement nos achats de tabac, principal produit grec d'exportation, achats qui sont passés de 400 tonnes en 1938 à 5000 tonnes par an depuis 1946.

Depuis 1949 nos exportations vers la Grèce ont dépassé nos importations en provenance de ce pays, mais l'excédent de nos exportations sur nos importations est en nette décroissance depuis 1951, phénomène malheureusement accompagné d'une légère régression des échanges. Celle-ci est due à la reprise de relations commerciales très active entre la Grèce et l'Allemagne, et, d'autre part, à la libération de la quasi-totalité des importations décidée par le Gouvernement d'Athènes en avril 1954, libération qui a mis l'industrie française en compétition sur le marché grec avec des concurrents étrangers dont les prix sont souvent inférieurs aux siens au moment où les crédits bancaires accordés aux importateurs grecs étaient considérablement réduits.

Depuis près de dix-huit mois, les efforts de la délégation française chargée de négocier les accords commerciaux ont donc spécialement tendu à obtenir l'attribution
de contingents accrus pour les rares produits restant soumis à licence en Grèce et à faire attribuer des contrats à l'industrie française dans un pays où les adjudications ne sont pas automatiquement données au moins offrant.

Dans le domaine économique votre mission consistera essentiellement à appuyer de votre haute autorité les démarches que votre conseiller commercial sera chargé d'effectuer auprès des services helléniques en faveur de nos exportations.

En octobre 1953, un accord de collaboration économique et technique a été signé entre la France et la Grèce aux termes duquel la France s'engageait à donner à la Grèce des facilités d'assurance-crédit pour un montant de 5 milliards et demi de francs sur sept ans. Ces facilités ont été portées ultérieurement à 6 milliards et demi et à 8 ans. Elles doivent permettre à l'industrie française de participer à l'équipement électrique de la Grèce (change-over et construction de la centrale de Megdova). Depuis le départ de M. Markezinis du Ministère de la Coordination, la mise à exécution de cet accord semble assez laborieuse. Il conviendra que vous informiez très exactement le Département de la passation des commandes afférent à ce programme.

2. Action culturelle de la France en Grèce

Si, par la force des choses, nous ne reprenons que lentement sur le plan économique (et aussi politique) la place traditionnelle que nous occupions avant la guerre dans ce pays, nous avons largement réussi à la reprendre sur le plan spirituel et nos efforts dans le domaine culturel ont abouti à des résultats encourageants :

1. Enseignement

Notre action culturelle repose essentiellement, en Grèce, sur trois éléments, l'Institut Français d'Athènes, le Lycée de la Mission Laïque à Salonique et les Écoles Religieuses.

L'Institut Français d'Athènes donne, comme la plupart de nos Instituts, des cours de littérature et de civilisation françaises du niveau des classes terminales de l'Enseignement Secondaire ou de la préparation à certains certificats de licence, ainsi que des cours supérieurs destinés à la formation des professeurs grecs de français (« Cours Spécial ») ; il se charge également des cours de langue qui en d'autres pays incombent à l'Alliance Française. Il atteint de la sorte une dizaine de milliers d'élèves et dispose, grâce aux « Écoles annexes », d'un puissant moyen d'action dans les villes de province.

Le Lycée Français de Salonique s'efforce de jouer en Grèce du Nord un rôle analogue, tout en étant un établissement d'enseignement comme ceux de Londres ou de Vienne ou ceux qu'administre la Missions Laïque au Proche-Orient. Il donne essentiellement des cours de littérature et civilisation françaises.
Les Écoles Religieuses sont en fait, depuis une vingtaine d'années, des gymnases grecs, préparant à l'Apolytirion grec, mais où le français joue un rôle plus important que dans les autres établissements secondaires publics ou privés du territoire hellénique.

L'action de l'Institut Français est considérable, les effectifs du Lycée Français de Salonique s'accroissent et ceux des écoles religieuses se maintiennent dans l'ensemble. Il est toutefois impossible de se dissimuler que ces divers établissements ne peuvent, à eux seuls, maintenir et accroître l'influence française en Grèce ; et qu'il convient d'agir de plus en plus dans les établissements du pays, et par l'intermédiaire des Administrations helléniques ; telle est depuis trois ans la préoccupation constante de l'Ambassade et du Département. Tandis que le Directeur du Lycée Français de Salonique, M. Ehret, était nommé titulaire de la chaire de littérature française de l'Université voisine et jetait les bases d'un enseignement français méthodique au sein de cette Université, des négociations se poursuivaient à Athènes en vue de conférer une valeur officielle au diplôme de professeur de français délivré aux élèves du Cours Spécial de l'Institut. Ces négociations ont abouti à la fin de l'année 1954 ; en fait ce sera l'Université d'Athènes qui formera au sein d'une section spécialisée, les futurs professeurs de français, mais avec la collaboration des professeurs de l'Institut et sous la direction de deux titulaires de chaire venus des universités françaises. Ainsi notre action se trouvera, dans le domaine de l'enseignement, adaptée aux conditions nouvelles de la vie universitaire et culturelle hellénique.

2. Diffusion des moyens d'action culturelle
En ce qui concerne la diffusion de nos moyens d'action culturelle, livres, périodiques, films et articles, les résultats ne répondent pas encore à l'effort poursuivi :
Pour la diffusion commerciale du livre et des périodiques, la Grèce n'arrive respectivement qu'au 19ème et 18ème rang des pays importateurs (après l'Égypte, le Liban, les Pays-Bas, la Turquie, l'Espagne et le Portugal) avec 347 quintaux métriques de livres français importés en 1954 (contre 408 en 1953). Il y a donc une régression marquée qui tient essentiellement au prix de vente trop élevé fixé par les libraires locaux. Il n'est pas douteux que si les vendeurs resserraient leurs marges bénéficiaires, le volume des ventes en bénéficierait aussitôt.
En vue de favoriser le plus largement possible la diffusion de nos livres et périodiques en Grèce, un effort tout particulier a été fait et sera poursuivi par le Département, qui vient d'adresser à l'Institut Français d'Athènes 2000 volumes pour l'ouverture de sa bibliothèque de prêts et qui aliment de façon substantielle les bibliothèques du lycée français et de l'Ambassade en nouveautés.
Une exposition photographique sur Anna de Noailles sera également montée au cours de l'année par le Département pour répondre à la demande des autorités grecques et
notamment de M. Argyropoulos, ancien Ambassadeur de Grèce à Paris et cousin germain d'Anna de Noailles.

Par ailleurs la direction des Relations culturelles étudie le projet d'une exposition des « Écrivains et artistes français philhellènes » dont l'organisation a été également suggérée par les autorités grecques.

La place du film français sur le marché grec reste stationnaire malgré les efforts déployés par Unifrance Film avec le concours de son délégué local. Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères attacherait le plus grand prix à être tenu informé des raisons psychologiques et économiques qui semblent freiner la diffusion de la production filmée française.

Enfin il convient de noter que le matériel photographique et informatif (bulletin et articles EXTINFOR) adressé par le Département à l'Ambassade pour diffusion dans la presse grecque tant à Athènes qu'à Salonique, n'a pas connu jusqu'à ce jour une grande faveur auprès de la presse, et qu'un effort tout particulier devra être fait dans ce domaine.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères vous serait donc reconnaissant de toutes les suggestions que vous pourrez présenter au Département pour intensifier notre action sur le plan de la diffusion, et elle s'efforcera de mettre à votre disposition, dans toute la mesure du possible, les moyens qui paraîtraient nécessaires pour atteindre ce but.

Relations politiques
Sentimentalement et traditionnellement, les relations franco-grecques se reposent sur de solides affinités. Vous serez à même de constater à quel point y contribuent la bonne situation de la colonie française en Grèce, de la colonie grecque à Paris, et les liens noués dans tout le Moyen-Orient entre Grecs et Français émigrés. Une partie de l'élite et des milieux politique helléniques est de formation française et ne l'oublie pas. Cette atmosphère a été réchauffée encore par le généreux secours accordé par la France aux sinistrés des Îles Ionniennes, et surtout par les relations entretenues entre les Chefs d'État. Visites de MM. Georges Bidault et Edgar Faure, excellent accueil réservé à Paris au Maréchal Papagos et à M. Markezinis.
Mais avant tout, la Grèce, qui se relève à peine de l'emprise communiste et qui ressent encore celle-ci à sa frontière nord, se sent étroitement solidaire de la défense de l'Occident. Pour combattre le péril communiste on compte à Athènes non seulement sur les USA et sur la Grande-Bretagne, mais aussi sur la France. S'il n'est pas étonnant que le rejet de la CED ait causé un certain malaise à Athènes vis-à-vis de notre pays, l'on paraît maintenant rassuré sur notre attitude, et c'est plutôt du côté de la République Fédérale que viennent aujourd'hui les inquiétudes. Votre mission s'en trouvera facilitée.
LA GRÈCE ET LES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES

La Grèce et l'OTAN
Depuis le 18 février 1952, date de son entrée à l'OTAN, la Grèce considère l'alliance atlantique comme le fondement de sa politique étrangère. Elle n'y joue pourtant pas un rôle particulièrement important. Une de ses rares initiatives a consisté, en 1955, à proposer que la propagande de l'OTAN soit intensifiée et développée dans les pays de l'Est. Il faut signaler d'autre part que, lors de la dernière session ministérielle de l'OTAN, M. Stephanopoulos, mettant à profit ses fonctions du Président, a proposé que la prochaine session ministérielle se réunisse en avril 1955 à Athènes.

Niveau de forces et effort militaire
En mars 1953, l'armée grecque compte 145000 hommes d'actifs. En novembre 1954, les forces aériennes étaient portées à 156 chasseurs à réaction, 31 avions de transport et les appareils d'entraînement.
En avril 1954, le Gouvernement grec a décidé de réduire de 20 à 25% les effectifs de l'armée de terre et d'affecter les crédits ainsi dégagés au perfectionnement de l'infrastructure et de la défense anti-aérienne, ainsi qu'à l'instruction des réserves.
Pour 1955, le Gouvernement grec a prévu la constitution de deux escadrilles supplémentaires et d'une division blindée. Toutes ces forces sont soumises au commandement OTAN Sud-Europe. Dans l'ensemble, les forces grecques sont de valeur inégale. Elles auraient vraisemblablement de grandes difficultés à soutenir le choc d'armées modernes, puissamment organisées et équipées.

L'aide américaine a conduit à donner aux États-Unis en Grèce ainsi que je l'ai indiqué ci-dessus, une position prééminente qui a peu à peu supplanté l'influence britannique. Les principales étapes de ce changement sont les suivantes:

- 8 octobre 1953 : Le Gouvernement grec met fin à l'activité de la mission navale britannique
- 12 octobre 1953 : signature d'un accord gréco-américain au sujet des bases aériennes mises à la disposition des forces américaines, en Crète (rade de la Sude et aérodrome de La Canée), dans l'île de Leros, à Eleusis. Ces bases comportent des installations de ravitaillement pour les avions embarqués de la 6ème Flotte américaine.
- Janvier 1955 : le Gouvernement grec nomme Chef d'État-major des forces aériennes le Brigadier général Margaritis, de formation américaine, en éliminant deux lieutenants-généraux ; donc de grade plus élevé, formés par la RAF.
Les rapports de la France et de la Grèce au sein de l'OTAN sont cordiaux et confiants. Aucune difficulté sérieuse n'a jamais surgi entre les deux pays à propos des problèmes atlantiques.

Sur le plan militaire, les relations entre les deux pays se limitent à l'accueil d'un officier grec dans chaque promotion d'École de Guerre française.

La Grèce et le Pacte balkanique
L'alliance atlantique ne peut apporter à la Grèce une garantie complète tant que la Yougoslavie reste à l'écart du système. Une défense efficace de la Grèce ne peut être assurée en effet qu'avec une couverture de sa frontière du nord-ouest, ce qui n'est réalisable que grâce à une étroite collaboration gréco-yougoslave. C'est pourquoi la Pacte balkanique est essentiellement fondé, du point de vue stratégique, sur la coopération militaire gréco-yougoslave. Dès la signature de l'accord d'amitié d'Ankara, le 28 février 1953, la Grèce a considéré cet instrument comme une étape vers la constitution d'une alliance militaire à laquelle il fallait s'efforcer d'obtenir l'adhésion de l'Italie.

Bien que le Pacte balkanique de Bled constitue, pour la Grèce, le complément de la garantie que lui assure l'OTAN, ce pays a toujours désiré éviter une liaison formelle entre les deux organisations, par crainte que l'extension des obligations de l'OTAN ne soit désapprouvée par certains de ses partenaires atlantiques.

La double appartenance de la Grèce au Pacte balkanique et à l'OTAN lui fait souhaiter que les engagements qui peuvent découler de ces deux systèmes ne soient pas contradictoires. Elle attache donc une grande importance à ce que soit résolu le problème de la coordination des plans balkaniques et des plans OTAN, c'est-à-dire, en fait des liaisons à établir entre la Yougoslavie et l'OTAN. Le refus du Maréchal Tito d'entrer dans l'OTAN ne pouvant faire de doute, le Gouvernement grec désire que soient établis, le plus tôt possible, des liens de fait. À ce sujet, le Gouvernement d'Athènes estime, en conformité avec le Gouvernement américain, que le but à atteindre est la présence permanente d'officiers yougoslaves à l'État-major du Commandement Sud-Europe.

Néanmoins, le Gouvernement ne dissimule pas que cet objectif est lointain. Il éprouve, en particulier, la crainte qu'une demande prématurée, ou trop précise, faite au Gouvernement de Belgrade de se lier formellement à l'OTAN, ne provoque une réaction anti-occidentale du Maréchal Tito qui risquerait de compromettre toute chance d'accord ultérieur.

Tout ce qui peut renforcer le Pacte balkanique, facteur de stabilité dans la Méditerranée orientale, et faciliter après l'affaire de Chypre une réconciliation gréco-turque, constitue un avantage pour la politique française dans cette partie de la Méditerranée.
Pour ce qui est de l'Union de l'Europe occidentale, certains milieux grecs ont accueilli favorablement la candidature de la Turquie à l'Organisation, et ils ont espéré que la Grèce adopterait la même attitude et entraînerait la Yougoslavie. Le Gouvernement grec quant à lui est demeuré sur la réserve. Il n'a pas demandé à entrer à l'UEO, et a même critiqué l'initiative turque. Pour lui, en effet l'UEO doit rester un regroupement des intérêts purement occidentaux, de même que le Pacte balkanique groupe les intérêts spécifiques du Sud-Est européen.

Enfin, en ce qui concerne la défense du Moyen-Orient, il est possible, si cette défense s'organise, que la Grèce demande à y participer. La question s'était posée, en 1952, lors des projets d'installation à Chypre d'une Organisation de Défense du Moyen-Orient. La France avait alors soutenu la revendication grecque. Il n'est pas impossible que cette question, actuellement en suspens, se repose à l'avenir.

Depuis la deuxième partie de l'année 1954, quelques inquiétudes et un malaise assez grave se sont glissés dans les relations franco-grecques :

1. Les liens assez étroits entretenus par la République fédérale allemande avec certains hommes d'État grecs (entre autres M. Markezinis), l'intervention économique exceptionnellement active de l'Allemagne dans la vie commerciale, financière et industrielle de la Grèce, ont fréquemment attiré l'attention du Département, et vous vous efforcerez de noter avec précision les développements de cette influence qui, pour n'être pas critiquable, ne saurait pourtant pas être ignorée.

2. Peu après sa visite à Paris au début de 1954, le Maréchal Papagos décidait de se rendre en Espagne. Cette rencontre n'eut pas lieu avant le mois d'octobre, le Gouvernement espagnol entendant probablement en profiter pour sonder son interlocuteur sur l'idée d'un accord méditerranéen qui aurait réuni l'Espagne, la Grèce, la Turquie et divers États arabes. En fait ce voyage n'a eu qu'un caractère fort modeste et peu spectaculaire ; entre temps, en effet, le Gouvernement de Londres inquiet d'une collusion possible de la politique espagnole et de la politique grecque dans les affaires de Gibraltar et de Chypre, avait adressé au Cabinet d'Athènes des avertissements à vrai dire comminatoires.

Toutefois, il est naturellement impossible de savoir avec certitude ce que les deux chefs de gouvernement se sont dits au cours de leur tête à tête. On peut craindre une certaine interférence des deux politiques, dont l'éventualité devra retenir votre attention, particulièrement en raison de l'évolution de la politique grecque depuis l'affaire de Chypre.
L'AFFAIRE DE CHYPRE
Le 20 août 1954, le gouvernement grec demandait au Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies l'inscription de la question de Chypre à l'ordre du jour de l'Assemblée générale, sous le titre « application à l'égard de la population de l'île de Chypre, sous les auspices des Nations Unies, du principe de l'égalité de droits des peuples et de leur droit à disposer d'eux-mêmes ».

Cette démarche, dont nous redoutions les conséquences, non seulement parce qu'elle portait devant les Nations Unies un différend entre deux puissances alliées au sein de l'Organisation des Traités de l'Atlantique nord, mais encore parce qu'une fois de plus, elle allait livrer à la démagogie de l'Assemblée une question d'ordre « colonial » dont les développements et la solution risquaient d'avoir leurs répercussions sur les problèmes du Maroc et de la Tunisie et sur ceux des territoires non autonomes en général, a été faite dans des circonstances sur lesquelles vous trouverez toutes les indications de nature à vous intéresser dans les archives du poste.

De même, les correspondances échangées avec le Département, New York, Londres et Ankara sur le sujet ont été régulièrement communiquées à Athènes, ainsi que les documents des Nations Unies concernant, dans ses aspects techniques, l'affaire qui s'est terminée, vous le savez, par une motion d'ajournement adoptée le 17 décembre par 50 voix contre 0 (avec l'abstention de l'Australie, du Chili, de l'Union sud-africaine et des 5 pays soviétiques). Vous pourrez utilement vous reporter à ces communications pour connaître dans leur détail les développements de la question.

Il importe seulement, ici, de souligner les incidences qu'elle pourrait avoir sur les relations franco-grecques, si, dans l'avenir, la délégation de la Grèce à l'Assemblée devait persister dans l'attitude adoptée à la dernière session par M. Kyrou, qui, déçu par la tournure prise dès l'origine par la question de Chypre, s'est laissé aller à une surenchère telle qu'il a dépassé dans la passion anti-colonialiste les représentants arabo-asiatiques traditionnellement les plus virulents ; il a été jusqu'à faire des déclarations directement dirigées contre les intérêts français dans des termes fort désobligeants.

La Grande-Bretagne avait décidé de dénier la compétence de l'Assemblée en s'appuyant sur l'article 2, paragraphe 7 de la Charte qui interdit aux Nations Unies d'intervenir dans les affaires « qui relèvent essentiellement de la compétence nationale d'un État ». Si la question était néanmoins inscrite, sa délégation devait s'abstenir de participer aux débats. Cette position était identique à celle que nous avions adoptée dans les questions tunisienne et marocaine. Dans ces affaires d'ailleurs, le délégué britannique nous avait apporté le concours le plus précieux, alors qu'au contraire, l'attitude de la délégation grecque procédant essentiellement du souci de ménager les Arabes, nous était devenue, d'année en année, plus défavorable. Ces raisons auraient à elles seules suffi pour nous déterminer à donner notre appui à la Grande-Bretagne. Il
s'y ajoutait, à nos yeux d'alliés, les motifs d'ordre stratégique que l'Angleterre à de tenir au maintien de sa souveraineté à Chypre, à l'heure où elle retirerait ses troupes et garnison le long du canal de Suez. Enfin, la Turquie avait fait savoir qu'elle était absolument opposée à une modification du statut de l'île.

Nous avions informé les Grecs de la position que nous serions inévitablement amenés à adopter, et nous leur avions exprimé l'espoir qu'ils comprendraient nos raisons, comme nous avions nous-mêmes cherché à comprendre tout en les regrettenant les motifs qui dictaient leur conduite dans les affaires marocaine et tunisienne. Nous pensions que, dans un cas comme dans l'autre, la divergence des vues dans ces problèmes particuliers n'altérerait pas les bonnes relations qui existent entre les deux pays. Nous avons, dans ces conditions, été surpris de la violence des réactions de M. Kyrou à la suite des votes négatifs émis par la France aux côtés du Royaume-Uni dans le scrutin relatif à l'inscription de la question à l'ordre du jour.

M. Kyrou – sans qu'il ait été véritablement établi s'il s'agissait de son propre gré ou sur instruction, encore que son départ du poste de directeur politique peu après son retour en Grèce permette d'incliner pour la première hypothèse – s'est associé pour embarrasser les puissances administrant des territoires non autonomes, et en premier lieu la France et l'Angleterre, aux projets qui nous étaient les plus défavorables, et a prononcé le discours qualifié par notre représentant permanent au Conseil de Tutelle, de « discours le plus agressif de toute la session ».

Il est difficile de prévoir dès maintenant si la Grèce, après l'échec de l'année dernière, s'obstinerà à vouloir faire discuter par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies la question de Chypre. Il est vraisemblable que cette détermination dépendra du gouvernement qui sera au pouvoir l'automne 1955. Il est évidemment souhaitable, de notre point de vue, que la Grèce s'abstienne de persévérer, et c'est naturellement le sens que vous devrez donner aux conversations que vous serez amené à avoir sur ce sujet. Vous pourrez faire valoir qu'une certaine lassitude paraît se manifester au sein de l'Assemblée devant ce genre de questions, comme l'ont montré les ajournements qu'elle a décidés aussi bien en ce qui concerne le Maroc et la Tunisie ou sans doute elle a tenu compte des pourparlers en cours, que dans la question de Chypre elle-même et dans celle de la Nouvelle-Guinée, pourtant nouvellement inscrites à son ordre du jour.

Si la Grèce devait néanmoins s'obstiner, il conviendrait en tout cas, de lui faire comprendre que son attitude dans les questions dites coloniales est peu compatible avec son appartenance au Pacte atlantique et avec sa position naturelle de puissance méditerranéenne de civilisation occidentale. Que la Grèce, obligée de ménager certains intérêts qui lui sont propres, ne puisse nous soutenir ouvertement, nous pouvons nous l'expliquer ; ce que nous ne pouvons pas admettre, c'est le véritable chantage que sa délégation a cru habile d'exercer dans le domaine des territoires non
autonomes. Une telle attitude ne pourrait manquer de finir par peser sur les rapports généraux entre les deux pays.

Ce serait d'autant plus regrettable que tout nous conduit à entretenir avec la Grèce des relations de confiance et d'amitié.

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MAE, Grèce, 1949-1955, 115
Note de la Direction générale politique, au sujet : Rapports franco-grecs
1er décembre 1955

Quel que soit son désir d'apaisement, le gouvernement Karamanlis se trouve dans l'incapacité d'agir sur une opinion publique qui, encouragée par le précédent gouvernement du Maréchal Papagos, a fait de la question de Chypre le facteur dominant de la politique grecque. Au risque de compromettre les liens qui l'unissent aux puissances occidentales, la Grèce n'a pas hésité à rejoindre le camp afro-asiatique et, pour bénéficier de l'appui de celui-ci, à se poser en accusatrice de la France lorsque le problème de l'avenir de nos territoires d'Afrique du Nord a été évoqué devant les Nations Unies.

L'attitude adoptée à New York par les puissances communistes, qui avec le bloc musulman soutiennent paradoxalement les thèses de la guerre anti-communiste et chrétienne, a valu à l'Union soviétique un renouveau de crédit. L'opposition grecque ne manque pas, en effet, de chercher querelle au Gouvernement partout où cela est possible et notamment sur la politique étrangère, en raison de l'aspect passionnel de cette politique. Le résultat se traduit par un renforcement du clan neutraliste et il n'est pas exclu que les élections d'avril prochain ne portent au pouvoir des hommes favorables à une politique d'amitié « égale pour l'Est et pour l'Ouest ».

En présence de cette menace que soulignent les avances faites par les pays satellites pour renouer avec la Grèce, l'Occident ne peut rester passif. Sans doute la Grèce n'est-elle qu'un maillon de la chaîne de défense de l'OTAN, mais du jour où elle aura quitté le camp des Nations libres pour lier son sort à un axe neutraliste allant du Danube à l'Égypte, la position stratégique des puissances atlantiques en Méditerranée serait sérieusement compromise.

Il appartient donc aux Occidentaux de tenter de reprendre le contrôle de l'opinion hellénique. Si les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni en ont les moyens, les premiers, en accroissant le montant de leur aide, tant économique que militaire, le second en tentant un ultime effort à propos de Chypre, il apparaît singulièrement plus difficile d'améliorer notre position aussi longtemps que les problèmes d'Afrique du Nord
resteront en suspens. Tout au plus pourrions-nous témoigner à la Grèce des prévenances auxquelles elle se montrerait sensible. Encore ce champ d'action se trouverait-il limité du fait de la détérioration progressive de nos positions économiques depuis que l'Allemagne s'impose de nouveau sur le marché grec.

En revanche, il peut nous appartenir d'utiliser le cadre des institutions atlantiques et européennes existantes pour tenter de ramener la Grèce à une plus juste compréhension de ce que doit être la solidarité occidentale. Le caractère transitoire du Gouvernement grec actuel n'est pas pour faciliter ces efforts qui, au demeurant, ne paraissent pouvoir aboutir que s'ils reçoivent l'appui de nos alliés anglo-saxons.

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MAE, Europe, Grèce, 1961-1970, 252
Télégramme 700-713, Charbonnières (Athènes)
23 mai 1963

Avant de vous rendre compte des impressions laissées ici par la visite officielle du Président de la République, j'ai jugé préférable d'attendre quelques jours afin de pouvoir recueillir directement ou indirectement un aussi grand nombre d'indications que possible en provenance des milieux les plus divers, je crois être en mesure de vous communiquer aujourd'hui un certain nombre de conclusions.

Comme le général de Gaulle, Votre Excellence, et tous les membres de leur suite ont pu le constater au jour le jour, la visite a constitué un très grand succès. Cela avait été prévu depuis qu'il en avait été question et je n'avais moi-même cessé de l'annoncer. Quelques précisions ne s'en imposent pas moins.

On s'attendait généralement à un très grand élan populaire provoqué à la fois par les sentiments d'amitié que la France inspire dans l'ensemble de ce pays et par la prestigieuse personnalité du Chef de l'État. Cet élan s'est bien produit, encore qu'il ait été à Athènes même et surtout le premier jour freiné par les extraordinaires mesures policières prises par les autorités helléniques en vue d'assurer la sécurité du Président. On a délibérément cherché à empêcher la foule à l'exception des enfants des écoles – de se masser sur le parcours, des policiers en uniforme et en civil obligeant les badauds à « circuler ». Chacun a pu constater qu'à Salonique où les précautions policières avaient été bien moindres, l'accueil de la population a été plus libre et, de ce fait, plus chaleureux.

Ce n'est donc pas sur ce plan que la réussite de la visite s'est manifestée au delà de toutes les prévisions. C'est auprès de tous ceux qui ont eu la possibilité d'approcher le
général de Gaulle, de causer avec lui, d'entendre ses allocutions, etc... Ceux-là ont tous été conquis.

Si toutes les pensées de la famille royale ont été, depuis dimanche matin, accaparées par la maladie du souverain, j'avais déjà pu noter chez certains de ses membres pendant la visite et j'ai eu l'occasion de vérifier depuis lors auprès des hauts fonctionnaires de la Cour que le Président et Mme de Gaulle avaient vivement séduit leurs hôtes. Ce n'est pas en effet sans une certaine timidité que le Roi et même la Reine attendaient le général. Son affabilité, sa bonne grâce, ainsi que le charme de Mme de Gaulle les ont d'emblée mis à leur aise et tous les contacts avec eux se sont révélés de bout en bout aussi faciles qu'agréables.

Je crois devoir mentionner ici l'impression extrêmement vive qu'a produite la réception des chefs de missions diplomatiques par le Président. La bienveillance avec laquelle il s'est adressé à chacun, son art à trouver les sujets et les mots appropriés au représentant de chaque pays ont d'autant plus frappé les assistants qu'il s'agissait de quelque chose de tout à fait inhabituel, les chefs d'États venus ici en dernier lieu s'étant bornés à de muettes poignées de mains. Cela s'étant immédiatement colporté, une excellente atmosphère a ainsi été créée et, lors de toutes les réceptions suivantes, on a cherché à approcher le général afin de recueillir quelques paroles de lui.

Dans les milieux dirigeants et plus spécialement au sein du gouvernement il y a eu lieu, me semble-t-il, de noter deux points :

Tout d'abord le même effet que celui que je viens de signaler, c'est-à-dire la séduction exercée par le Président de la République auprès de tous et l'extrême admiration suscitée par lui. Que ce soit lors de courtes conversations avec tel ou tel ou par les allocutions qu'il a prononcées publiquement, le général de Gaulle est apparu à tout ce monde comme une personnalité encore plus remarquable et plus forte qu'on ne l'imaginait. Il est absolument certain que son prestige a été encore très considérablement accru par sa visite.

En second lieu le contenu des discours présidentiels a provoqué la plus grande satisfaction. En exaltant ce que la civilisation occidentale doit à la Grèce antique, le courage déployé en toutes circonstances par les forces armées helléniques, les progrès accomplis dans le domaine économique par ce pays, tout cela étant dit à l'aide de formules nouvelles et frappantes, le général de Gaulle a su faire plaisir à tous. Les tenants du gouvernement ont été heureux d'autre part de relever dans ses discours des éloges pour l'œuvre réalisé par M. Caramanlis mais ses éloges ont été exprimés de telle sorte qu'ils n'ont pas froissé l'opposition. Il est de fait, en tout cas, que, sauf le quotidien communiste « Avghi » aucun journal n'a trouvé quoi que ce soit à redire aux diverses déclarations du Président de la République et que, comme j'en rends compte ailleurs, la presse a été unanime dans ses louanges et ses approbations.
Ce qui, dans les discours du général, a non seulement satisfait mais on pourrait même dire soulagé les milieux dirigeants est que ceux-ci n'y ont pas trouvé un mot pouvant les placer en posture délicate vis-à-vis d'un quelconque des alliés, voire des amis de la Grèce. Certains craignaient que le Président de la République ne manifestât quelque tiédeur envers l'alliance atlantique ou n'exprimât à l'égard de tel ou tel sujet controversé d'actualité des vues contraires à celles d'autres gouvernements avec lesquels la Grèce entend entretenir de bons rapports ou encore définît, par exemple, à l'intention des puissances méditerranéennes, une politique de nature à susciter des inquiétudes. Que les rumeurs que l'on avait fait circuler à ce sujet se soient révélées fausses et que le général de Gaulle ait au contraire pris des positions en tous points conformes à celles de la Grèce elle-même, a littéralement ravi les membres du gouvernement et les hauts fonctionnaires de ce pays.

Peut-être existe-t-il chez certains d'entre eux quelque déception de ce que les bruits qui avaient couru d'une importante aide financière à la Grèce n'aient pas trouvé, à l'occasion de la visite, leur confirmation. Mais ils se consolent en se disant qu'il n'est pas d'usage que pareille question soit réglée entre chefs d'État et en espérant que l'octroi d'une telle aide constituera d'ici peu l'une des concrétisations du succès de la visite.

Que ce soit, par conséquent, auprès de la famille royale, auprès des milieux politiques ou auprès du grand public, cette visite, qui a été sans doute la plus remarquable de toutes celles qui se sont produites ici depuis la guerre, a à la fois encore grandi le personnage déjà presque légendaire du général de Gaulle et puissamment servi la cause française dans ce pays. La position de la France qui s'était beaucoup améliorée au cours des dernières années est maintenant aussi bonne que possible et il y aurait lieu, selon moi, d'en profiter sans tarder pour asseoir plus solidement notre influence aussi bien dans le domaine économique que dans le domaine culturel.
Italia
ASMAE, Telespresso N. 729/286, (Ambasciata d’Italia Grecia - Ministero degli Affari Esteri)

Oggetto: Inglesi e americani in Grecia
Atene, 1° maggio 1947

Il 29 Aprile è tornato ad Atene l’Ambasciatore degli Stati Uniti, MacVeagh. Ha avuto un’accoglienza trionfale, quale si conviene al personaggio più influente della Grecia. Già ieri si è incontrato in un primo lungo colloquio con Tsaldaris, a seguito del quale è stato diramato un comunicato che constata “completa identità di vedute” sulle seguenti questioni: a) assistenza economica in luogo e vece del soccorso sinora fornito dall’UNRRA; b) aiuto immediato; c) necessità future.

Mancano sinora altri particolari. E in realtà si ha l’impressione che, se non il piano generale, l’esecuzione pratica dell’azione americana in Grecia si trovi ancora in una fase di studio e di preparazione. La relazione Porter, che è stata pubblicata in questi giorni in America e riportata con grande rilievo, ma in breve sunto, dalla stampa di Atene, fornisce qualche indicazione interessante soprattutto per quanto riguarda la parte finanziaria. Si terrà presente a questo proposito che il messaggio Truman ha preceduto, non seguito, le conclusioni di Porter; e che perciò non è il rapporto di questo che ha ispirato il messaggio del Presidente (come sarebbe stato logico se l’iniziativa americana fosse stata motivata da considerazioni puramente tecniche), bensì l’inverso. Ragione di più per ritenere che la relazione Porter, oltre a tener conto degli umori prevalenti nel Congresso, rispecchi le intenzioni reali e attuali del Governo Americano.

Ciò premesso, ne riassumo i punti principali: 1) il Governo Americano dovrebbe fornire alla Grecia i mezzi necessari per supplire alle spese militari, alle necessità correnti, e a quelle della ricostruzione, sino al 30 giugno 1948. L’importo che si suggerisce è di 300 milioni di dollari, cifra che coincide naturalmente, a posteriori, con quella indicata da Truman nel suo messaggio.

2) se si vuol assicurare il futuro della Grecia, occorre però anche un programma a lunga scadenza. Si propone un piano quinquennale, il cui costo viene stimato in 335 milioni di dollari. Di questa somma, afferma Porter con molto ottimismo, soltanto 148 milioni dovrebbero essere forniti dall’estero; ma osserva anche che condizione indispensabile del successo di questo piano, sarebbe la “tranquillità interna e un Governo greco più stabile e più efficiente”.

3) una piccola missione americana, composta di non più che 50 persone e guidata da un unico capo, dovrebbe controllare, con poteri ampissimi, l’impiego dei fondi. Inoltre esperti stranieri dovrebbero essere collocati nelle posizioni chiave dell’amministrazione greca perché, osserva giustamente Porter, un funzionario greco si troverebbe in molti casi nell’impossibilità di resistere alle pressioni locali nell’adempimento dei doveri prescrittigli dal programma di ricostruzione. La missione avrebbe il potere di interrompere l’elargizione dei fondi non solo in generale, ma
anche per ogni singolo capitolo di spesa qualora, a suo giudizio, questo o quell’ufficio greco si mostrasse riluttante a eseguire le istruzioni ricevute.
4) si suggeriscono inoltre molte riforme, tutte necessarie, indubbiamente, ma una più difficile dell’altra ad attuarsi: compressione delle spese militari, forti riduzioni negli organici della burocrazia, aumento del 50% nelle imposte sugli importatori e i commercianti.
5) un invito alla collaborazione viene rivolto “a quegli elementi politici di opposizione interessati a mantenere l’indipendenza del Paese”. Questo accenno, assieme ad altri indizi che erano stati notati negli ultimi tempi, ha rafforzato la convinzione generale che i liberali di Sofulis, l’unico partito rappresentato in Parlamento che sia sinora rimasto fuori dal Governo, entreranno, in una forma o nell’altra, nella composizione ministeriale. Il cerchio verrebbe così chiuso, e si potrebbe presentare all’opinione pubblica internazionale un fronte politico greco compatto e chiuso soltanto ai comunisti.

E’ evidente che la missione economica inglese che sinora ha guidato, con buone intenzioni ma con mezzi insufficienti, l’economia greca, sarà completamente e in breve tempo sostituita dagli americani. Alcuni dei suoi componenti sono già partiti e gli uffici si preparano a smobilitare. Per quanto riguarda la missione militare britannica, che contava circa 1.000 persone, si è detto in un primo tempo che avrebbe continuato ad occuparsi dell’istruzione delle truppe, mentre la nuova missione americana si sarebbe limitata a fornire l’armamento e sorvegliarne la distribuzione. Ma successivamente è stato annunciato che la missione inglese verrà ridotta progressivamente ad un piccolo gruppo di circa 40 ufficiali.

Le prospettive si presentavano più liete per la missione navale inglese. Si è ritenuto infatti che i legami tradizionali tra le due marine, il fatto che quasi tutti i bastimenti da guerra greci sono stati costruiti in Inghilterra e dipendono perciò dai cantiere e arsenalì inglesi per i pezzi di ricambio e per le munizioni, avrebbe reso indispensabile la permanenza della missione. E, dal lato puramente tecnico e operativo, ciò può essere anche esatto. Ma si tratterebbe in ogni caso di compiti limitati all’addestramento degli equipaggi e alla manutenzione delle navi. La parte direttrice passa rapidamente in mani americane. Si conferma anzi il giudizio espresso nel rapporto no 502/218 del 5 aprile. L’interesse americano in Grecia è prevalentemente aereo-navale. Non è stata ancora costituita una vera e propria missione, e quella inglese mantiene apparentemente intatte tutte le sue prerogative. Ma come addetto navale americano è stato già destinato ad Atene il Contrammiraglio Snackenberg, uno specialista di problemi aero-navali. E’ accompagnato da ufficiali superiori che hanno la qualifica di addetti navali aggiunti, e alcuni dei quali provengono dal Supply Corps e dai Marines; due specialità che non figurano normalmente nell’ufficio di un Addetto Navale, ma che sono invece indispensabili qualora si vogliono prendere in esame problemi di basi navali. Infine anche la missione di polizia inglese, si annuncia, non resterà in Grecia oltre la fine dell’anno in corso.
Il processo di sostituzione dell’influenza americana a quella inglese è dunque generale e inarrestabile, come già avevo previsto sin dal 15 marzo col mio rapporto no 321/157. E’ naturale che non si svolga senza frizioni, contrasti, tentativi di resistenza. A un ricevimento offerto dall’Ambasciata d’America, alla fine di marzo scorso, a tutto il Governo e il Corpo diplomatico, e che per l’autorità e magnificenza degli anfitrioni, l’affluenza e l’ossequio degli ospiti indigeni, poteva ben paragonarsi al ricevimento di un Proconsole Romano in qualche provincia del Medio Oriente nel 1° Secolo d. C., tutta l’Ambasciata Inglese, al completo, si è fatta notare per la sua assenza. Ma, a parte queste manifestazioni di risentimento personale che non debbono essere valutate oltre il segno del modesto pettegolezzo, si notano da parte inglese tentativi di affermare le vecchie posizioni in Grecia.

Se ne è avuto un curioso esempio in occasione della festa del 1° maggio. Come ho riferito a suo tempo, gli inglesi si erano giustamente preoccupati dello stato caotico ed illegale nel quale si trovano i sindacati operai di questo Paese; e a mezzo dell’Addetto del Lavoro inglese a Roma avevano concluso con il Governo (che allora era presieduto da Tsaldaris) un compromesso che porta appunto il nome di accordo Braine-Tsaldaris. Il Governo greco ha trovato poi il modo di non rispettare gli impegni assunti, o quanto meno di ritardarne l’esecuzione; e in occasione del 1° maggio era giunto sino a proibire, non solo ogni manifestazione, ma anche la sospensione del lavoro – una misura che aveva profondamente irritato sinanco le organizzazioni operaie di destra. L’Ambasciata d’Inghilterra è intervenuta all’ultimo momento con molta energia, e ha imposto al Governo di ritirare la sua decisione. Il 1° maggio è stato perciò festeggiato regolarmente.

Ma, nonostante questi tentativi sporadici, l’usura, se non la liquidazione, delle posizioni inglesi in un Paese ove il prestigio e il denaro contano sovra ogni altra cosa, procede rapida e fatale.

Gastone Guidotti

ASMAE, Telespresso N. 33294, (Ministero degli Affari Esteri - Ambasciata d’Italia)

Oggetto: Situazione interna in Grecia
Roma, 4 Ottobre 1948

Si trascrive qui appresso, quanto ha riferito la Missione italiana in Atene, in data 13 settembre u.s., sull’argomento in oggetto:

“Premesso che in Grecia, più ancora che altrove, la situazione politica interna è in funzione di quella internazionale, mi propongo di esaminare brevemente l’una e l’altra in relazione agli avvenimenti che si maturano in Macedonia. In questa regione,
fatale alla pace dei Balcani, si concentra attualmente una lotta il cui esito, in ultima analisi, potrebbe decidere ugualmente del regime interno della Grecia e della sua posizione come Stato nell’ordine delle Potenze.

Poiché la lotta si svolge, per ora e sinora, in quella forma moderna e ambigua che viene chiamata “guerra dei nervi”, chi si ponga a tale esame deve anzitutto sceverare i fatti dalle voci sparse ad arte. Le ultime settimane sono state particolarmente fertili in fantastiche dicerie. E’ stato affermato ad esempio che la settimana scorsa fosse imminente un colpo di mano: le bande comuniste dell’ELAS, e dietro ad esse gli jugoslavi (e nell’ombra la Russia) stavano per scendere dalle montagne, varcare le frontiere, occupare il porto e la città di Salonicco, e assicurare così al maggiore interessato quello sbocco all’Egeo che è la posta finale di tutta la partita. Le Potenze occidentali, informate della minaccia, avrebbero fatto pervenire un chiaro avvertimento alla Russia, e per renderlo ancora più persuasivo lo avrebbero sottolineato con le note dimostrazioni navali; squadra americana con la grande portaerei “Franklin Roosevelt”, annunciata visita della flotta inglese del Mediterraneo.

Dopo ripetute e discrete indagini credo di poter affermare con quasi assoluta certezza che la voce era falsa, una delle molte che nascono con tanta facilità al bar del Grande Bretagne. Resta naturalmente, in tutta la sua massiccia portata, il fatto della dimostrazione navale: una chiara e diretta indicazione delle forze che si affrontano ancora latenti in questo settore.

Nella stessa categoria di fantasmi deve porsi la voce dei razzi, o proiettili volanti, che sarebbero stati scorti nel cielo macedone, una voce di cui si è fatto autorevole ma incauto propagatore lo stesso Tsaldaris a Parigi. Poiché a un certo momento si invocava la testimonianza dei comandi inglesi, è giunta da questi una recisa smentita. Nella più onesta delle ipotesi si può ammettere che i segnali luminosi che usano scambiarsi le numerose bande annidate della regione dell’Olimpo siano stati presi per proiettili a razzo.

Ma non tutto ciò che avviene in Macedonia può essere qualificato fantasia o menzogna. Gli animi e le forze in contrasto vi sono da lungo tempo in fermento; nelle ultime settimane la tensione è degenerata in crisi, e la crisi minaccia ora di tradursi in conflitto aperto. Per intendere la precisa natura e i termini di quanto avviene occorre riassumere brevemente i precedenti. La rivolta comunista del dicembre 1944, soffocata con la forza nelle grandi città e nei centri abitati, si è trasformata nelle campagne in guerra civile permanente. Soprattutto nel Nord, ove la scarsità di comunicazioni, la natura spesso impervia del terreno circostante e, sovra ogni altra cosa, la prossimità delle frontiere mal guardate con la Jugoslavia, hanno favorito la formazione e l’attività di grosse bande comuniste. Che queste ricevano aiuti e soccorsi di ogni genere dalle formazioni militari jugoslave ammassate lungo la frontiera non è posto seriamente in dubbio da nessuno. A provarlo, del resto, basterebbe non soltanto l’ampiezza dei mezzi militari di cui dispongono le bande, ma anche e soprattutto l’obblittivo cui mira la loro attività, la coincidenza di questa attività con programmi apertamente sostenuti oltre frontiera. E’ facile indicare i punti più salienti di queste analogie. Mentre a Parigi e innanzi al Consiglio di Sicurezza dell’UNO l’attuale
regime greco viene definito come illegale, nato da elezioni fatte con la violenza, confermato da un plebiscito popolare viziato dal terrore, mentre queste accuse vengono sottolineate “in loco” con il ritiro del Ministro di Jugoslavia ad Atene e la “partenza” dell’Ambasciatore di Russia, l’EAM che non disconosce l’affiliazione con le bande dei “patrioti” e “democratici” operanti nel Nord, ripete le stesse accuse all’interno del Paese, sulla stampa sua, e le formula anche pubblicamente con indirizzi e proteste rivolte ai “popoli e governi” delle grandi potenze. Infine l’EAM fa risalire all’atteggiamento “violentemente antirusso” del Governo greco la responsabilità di quanto avviene in Macedonia; e dichiara che un governo veramente democratico, cioè di fatto controllato dall’EAM, non avrebbe nessuna difficoltà ad intendersi e accordarsi amichevolmente con gli Stati democratici vicini. Non precisa tuttavia in che modo e a quali condizioni.

Si noti che nel riferire obbiettivamente questi dati di fatto non si vuole esprimere un giudizio, morale o politico, sul merito di essi. La tesi principale sostenuta dall’EAM, che cioè è antinazionale e antistorico per la Grecia di seguire, unico stato balcanico, una politica antiussa, e che questa politica potrebbe un giorno degenerare in disastro, è un argomento solido che viene presentato e sviluppato con molta tenacia e abilità. Qui preme rilevare soltanto l’identità di condotta e di metodo tra la politica del gruppo di Potenze slave e quella dell’EAM.

Ciò che, semmai, può sorprendere l’osservatore straniero, ma è d’altra parte la conseguenza naturale di molte circostanze locali concomitanti, è che l’EAM, e i partiti che la compongono abbiano osato mettersi in così aperto contrasto con la politica ufficiale dello Stato, e abbiano potuto a lungo mantenersi legalmente in tale posizione. Mentre in tutti gli Stati i partiti di estrema sinistra hanno preferito seguire, nelle questioni che riguardano il territorio nazionale e l’interesse generale del Paese, una linea comune a quella degli altri grandi partiti, l’EAM, in Grecia, ha potuto sinora sostenere apertamente una linea diametralmente opposta. Ciò è dovuto principalmente: all’influenza inglese che per molto tempo ha creduto alla possibilità di una conciliazione delle fazioni; al desiderio greco di non sfidare la Russia; infine nel peculiare carattere costituzionale del regime che, nato da un incerto e contestato mandato, è vissuto per mesi nell’attesa della convalida popolare del referendum indetto per il 1° settembre.

Comunque sia, gli avvenimenti hanno preso ora una nuova e più decisa piega. Le bande dell’EAM hanno ricorso improvvisamente ad una nuova tattica: quella di minare le strade che portano dal sud al nord, in modo particolare l’arteria vitale di Larissa. Non è chi non veda la gravità della minaccia. Nell’ultimo mese 25 persone, agenti di UNRRA, gendarmi greci, conducenti militari inglesi, sono stati uccisi, e i loro veicoli sono saltati in aria. Mi è stato assicurato che, in pratica, le comunicazioni terrestri dal Nord al Sud sono cessate. Le formazioni militari greche e inglesi che presidiano la Macedonia, una regione – si badi – apertamente minacciata, possono essere rifornite unicamente per via marittima ed aerea. Se si pensa che il porto di Salonicco sarebbe certamente il primo, e non difficilmente raggiungibile, obbiettivo di un’azione diretta contro la Macedonia (sia in forma di offensiva nemica, sia nella nota
versione larvata di moto interno del tipo Azerbaigian), il carattere e la portata della nuova tattica dell’EAM appaiono chiare. Qui essa viene generalmente interpretata, non solo come il tentativo attuale di isolare strategicamente una regione contesa, o quanto meno anemizzarne le forze di difesa, ma anche come la prova generale di quanto potrebbe essere fatto in caso di conflitto aperto. E si noti bene: tentativo e prova generale sono in funzione di un attacco che, in forma larvata od aperta, dovrebbe venire sferrato dall’esterno contro una parte integrante del territorio nazionale.

E’ chiaro che nessun governo al potere, qualunque sia il suo titolo per esservi, potrebbe a lungo tollerare un simile stato di cose. Potrebbe cioè tollerare che un raggruppamento politico, legalmente riconosciuto e funzionante, continui ad appoggiare una simile azione. D’altra parte, i vari motivi e circostanze che si citavano più sopra, e che sinora hanno permesso il sussistere di tale anomalia, hanno cessato di operare, o la loro forza si è attenuata: le speranze inglesi di una riconciliazione sono svanite, l’antagonismo con la Russia si è fatto aperto e irrimediabile, il regime si sente forte della convalida popolare ottenuta il 1° Settembre.

E’ di fatto il Governo è passato risolutamente alla controffensiva. Non solo sono stati ristabiliti i tribunali militari, con poteri eccezionali e vastissimi, la cui competenza era stata temporaneamente sospesa nell’imminenza del plebiscito; ma la loro funzione, che prima era limitata alle regioni del Nord, è stata ora estesa a tutto il Paese. Si annunciano ora misure assai più gravi e più radicali. Si parla già apertamente dello scioglimento dell’EAM, e del partito comunista che ne costituisce il nerbo, e dell’arresto dei suoi capi. E’ evidente che il Governo giudica il momento favorevole per sfruttare gli errori e le intemperanze degli avversari e disfarsi di essi.

Al raggiungimento di questo scopo tutti i mezzi sono buoni, anche i colpi di mano e i proiettili volanti. Resta da vedere se il Governo greco oserà giungere sino alla soppressione del partito comunista, una misura che nessun Governo europeo del dopoguerra ha sinora sognato di prendere. Resta soprattutto da vedere se le Potenze occidentali, che, volenti o nolenti, sono venute a trovarsi nella posizione di avallanti dell’attuale regime greco, vorranno incoraggiarlo nel suo stato di presente euforia”.

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ASMAE, Telespresso 2224/748, (Ambasciata d’Italia Grecia - Ministero degli Affari Esteri)

Oggetto: Operazioni GRAMMOS
Atene, addì 16 Agosto 1948

Con il prossimo felice concludersi della battaglia pel Grammos sta per calare il sipario sulla fase unicamente militare della ribellione politica. Ma non per questo l’azione militare è chiusa e conclusa e sotto un diverso aspetto s’inizia ora la necessità
d’una serie di operazioni complementari – sempre di carattere militare – sulle quali mi propongo gettare un po’ di luce.

Il Presidente del Consiglio, rientrando dal Fronte (mentre sull’uscio dell’Aula delle sedute veniva da Lui fatto affiggere l’inaspettato ordine di chiusura del Parlamento greco), ha detto chiaramente che la battaglia del Grammos è virtualmente vinta e che la sua preoccupazione maggiore consiste ora nel predisporre il rastrellamento dei ribelli che infestano il Peloponneso.

Come da me previsto (mio telespresso n. 2084/690 del 3 agosto 1948), le forze nazionali ammontanti a circa otto Divisioni raggruppate in due Corpi d’Armata, partite dai due versanti della dorsale Grammos – Smolika, subito dopo la definitiva conquista dello Smolika, hanno operato la loro giunzione alla fine dello scorso mese di luglio.

Costituito così l’agognato fronte unico, lo sforzo principale dell’esercito ellenico è stato – come si prevedeva – subito diretto sulle due ali estreme dello schieramento.


Esse sono ora in condizione di effettuare un attacco frontale e sui fianchi del grosso delle forze di Markos che, ridotte in una zona selvaggiamente montuosa di circa 500 chilometri quadrati, si apprestano a sostenere l’urto dietro la protezione di tutta una serie di difese, in parte naturali, in parte appartenenti all’antica linea Metaxas, in parte, infine, da loro stesse predisposte.

Si tratta però, ormai, di una questione di tempo, forse anche di pochissimo tempo, poiché è da ritenersi, con il massimo di certezza che è consentito in materia di operazioni militari, che prima dell’apparire della cattiva stagione sulle montagne, l’operazione possa essere felicemente conclusa.

Con ciò potrà dirsi terminato un capitolo della tormentata storia ellenica di questo dopoguerra.

Ma altri problemi – non meno ardui, non meno difficili – già urgono alle porte e qui di seguito mi riprometto di esaminare brevemente quelli che rivestono un carattere militare.

Essi sono essenzialmente due e, precisamente, quello del mantenimento delle posizioni così faticosamente raggiunte e quello della liquidazione del banditismo organizzato nel rimanente territorio greco.

Conquistato il Grammos sarà necessario servirsene non solo a scopo puramente negativo – cioè togliendo ai guerriglieri la possibilità di usare delle sue gole come di un comodo rifugio – ma, anche, per fare di esso un primo bastione per controllare l’intera frontiera albanese.
Ciò richiederà delle forze, molte forze (a meno che sopravvengano dei fatti politici tali da dare garanzie su di un mutato atteggiamento del blocco slavo, il che, per ora, non è il caso di pensare) e non è da stupirsi se già fin d’ora Governo e Stato Maggiore ellenico si oppongono ad una qualsiasi riduzione negli effettivi dell’esercito.

Ma, specialmente, altre forze saranno richieste per le grandi operazioni di rastrellamento che sono ancora da compiere sul territorio ellenico.

Non è, infatti, da escludere che una certa aliquota delle formazioni partigiane, ora sul Grammos, riesca a sfuggire alla cattura infiltrandosi fra le colonne elleniche e raggiungendo le bande operanti più a sud; è, anzi, questa un’ipotesi da ritenersi piuttosto verosimile, tanto più che, secondo quanto risulta in base a tutti gli elementi finora in possesso, mentre Markos si sarebbe già rifugiato in territorio albanese, il grosso delle sue forze si appresta a resistere sul Grammos sino alle ultime possibilità.

In ogni modo, una recentissima comunicazione dello Stato Maggiore Ellenico ha fornito precisazioni, finora mantenute gelosamente riservate, in merito all’entità ed alle dislocazioni attuali delle formazioni partigiane: tali elementi sono stati riportati nella carta e nell’elenco allegati dai quali ci si può formare un’idea di quale sia l’attuale situazione del banditismo organizzato sul territorio ellenico.

Come è la conquista del Grammos – se può ritenersi un grosso passo in avanti nella via della liquidazione del banditismo – anzi la conditio sine qua non per ottenere tale risultato – lascia dietro di sé la necessità di condurre tutta una serie di operazioni militari complementari vere e proprie di rilevante entità.

Il primo problema da risolvere – e lo ha già accennato il Presidente del Consiglio – sarà quello del rastrellamento delle formazioni partigiane del Peloponneso. Queste hanno operato, in questi ultimi mesi, praticamente indisturbate e hanno avuto il tempo sufficiente per fortificarsi sulle montagne e costituire, a loro protezione, tutta una rete di spionaggio e di favoreggiamento – spontaneo o coatto che sia. Per di più, anzi, caratterizzare la loro azione con il termine esso, che non possedevano vere e proprie basi di appoggio, si sono guardate bene dall’infierire sulle popolazioni rurali limitandosi a prelevare, pagando, quanto loro abbisognasse, svolgendo fra di esse opera di propaganda e persuasione e minacciando rappresaglie soltanto nel caso in cui venissero tradite.

L’aspetto di questa nuova fase di banditismo darà non poca tribolazione. Ho infatti detto le bande agirono in questo tempo indisturbate, ma devo spiegare che la parola indisturbate dev’essere letta nel senso che i 2.500 banditi non sono affatto imbrigliati dai 18.000 regolari opposti loro e sin’oggi non potuto aumentare a causa dello sforzo decisivo che richiedeva l’impiego totale delle forze armate al Nord.

Si tratta dunque di operazioni difficilissime per le quali evidentemente l’azione del solo esercito non è più necessaria e sufficiente ma complementare e va inquadrata in un programma più vasto di carattere politico.

Infatti la situazione nel Peloponneso si complica perché al focolaio di banditismo militarizzato politico si sommano le varie altre specie di banditismo che per meglio distinguere indicherò con la parola “istituzionale”. Voglio cioè dire il
banditismo ordinario abituale in quella regione in cui s’interpone oggi quello partigiano degli Xites (partigiani di destra o così detti partigiani di Zervas) e quello dei partiti locali che in quel Paese sono in eterna lotta fra loro.

Le complicazioni sono perciò su questo terreno di spiccata natura interna ma non per questo meno gravi a trattare e possono ben illustrare e giustificare la frase del Signor Sofulis circa la sua “preoccupazione” per le operazioni nel Peloponneso (mio telegramma n. 217 del 14 agosto 1948) e per il rastrellamento definitivo del banditismo militarizzato in tutta la Grecia.

Ma la tela che cala sulla scena del Grammos non annuncia soltanto questo nuovo atto di natura puramente militare della vita ellenica; qualcosa di ben più grave si profila all’orizzonte della scena politica della Nazione, qualcosa che dà certamente adito a ben maggiori preoccupazioni al Signor Sofulis e di cui riferisco in altro rapporto.

Sidney Ricotti

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ASMAE, N. 79/19 – Riservato (Ambasciata d’Italia Grecia - Ministero degli Affari Esteri)
Atene, 8 Gennaio 1952

Sua Eccellenza
l’Onorevole Alcide DE GASPERI
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri
Ministro degli Affari Esteri
ROMA

Signor Ministro,

Nel primo rapporto riassuntivo della situazione politica ellenica, (da me) inviato (all’Eccellenza Vostra) esattamente un anno fa (N. 97/35 dell’11 Gennaio 1951), cercavo di rilevare i riposti motivi che tale situazione rendono, ad occhi stranieri, tanto complessa e così singolare. E credevo individuarli nel peso preminente che, su ogni aspetto della vita di questo Paese, esercitano talune forze estranee all’amministrazione, al Parlamento ed agli stessi esponenti dei vari partiti: i notabili, le Ambasciate anglo-sassoni ed il Re.

Gli avvenimenti del 1951 non hanno fatto, mi sembra, che confermare l’attendibilità di questo modo di vedere; e se anche, ad un certo momento, una figura è sembrata campeggiare sulla scena ed imporsi, quella del Maresciallo Papagos, all’ora della resa dei conti si è dovuto riconoscere quanto le sue possibilità reali di azione fossero circoscritte e dipendenti dall’altrui arcano volere.
L’episodio Papagos è stato in Grecia senza dubbio il più saliente fra gli avvenimenti politici dell’anno trascorso: sicché, dalla modesta portata del suo sostanziale valore è dato giudicare quanto tutto il resto non abbia avuto che ben scarso interesse.

Sullo scorcio del 1950, il frantumarsi del partito populista in vari gruppi contrastanti fra loro ed infine l’uscita del capo di esso Tsaldaris dal governo tripartito, avevano pericolosamente isolato il gabinetto Venizelos-Papandreou, arbitro dei cui destini diventava inopinatamente il generale Plastiras col proprio gruppo di sinistra moderata, l’E.P.E.K.

Rendendosi conto di tale situazione, e del declinante prestigio del suo collega Papandreou; di fronte alla crescente impazienza degli Americani per l’instabilità governativa in un rovinoso quadro economico, Venizelos si vide costretto ad avvicinarsi decisamente a Plastiras ed a stabilire con lui le premesse di una nuova coalizione.

Il Generale respinse la proposta di entrare a far parte del Governo ma offerse l’appoggio del proprio partito a condizione che subito fossero indette le elezioni amministrative e, nel corso dell’anno, avessero luogo quelle politiche. Venizelos dovette inchinarsi a tali pretese.

I risultati delle elezioni amministrative, le prime a svolgersi in Grecia dal 1934, palesarono un orientamento così anticomunista nonché tale sfiducia per i partiti di centro, che Venizelos si sentì meglio incoraggiato ad annunciare lo scioglimento della Camera per la fine di giugno e, per il mese di settembre, le nuove elezioni.

In quella – 30 Maggio – scoprì la crisi Papagos.

2.- La figura di questo vecchio soldato era circondata in Grecia da una specie di alone di leggenda.

Anima della resistenza nel 1940, vincitore della guerriglia contro i comunisti, organizzatore capace, di rare e specchiate virtù civili e familiari, sdegnoso di intrighi, indifferente agli onori della vita pubblica, godeva fra le Forze Armate di un enorme prestigio e di grandissima considerazione in ogni classe sociale: forse perché in lui sembrava scorgersi una singolare eccezione al comune carattere greco. Ma poiché, tale carattere non può concepire personalità se non in funzione della vita pubblica, tutti, plaudendo a Papagos, auspicavano di vederlo prendere le redini del potere: senza curarsi di sapere se egli, dell’uomo politico, possedesse le qualità necessarie.

Malgrado la fermissima fede monarchica del Maresciallo, questa sua popolarità non andava troppo a genio a Re Paolo ed in particolare alla Regina, i quali temevano di vedere un giorno in lui un Primo Ministro con atteggiamenti dittatoriali. I Sovrani prestarono pertanto troppo compiacentemente l’orecchio e lasciarono un po’ troppo allentate le briglie a taluni funzionari della Corte, di abbastanza dubbia moralità che, per avere provato quanto fosse incorruttibile e severo il Papagos, gli andavano muovendo una guerra di mormorazioni e di intrighi. Costoro naturalmente avevano trovato alleati presso l’Ambasciata Britannica, ostile al Maresciallo da vecchia data, e presso non pochi esponenti politici i quali, dopo averne invano cercato
di arruolar Papagos fra le proprie fila per farsene un comodo paravento, paventavano una sua candidatura alle future elezioni.

Più volte il Maresciallo si era lagnato col Re per la sorda campagna che sentiva organizzarsi alle spalle: non aveva ottenuto che vaghe e generiche assicurazioni. Mentre egli stava compiendo un viaggio di ispezione alle frontiere settentrionali, alcuni giornali lo accusarono apertamente di ambizioni politiche e di tramare un colpo di stato. Papagos scoperse gli autori della campagna e ne identificò gli ispiratori: tutta gente del gabinetto politico del Re od alti Ufficiali addetti alla sua persona. Si recò dal Sovrano e ne chiese l’allontanamento. Di fronte ad un netto rifiuto del Re, presentò seduta stante le sue dimissioni da Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale.

Re Paolo ed il Governo mostrarono una eccessiva precipitazione ad accettare ed a sanzionare la decisione del Maresciallo, nonché a manovrare in modo da rendere una riconciliazione impossibile. Senoche l’annuncio dell’avvenimento inatteso sollevò in tutto il Paese una ondata di riprovazione e di sdegno: il Re, la Corte ed i Ministri furono unanimamente accusati di ingratiudine e di insipienza, mentre la popolarità di Papagos, in cui si vedeva la vittima innocente di un intrigo, saliva alle stelle.

Il più pericoloso contraccolpo si ebbe però nell’esercito, ove alcune unità, guidate da Ufficiali appartenenti all’Associazione Militare “IDEA” e devotissimi al Maresciallo, tentarono, nella notte sul 31 Maggio, un pronunciamento tosto sedato, per fortuna senza spargimento di sangue (oggi essi sono sotto Consiglio di guerra per volere del Re e malgrado i tentativi di questo Ambasciatore d’America di far sospendere il processo a loro carico).

3.- Al momento di liquidare Papagos, i capi dei vari partiti avevano trovato modo di fargli dichiarar formalmente che egli si sarebbe astenuto da qualsiasi attività politica e, soprattutto, non si sarebbe presentato alle future elezioni.

Rassicurati su questo punto che tutti preoccupava e senza gran che curarsi della profonda crisi morale che stava ancora attraversando il Paese, Venizelos, Plastiras e Tsaldaris si accordarono su ciò che maggiormente stava loro a cuore: assicurarsi un agevole, e per ciascuno di essi equo, successo alla prossima consultazione. Decisero pertanto di far approvare una legge elettorale il cui meccanismo, detto della “proporzionale rinforzata” avrebbe automaticamente messo in vantaggio i partiti più numerosi. Il loro collega Papandreu, non ammesso all’intrigo, appena accortosi di essere stato giocato, diede le dimissioni.

Al Governo fu giocoforza dimettersi. Il Re lanciò un ennesimo proclama ingiungendo ai capi partito di formare un gabinetto di unione nazionale: proclama che naturalmente rimase senza alcun seguito.

Venizelos da solo costituì un governo, forte ormai dell’appoggio del generale Plastiras. Subito ebbe ad affrontare una dura prova: quella dello sciopero generale dei Funzionari Statali che durante 15 giorni paralizzò completamente la vita del Paese. Fortemente appoggiato dall’Ambasciatore d’America, il Presidente del Consiglio seppe resistere e non cedette ad alcuna delle richieste degli scioperanti. Ottenne, è
vero, un successo politico ma con questo non fu certo risolto uno degli aspetti più gravi della crisi che travaglia la Grecia.

Votata appena la legge elettorale, il 30 Luglio la Camera fu sciolta e le elezioni indette per il 9 Settembre. La sera stessa si verificò un inatteso colpo di scena: il Maresciallo Papagos annunciò la decisione di presentare la propria candidatura.

4.- La notizia giunta pressoché inaspettata suscitò effervescenza generale.
Fra il pubblico in genere la prima reazione fu favorevolissima ed una schiacciante vittoria del Maresciallo senz’altro scontata. Per i parlamentari professionisti la candidatura Papagos rappresentava senza dubbio un grossissimo guaio: turbava la loro routine introducendo nel gioco un elemento nuovo, ricco di popularità e di prestigio. Un grosso successo del Maresciallo avrebbe rischiato di scuotere troppe clientele, troppo interessi e troppo comode posizioni perché fra gruppi differenti ed anche rivali non sorgesse subito una specie di solidarietà difensiva volta a combattere il concorrente poco gradito nel corso della battaglia elettorale ed a stabilire le premesse per rendergli difficile l’azione in caso di conquista del potere.

Mesi da parte problemi, programmi e dottrine, la campagna adunque si imperniò unicamente sulla questione Papagos. Fu una lotta accanita, un carosello rabbioso cui, senza alcun apparente timore di compromettersi, la Corona prese attivissima parte. È lecito anzi affermare che due soli furono i protagonisti: Papagos ed il Re, al quale ultimo tenevano dietro tutti gli altri partiti e, per vero dire, in tono, questi ultimi, alquanto minore.

Il Sovrano non perdette occasione per manifestare apertamente i suoi sentimenti di ostilità al Maresciallo: rifiutò di riceverlo, gli impartì secche lezioni di diritto costituzionale attraverso pubblici comunicati, si espresse assai duramente nei suoi confronti in varie interviste, autorizzò, lui, Capo Supremo delle Forze Armate, la divulgazione di notizie circa l’esistenza di società segrete in seno dell’esercito per accusare Papagos di averle create.

Dal canto suo il Maresciallo, se sostenne gli attacchi degli avversari, ed in primo luogo del Re, con pazienza e moderazione esemplari, si rivelò in pari tempo lottatore non sufficientemente preparato alla battaglia politica come è qui concepita.

Apparve in primo luogo l’inesistenza di un suo vero e proprio programma. I Greci volevano Papagos al governo soprattutto perché egli rappresentava un nome nuovo, estraneo ai partiti su cui era interessante puntare. Egli aveva accettato la designazione ma adesso era palese il suo impaccio, non sapendo cosa promettere e soprattutto essendo incapace di proclamarlo in termini efficaci e vistosi: trascurando di ricordare che, per questo pubblico, non ha interesse tanto la sincera volontà di essere onesti quanto il modo brillante di saperla affermare.

In secondo luogo egli si trovò subito assai mal circondato. Non aveva un partito sulla cui organizzazione appoggiarsi ed il suo nome servì da bandiera ad altri isolati, ad ambiziosi e malcontenti, a perpetui disidenti di ogni raggruppamento ed a estremisti pericolosi, che accorrendo fra le sue fila ed associandosi sotto il nome
generico di “Raggruppamento Ellenico” non espressero alcuna idea precisa mentre richiamarono l’attenzione sui loro trascorsi non sempre puliti.

Da ultimo, la reazione di Papagos alla campagna sferratagli contro non piacque. Si aspettava un suo contrattacco, si desiderava che egli rispondesse alle offese con atti di accusa, alle calunnie con diffamazioni. Egli taceva sdegnoso ed il pubblico ne era spazientito: come di un lottatore che ci si attende aggressivo e che si dimostra invece eccessivamente disposto ad incassare colpi dall’avversario.

Il carosello durò tutto il mese di Agosto e si sarebbe detto di assistere, in un’atmosfera di caldo asfissiante, ad un combattimento fra due soli campioni: desiderosi, l’uno di abbattere l’altro e questi di vincere ai punti.

Di tanta e non edificantissima giostra faceva il moderatore, piuttosto che l’arbitro, l’Ambasciatore d’America, il quale, parteggiando in cuor suo per Papagos ma come stordito dalla incongruenza della zuffa, interveniva di quanto in quanto per placarne qualche aspetto violento e più spropositato.

Si votò il 9 Settembre senza che si verificassero incidenti ed i risultati della consultazione dimostrarono che la battaglia, lungi dal trascinare, non aveva convinto nessuno.

Papagos, che avrebbe dovuto trionfare, usciva sì vincitore ma senza ottenere la maggioranza assoluta (72 deputati saliti poi a 110 per il gioco dei resti).

Plastiras - il cui partito rappresentava senza dubbio una forza reale corrispondente alle difficili condizioni di vita ellenica del momento – si assicurava un successo rilevante (40 seggi al primo turno e 72 in tutto). I Liberali di Venizelos riuscivano abbastanza a piazzarsi terzi (25 seggi saliti alla fine a 56).

Tutti gli altri partiti uscivano dalle elezioni letteralmente polverizzati: il che non era certo un gran male.

5.- Si trattava ora di formare un governo: l’impresa si rivelò lunga e tutt’altro che facile.

Un gabinetto di coalizione avrebbe rappresentato la formula migliore e, dati i risultati delle elezioni, la più logica. Venizelos e Plastiras per parte loro si dichiararono pronti a parteciparvi. Papagos invece ricusò la proposta: voleva governare da solo, riformare la legge elettorale, e bandire subito nuove elezioni nella speranza di assicurarsi più solide basi.

A norma delle consuetudini parlamentari, il Maresciallo, detenendo la maggioranza relativa, avrebbe dovuto almeno ricevere l’incarico di tentare la composizione del Governo. Il Sovrano non glielo affidò riuscendo ad imporre un gabinetto Plastiras – Venizelos che disponeva di un’insignificante maggioranza (4 voti).

E’ il governo attualmente al potere: di tendenza centrista, composto di personalità non monarchiche per opinione od origine ma ora strettamente legate alla Corona per meglio difendersi contro Papagos. Il timore di vederlo Primo Ministro, infatti, tiene unita questa singolare amministrazione procurandole l’appoggio del gruppo socialista che non ne fa parte.

Ciò che invece il Gabinetto è riuscito a portar a termine, con impensata rapidità, è la discussione della nuova Costituzione che dopo quasi trent’anni d’incertezze viene a dare alla fine un fondamento giuridico alle istituzioni statali. Approvata in Parlamento il 31 Dicembre la Costituzione è stata sanzionata dal Re il 1° Gennaio 1952 e subito è entrata in funzione.

6. Dall’insieme degli avvenimenti sopra esposti è lecito trarre anzitutto una constatazione, e cioè, che arbitro della vita politica ellenica è stato, nel 1951, il Sovrano. Egli ha osato affrontare di petto la situazione che andava creandosi a causa della crescente popularità del Maresciallo Papagos; non ha esitato a mettersi in battaglia contro di lui, a contrastargli la vittoria alle elezioni ed a rifiutargli alla fine l’incarico di formare il Governo che, a rigor di termini, gli sarebbe spettato.

Dal punto di vista dei risultati immediati che egli si proponeva raggiungere, la partita si è senza dubbio chiusa, per Re Paolo, all’attivo: Papagos non è andato al Governo, la sua posizione è men salda di prima, mentre tutto il vecchio mondo parlamentare, per combatterlo, va raccogliendosi sotto il vessillo della Monarchia. Ma in quanto al valore effettivo di questi successi, sono indotto a giudicarlo assai scarso.

A parte il fatto che in questa lotta il Sovrano ha alienato non poco della propria popularità, egli mi sembra aver troppo esposto la Corona ed averle fatto perdere alquanto prestigio per una causa che, se personalmente poteva stargli a cuore, in realtà non usciva, come non esce, dal quadro delle vicende interne più meschine, senza aver alcun importante riflesso nei confronti dei gravi problemi dell’ora. Ha agito insomma con maggior cocciuttaggine e furberia che non con saggezza e larga visione dei superiori interessi del suo Paese.

Le vicende che ho riassunte, le bizze della Regina, i furori del Re, gli intrighi della Corte, le schermaglie di Plastiras e di Venizelos, i gesti del Maresciallo Papagos: tutto ciò non è che cronaca, piccola cronaca di avvenimenti di tipo prettamente balcanico, che sarebbero divertenti, più che interessanti, se il Paese fosse prospero e l’atmosfera serena.

Il che proprio, per la Grecia, non è.

Nel corso del 1951 la crisi che l’Europa Occidentale attraversa – economico, morale e politica – si è andata aggravando qui assai più che altrove poiché il corpo su cui tale crisi agisce è più di ogni altro povero di linfa e debole di struttura. Lo scarso patrimonio nazionale, già gravemente intaccato, e gli aiuti americani, fortemente ridotti, servono appena a far vivere giorno per giorno ed a mantenere in piedi plebisciti e praticamente inutili organismi burocratici. Si assiste quindi ad un preoccupante fenomeno di impoverimento, al quale la classe politica è incapace di porre rimedio anche perché troppo legata ai canoni di vecchie dottrine e per di più tarata dal
congenito individualismo, dal costume dell’intrigare e dal vizio di troppo comprare e di lasciarsi corrompere.

Non sono, credo, da temere movimenti interni né azioni dirette di marca comunista: l’orrore per i rossi, derivante dagli ancor freschi ricordi della guerra civile è pressoché unanime e certo ha profonde radici. Ma il terreno appare d’altra parte troppo fecondo perché i commissi non cerchino di approfittarne accelerando e aggravando subdolamente la carenza degli organismi amministrativi e la confusione economica, nonché premendo su quel tasto nazionalista cui i Greci sono tanto sensibili. Il nazionalismo è il miglior strumento di cui dispongono gli estremisti di sinistra là dove non possono legalmente operare. E così si assiste al ripetersi di fastidiosi incidenti con i turchi, mentre si eccitano incongrue campagne irredentiste per Cipro e l’Epiro, utili per esaltare le folle e per creare imbarazzi al governo, ma non certo fatte per rinsaldare l’amicizia di questo popolo con i suoi vicini.

Rimane di abbastanza saldo l’esercito, che non ha risentito troppo della crisi Papagos ma tuttavia è ben lungi dal possedere quella forza che non soltanto da parte greca sembra volerlisi attribuire. Come ho già riferito, esso è infatti un buon nucleo di 140 mila uomini ben addestrati ma scarsissimo di artiglieria, appoggiato a un sistema di servizi ben studiato ed efficiente in tempo di pace ma assai vulnerabile in caso di ostilità. Il tutto isolato in un settore pericoloso e dipendente, per vivere e per combattere, dal pronto affluire di soccorsi alleati.

In conclusione, nel corso degli scorsi dodici mesi le condizioni interne della Grecia sono notevolmente, ed anche visibilmente, peggiorate. Le perplessità che si manifestano da parte degli osservatori stranieri sulla solidità strutturale di questo paese, sulla sua vitalità economica e sulla sua reale efficienza sembrano pertanto essere oggi giustificate.

Mi consenta tuttavia l’Eccellenza Vostra di esprimere ancora una volta, ad un anno di distanza e malgrado gli aspetti negativi della situazione interna greca, un ragionato convincimento: quello della necessità di aiutare e di sostenere questo paese, la cui posizione, considerata nel quadro dello schieramento occidentale, è appunto tanto più importante quanto più vulnerabile.

Ciò bene intendono gli Americani, ogni giorno più esasperati dalle carenze, dalle astuzie e dalle miserie greche, ma forzatamente convinti della necessità di non lasciar spezzare questo malfermo anello della catena che deve sbarrare ad est le difese del mondo occidentale.

Voglia gradire, Signor Ministro, gli atti del mio profondo ossequio.

Adolfo Alessandrini
ASMAE, Ministero degli Affari Esteri

Oggetto: Visita Venizelos ad Ankara
Roma, 18 Febbraio 1952

L’Ambasciata ad Ankara in data 1° corr. Ha comunicato quanto appresso:
"Ho fatto visita ieri al Vice Presidente del Consiglio ellenico Sig. Sofokles Venizelos nell’Ambasciata di Grecia e sono stato da lui trattenuto in cordiale conversazione oltre un’ora. Poiché è probabile che su taluni degli argomenti da lui toccati nel colloquio di ieri egli si soffermerà nelle prossime conversazioni con Vostra Eccellenza a Roma ritengo opportuno riassumerli qui appresso.

1. Il Sig. Venizelos ha messo in rilievo, con parole di viva simpatia, l’intimità dei rapporti che si è ristabilita tra i due Paesi, grazie, mi ha detto, alla grande comprensione e alla sincera volontà, dimostrate dal Governo di Vostra Eccellenza, di risolvere con spirito di amicizia i problemi pendenti tra i due paesi e soprattutto quello, così delicato, delle riparazioni, nel quale, egli ha detto, se si è avuto qualche ritardo esso non è dovuto all’Italia, bensì alla lentezza e talvolta alle materiali difficoltà della Grecia di fornire le materie prime o di dare tempestive risposte.

A questo riavvicinamento ha contribuito in misura determinante (ripeto le sue stesse parole) l’azione chiarificatrice, dinamica, amichevole dell’Ambasciatore Alessandrini. Un elemento che contribuì, negli anni della guerra, a non portare all’estrema tensione l’ostilità del popolo greco, è stato il contegno umano delle nostre truppe, così diverso da quello dei comandi e dei militari germanici. Molti soldati italiani, al momento dell’armistizio, furono sottratti alle rappresaglie tedesche dalla popolazione che si adoperò a nasconderli e ad assisterli con spirito di simpatia e di riconoscenza. Tutti questi fattori, mi ha detto il Sig. Venizelos, hanno concorso a far dimenticare il passato e a far nuovamente fiorire una cordiale, fiduciosa amicizia che sarà suggellata dal prossimo incontro di Roma.

2. A rafforzare ancor più questa collaborazione concorrerà la comune politica che Grecia e Italia perseguiranno, insieme alla Turchia, per la difesa del Mediterraneo Orientale. I tre paesi si troveranno a far parte di una stessa organizzazione difensiva, a seguito dell’inquadramento della Turchia e della Grecia nel Comando di Eisenhower, anzi, come si spera, sotto il comune comando dell’Ammiraglio Carney. Quest’ultima è infatti la soluzione, mi ha confermato Venizelos, che Grecia e Turchia appoggiano senza esitazioni, consapevoli della necessità di costituire un blocco di forze della maggiore possibile entità.

Con il Governo e coi Comandi Militari turchi è stato preso in considerazione, durante questa visita, il problema della difesa dei Balcani, benché, a quanto mi è sembrato di comprendere, il problema non sia stato approfondito come i greci avrebbero desiderato. Venizelos mi ha accennato che il Presidente della Repubblica turca, Sig. Celal Bayar, col quale ha parlato dell’argomento, è stato assai esplicito nel
sostenere la necessità di organizzare la difesa balcanica giacché il pericolo maggiore per la Turchia e la Grecia è costituito da invasioni provenienti dal Danubio. Il Signor Venizelos mi ha detto che l’inserimento della Turchia nel SHAPE, in contrasto con le pretese britanniche di inquadrarla nel SACKE, era assolutamente indispensabile per imbastire un primo piano difensivo balcanico come pure per indurre la Jugoslavia a collaborare a tale piano con prospettiva di successo. Venizelos ha molto insistito sulla necessità di ottenere la collaborazione militare della Jugoslavia. Egli mi ha tratteggiato le difficoltà che presenta la difesa della Tracia e della Macedonia, data la debolezza della frontiera, così ravvicinata al mare che non permette una densità sufficiente di apprestamenti e di forze. E’ perciò convinto della necessità, non appena si determinasse un conflitto, di migliorare tale situazione spingendo rapidamente verso il nord il fronte balcanico. Su questo punto mi ha ripetuto quanto altre volte egli ha dichiarato sia all’Ambasciatore Alessandrini sia in interviste alla stampa che occorre fare dei territori greci e turchi una base di lancio per arrivare, quando le circostanze lo consentano, al Danubio. E’ questa evidentemente una delle idee su cui più volentieri si sofferma.

3. Per connessione di argomento siamo venuti a parlare della Jugoslavia. Venizelos ha cominciato col rilevare che essa è un paese comunista e che fino a qualche tempo fa la situazione interna jugoslava non aveva mancato di destare in lui qualche preoccupazione; da qualche tempo tuttavia aveva l’impressione che tale situazione fosse migliorata. Dal punto di vista del potenziale militare la Jugoslavia – mi ha detto – non rappresenta ogni gran cosa. Ma gli americani intendono rafforzarla con forniture militari, dietro la garanzia di un’assistenza e di controlli che la Jugoslavia ha accettato. Occorre ora procedere al coordinamento degli sforzi. Venizelos mi ha riferito che l’Addetto Militare Jugoslavo ad Ankara gli ha dichiarato, alla presenza del Ministro degli Esteri Koprulu, che la Jugoslavia in caso di guerra marcerà senza alcuna esitazione a fianco della Grecia e della Turchia. Anche a me, del resto, questo Ambasciatore jugoslavo mi ha assicurato, con il tono di chi riferisce una notizia precisa o indiscussa, che la collaborazione del suo paese alle Potenze occidentali è cosa sicura, ancorché la Jugoslavia non intenda far parte dell’organizzazione atlantica.

Sono accenni, ancora vaghi e non precisi, ma non perciò meno importanti e meritevoli di attenzione, della possibilità di un nuovo blocco balcanico: questione che c’interessa direttamente e vitalmente. Il fatto ch’esso possa prendere forma nell’ambito del comando mediterraneo dell’Ammiraglio Carney ci offre la possibilità di seguirne gli sviluppi e considerare la possibilità e i modi di una nostra collaborazione.

4. Dalla situazione della Jugoslavia il Sig. Venizelos è passato a parlare della situazione dei paesi balcanici oltre la cortina di ferro. Tutte le notizie in suo possesso concordano nel far risaltare l’avversione crescente di quei paesi al regime comunista e alla Russia. Venizelos ne trae la conseguenza che in caso di conflitto questa avversione potrebbe assumere forza maggiore e più preciso rilievo in modo di indebolire notevolmente lo sforzo militare dei paesi satelliti.
5. Infine Venizelos mi ha accennato all’assoluta necessità di associare la Germania alla difesa dell’Europa occidentale. Senza di essa si avrebbe il vuoto nel centro d’Europa e vi sarebbe per lo meno da dubitare che la Francia, trovandosi a sostenere, fin del primo momento, tutto l’urto dell’offensiva sovietica, sarebbe in grado di resistervi, data anche l’attuale situazione dello spirito pubblico francese. D’altro canto l’assenza della Germania importerebbe la necessità di arretrare il fronte occidentale al Reno con grave pericolo dei Balcani e dell’Italia che resterebbero scoperti.

6. Il Signor Venizelos è convinto assertore della necessità dell’Unione Europea che troverà la prima base nell’unificazione, non solo delle forze armate, bensì della politica cui queste forze dovranno obbedire. I piccoli e medi paesi, mi ha detto, non hanno più ormai alcuna possibilità di difendersi isolatamente. Egli è convinto che la formula federale consentirebbe di salvare le posizioni europee in Africa portando i rapporti coi paesi africani, che oggi lottano per la loro autonomia, dal piano di subordinazione a una singola potenza su quello della collaborazione con tutti i paesi europei. Occorre, cioè, secondo l’uomo di stato greco, uscire dalle vecchie tradizioni coloniali e imperialiste per mettersi sulle vie nuove rispondenti all’evoluzione delle idee e della struttura politica mondiale. Solo in tal modo potrà salvarsi quell’unione dell’Africa all’Europa che consentirà a quest’ultima di riprendere, con larghezza di spazi e di risorse, una nuova funzione nel mondo e riservare l’empito delle sue energie, compresse in territori nazionali troppo angusti, in un continente immenso e quasi completamente vuoto.

Su tutte le questioni discusse ho avuto l’impressione di trovarmi in presenza di una personalità dalle vedute ampie, equilibrate, aperte alle esigenze dei tempi, buon conoscitore dell’Italia, di cui parla molto bene la lingua”.

In data 4 corrente ha comunicato:
“Il Vice Presidente del Consiglio greco e Ministro degli Affari Esteri, Signor Sofokles Venizelos, si è trattenuto in visita ufficiale, da mercoledì 30 gennaio a sabato 2 febbraio, ad Ankara dove è stato ricevuto con manifestazioni di speciale solennità. Il Governo turco ha tenuto a mancare, con la cordialità delle accoglienze, l’importanza che annette a una solidarietà sempre più intima e operante tra i due paesi, mettendo in luce i motivi di collaborazione e prestandosi a ricercare, insieme all’ospite e ai suoi consiglieri politici, nuovi capi di collaborazione suscettibili di allargare e rafforzare i vincoli di unione. Alludo specialmente al progetto, di iniziativa del Bakkalbasci, di promuovere un’unione doganale tra i due paesi, al quale i turchi sembrano prestar, in linea di principio, una favorevole attenzione.

1. In una parola questo Governo ha tenuto a ostentare un’intimità di rapporti che, in un certo senso, è un fatto nuovo, dato che fino ad ora tutte le “avances” della Grecia aveva risposto con una freddezza che quasi rasentava il disinteresse. Così la Turchia non aveva sentito la necessità di associare la Grecia ai suoi reiterati passi a Washington per essere inclusa nel Patto
Atlantico, nè aveva aderito all’invito greco di studiare a fondo i problemi della comune difesa, nè risposto al desiderio greco di procedere all’integrazione, o di precisare la portata degli accordi politici e di collaborazione militare che legano i due paesi, nè la stampa turca aveva risparmiato, anche in tono virulento, talvolta persino sprezzante, gli attacchi alla Grecia per le sue pretese su Cipro, nè le autorità turche si erano astenute dal procedere con mano pesante contro i pescatori greci che dalle isole dell’Egeo sconfinano nelle acque territoriali dell’Anatolia. Si era così creata un’atmosfera che mal rispondeva alla facciata ufficiale di cordialità politica tra i due Paesi.

Da questo punto di vista l’incontro di Ankara contribuirà indubbiamente a dare alle relazioni tra i due paesi un carattere più di accentuata amicizia. È questo un primo risultato della visita di cui non va sottovalutata l’importanza.


Viceversa, se le mie informazioni avute parlando sia con Venizelos che con l’Ambasciatore Contoumas sono esatte, e comunque mi riservo di controllarle, i Turchi avrebbero mostrato al riguardo una certa riservatezza. La mia impressione è
che il Governo turco procederà assai cauto su questo terreno a seguito della reazione opposta dai Soviet alla partecipazione della Turchia al Patto Atlantico. Si è perciò voluto evitare, a mio avviso, di dare alle conversazioni di Ankara il carattere di un’intesa a scopi militare o di preparazione di piani. Si è notato ad esempio che il generale Egheli, che aveva presieduto la missione militare turca inviata qualche mese fà ad Atene, è partito proprio in questi giorni ad Ankara per assumere il comando del V corpo d’Armata a Balikesir e in tal modo non è stato fatto partecipare all’incontro. Si è preferito, cioè, che i problemi militari siano esaminati in sordina dagli Stati Maggiori dei due Paesi, in forma meno appariscente di quella costituita dall’invio di missioni speciali, bensì con l’invio di ufficiali e con lo scambio d’informazioni e in ogni modo attraverso contatti discreti e continuativi.

4. Uno degli obbiettivi più importanti, perseguiti dal Signor Venizelos in questa visita, è stato di sondare le vedute turche sul problema dei Balcani e specialmente sulla necessità di promuovere una stretta collaborazione con la Jugoslavia, considerata da Venizelos come un elemento indispensabile alla difesa di quel settore. Ho riferito, nel mio rapporto sulla visita da me fatta a Venizelos, le idee espressi da quest’ultimo. È stata notata altresì una lunga conversazione da lui avuta con l’Ambasciatore jugoslavo Sig. Radovanovic. Ai giornalisti che lo hanno interrogato su tale conversazione Venizelos ha risposto che era evidente la necessità di rafforzare le relazioni tra i due paesi; Grecia, Turchia e Jugoslavia. Mi riservo di accertare quale è stata la reazione turca a queste vedute, ancorchè sia lecito supporre che esse siano state ritenute conformi alle idee e agli interessi turchi.

5. Sembra che nelle conversazioni predette siano stati passati in rassegna anche i problemi del Medio Oriente, sotto la forma di uno scambio di vedute puramente informativo, in considerazione dell’interesse che la Grecia annette, quale paese mediterraneo, a quanto avviene o è oggetto di decisione in quell’importante settore.

6. Speciale importanza è stata data alle discussioni sui problemi economici. Il comunicato finale insiste principalmente su di essi, pur senza specificarli. Si tratta, oltreché del progetto proposto dai Greci di un’azione doganale, di addivenire a un’azione concertata per l’esportazione di prodotti comuni ai due paesi, per i quali questi ultimi potrebbero farsi una dannosa concorrenza, quali il tabacco, la frutta secca e simili. E’ stato anche discusso il regolamento della questione della pesca, per la quale vorrebbe tenersi conto degli accordi intervenuti tra noi e la Jugoslavia, nonché l’abolizione dei visti sui passaporti sull’esempio dell’accordo italo-turco, od altre minori del genere. Per lo studio di tali questioni è stato deciso “di creare, senza indugio, una commissione mista, incaricata di procedere nel modo più costruttivo e più rapido”. “Questa commissione – è detto nel comunicato – redigerà un rapporto particolareggiato e, se del caso, dei progetti di accordo che saranno sottoposti all’apprezzamento dei due Governi”.

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7. Merita speciale cenno la proposta dell’unione doganale. E’ evidente che una proposta del genere non ha soltanto una portata economica. E’ noto che da lungo tempo i Greci vagheggiano la possibilità di un più intimo collegamento con la Turchia che, secondo alcuni di essi, potrebbe anche assumere la forma di un vincolo federativo. Quale risultato la Grecia si attende da questa più intima associazione con la Turchia non è difficile scorgere: essa mira logicamente a rafforzare la sua posizione ed eventualmente ad averne appoggio per quelle rivendicazioni nei Balcani e alle quali non ha mai rinunciato. La Turchia ha sempre declinato fino ad oggi di prendere in considerazione possibilità del genere, delle quali la stampa turca non ha mancato in addietro di far qualche accenno. Questa volta invece, secondo quanto mi è stato confermato da questo Ministero degli Esteri, la proposta dell’unione doganale è stata considerata con un certo interesse. A dire il vero la stampa non manca dell’esprimere qualche dubbio, accennando alle “numerosi difficoltà concrete che non potrebbero essere risolte se non attraverso lunghe discussioni tecniche”. I fatti soltanto permetteranno di vedere chiaro nell’atteggiamento dei Turchi e di accertare se il rinvio a una commissione di studio è stato, come si propende a credere in questi ambienti diplomatici, un cortese modo per insabbiare la questione.

8. A quanto pare nelle conversazioni di questi giorni si è evitato ogni accenno a una questione, come quella di Cipro, che tanto emotivamente interessa le opinioni pubbliche dei due paesi. Ma se gli uomini politici non ne hanno parlato, vi ha fatto insistenti e precisi riferimenti la stampa turca, la quale con molto buon senso ha fatto presente che tutte le manifestazioni e le dichiarazioni di amicizia non servono a nulla se non viene sgombrato il terreno da questa scottante questione, che minaccia di compromettere la fiduciosa collaborazione tra i due paesi. Sarebbe troppo lungo riferire tutti i commenti al riguardo. Basti dire che questa stampa è stata unanime nell’insistervi ed è stato questo una specie di richiamo alla realtà nella solita retorica dei brindisi e delle dichiarazioni ufficiali che sempre imperversa in incontri di questo genere.

In conclusione, nei rapporti greco-turchi esistono motivi di unione e motivi di contrasto. Si tratta di vedere se i primi, che sono i più sostanziali e rispondenti ai fondamentali interessi dei due popoli, riusciranno a prevalere sui secondi più appariscenti e che fanno appello purtroppo alla passionalità delle masse”.

[Luca Pietromarchi]
Oggetto: Rapporti economici italo-greci
Atene, 28 Aprile 1952

Ho preso conoscenza con vivo interesse delle comunicazioni dell’Ambasciata in Washington e del telespresso di Vostra Eccellenza citato in riferimento, relativi allo sviluppo futuro delle relazioni economiche italo-greche.

Il quadro della situazione economica ellenica ed i risultati dell’Amministrazione americana corrispondono, in linea generale, a quanto ho potuto constatare in loco. Sono invece meno sicuro che l’America, in considerazione dei risultati spesso nettamente insoddisfacenti, si prepari a ritirarsi da questo Paese o ad alleggerire comunque i suoi controlli.

Gli insuccessi dell’Amministrazione americana possono da alcuni essere attribuiti all’incapacità amministrativa dei dirigenti americani. Altri però, ed in primo luogo naturalmente gli americani qui residenti, li attribuiscono alla scarsa collaborazione dell’elemento locale ed alle sue resistenze ai suggerimenti e consigli della Missione americana. E’ probabile che la colpa sia da attribuire un po’ alle due cause. Effettivamente gli americani hanno qui inviato troppi funzionari per un piccolo Paese ad economia semplice come l’ellenica, e non tutti all’altezza del compito, sicché essi sono stati spesso, troppo spesso, giocati dalla ben nota abilità ellenica.

Gli ambienti americani locali riconoscono la necessità di smobilitare una parte notevole della loro barbatura amministrativa. Sembra infatti che circa la metà dei funzionari americani attualmente residenti ad Atene verrà rimpiantata nel corso dell’estate, in relazione anche alla riduzione degli aiuti economici diretti. Ma per contro si sostiene specialmente da parte degli esponenti americani in loco la necessità di rafforzare il controllo economico e politico sul Paese per evitare che le misere condizioni di vita della popolazione servano allo sviluppo del comunismo, come sempre avviene in simili casi. E se, da parte di tali esponenti, si accetta, in relazione alle nuove direttive della politica americana, la necessità di ridurre il numero dei funzionari americani, in considerazione soprattutto del fatto che lo stesso sviluppo economico del Paese deve essere temporaneamente sospeso, si insiste nel fare presente a Washington l’opportunità di intensificare maggiormente la direzione amministrativa del Paese e di aumentare i poteri dei funzionari americani distaccati presso tutte le branche dell’Amministrazione statale e parastatale ellenica.

E’ in questi giorni qui giunta, in evidente ispezione ed al fine di fornire a Washington opportuni elementi di giudizio sulla condotta da adottare nei riguardi della Grecia, una Commissione diretta dal Signor Weldon, accompagnato dal Signor Sullam. Non so se le conclusioni di tale Commissione saranno interamente favorevoli alle concezioni dei locali ambienti americani, ma si può prevedere che comunque la politica americana in Grecia non si differenzerà sostanzialmente da quella adottata
negli altri Paesi Europei e che essa sarà intesa a raggiungere anzitutto, qui come altrove, due precisi obbiettivi:

1) l’aumento del potenziale di difesa;
2) la lotta contro l’inflazione.

Le spese elleniche per la difesa sono già elevatissime, e proporzionalmente più alte che in qualsiasi altro Paese europeo: non si può ragionevolmente chiedere alla Grecia di fare di più. Per il passato tali spese erano in gran parte coperte dagli aiuti economici ECA e da ciò il ritardo nello sviluppo economico del Paese. Con la riduzione degli aiuti economici, e dovendosi lottare contro l’inflazione, non resta altra soluzione che una ulteriore compressione dei consumi civili, compressione che si spera di poter attenuare con una più oculata amministrazione.

In tale situazione le prospettive di uno sviluppo della collaborazione italo-ellenica non sembrano propriamente rosee.

Come è noto, finora le relazioni economiche fra i due Paesi si sono basate quasi esclusivamente sull’Accordo di Collaborazione Economica, che ci ha consentito non solo di compiere importanti lavori, quali gli impianti idro-elettrici o forniture d’investimento quali navi, materiale ferroviario, ecc. ma anche di collocare un discreto quantitativo di beni di consumo corrente. Per contro l’Accordo Commerciale, stipulato nell’aprile 1949, prima cioè dell’Accordo di Collaborazione, e mai da allora aggiornato, non ha praticamente funzionato anche per la situazione fortemente creditizia dell’Italia e fortemente debitrice della Grecia nell’Unione dei Pagamenti Europei.

L’Accordo di Collaborazione Economica può ormai considerarsi giunto a termine, dato che non restano da fornire alla Grecia, nei prossimi due anni, che circa 5 milioni di dollari di merci in conto riparazioni. Effettivamente l’ammontare delle nostre esportazioni sarà più elevato per l’espletamento delle forniture in corso, ma soltanto per forza di inerzia.

Le possibilità di potenziare l’Accordo Commerciale normale sembrano molto scarse per i due seguenti motivi:

1) la già ricordata, inversa posizione nell’Unione Pagamenti Europei;
2) i prezzi delle merci italiane esportabili in Grecia.

Salvo trascurabili eccezioni l’Italia non può pensare, in vista del preannunciato intensificarsi del regime di restrizioni dei consumi, di poter collocare su questo mercato i propri prodotti agricoli e tessili tradizionali, che sono localmente prodotti in quantità sufficiente.

Le maggiori correnti di importazione in Grecia resteranno dunque i prodotti meccanici e chimici e per tali merci siamo generalmente in posizione di inferiorità rispetto alla concorrenza mondiale e a quella germanica in specie, la quale ultima gode di una posizione preferenziale, essendo essa la principale acquirente di tabacchi ellenici.

In considerazione della situazione sopra esposta ritengo che per non ridurre i nostri rapporti economici con la Grecia le uniche possibilità debbano essere ricercate nei due settori seguenti:
1) forniture in relazione alla difesa;
2) interessamento del capitale italiano allo sviluppo dell’economia ellenica.

I) FORNITURE IN RELAZIONE ALLA DIFESA – Ho già ricordato che la Grecia compie da anni uno sforzo notevole per il mantenimento delle sue forze armate. Di più la Grecia non può fornire né come effettivi, né come armamento. Il rafforzamento dell’ala meridionale dello schieramento atlantico dovrà quindi essere fornito tramite il NATO e mirare all’armamento pesante, alle infrastrutture ed all’equipaggiamento.

Trascurando il settore armamento, la nostra collaborazione potrebbe utilmente essere fornita nel campo dell’assistenza tecnica e delle forniture di materiale per i lavori delle infrastrutture, quali le costruzioni stradali; la sistemazione di porti e degli aeroporti; le comunicazioni tele e radio telegrafiche; telefoniche ecc. Per quanto riguarda l’equipaggiamento la nostra industria potrebbe fornire, oltre i mezzi di trasporto (soprattutto se le nostre vetture jeep potranno essere fornite a prezzi non troppo discordanti da quelli mondiali), anche prodotti alimentari conservati ed altri.

Tali forniture dovranno essere decise ed effettuate dal NATO ed in tale sede le nostre possibilità potrebbero essere valorizzate.

II) INTERESSAMENTO DEL CAPITALE ITALIANO ALLO SVILUPPO ECONOMICO DELLA GRECIA

Se nel momento attuale gli Americani si oppongono a che le scarse risorse elleniche vengano utilizzate in investimenti a lungo termine, per timore che esse non siano sufficienti, senza pericolo di inflazione, alle spese per la difesa, essi non si oppongono invece ad iniziative che siano finanziate con mezzi che sfuggono al loro controllo, cioè mediante apporto di capitali dall’estero, siano essi di proprietà greca o straniera.

L’ambizione ellenica, stimolata dalle prospettive che erano state fatte balenare, spesso con incredibile faciloneria, dei presunti tecnici della Missione ECA, è in materia illimitata. Un apporto di capitali, anche modesto, sarebbe certamente il benvenuto da parte degli uomini politici ellenici, ai quali servirebbe di piattaforma elettorale, non fosse altro per dimostrare all’opinione pubblica di essere riusciti a passare sopra ai divieti americani.

Se investimenti del genere fossero senz’altro proficui, una parte degli ingenti capitali ellenici attualmente investiti all’estero comincerebbe forse a rimpiangere. Tali capitali però possono considerarsi esposti, una volta rimpatriati, al rischio di manomissione da parte del Fisco ed il loro astensionismo può quindi trovare una giustificazione. Non così, invece, per i capitali di altri Paesi, ed in primo luogo americani. Se la situazione fosse effettivamente stata quale l’avevano prospettata nei primi tempi i tecnici della Missione ECA, non sarebbero mancati gruppi finanziari americani per sfruttare una situazione che per il capitale americano doveva sembrare particolarmente privilegiata. E viaggi esplorativi di uomini d’affari infatti non sono
mancati. Ma i finanziamenti non sono venuti: né dalla Banca per la Ricostruzione, né dalla Import-Export Bank, né tanto meno da privati.

In verità la situazione economica e finanziaria della Grecia è lungi dal potersi considerare di tutto riposo. A parte l’instabilità finanziaria, sempre preoccupante malgrado la lotta anti-inflazionista, non esiste alcuna garanzia per i capitali esteri che intendessero piazzarsi nell’economia ellenica. Nonostante le pressioni americane, un progetto di legge tendente a favorire, mediante opportune garanzie ed esenzioni fiscali, l’afflusso di capitale estero, non è ancora stato varato. La causa di tale ritardo va probabilmente ricercata nella sorda, ma potente, opposizione degli industriali locali, i quali temono, se venisse aperta la porta al capitale estero, di perdere la loro posizione di monopolio. Questa presa di posizione degli uomini d’affari ellenici va tenuta in evidenza perché i capitalisti ellenici costituiscono un’oligarchia ben più potente di quelle analoghe degli altri Paesi occidentali.

Nelle attuali circostanze, riterrei quindi di dover escludere l’eventualità di finanziamenti di Stato a Stato, che non potrebbero fruire dei previsti privilegi fiscali e non potrebbero ottenere garanzie di rimborso se non a lungo termine. Operazioni del genere possono essere giustificate solo da preponderanti ragioni politiche (non è escluso vi ricorra l’Inghilterra nella sua affannosa ricerca di riacquistare in Grecia il passato prestigio).

La scarsa, per non dire totalmente mancata, industrializzazione del Paese, congiunta alla prevista necessità di risparmiare a qualsiasi costo, almeno per un certo periodo, la valuta estera, può presentare allettanti prospettive per il capitale privato. Tali prospettive sono però limitate da vari fattori e principalmente:

a) altezza dei costi di produzione, per cui in molti casi il prodotto importato, nonostante la protezione doganale, resta più conveniente e difficile, per non dire impossibilità, di allargare il ristretto mercato interno con esportazioni. Ciò rende aleatori gli investimenti;

b) esasperato nazionalismo ellenico per cui un’impresa straniera, che prendesse favorevole sviluppo, sarebbe esposta agli assalti, senza limitazione di mezzi di lotta da parte degli elementi locali;

c) impossibilità di prevedere non dico il rimpatrio dei capitali, ma anche il trasferimento degli utili.

Fra le ricchezze non sfruttate della Grecia sono stati giustamente ricordati i minerali. Anche in tale campo però occorre sfiatare molte leggende. I giacimenti minerari ellenici sono indubbiamente numerosi, ma tutti quelli ancora da sfruttare sono di limitata entità. Le necessarie spese di impianto ne rendono quindi non conveniente lo sfruttamento in congiuntura economica normale.

Uno dei campi in cui si presentano favorevoli prospettive è quello dell’industria dell’alluminio. I giacimenti di bauxite sono abbastanza numerosi e di non difficile accesso. Solo la mancanza di energia elettrica ne ha reso finora impossibile lo sfruttamento. Se la centrale elettrica dell’Acheloos venisse costruita, sarebbero realizzate le premesse per un’attività che dovrebbe essere meno esposta alle incognite proprie di qualsiasi iniziativa in Grecia.
Condizione indispensabile è però la proprietà della fonte di energia. L’industria dell’alluminio dovrebbe cioè possedere la centrale elettrica. Se attualmente un gruppo italiano fosse disposto a fare proposte concrete in proposito potrebbe certamente ottenere favorevoli condizioni compresa quella di poter esportare una parte di alluminio franco valuta in modo da assicurarsi un ammortamento degli investimenti. Se invece l’impianto elettrico dell’Acheloos venisse realizzato dal Governo ellenico dovremmo ancora, per l’istituenda industria dell’alluminio, superare la concorrenza germanica, ed il risultato apparirebbe almeno dubbio.

Possono esistere altre possibilità soprattutto nel campo dell’industria chimica, la più elementare, per la cui attività non sono necessari forti immobilizzi, ma soprattutto apporti tecnici.

In conclusione le possibilità di continuare la collaborazione economica italo-ellenica sono piuttosto scarse, ma non inesistenti.

Le occasioni migliori sono certamente quelle che potrebbe offrirci il NATO, anche perché non esposte a rischi.

I finanziamenti diretti sono invece esposti ad alee ed a pericolo che il Governo può aiutare ed attenuare, ma che sarebbe illusione pensare di eliminare.

Per parte mia non mancherò di segnalare le occasioni che potranno presentarsi, ma indubbiamente l’Ambasciata non potrà sostituirsì all’iniziativa privata, alla quale deve rivenire il compito di rintracciare le buone occasioni. Sarà tuttavia cura di questa Ambasciata il facilitare la realizzazione dei progetti, il consigliare circa le forme più opportune da dare ad ogni iniziativa ed il ricercare infine le garanzie che possano ridurre al minimo possibile i rischi, in modo che la nostra presenza in questo Paese abbia a realizzarsi, con prudenza, su basi sufficientemente fondate e sicure.

Adolfo Alessandrini

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ASMAE, Telespresso N. 4170/1104, (Ambasciata d’Italia-Ministero degli Affari Esteri)

Oggetto: Viaggio in Italia del Ministro del Coordinamento greco Markezinis
Atene, 4 Novembre 1953

Il telegramma di Vostra Eccellenza N. 197 in data 1° Novembre, è qui pervenuto dopo la partenza del Ministro Markezinis per Bonn e non mi è stato quindi possibile comunicargli l’assenso di Vostra Eccellenza per le date da lui proposte. Suppongo tuttavia che l’Ambasciatore Argyropoulos abbia concordato la data del 30 Novembre con Notarangeli dopo aver ricevuto istruzioni da Markezinis, transitato per Roma durante il suo viaggio.
La composizione del seguito del Ministro potrà essere conosciuta solo al suo ritorno da Bonn, cioè verso il 16 Novembre.

Al riguardo desidero comunque attirare l’attenzione di Vostra Eccellenza su quanto segue:

Il Ministro Markezinis non è solo il supremo regolatore dell’economia ellenica, ma la personalità più spiccatamente del Governo Papagos. Egli si è proposto di rinnovare la struttura economica del paese non solo animato dal sincero desiderio di migliorare il tenore di vita della popolazione e di potenziare il suo paese, ma anche e soprattutto come base per il rafforzamento del Partito di cui egli è stato fin dall’inizio l’animatore.

Come è noto egli ha predisposto un piano quadriennale di sviluppo dell’economia ellenica e si è dedicato alla sua realizzazione con ogni energia e decisione, comprendendo che dal successo o dall’insuccesso di tale piano dipendeva anche il suo avvenire personale.

L’energia con cui ha realizzato le prime riforme della struttura interna del Paese ed i risultati, sebbene non ancora definitivi, finora raggiunti hanno attirato su di lui l’attenzione internazionale.

Con senso realistico il Ministro Markezinis si è reso subito conto che la Grecia non avrebbe potuto con i soli suoi mezzi compiere rapidamente l’evoluzione o rivoluzione economica prevista dal suo piano. Dopo aver quindi dato il via alle prime riforme interne (riforma del credito, svalutazione, pareggio del bilancio, liberalizzazione del commercio, riforma amministrativa, garanzie per gli investimenti esteri) per procurare al paese credito internazionale, Markezinis ha iniziato una serie di viaggi all’estero recandosi innanzitutto negli Stati Uniti, poi in Inghilterra, indi in Francia e ora in Germania. Egli dovrebbe concludere in Italia le sue ricerche di collaborazione.

Se i risultati dei viaggi negli Stati Uniti ed in Gran Bretagna non hanno dato apparentemente un immediato, tangibile risultato ciò è dovuto probabilmente al fatto che le riforme interne non avevano ancora, al momento in cui tali viaggi venivano effettuati dato i risultati, ripeto provvisori, che si possono ora constatare. Molte personalità del mondo economico anglo-sassone che si erano in un primo momento mostrate scettiche circa la politica economica ed i sistemi adottati da Markezinis, riconoscono ora tali risultati.

Il viaggio di Markezinis in Francia ha portato un primo concreto successo: la garanzia del Governo francese per forniture alla Grecia a lungo termine per un ammontare di 5,5 miliardi di franchi.

Il viaggio in Germania porterà versosimilmente a risultati ancora più sostanziali per lo sviluppo dell’economia ellenica, che potrà contare non solo su finanziamenti ma anche sulla collaborazione tecnica di gruppi come la Krupp per lo sviluppo delle industrie elleniche della metallurgia e della chimica.

Persino la ultra prudente Svizzera sembra interessarsi allo sviluppo economico della Grecia e offerte per il finanziamento di costruzioni idroelettriche sarebbero state fatte da holding elvetiche.
Tutto ciò premesso, ritengo mio dovere attirare l’attenzione di Vostra Eccellenza sul fatto che, data la personalità di Markezinis, l’eventuale successo od insuccesso della sua progettata visita in Italia avrà un riflesso non solo sui rapporti economici fra i due Paesi, ma anche su quelli politici.

Tale successo può però essere assicurato solo se da parte nostra si è disposti a fare delle concessioni.

Non sembra necessario prevedere da parte nostra sacrifici della nostra economia, poiché non si tratta di aumentare l’importazione di prodotti ellenici atti a disturbare il nostro mercato (naturalmente Markezinis insisterà anche su aumento delle nostre importazioni dalla Grecia specie per il tabacco). E’ invece nel settore finanziario che Markezinis cercherà di avere anche da noi speciali concessioni.

Il Governo ellenico sa perfettamente che il Governo italiano non è in grado di fornire un credito diretto all’economia ellenica ma esso spera, con il viaggio di Markezinis, di riuscire ad incoraggiare ed a facilitare un eventuale interessamento del capitale privato con garanzia statale per gli investimenti che potrebbero essere qui effettuati.

Non si può naturalmente affermare che gli investimenti in Grecia siano essenti da rischi. Poiché però non si tratta di veri e propri finanziamenti all’economia ellenica, ma piuttosto di finanziamenti all’industria italiana per consentire di effettuare forniture a medio e lungo termine, il rischio sembra bilanciato o almeno attenuato dall’aumento della produttività italiana.

Il piano economico ellenico è già conosciuto dal Ministero a seguito delle mie precedenti comunicazioni. Unisco comunque una pubblicazione in lingua inglese di questo Ministero del Coordinamento, relativa al programma di sviluppo industriale.

Oltre il settore industriale il piano Markezinis prevede sviluppi per l’economia agricola (bonifica e meccanizzazione) e nel settore dell’energia (in specie idroelettrica). In tali settori una nostra collaborazione può particolarmente svilupparsi.

Malgrado gli impegni già presi nel settore della distribuzione dell’energia elettrica con la Francia e quelli nei settori metallurgico, chimico e probabilmente altri che verranno presi con la Germania, ritengo che esistano ancora occasioni favorevoli ed interessanti per l’economia italiana. Però è necessario non perdere tempo, altrimenti si corre il rischio di vedere sfruttate da altri le migliori possibilità.

Per il lato formale ritengo opportuno far presente che il Ministro Markezinis è particolarmente sensibile ad ogni manifestazione che lo metta in evidenza, anche perchè, per rafforzare il suo prestigio interno, ha bisogno di poter dimostrare che gode di considerazione internazionale.

Adolfo Alessandrini
United Kingdom
Sir Charles Peake (Embassy Athens) to Anthony Eden (Foreign Office)

Subject: Report on the internal political situation during 1952
Athens, February 4, 1953

Sir,

The most important event of the year 1952 in Greece was the general election in November which brought Field Marshal Papagos and his Greek Rally into power with an overwhelming parliamentary majority. The inexorable trend throughout the first half of the year towards a change of government, the protracted political crisis at the height of an already hot summer, which culminated in the proclamation of fresh elections, and the first results of the Field Marshal’s administration will be the theme of the annual review which I have the honour to submit in the present despatch.

2. The year opened with the liberal-EPEK Centre Coalition Government of General Plastiras and Monsieur Venizelos in a reasonably confident mood and seemingly determined to govern despite the Rally’s incessant chorus that the previous elections had given them no title to office. The new Constitution, on which the Rally had refused to vote, was brought into effect on the 1st January, and the Government even took the offensive against the Field Marshal by re-opening an enquiry, which they hoped would reduce his popularity, into a secret league of anti-Communist army officers, called IDEA, with which he had previously been associated, as also into the short-lived insurrectionary movement in his favour on the 30th-31th May, 1951, which followed his resignation as Commander-in-Chief. But fortunately both The King and the Americans intervened to prevent the armed forces from becoming involved in an unsavoury political squabble, and an amnesty was granted to all who had been connected with either movement.

3. The political temperature rose rapidly. The Rally were convinced –and not without reason– that the Palace was in league with the Government to thwart them by any means, and although the attitude of the Field Marshal himself towards The King was impeccable, the Rally Press gave vent to their feelings in a constant stream of abuse against The King’s entourage. Meanwhile the Field Marshal began a series of provincial tours, during which he denounced the Government and all its works (there was little enough evidence of these in the neglected country-side) and demanded fresh elections immediately on the majority system. The effect of these attacks was enhanced by the unedifying spectacle of partisan squabble within the Coalition itself, which was further weakened when in the 9th March General Plastiras was incapacitated by a stroke. To implement their appeasement programme the Government were engaged in drafting legislation providing for the release of large numbers of persons who had been in detention or deportation for their part in the Communist bandit war. The Liberals were unwilling to go as far or as fast in their respect as their EPEK colleagues desired; and their disagreement developed into an open crisis when Beloyannis and three other Communist spies were shot on the 30th
March, in despite of the known feelings of the rank and file of the EPEK party. The Coalition was now straining in all joints, but a breach was avoided and the leniency law was finally passed in April.

4. Meanwhile the Government were in serious trouble with the Americans. Profiting by the illness of the Prime Minister, who was known to hold opposite views, Monsieur Venizelos and the Minister of the Interior, Monsieur Rendis, tried to secure proportional electoral system, to which the Americans were likewise known to have the strongest objections. These were somewhat bluntly expressed in a public statement by the United States Ambassador, which provoked a tart rejoinder from the Government and a series of remarkably vicious anti-American articles in the Greek Government’s press. At this point, in March, the Rally launched their first big parliamentary attack against the Government whom they accused of undermining the morale and efficiency of the armed forces and of jeopardizing public security by the release of unrepentant Communists. Although the Coalition secured a vote of confidence the initiative remained with their opponents, as was proved a few days later when the Government was forced to accept the Rally’s demand for the removal of the Minister of Defence, who had published an order of the day which contained criticism of Field Marshal Papagos. The total abstention of the Rally deputies from parliamentary business for three weeks in connection with this incident exacerbated political tempers still further besides demonstrating a party discipline which belied the rumours being assiduously spread by the Government to the effect that the Rally was about to disintegrate.

5. In the early summer individual defections from the parliamentary ranks of both Liberals and EPEK rendered the Government’s position still more precarious and when, at the beginning of August, General Plastiras returned from his treatment in France no more capable than before of providing effective leadership, it was widely recognised that, since the Field Marshal steadfastly refused all offers of a three-party coalition, there was not solution to the deadlock which was paralyzing the life of the country but a fresh appeal to the electorate. On the 18th August the Chamber was called back from its summer recess at the request of the Opposition, who declared that the country was on the brink of disaster. Once again the Government managed to secure a vote of confidence, but as their supporters now numbered less than half the total of the House, the Opposition demanded their immediate resignation.

6. The Government did not at once comply but tabled a draft bill providing for the introduction of the majority electoral system with certain modifications designed to suit their partisan interests in the elections which were now regarded as inevitable. This was finally passed on the 3rd October and the Government resigned on the 10th. Their primary motive in so doing was undoubtedly their realisation that their narrow and fluctuating majority gave them insufficient power to govern in the face of the unremitting hostility of the Opposition. An important secondary consideration however was their desire to reap the popularity which they thought would accrue to them from two recent measures: namely the reduction of the military service term to
24 months, and the expropriation of large estates (including the British owned Lake Copais property) for the resettlement of landless peasants.

7. The economic backcloth against which these political events were played was almost unrelievedly sombre. The announcement at the end of the previous year that the ceiling of United States’ economic aid for the twelve months ending 30th January, 1952, had been fixed at $182 million meant that no new reconstruction projects could be launched and even that some already under way would have to be curtailed. Professor Varvaressos, a distinguished Greek economist on the staff of the International Bank, was invited to Greece to advise on the economic situation, but his recommendations for a drastic overhaul of the public services and a serious long-term economic programme were shelved. Under American pressure the Government pursued a policy of severe credit restriction designed to check inflation, to compel the hoarders to disgorge their gold sovereigns, and to reduce prices by forcing stocks of commodities on to the market. In all this they were only partially successful. After an initial run on gold, sales almost ceased and the price of the sovereign dropped considerably. Inflation was contained but the cost of living continued to rise and the plight of Greek workers and peasants to deteriorate. Unemployment grew and demands for wage increases, legitimate enough in themselves, had to be refused for fear of increasing inflationary pressure, which gave rise to sporadic strikes. Production costs remained exorbitantly high—and especially the all-important tobacco crop—were unable to compete on the world market without subsidies which the national budget could not stand. Although the Minister of Co-ordination did his able best to balance the budget and energetically pursued tax evaders, his efforts were constantly being thwarted by his colleagues’ disinclination to endorse unpopular measures when elections were believed to be imminent, and by August the exasperated Americans had reached the conclusion that nothing but a change of Government could save the country from economic collapse.

8. In foreign affairs, certain encouraging developments took place, but it must be recorded that the Coalition’s dealings with Greece’s major allies were such that Anglo-Greek and Greek-American relations had deteriorated considerably by the time Parliament was finally dissolved.

9. There was a steady improvement in relations with Yugoslavia and an exchange of parliamentary delegations in July and August was followed a month later by the arrival in Athens of a Yugoslav Military Delegation. Trade and tourism between the two countries was encouraged and further batches of abducted children were repatriated. The rapprochement with Turkey proceeded with the speed and exuberance of a first romance. In January Monsieur Venizelos made an official visit to Ankara which was returned by the Turkish Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs in April, while The King and Queen of the Hellenes paid a highly successful state visit to Turkey in June. Visas were abolished between the two countries in September, and agreement in principle was also reached on a settlement of a longstanding dispute about the fishing grounds off the coast of Asia Minor. This was unfortunately not ratified and continuing seizure of Greek fishing boats by Turkish
patrol vessels, together with occasional tart references to Turkish claims on Cyprus, provided the only discordant note in this otherwise harmonious duet. The good-neighbourly embrace was also extended to Italy. Visas were abolished in August, and an Italian Military Delegation paid a good will visit to Greece in October. But there was little real warmth in this relationship, and before the creation of General Wyman’s South-East Europe Command the Greek Government had not hesitated to state emphatically that they would never accept the placing of their forces under an Italian General.

10. The Greeks were immensely gratified by their formal admission in February to membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This greatly increased their sense of security –as was illustrated by their intemperate reaction to a minor Bulgarian provocation on the Evros River frontier in July– and opened up to them attractive vistas of additional foreign aid. Although the Greek High Command was always in greater or lesser degree involved in internal politics, the re-organisation and re-equipment of the Greek armed forces went steadily forward, and about one half of the national budget continued to be devoted to defence expenditure.

11. Throughout the Coalition Government’s tenure of office their press did not hesitate at the least provocation to vilify the Americans collectively and individually, and to declare them responsible for all the evils which beset present day Greece. Relations with the United Kingdom were equally troubled. The decision to dispense with the service of the British Police Mission in January and of the Military and Air Missions in April, though primarily taken for reasons of economy, had much of ‘dropping of the pilot’ about it. In their desire to distract attention from the dismal scene on the home front the Government allowed the agitation whipped up by the Orthodox Church in favour of the union of Cyprus with Greece to degenerate into street demonstrations, though they resisted the insistent demand of Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus, who spent nearly two months here in the summer, that they should raise the question at the United Nations Assembly. Their recognition in June of King Farouk’s title to the Sudan, as also the expropriation of the Lake Copais Company, were further causes of friction between Greece and the United Kingdom. The deterioration of Anglo-Greek relations, for which Monsieur Venizelos was to a large extent personally responsible, did not, however, reflect any weakening of the fundamental bond between the two countries, the strength of which was apparent from the spontaneous nation-wide grief with which the news of The King’s death was greeted in February, as also from the great warmth of welcome accorded to Lord Halifax and others, who attended the unveiling in April of a Greek Memorial to the men of the Commonwealth who fell in defence of this land in 1941.

12. The elections of the 16th November blew like a fresh wind through a stale room. The caretaker administration, headed by Monsieur Kioussopoulos, which governed during the electoral period, did its job well and the fight was a fair one. The Liberal and EPEK parties, who presented a joint list, denounced Papagos as a would-be dictator, whilst the Rally contended that the choice lay between Papagos and Communism, since the Centre were manifestly incapable of governing. The extent of
the Rally’s victory –239 seats out of a total of 300– was primarily attributable to the candidature of the crypto-Communist EDA party, which split the left wing vote with EPEK: but there is no doubt that the Field Marshal would have secured a majority even without this circumstance.

13. The new Government, which took office on the 19th November, embarked at once upon a policy of retrenchment and reform. Numerous committees and redundant civil servants, thousands of whom clutter the Greek state machine, were dismissed and all further appointments forbidden, whilst urgent work was begun on plans for the decentralisation of the administration, for the attraction of foreign private capital, and for a long overdue reorganisation of the hopelessly inefficient banking system. At the same time far reaching changes of personnel took place in the high command of the armed forces and of the police, as also in many civilian departments of state. Opinions differed about the wisdom of some of these changes, but there was no denying that a firm hand was at the helm.

14. In foreign affairs the new Government continued the policy of good neighbourliness which they had inherited. The state visit of the Turkish President in November was an undoubted success, and a further exchange of military delegations between Belgrade and Athens brought Greece and Yugoslavia still closer to the goal of joint defence planning. There was a marked improvement in relations with the Americans, and it was evident from the anodyne reference to the Cyprus question in the Government’s anxiety to negotiate an amicable settlement of the Lake Copais question, that the Prime Minister was sincere in his avowed wish to see the Anglo-Greek relations restored to their old basis of was friendship.

15. The year which, save for a few bright interludes, had been so drab and inglorious, thus ended on a note of sober hopefulness. The impact of the Field Marshal’s personality was considerable and it came at a moment when the Greek people had lost faith in the professional politicians. He has promised to create an honest and efficient administration, to lift Greece out of the economic slough and to restore her prestige abroad. If he succeeds, he will indeed have saved this country for the third time. The stakes are high, but so are the risks. For his advent to the political scene has completely destroyed the old balance of parties and, should he fail, he would leave behind him a dangerous vacuum which Communism would assuredly seek and might even seek successfully to fill.

I have the honour to be
with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant
Charles Peake
FO 286/1341
Sir Charles Peake (Embassy Athens) to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Office)

Subject: The anti-British riots in Athens
Athens, May 9, 1956

Sir,

The serious riots in Athens on the 9th of May, on which I reported in my telegrams Nos 344 and 353, were brought about as the result of a demonstration organized by the Pan-Hellenic Committee for the Union of Cyprus with Greece. The population of the city were informed by handbills and by loudspeaker cars that the committee’s chairman Dorotheos, the recently elected Archbishop of Athens, would address a public meeting of protest in the main square of Athens at 3 p.m. that afternoon. Some 30,000 people attended and heard a vindictive and rabble-rousing speech by the archbishop. His concluding advice that they should go home quietly was naturally ignored, as it was probably meant to be by about 5,000 of the crowd who moved off in the direction of the embassy in angry mood. At the same time after the (polite) telephone call to the Counselor of her Majesty’s Embassy a small delegation handed in to the Head Chancery Messenger a copy of the resolution passed by the meeting, of which a translation is enclosed. It will be seen that the Greeks are still unable to decide whether Karaolis was innocent of the crime of which he was accused or had carried out a fine piece of work.

2. The crowd of demonstrations came into collision with the police cordons in Churchill Street and Academy Street. In the first the shooting was started by the demonstrators: they fired first, the police fired back, as they claim over the heads of the crowd: at least thirty shots were exchanged. In Academy Street the police apparently became rattled and opened fire from the officer in charge. An official enquiry is being held about the riot, and a number of demonstrators and a police officer have been detained. Three people were killed altogether and a very substantial number injured. On the following day, in fact, it proved extremely difficult to secure a hospital bed for an emergency case since all places were occupied by casualties from the riot.

3. The Government must, of course, bear a full share of the responsibility for having authorized the demonstration. They presumably hoped that this would reduce the temperature by giving popular feeling an opportunity to express itself, but after their experience of the 10th to 12th of March (my despatch No57) they should have known better. The Chief of Police has informed a member of my staff that permission for the demonstration was given without the security forces having been consulted. There has so far been no further public demonstration, due, I think, to the widespread shock at the outcome of that held on the 9th of May.

4. It is my strong impression, however, that Greek public opinion has been deeply embittered by the executions in Cyprus, and that the statements by the Prime Minister, the Opposition leaders ant the articles in the press claiming that a century’s
Anglo-Greek friendship is now at an end and expressing horror and outrage at the Governor’s decision, fairly reflect popular feeling. For the first time people in the shops and in the street have shown signs of antagonism to individual English, and I expect that the social boycott imposed on members of this embassy after the September riots and again after the deportation of Makarios will on this occasion last somewhat longer than hereto and in unlikely to be completely lifted for a long time to come. An example of the depth of feeling is that a Greek couple who were both decorated for gallantry during the last war, the husband with the King’s Medal for Gallantry and the wife with the George Medal, have jointly returned these decorations to me despite the fact that the woman’s mother is English and the family has long and close connections with the British. (The decorations are being forwarded to you under cover of my despatch No 91).

5. As to the future, I can only hope that the Government have learned their lesson from the riot of May 9 and will keep a tighter hand in future in the interest of public order. Fortunately, the police force remains sound and we must be thankful for the efficient way in which it has carried out its duties. There is however to be a debate I the Greek Parliament on the 21st of May in which the Government will be under attack by the Opposition for having failed to prevent the execution and for their responsibility for the riot, which may produce further popular reactions. I should nevertheless, expect that, apart from the risk of an odd fanatic, we are now over our more pressing difficulties.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor of Cyprus.

Charles Peake

FO 371/123850
Anthony Lambert (Embassy Athens) to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Office)

Subject: Concerning Greece’s Foreign policy and what H.M’s Government’s policy should be towards Greece
Athens, August 29, 1956

Sir,

The account of the circumstances surrounding the Greek Government’s refusal of Her Majesty’s Government’s invitation to the Suez Conference, which I had the honour to furnish in my despatch No. 153 of the 16th August, raises two important questions. Where does Greece stand in the world to-day, and what should be Her Majesty’s Government’s policy towards her?

2. To the first of these questions the Greek leaders themselves would no doubt reply somewhat as follows. Greek relations with the United States of America are unaltered, and their loyalty to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is unimpaired.
They would be glad to see new life infused into the Balkan Pact, and to restore their relations with Turkey. They are also greatly concerned at the deterioration of relations with the United Kingdom. They remain firmly Western and anti-Communist in outlook. Meanwhile they have ties of “friendship” with Egypt and the other Arab States.

3. All this look unexceptionable, and conforms to the pattern of foreign relations which Greece would be expected to follow in the post-war world. But when one comes to examine it a little more closely, one sees ominous cracks in the façade. It is true that the Americans have tended to support the present Government as being the only alternative to a swing to the left. But at the best United States interest in Greece is fragile and the Greeks themselves regard it as impermanent.

4. Greece’s loyalty to N.A.T.O. is now reduced to little more than lip service. The Minister for Foreign Affairs himself assured me as recently as the 18th of August that Greece would abide by any decision N.A.T.O. might take, even if it were hostile to Egypt. But I am beginning to doubt if in the present climate of opinion the Government would be able to do so. In any case, Greece’s actual contribution to N.A.T.O. is negligible, and is at the mercy of emotional outbursts against the Turks or ourselves. As for the Balkan Pact, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has told me that the Government would be quite glad to exchange it for a bilateral agreement with Yugoslavia. It is true that Greece remains anti-Communist. But she is laying herself open to Russian penetration, chiefly through her quarrel with the United Kingdom. Such developments as her increasing contacts with the satellites, or the recent visit of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot look re-assuring to outside observers –including those who vote U.S. economic aid. Greek ties of friendship with the Arab world consist only of the presence of a large Greek colony in Egypt, and a coincidence of views on “colonialism”. In almost all other respects their interests are diametrically opposed.

5. The real position is thus much more fluid and uncertain than the Greek political leaders would admit publicly. The political climate, like the physical climate, seems to be not quite Europe, nor Asia, not Africa. In confidential talk Greek Ministers will admit the existence of grave dangers and pitfalls. The only way to avoid them, they say, is for Her Majesty’s Government to hold out a helping hand. By not doing so, it is though in Athens and probably also in Washington, we are driving Greece into the arms of Russia.

6. The thesis is all too familiar and is one which is at present being used by the Greek political leaders in conversation with the American Embassy. However, even discounting that pact which is designed to make American flesh creep, I believe it is true to say that if things go on as they going at present, Greece may find herself drifting ever more rapidly either towards the Arab States or the Iron Curtain. Neutralism, of which there is so much talk in Athens these days, could, at best, be a pressing phase. Greece is too small and too weak a country to maintain herself in equilibrium between two or more power blocs for very long.
7. It is generally assumed that the Americans would never allow such a dangerous situation to develop; yet there may be, in certain conditions, a point of no return, after which it would become politically impossible for even the Americans to draw Greece back into the Western orbit. That point would, no doubt, be reached if Greece were to sever her connection with N.A.T.O. The Greek Government are therefore faced with a very real and urgent problem, since it is they who must take the first step to help themselves.

8. Meanwhile, I suggest that the time has come when Her Majesty’s Government’s own policy towards Greece should be reviewed in the light of the present distinctly fluid situation.

9. There are, perhaps, three ways of looking as the problem:

(i) We could try and bring the Greeks to their senses by a vigorous exposure of their misdeeds, or by the threat of exposure. I assume that we have, or will shortly have, ample material with which to do this.

(ii) We could do what the Greeks would like us to do and work out a political solution of the Cyprus problem which would satisfy us and the Turks. We would then endeavour to persuade the Greek Government to associate themselves with it or, at least, not dissent from it.

(iii) We could press on with the pacification of Cyprus and leave Greece severely alone with both insofar as open criticism of their policy and any diplomatic moves were concerned.

10. Of these three courses, the success of the first would depend upon the emergence in Greece of a statement of the stature of the late Eleftherios Venizelos. Failing that—and I see no signs of it at present—I fear that instead of driving the sheep into the fold, we should end by scattering them completely. The indictment of Archbishop Makarios, which has just been published, goes, in my view, just as far in this direction as it is advisable to go at present. That is to say, apart from justifying Her Majesty’s Government’s policy, it unmistakably points to Greek complicity in the activities of EOKA without actually attacking or naming the present government. I suspect that the probable existence of later documents of the same nature as Grivas’ diary may at the moment be giving the Greek Government cause for serious reflection.

11. The second course of action open to us is clearly what the Minister for Foreign Affairs had in mind during the conversation I had with him on the 18th of August and which I recorder in my telegram No. 614. It has considerable merits in that, if successfully carried out, it might neutralise the Greek Government for some considerable time to come. I assume, however, that recent events have ruled it out for the moment. Whether we should be able to return to it when violence in Cyprus has finally been brought to an end remains to be seen.

12. The third choice open to us—to leave Greece alone—has all the defects of a negative policy. Yet I believe it to be the only possible one in present circumstances. I suggest that it should be examined under two separate, though related aspects.
13. In the first place our principle and most urgent concern is the pacification of Cyprus and the assurance of a decent future for the islanders. The Greek Government’s part in this has consisted mainly of attacking Her Majesty’s Government on the international plane, and encouraging terrorism, either directly or by means of propaganda. The first of these activities has caused us an infinity of trouble, but, I suggest, not much actual harm. The Greek Government themselves, though resolved still to have recourse to the United Nations, no longer hope to derive any advantage out of such an appeal. They seem to realize that it was a mistake ever to launch it in the first place, and they only wish they could get out of it now. The logical riposte to the encouragement of violence is to counter-attack. A counter-attack, in the military sense, is presumably designed to destroy or paralyse the “enemy”. I assume that we do not wish to destroy Greece altogether, but only to deter her from a certain course of action. As I have suggested above, I doubt whether an open attack on the Greek Government would produce this result. It would be met with defiance. Nor, I imagine, would we be supported by the United States Government. At the same time we may have to defend ourselves against an onslaught at the General Assembly. This is something which the Greeks themselves accept—and rather dread. What has the undesired effect upon them is what they conceive to be unprovoked attacks.

14. In the second place, we have to consider the whole field of Anglo-Greek relations, and the future position of Greece in relation to her allies. Our object here is presumably to retain Greece as a respectable member of N.A.T.O. manifestations culminated in a refusal to participate in the Suez Conference. Delicate as the position in Greece had by that time become, the decision was clearly a wrong one. Not that the Greeks would have made any helpful contribution to the debate—as the Greek Government’s own reply admits. But, by refusing, the Government have isolated Greece from her allies. As a result the press and public opinion in Athens, and often the Government-controlled radio, have swung sharply towards, the side of Nasser. I doubt if the Government are now strong enough to go against this current. Indeed, by their own decision they have almost lost the power to do so.

15. I understand from my U.S. colleague that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had told me a week ago that the Government felt stronger than hitherto, was now talking of the possibility of Mr. Karamanlis resigning even before the appeal to the General Assembly. Were he to be replaced by a coalition of Centre Parties I do not myself think that we need necessarily look for any drastic change in Greece’s foreign policy either as regards Cyprus or as regards Egypt. Only in the event of elections and a pronounced swing to the Left would the trend towards neutralism gain any sudden impetus. Nevertheless, it is certainly not in our interest that anything should be done at the present time which might have the effect of weakening still further the links which still bind Greece to the Western Powers.

16. My conclusion is, therefore, that, until such time as the Governor of Cyprus is ready for further political or constitutional moves within the island, Her Majesty’s Government should refrain from any diplomatic moves or public statements
involving Greece which might be interpreted in Athens as being definitely hostile. This would involve leaving Greece alone so far as possible until the time comes for the appeal to the General Assembly to be heard. At the same time we should be ready to give the Greek Government an opportunity to declare their concurrence in any settlement which may be reached.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty’s Ambassadors at Paris, Washington, Cairo and to the Political Officer to the Middle East Forces.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Anthony Lambert

FO 371/123851
Sir Charles Peake (Embassy Athens) to H. Young (Foreign Office)

Subject: Greece’s Foreign Policy
Athens, November 15, 1956

Dear Hilary,

I had a long talk with George Allen yesterday, and found him in a robust frame of mind. He told me that Cavendish Cannon, his predecessor, was for ever impressing upon the Greeks that they must seek to do business with us about Cyprus and that the Turkish interest in the island was unimportant. He himself was taking a different line and was trying to convince the Greeks that it was for the first importance that they should try to come to some understanding with the Turks, since if they did so British difficulties would certainly decrease; and that they owed us consideration, since without our help they could hardly have established their independence. I saw no reason to quarrel with this point of view.

In talking of Suez, he said that he thought that there was a good deal more understanding of our section in America than had as yet appeared in the American press. He did not for a moment believe that Anglo-American friendship had been seriously shaken; nor did he believe that the President would ever allow it to be shaken if he could prevent it. He thought that many people had been mystified by our avowed intention to send troops in for no other purpose than keeping the Israeli and the Egyptians apart, when it was clear to everybody that our main preoccupation was (and quite rightly in his view) to safeguard the Canal, and perhaps also to deal with Nasser once and for all. The American Government loathed Nasser and were almost
morbidly sensitive about Russian influence in the Middle East, and, whatever they might have to say in public, they could hardly regret the turn which events had taken.

I said that, while our conversation was necessarily on a personal and informal level, I could not resist the conclusion that Mr. Dulles must bear a very large share of any blame which was going about for our action over Suez. Whether or not it was his fault, he had succeeded in inspiring the deepest distrust in many British hearts, and, though of course I was not speaking for my Government, I was sure that among the British public there had seldom been an American Secretary of State who had inspired such dislike in his handling of public affairs.

Before I left, Allen told me that Karamanlis had asked him whether he could arrange for him to be received by the President during his visit to the United Nations. He had replied that he could take no steps whatever, but that Karamanlis could after all try his luck once he had arrived to New York. He had reported this conversation to the State Department, who had mildly reproached him for giving Karamanlis any encouragement at all to think that the President would see him. The fact that Karamanlis has now, according to the press, been invited to the White House seems rather odd, but I should suppose that it was arranged by an American Greek, perhaps Spiro Skouras, who is known to have a good deal of influence in American government circles.

I am sending copies of this letter to Harold Caccia at Washington and Bob Dixon at New York.

Yours ever
Charles Peake

FO 371/130027
Sir Charles Peake (Embassy Athens) to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Office)

Subject: Causes of decline in Anglo-Greek relations
Athens, April 4, 1957

Sir,

In this my farewell despatch from Athens I have the honour to review the causes of the sad decline in Anglo-Greek relations during my term here.

2. The day before I left Belgrade to assume my duties as Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Athens, I had luncheon alone with Marshal Tito, who addressed me at some length about Yugoslav-Greek relations and the necessity, in view of certain dangers which he did not specify, of creating some kind of entente between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece which might in its way be complementary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and help to safeguard the interests of those Powers
which were, as he described it, dependent upon the West. Since I was unacquainted with Greece, a country which I had never previously had the opportunity to visit, I contented myself with remarking that it might be best to try to persuade the Greek Government to let bygones be bygones. I was thinking, I explained, of the recent civil war in Greece, in which the Communists, who proved to be the losing side, got a good deal of encouragement by the Yugoslav Government, which had shown itself only too ready to harbour any of the Greek rebels who could get over the frontier. Moreover, there were still some thousands of Greek children in Yugoslavia and in neighbouring countries. If I could announce to the Greek Government, or if better still he could instruct the Yugoslav representative in Athens to announce, that his Government was prepared to return such of these children as were in Yugoslavia as soon as it was convenient for the Greek Government to receive them, I thought this might conceivably lay a foundation on which some durable political arrangement could be built. Marshal Tito took all this quite well and said that he was determined to reshape his Government’s foreign policy so that it would be adequate to meeting Yugoslav necessities, which had of course completely changed since the expulsion of his country from the Cominform in 1948. He hoped that I would take whatever opportunity came my way to impress upon the Greek Government his desire for a durable friendship between the two countries. It was then with this chiefly in mind that I left Belgrade on the following day and flew into Athens at about half past five on an October evening, to get my first view of the Parthenon in the fading light of the evening sun and to meet my new staff.

3. At this period, although we had handed over responsibility for the financial support of the Greek Government to the United States Government, His Majesty’s Government still maintained Naval, Military, Air Force and Police Missions in Athens, and it became clear to me, partly from the deference with which I was treated upon my arrival by Government and Opposition alike and partly from the respect with which the Heads of these respective Missions were treated, that British prestige had not suffered as a result of the transference from London to Washington of financial responsibility for the welfare of Greece. This state of affairs was not, alas, to continue for long.

4. Mr. Moore Crosthwaite, at that time Chargé d’ Affaires at His Majesty’s Embassy, in his Annual Review of Greece for 1951, remarked that a fresh impetus had been given during that year to the dangerous issue of Cyprus, and anticipated that, of the Greek Government pursued this issue, which of course Greek Governments would always be tempted to do on account of the favour they could curry with the Greek press, serious difficulties might arise. This could, not seriously significant on my arrival, became larger and more lowering during 1952. Street demonstrations in favour of Enosis began to take place, though it is right to say that Archbishop Makarios’ insistent demand, maintained during a two-month-long stay here in the summer of that year, to raise the matter at the United Nations was, for the time being, successfully resisted. Against this background, the economic condition of the country continued sombre, though the election of Field Marshal Papagos and the Greek Rally
assembled under his leadership by an overwhelming majority in the same year gave some hope that progress in economic rehabilitation would be made during this Government’s lifetime.

5. The following year was, save in one respect, rather brighter all round. Field Marshal Papagos and his “Rally” Government could be credited with a considerable measure of success on the home front. The devastating earthquakes in the Ionian Islands, as a consequence of which Her Majesty’s Government and the British public at once came forward with generous measures of assistance, were on the whole dealt with creditably by the Greek Government. It was during this year that the Tripartite Balkan Friendship Pact was signed at Ankara; ministerial meetings of the three Powers concerned took place in Athens, and in November a parallel series of tripartite military talks was held, which went a good way to producing an agreed defence plan against any attack from the North. Economic relations with Germany developed and some progress was made towards improving Greek relations with Italy. Unfortunately, while all this was happening the Greek press devoted its efforts ever more and more blatantly to its campaign of slander against the Government of Cyprus. For this I have not yet found any rational explanation. The Greek Government had an unassailable majority in the Chamber and had frequently expressed its gratitude to the United Kingdom as one of its principle allies in the fight against Communism. Why therefore the opportunity should have been taken at that particular moment to press the claim for Enosis it is hard to decide. But this is a problem which will fall to be discussed somewhat later in the course of this despatch.

6. The clouds which gathered in 1954 and which are recorded in my review for that year, closed down heavily in 1955; it was then that Field Marshal Papagos died. His powers had been failing for more than a year before his decease, but in spite of that and in spite of his faults he had shown the qualities of a leader and enjoyed a prestige which no-one in Greece has been able to command since his passing. Touchy as he had been on the subject of Enosis, he well knew the value to Greece of her traditional friendship with the United Kingdom and with his death the more violent and unruly elements which had in some sense been kept in leash while he was alive got their liberty. Moreover, the so-called Greek Rally which he had created came to an end.

7. It is unnecessary that I should recount here the particular events which since 1955 have so corroded Anglo-Greek relations. Once again the annual review furnished by this Embassy to the Department provides the calendar of events and a commentary on them. What it now falls to me to do is to make some assessment of Greek mentality and to attempt what must necessarily be a superficial enquiry into the reasons which have made the Greeks both irresponsible and next impossible to deal with in international affairs.

8. Greece, it will be remembered, has historically depended for her independence, security and continued existence upon the protection of a great Power or of an association of several Powers. In the past, however, this protection has on the whole been exercised only in a general way leaving to the Greeks a reasonable
responsibility for their own affairs; and in return for it Greece has been expected and, from time to time, obliged to conform to the wishes of the dominant Power in matters of import.

9. In Greece’s present situation neither of these two conditions seem to apply: since the last world war the defence of Greece has been largely organised and paid for from outside, first and foremost by ourselves and later by the Americans, and more recently her admission to N.A.T.O. has come to provide her with a guarantee of her security. And though the United States are now exercising the role of a protecting Power more toughly than their predecessors both in their preponderance of force and in the extent of economic and military assistance, and consequent penetration of Greece’s affairs, which they provide, they do not exercise any proportionate degree of authority or control over Greek policy. For example in the matters of whole-hearted Greek cooperation in N.A.T.O., particularly in service exercises by that organisation, and of Greek participation in the first Suez Conference, the Greeks have successfully flouted American wishes.

10. The consequence of this situation has been to demoralise Greek political life and to include a mood of irresponsibility, in the present Greek Government and in Greek political circles generally. They are demoralised because they are no longer compelled to rely upon their own judgment and efforts to achieve national security and solvency and they are irresponsible because they think that, no matter what they do, the United States and N.A.T.O. will keep them out of trouble; they are therefore not concerned to consider seriously the consequences of their present actions. Since, like the Poles, they are romantics at heart these grave responsibilities do not bother them unduly.

11. The way in which the Greek Government have allowed the Cyprus question to develop to the point where it excludes all other considerations in Greek thinking about foreign affairs and their cavalier rejections of the Colonial Secretary’s approach seem to be consistent with the above hypothesis, and in fact the principal demonstration of its effects.

12. Because the United States is not a principal in the Cyprus question, the Greek Government has so far succeeded in avoiding any important differences with their American friends about it, but if as a result of the Suez crisis the United States are going to concern themselves more directly with the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East they will presumably show more immediate concern to bring about a settlement of the Cyprus problem. It would seem that the first essential is for the United States Government to recognise that Greek policy can only be kept on the right lines if the protecting Power for the time being is ready to use its position in a positive way. The Greeks have got into the way of thinking that the Americans will allow them free rein and until they are disabused we shall get nowhere towards any settlement about Cyprus which is not Enosis. And Enosis, if by our inertia or weariness with the persistent and relentless propaganda of the Hierarchy of Greek and Cypriot bishops it comes to pass, may well so embitter Greece’s relations
with Turkey that all hope of a lasting reconciliation may recede yet further, with all the attendant risks of serious incidents and even armed conflict.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Charles Peake.

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FO 371/130014
Sir Roger Allen (Embassy Athens) to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Office)

Subject: Sir Roger Allen’s first impressions of Greece
Athens, September 26, 1957

Sir,

I have the honour to send you in this despatch some of my first impressions of Greece. I have been in this country for over four months, and it seems time now, if ever, to make an attempt to gather together some thoughts on Greece and the Greeks as they appear to a newcomer, but in doing so, I am only too conscious of the fact that the more dogmatic one’s generalisations appear to be, the less likely they to be founded on anything concrete. Apart from the normal difficulty of generalising on the basis of insufficient knowledge, the situation in Greece to-day is in some ways exceptional, and so inevitably one sees everything through a lens which destroys to some extent.

2. At the outset I must admit that I have not, for various reasons, had occasion yet to see nearly as much of the country as I should have liked. Nevertheless, perhaps the first impression of a newcomer is that Greece is in appearance and way of life at least halfway to the Levant. There is nothing really surprising in this, since after all Greece lies geographically right on the south-east fringe of Europe, cut off on the landward side by high and until recently almost impenetrable mountains. On the other hand, the sea routes to the Levant have always been open. Athens to-day is a curious mixture of East and West, a huge, narrow, sprawling city, stretching from the modern residential suburb of Ekali in the north-east for some 20 miles to the jumble of old houses and the commercial port of Piraeus in the south-east. One does not have to go far from the new and comparatively well-built centre of the town to find the squalid, dust-blown settlements originally put up by the refugees from Asia Minor and still looking like the suburbs of almost any Middle Eastern city. In the country, too, conditions are generally primitive; the sanitation except in the main centres is strictly limited; though the main trunk roads have been greatly improved in the last few years,
other roads vary from bad to almost impassable; the climate in summer in Attica is
scorching; and the general air of dilapidation and the signs of a primitive standard of
life are unmistakable. Although one knows very well that there is nothing unexpected
in all this, yet to many people it does come with a faint shock of surprise. Greece, for
the average educated West European, has for so long been regarded as the “cradle of
European civilisation” that it is perhaps natural for him to imagine her, almost
involuntarily, as a kind of Keatsian paradise, a pillar’d and portico’d Arcadia,
inhabited by warrior-shepherds, nymphs and sages, and surrounded by verdant islands
set in a blue sea. In reality, the country varies greatly from one area to another, and
preconceived ideas are sometimes disappointed.

3. The second impression, and one connected with the first, is that modern
Greece seems to have nothing in common with the Greece of classical times. True,
there are the ruins of antiquity scattered over the stony hills and plains of Attica, in
the Peloponnesian, in Crete, in Boeotia, and elsewhere, and one is perhaps inclined to
build too much on this. No one, however, expects the modern Englishman to have
much in common with the ancient Briton on the strength of the existence of
Stonehenge and a few tumbledown cromlechs. No one expects to find traces of a
Druidical civilisation in the customs of Chelsea to-day. Why therefore should we
expect modern Greeks to behave like Socrates or Pericles? Perhaps again the answer
is that the ancient Greeks have left memorials of themselves, literary, sculptural,
architectural, which have been familiar to us for so many generations; even the place
names in Greece carry so many associations for us; and the Greeks themselves have
taken such pains to cultivate the myth of their spiritual descent from their classical
ancestors, that sometimes we tend to overlook the intervening centuries. The fact is
that the historical influences which count most in modern Greece seem to be
Byzantine and Turkish. The power of the Orthodox Church is still considerable. The
vast majority of Greeks are peasants and their way of life does not seem to have
changed much since the Turkish occupation. The pashas have gone, but the donkeys
and the goats remain.

4. It is true that there is, in Athens at any rate, a veneer of modern European
civilisation. Athenian society may be stratified roughly as follows: the monarchy,
polite society, the political world, and the rest. The monarchy, of course, is West
European in origin, and for that reason alone, alien. Apart from this, however, and
despite the great efforts made by their Majesties in all fields open to them, and
especially through such institutions as the King’s and the Queen’s Funds, and despite
their considerable personal qualities, I fear that the average Greek still does not feel
that monarchy itself is a native and natural institution. One does not actually come
across many traces of strong republican sentiment, but equally one does not gain the
impression that the monarchy is very deeply rooted in the lives of the people. Even
Athenian society does not seem to care very much. It is true that there is a certain
number of ladies who devote time to good works, mostly under royal patronage, but
society does not appear to centre round the Court and Royal Family to any marked
degree. Athenian society indeed seems preoccupied, first, with money-making;

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second, with feminine fashions and parties; and third, with politics. The political world impinges of course on the social. But the professional politician is above all a professional. He cares little for the opinion of the people as such, a good deal for newspaper opinion, but most of all for the opinion of his fellow-politicians because it is on this that he chances of advancement so largely depend. As for the rest of the population of Athens, doubtless they exist, but the professional or artisan classes do seem to have less standing than in most Western European countries.

5. Athens to-day has something of the look of the boom town, with new blocks of flats going up, new streets being laid, large American cars, and comparatively well-stocked shops. Even outside Athens considerable efforts are being made to attract the tourist trade. But the actual Greek trading deficit in 1956 was £86 millions on a total figure for imports of £161 millions including £4.5 millions of surplus agricultural commodities provided free by United States welfare organisations; in other words, the value of imports was rather more than double that of exports. The difference is mostly made up by invisible earnings, including remittances from Greeks overseas, to the amount of £53 millions, and United States aid to the amount of £28 millions. Unemployment is heavy, though the actual figures are not known. Taking into account underemployment and seasonal unemployment, which are particularly widespread among the agricultural population, it is estimated that, in addition to about 150,000 urban unemployed, there are some 900,000 agricultural workers, who are employed for less than 100 days in each year. Thus, for more than two-thirds of the year, over one-eighth of the total population of Greece is unemployed. No actual figures of average wages are available, but the national statistical services have calculated the annual per capita income in Greece as £65, which is said to be the lowest in Europe and compares with £121 per annum in Italy and £215 per annum in France (and £644 in the United States). The emigration figures, which are only available since 1951, show that in the last six years no fewer than 120,000 indigent Greeks have left Greece to seek their fortunes abroad. Greece therefore is, by Western standards, a very poor country. The present Greek Government are making efforts to improve economic conditions and to attract foreign capital investment, but it will take many years at best before they can effect a radical improvement.

6. The picture, then, seen by the newcomer is one of a busy, intensely self-centred urban society based in sub-structure of a more or less unchanging peasantry. The two sections may be less remote from one another than might appear. Greece has never had an hereditary aristocracy. The so-called “older families” who emerged into political prominence during and after the War of Independence can hardly be described as such, and in any case many of them have now lost a great part of their capital in the inflations which followed the first and second world wars, or in the land reforms, especially that of 1952, which limited individual estates to about 120 acres. The rich Greek of to-day has probably made his money comparatively recently, and indeed his father or grandfather may well have been illiterate. Often you have only to scratch the millionaire to find the peasant. Fortunes may be here to-morrow and gone the day after, so enjoy them while you may and do not be afraid of taking risks in
order to get on (otherwise it is certain that you never will get on). All this accords well enough with the Greek temperament, which seems to combine what may almost be called a genius for gambling and a passionate individualism with the peasant characteristics of toughness, cunning and suspiciousness.

7. The tradition of friendship for England is an old one, as such things go, and I believe a deep-rooted one. Greece is more used to living under British protection than under that of anyone else. Estrangement from us makes her feel lonely and the Americans do not fill the gap. The political changes that have taken place here in the last ten years can, however, hardly be exaggerated. In 1947, we had just saved Greece from a bitter civil war and probable Communist domination. It is true that fighting was then still continuing, but the immediate threat had receded, and Britain had established such a stake in the country that confidence was already returning. Material conditions were very bad, but British prestige could hardly have stood higher. As a result of the Truman doctrine, we handed over responsibility gradually from that point to the Americans. The British Missions, naval, military, Royal Air Force, and police, were one by one withdrawn. The British Embassy ceased to make and unmake Greek Governments. The American era had begun. We might nevertheless have maintained for many years a specially favoured position, second in influence only to the American and far ahead of that of any other country, had it not been for the Cyprus issue. Once Greek pride was engaged on that issue, however, the Greeks could not give up and Cyprus came to overshadow everything else. The existence of the Cyprus issue has ensured a passionate Greek interest in everything we do or say that remotely concerns Greece, but it has, of course, shaken Greek faith in us. Britain, from being the old and loved friend whose past services must never be forgotten, became almost overnight the friend who had wounded Greece so cruelly, the friend therefore who was more to be hated than an enemy. The modern Greek, unlike his classical predecessor, is not particularly conscious of the virtues of moderation and balance. He rushes off at a tangent; and one reason why he is a “bad” enemy is that his reactions often defy common sense.

8. To-day, the Cyprus problem looms so large as to obscure all other aspects of our relations with Greece. No settlement that gives Greece what she wants seems possible, but any settlement which the Greeks feel they can accept, faute de mieux, should in time cease to cloud Anglo-Greek relations. The Greek is, I should say, a cheerful soul, not much given to keeping up rancor or brooding on this wrongs. I know that the vendetta still exists in parts of Greece, but it is a local phenomenon, limited in scope and playing little or no part in normal life. It is perhaps of some interest that, according to a recent number of the Economist, the homicide rate in Greece is less than that in Finland, for instance, and the suicide rate is less than one-fifth of the Finnish. The Greek is not, perhaps, easy to manage; but on the other hand he rather likes to be managed if it is done in the right way. As my predecessor pointed out in his valedictory despatch, Greece has never stood alone. The Greek’s love of intrigue, his love of forms and devices for their own sake, make him more amenable to diplomacy than to force; his sense of drama and his egotism lay him open to
persuasion and flattery. While it is probably true that our material position in Greece will never again be what it once was, still the sentimental bonds between us and the Greeks may one day, at least on the Greek side, be as strong as before, if the Cyprus question can be settled in such a way that it ceases to be a burning issue for Greece. Then we should draw what advantage we can from this sentiment. We could perhaps step into a vacant place, that of the European leader. We should not and could not attempt to rival the United States, but Greece may respond to the suggestion (which is indeed somewhat flattering to her) that she is a “Western” and therefore a European country, that she need to put all her eggs in the American basket, politically or economically, and that it is to her interest to show that she does belong in fact as well as in name to the European comity of nations. Her ties with the United States, where there is always likely to be a large and wealthy Greek colony, will remain, but the Greek in Greece has for the United States a feeling of resentment and impatience mixed with his admiration. The ordinary Greek is not easily going to be fully Americanised (any more that he has in fact been Europeanised, if it comes to that); his natural inclination is to cling to the skirts of Europe, and provided he sees some material advantage in doing so, and provided he is not divided from Europe by some temporary emotional gulf such as that created by Cyprus at present, he will probably follow his inclination. At the same time, Greece is more than merely a minor Balkan country. She plays a larger part in world affairs than one might expect merely from her physical aspect. The Greeks, after all, are a restless people with wide-ranging interests, as shown by their reputation as traders, their large overseas communities and their great shipping interests. It is their paradox that, with all this, they still physically come back, and mentally look back, always to Greece; and this is also their strength. It is useless to expect them to be well-behaved, well-disciplined, or neatly integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Middle East pacts, Balkan alliances, or anything else; but if it is worth taking trouble to gain and keep Greek friendship, then eventually the way to do it may be for us to show Greece that there is a path along which she can follow us towards membership of a more united Western Europe.

I have, &c.

R. ALLEN.
Sir,

In my immediately preceding despatch I have described the present economic difficulties which beset Greece as a result of the creation of large and unsaleable agricultural surpluses. There are political difficulties also in this situation. It will readily be imagined that in a poor country like Greece, primarily dependent on agricultural products and with large peasant population, any fall in agricultural incomes is bound to be most unsettling. In many of the villages, people exist at little above the subsistence level, while in richer areas, Government propaganda, the creation of new roads and the slight improvements of recent years have led the population to expect a steady if slow improvement in their way of life. Wider horizons have been opened and new needs created so that any set-back appears intolerable.

2. I find it hard to say to what extent village incomes have fallen or discontent is rife. The Government are constantly publishing figures to suggest that the farmers are better off, whilst on the other hand one hears many tales of hardship and desperation. The United States Embassy is at present engaged in a careful filed survey of the problem and I shall be interested to learn the result. But it is undeniable that something is wrong and that agrarian distress, together with continuing unemployment in the towns, has made the economic state of the country the central political problem of the day. This is especially so because the Cyprus question has now almost vanished from the scene and distracts comparatively little attention from domestic troubles. During the debate on a vote of confidence which has been taking place in Parliament (my despatch No. 121 of yesterday’s date) the economic state of the country was chosen as the main ground for the Opposition attack because it is so clearly the Government’s most vulnerable front. In fact, economic troubles have brought about a change of political climate in the last month or so; whereas in the summer the position of the Prime Minister and his Government seemed unassailable (except for a possible onslaught by Grivas), there is now widespread and rather exaggerated speculation that the tide of mounting economic difficulties might conceivably overwhelm them. This is, of course, just what most Greek politicians who do not at present enjoy office are hoping for, and the agitation in such circles, the constant combining and dissolving of unstable elements, the statements of intention and denials have all been very noticeable in recent weeks.

3. The Government’s first reaction to attack on economic grounds has been for Ministers to publish a lot of misleading statistics to show increases in the national income, earnings per head of the population, industrial output, etc. Monsieur Karamanlis himself has made a number of boastful speeches claiming that Greece’s economic progress over the last few years has been better than that of many other
countries. This is dangerous because the Government risk convincing themselves that they speak the truth. Yet the Prime Minister does seem to have a vision of the need for an all-out economic effort. Unfortunately it is not a very practical vision and his tireless efforts have resulted mostly in a paper flood of social and economic legislation, plans and schemes, most of which are unlikely ever to turn into sound achievement. The truth is that the administration and the experience simply do not exist in Greece to bring about all these revolutionary and other contradictory aims. This is shown by the behaviour of the Prime Minister himself who, despairing of the abilities of his Ministers, progresses around like an assize judge, sitting one day in the Ministry of Agriculture to decide on a scheme for diversifying crops, the next day presiding in the Ministries of Labour or Social Welfare on some scheme for insurance and spending the whole of the day after in the Ministry of Commerce discussing trade problems. Progress, if there is any, will be very slow under such a régime. There is plenty to complain about, the opposition are constantly drawing attention to it and the country knows it.

4. There is a second problem beside the economic one, but closely united to it, which is of great political import at the moment and which formed a companion theme in the recent Parliamentary debate. This is the question of Greece’s relations with the Soviet Union and other members of the Communist Bloc. In my preceding despatch I have described how the Russians are in a position to relieve Greece of a good part of her agricultural surpluses and the determination of the Government to accept this only so far as they feel they safely can without being drawn into the Soviet economic orbit. Obviously this puts them in a different position at home. The Communist dominated E.D.A. are suggesting that the Government have turned down offers of inestimable benefit to the community at the behest of the Americans, while the nationalist opposition parties have also been urging the benefits of Soviet Trade. The public are well aware of what is going on and if the economic situation worsens they may well turn away from a Government which refuses assistance, even though this were preferred by the Devil himself.

5. The dispute extends to the whole field of Greek-Soviet relations. It is lucky for the Russians that they find themselves in a position to bring commercial pressure to bear on Greece just at a time when they want to bring her into line with their plans for denuclearisation of the Balkans. With the rest of the Western world eagerly welcoming the relaxation in international tension, the Government here find themselves obliged to pick political quarrels with the Soviet Union in order to create excuses for rejecting advantageous trade offers, and the opposition are continuously calling attention to this anomalous position. The Russians are well aware of the difficulties of the Greeks and are now subjecting them to heavy fire. On the one hand Soviet and satellite propaganda has continued to press on the Greeks the advantages of the proposals both for regional denuclearisation and a meeting of Balkan Heads of Government, while on the other hand it has attacked the Greek Government as out of step with the spirit of the times. Mr. Khruschev’s reference to the suppression of the Greek revolution in his speech at Budapest on December 2 was clearly of a
threatening nature. Whether it was well-judged is another matter, but the Russians must hope that all of this will sooner or later weaken the position of the Greek Government.

6. It is hard to say to what extent these Soviet manoeuvres have been successful. On the question of denuclearisation the Government have a good answer, which is that they are not interested in removing missile bases or atomic bombs from the Balkans if they can still be bombed from Soviet territory. This argument seems to be more or less accepted by a public which has shown little interest in the subject. The Government have also sought to avoid getting into unnecessary trouble on this front by avoiding acceptance, for instance, of the proposal to set up American guided missile bases on Greek soil or of candidature for the Security Council. It is only very recently, however, that they have been led into exacerbating their political relations with the U.S.S.R. in order to avoid the economic danger, as I have explained. The Glezos stamp and Mr. Khruachev’s Budapest speech have, it is true, been grist to their mill, and they may succeed in working up a wave of popular indignation against the Soviet Union, but it is a dangerous game and nearly all the opposition leaders are banking on a failure.

7. In such circumstances, it is natural that everyone should be watching Grivas, the great unknown on the political stage, to see what he is going to do and what use can be made of him for the advancement of personal fortune. In my despatch No. 90 of the 23rd of September (15113/218/59) I reported that, on his return to Greece from Cyprus, Grivas had first of all chosen to attack the Government with criticism of the London and Zurich Agreements, and that this had not proved very successful. Since his meeting with Archbishop Makarios on Rhodes in early October he has become almost completely silent about Cyprus. It was extraordinary that he did not even open his mouth at the time when the Turks were caught smuggling arms into Cyprus in the fishing vessel Deniz, although this caused such a stir both among the Greek-Cypriots and the Greeks. It is difficult to be sure of his reasons. Undoubtedly Makarios, who seems to have an ascendancy over him when the two men are together, will have shown good reason at Rhodes why Grivas should not interfere publicly in the conduct of affairs. It is also known that the Greek politicians who are constantly giving their advice to Grivas have been trying to prevent him from making any more of his invariably ill-chosen public statement and to convince him that Cyprus is not an issue which can bring him to power. But he is not an easy man to ménage and he must have had reasons of his own. One of several possibilities is that he has genuinely reached the conclusion that it is better to let the Cyprus Agreements go through provided that there is nothing too shocking in the final arrangements. His eyes have been fixed on the achievement of power in Greece and he would hardly wish to be diverted from this by a breakdown in Cyprus and the reopening of EOKA guerilla activity. It would be hard to have to resume leadership of the struggle and might be equally hard to refuse. Once he has achieved power or once he has abandoned the hope of it he might begin to make trouble again, but for the moment there is bigger game. Nevertheless, it may, of course, be that the nature of our requirements for the
Sovereign Areas may prove too much for him to swallow at the last moment. If, for instance, it proved impossible for us to reach agreement in the London Committee on our military requirements, so that a postponement of the Cyprus independence date became inevitable, this might give Grivas the kind of excuse for which he may be looking. At least, it is not to anyone’s interest to risk it. Indeed, so long as we warn the Greek Government in good time of the danger of postponement, they should in their own interest try to avoid it, since they cannot be sure that such a postponement would not cause Grivas to explode into activity again. But for two months now he has seemed content to let matters rest.

8. Grivas’ experience during these last months must have been discouraging. At first he said that he was not willing to enter into combinations with the old gang of politicians and that he would only come to power in answer to a call from the people. There is no sign of such a call yet. The general impression in Greece is that his prestige stands higher in the villages than in the towns. If true, this may partly be due to the simpler cast of the peasant mind, with its tradition of popular heroes, and partly to agrarian distress. By contrast, Mr. Consul-General Fish has informed me that the visit to Salonica was a conspicuous failure and I have reported in my despatch No. 115 of the 26th November that I found no enthusiasm at all in the wake of his visit to Crete. The general opinion seems to be that Grivas has lost support in the country, and that unless he does something soon he will be finished. It is probably true that he cannot afford to wait indefinitely. How, then, can he stimulate the people’s call? If it comes eventually only as a result of further economic deterioration and of disgust with Government corruption and ineptitude, the process may be too slow for him, and the call itself too faint.

9. While waiting for developments, Grivas has belied his earlier statements and has been in relations with a great number of politicians. If is not that he has encouraged them to work with him or made it any easier for them to do so, but his associates have been looking for support in every political quarter. The aim has been to persuade him to head a movement (which shall not be a political party in deference to his wishes) and to be guided by a political general-staff of which they would be members. The combinations and groupings of persons offering themselves in this capacity have shifted from week to week (and indeed from day to day) and there is no point in reporting on them. Or more interest has been the recent half-hearted attempt of Monsieur Venizelos to associate himself and his 20 members of the Liberal Party with Grivas. Throughout the autumn Monsieur Venizelos had been making common cause with Monsieur Markezinis and his Progressive Part. But this alliance collapsed at once when the former, in one of his fitful initiatives, suddenly though he saw Grivas’ star in the ascendant and announced that the Liberal Party would give him its support, though only while remaining independent and if he looked like winning. There has also been the attempt by Grivas’ admirers to detach twenty or more deputies from Monsieur Karamanlis’ party so as to remove his majority and bring about his downfall when required. The key figure required for this manoeuvre however, Monsieur Casimatis, has been away at the annual meeting of the World
Bank in Washington and has shown no disposition to be lured back to play this particular role. Finally, there has been the possibility of an alliance, no matter how unnatural, between Grivas and the Communist controlled E.D.A. with their 71 seats in Parliament. While there is evidence that the two parties have been in touch, and while it is very likely that E.D.A. would lend its votes to Grivas supporters in a Parliamentary division to bring Karamanlis down, there are still formidable obstacles in the way of any practical working alliance.

10. Almost all this manoeuvring and counter-manoeuvring, therefore, no political bloc has emerged in support of Grivas and I doubt if he is doing any better on this front than on that of popular mass support. It was noticeable that during the recent Parliamentary debate no-one seemed to have Grivas in mind at all. Yet it is hard to see how any new group could overthrow the Prime Minister just now without him. The main reason for this is that there is no organised nationalist opposition left. The small parties of the centre are utterly discredited and scattered and only a saviour figure like Grivas could draw a large body of voters away from right and left. Everyone deplores this unhealthy fact, for which the word “polarisation” has been coined, and it is a theme of constant lamentation in the press, but it explains why, although Monsieur Karamanlis and his Government have lost both prestige and popularity, they do not look as if they were really endangered as yet. It is significant that many people talk in terms of what would happen if the Prime Minister were run over by a bus rather than of he fell for political reasons.

11. My general conclusion is that the present Government is not yet seriously threatened either by Grivas or from other quarter. But the inter-related problem of dealing with economic difficulty and of handling relations with the Soviet Union are growing and could in the long run get out of control unless strong measures are taken or the Americans increase their help. On the other hand, a crisis of some kind, either an economic one or one manufactured by Grivas, could precipitate matters. If the Communists and Grivas then combined, there might be a governmental Débâcle. At present, however, there seems to be a kind of pause in Greek politics—a slightly unease one, perhaps, as is not unusual. If things do get worse, in the time honoured tradition of Greek politics, Monsieur Karamanlis might have to be sacrificed; but the situation is still too obscure to say how he would be replaced.

12. I am sending copies of this Despatch to His Majesty’s Representatives at Ankara, Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Sofia and Washington.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Roger Allen
FO 371/152972

Athens Chancery to Southern Department

Subject: President Eisenhower’s visit to Athens
Athens, January 8, 1960

Dear Department,

In his despatch No.130 of December 19 about President Eisenhower’s visit to Athens (not copied to all) the Ambassador mentioned the intention of the Greek Government to try and convince the President that Greece is at the moment one of the main targets of Soviet and communist pressure and that she is in a particularly exposed position. This thesis was developed in an article which appeared in the December edition of the Government sponsored glossary magazine “Greek Information Bulletin” entitled “The Triptych of new aggression of the Eastern Coalition against Greece”.

2. The article declared that since the end of the Second World War Greece and Turkey had become the main target of Soviet aggressiveness. Greece was the first to suffer an indirect communist attack when E.A.M and E.L.A.S attempted to seize power in December 1944. This attempt was defeated by the moral resistance of the Greek people, the intervention of the small free Greek forces from abroad and the aid of the very small British forces. After a short interval, the same anti-national forces, with the open aid of all neighbouring countries, attempted to overthrow the lawful government again. This rebellion, which was rightly called the “bandit war” was suppressed after three years struggle of the entire Greek people and after a great part of the countryside had been destroyed. The suppression of the rebellion and the regrouping of national, political and social forces through free elections, consolidated the home front of the country while the Atlantic Alliance ensured its external security. In these circumstances, it was possible to re-establish peaceful relations not only with Russia but also with some of her Balkan satellites.

3. The next move of Soviet diplomacy was to adopt a policy of psychological pressure. This peace offensive was exemplified by the Stoika proposals, the open threats which Mr. Khruschev uttered near the Greek-Albanian border and the systematic efforts to undermine Greek morale. These efforts were encouraged by the Greek elections of 1958 which, through the weakness of the nationalist opposition, returned subversive elements as the second parliamentary force. The Stoika proposals were revived, the Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments deluged Greece with notes and the recent statements of the Roumanian Vice-President, Mr. Zoza, and of the Soviet Ambassador in Athens, kept up the pressure. The failure of all these direct political attacks led to a Soviet attempt to put pressure on Greece by three new methods.

4. The first was the suggestion that the Soviet Union would make a new and spectacular gesture to Greece in the economic field by offering to buy all Greek
agricultural surpluses up to a limit of U.S. $100,000,000. The article recalled that the
Minister of Commerce, Monsieur Dertilis, had denied these unconfirmed reports
about the Soviet offer. Monsieur Dertilis had said that it was no mention of it in the
trade negotiations between Greek and Soviet delegations in Moscow in November. He
had pointed out that the Greek market would be unable to absorb industrial products
of the Soviet Union up to anything like the figure of U.S. $100,000,000 because there
was a consumers’ preference in Greece for products of the free exchange countries.
He said that the Soviet Union could not pay in terms of large technical projects
because they did not take part in competitive international bidding, without which
Greece would be uncertain whether the project was being done on the most economic
basis. Greece had already taken measures to increase trade with Soviet Russia and
with other countries of Eastern Europe. Trade with the Soviet Union in particular had
increased from $2.3 million in 1955 to $17 million in 1958. Despite all these efforts,
however, Greece’s exports of tobacco to the communist bloc represented only 13.9%
of her total tobacco exports. The article recalled that during the recent negotiations the
Soviet delegation had persistently refused to increase their purchases of Greek
tobacco.

5. The second new method of Soviet pressure was the issue of the Soviet
stamp bearing the picture of Manolis Glezos with the inscription “Freedom of the
hero of the Greek peoples”. This was an astonishing piece of insolence on the part of
those who were responsible for innumerable crimes and for the cold-blooded
assassination of the Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy.

6. The third example of Soviet pressure was Mr. Khrushchev’s attempt in his
speech in Budapest to press the perpetrators of the December 1944 rising and to
describe the immolators of the innocent population as the “best sons of Greece”. This
unprecedented provocation which was made on the eve of the 15th anniversary of the
frightful massacres of December 1944 had morally revolted the entire Greek people.

7. The article concluded that this “sad triptych” coming at a time when there
was much talk of international appeasement and Summit meetings proved that the
Soviet Union and her satellites did not intend in any way to desist from their
objectives and provocative methods. Greece, however, had no intention of striking her
colours and capitulating before the multitude of her opponents, even if it became
necessary to repeat the heroic acts which in the thousands of years of her history had
made her the pride of the civilised world.

8. We are copying this letter to the Chanceries at Belgrade, Moscow,
Washington, Bucharest and Sofia.

Yours ever,
Chancery
Subject: Valedictory dispatch
Athens, November 6, 1961

My Lord,

Anyone who has walked –as I have scores of times during the last four and a half years – on the slopes if Lycabettus, that crag rising almost like a lighthouse from the confused breakers of the city at its foot, must surely have been struck by the contrast between the turmoil of modern Athens in the foreground and the strength and serenity of the Acropolis in the middle distance. You look south-westwards over the welter of recently built flats and office blocks with their neon signs, and busy streets, across to where the Parthenon, perhaps the noblest architectural expression of human endeavour in the world, floats majestically on its hill, with the sea shining in the distance behind it. The Parthenon symbolises a world of order, restraint, and dignity, but still on a human scale; the city around represents current activities, the confusion, intrigue, and pre-occupation with the little things which make up daily life. One can hardly help thinking how strange that in one and the same country people were capable, nearly two and a half millenniums ago, of conceiving and executing the Parthenon, and that to-day they are capable of making such a muddle.

2. Now that I come to write my valedictory despatch, I think (as I thought when I wrote my first impressions) that one of the most obvious natural characteristics of modern Greece, to our eyes, is disorderliness. The Greek is intensely individualistic. He puts his house down where he feels like it, regardless of the lack of a road, drainage or lighting system. His country is a jumble of mountains in which each peasant carries on a one-man struggle against the elements and the soil. Standardisation, co-operation, planning are alien to him. He is a brilliant improviser. Usually, at the last moment, by superhuman efforts, everything will come off with splendid success. The Greek prefers it this way. He then feels that he, the particular human being, had made his special contribution to the event, whatever it may be. And he hates to feel he is committed beforehand to an irrevocable something, that he is caught up in some impersonal machine. He hates above all to be driven into a corner and obliged to take a decision. If this happens, he very often takes the wrong decision. Let him have his freedom of manoeuvre, appeal to his sense of human dignity and propriety, make him see that his voluntary collaboration with you is necessary if the right result is to be achieved, and you may get the right answer. Of course, this is not always so, because self-interest or other factors may be too strong, as they often are with all of us, but the chances are at least as good with a Greek, with his string feeling of amour-propre, as they are with anyone else.

3. Writing just a century ago, George Finlay, the historian and philhellene who took part in the War of Independence, complained about the disappointments of the generation which followed the Liberation. “In the Greek Kingdom”, he wrote,
“with every element of social and political improvement at hand, the agricultural population and the native industry of the country have remained almost stationary. The towns, it is true, are increasing and merchants are gaining money; but the brave peasantry who formed the nation’s strength grows neither richer nor more numerous; the produce of their labour is of the rudest kind; whole districts remain uncultivated; the wealthy Greeks who pick up money in foreign traffic do not invest the capital they accumulate in the land which they pretend to call their country; and no stream of Greek emigrants flows from the millions who live enslaved in Turkey, to enjoy liberty by settling in liberated Greece.” Since then, the stream of emigrants from Turkey has arrived in the form of refugees after the Asia Minor disaster, and parts of what were once Turkey have been added to Greece, but in other respects the picture remains still all too true. The modern Greek, in fact, is still in many ways a century behind the times. His natural atmosphere is still one of nineteenth century *laissez-faire*, devil-take-the-hindmost, and rugged individualism. All this creates a rather old-fashioned impression in a world of technocracy, vast international enterprises, and streamlined salesmanship. But, of course, even the Greeks are at least beginning to move. In the last few years the country has indeed begun to enter a stage of transition. Industrialisation is starting on a small scale. Contracts are being put out to international tender, even if the rules are something modified in a rather peculiar way. There is growing awareness of social problems, and even a (still rather rudimentary) system, of social insurance. New ideas are coming in with the new hordes of tourists. Greece is becoming conscious that she is tied to the West, and if she is to be part of Western Europe, in spirit if not in geography, she must bring herself into line with Western methods and be able to compete with Western techniques.

4. The process is a painful one anywhere, and for Greece it is particularly hard. In the first place, she has a great deal of leeway to make up. She is starting very late in the race. How can new industries, in a country of eight million people, compete with the already well-established industries of Western Europe, with their comparatively large capital resources and advanced ‘know-how’? In the second place, Greece is naturally a poor country, her main exports being agricultural surpluses which she finds it hard to sell; her standard of living is almost the lowest in Europe outside the Iron Curtain; and her rapacious neighbours impose on her a defence effort disproportionate to her strength. In the third place, she has a long tradition of muddle and corruption in public and business life, she lacks a competent civil service, or a properly organised trade union movement. Nevertheless, despite these handicaps, for the first time in her history she has had during the last six years a Government which was really trying to play politics. The late Government was not free from criticism, some of it justified, on the score broadly that it was too tender towards the rich. Its handling of individual projects and cases was sometimes inept. It may be thought to have paid insufficient attention to sociological requirements and to administrative reforms. But it had a vision of the Greece of the future, and it was trying to find the way there.
5. Greece has recently signed an association agreement with the Common Market countries, but the Government did so not without misgivings; as Monsieur Averoff said to the Lord Privy Seal during the latter’s visit last July, it will be necessary to re-orientate Greece’s whole economy if she is not to be swamped by goods which she cannot pay for. Greek imports, according to the latest official figures, are still more than two and a half times her exports in value. The adverse balance is made up by invisibles: American aid, remittances from the very important Greek communities overseas, tourism, and the earnings of her merchant marine, the sixth largest in the world (or the third if Greek ships under flags of convenience are counted). Some of her main agricultural exports compete with those of other countries in the Six, notably Italy. Her five-year programme of industrialisation is still largely a blueprint. Her trade with the Soviet bloc countries is still an important feature of her economic life, and it gives those countries a powerful political role. The future of Greece depends too much on the stability hitherto provided by one man: if his hand were to be withdrawn from the helm, one could not have much confidence that the ship would continue to move forward. Fortunately, it appears that the Greek electorate are conscious of this too, and the fact that they have returned Monsieur Karamanlis to power again after six years justifies the faith of those who thought that there had been a change in the Greek attitude towards the traditional game of politics. The Greeks have shown that they appreciate the advantages of stability and a settled purpose, and have abandoned, at any rate for the time being, the notion that politics is merely a kind of kaleidoscope. On the economic side, however, one has the impression that they are only just beginning to face their difficulties. They to not yet realise the inevitable slowness of industrial development, or the disappointments that await them. They seem not yet to realise their shortcomings. Their congenital inability to plan methodically and exactly, the corruption and inadequacy of their civil service, their lack of a foreman class, of technical skills, of international marketing ability, all have to be overcome if they are ever to hope to compete with Western nations. One obvious example of their failure to plan is the growth of the cities of Athens, Piraeus and to a lesser extent Salonika. The population of Athens and Piraeus has increased by 33 per cent during the last ten years. Comparatively few of these people who have drifted in from the countryside or islands have found useful full-time jobs. Nor is there much prospect that they will do so. The projected industries will absorb only a few. Meanwhile, though efforts are made to site new industries in the provinces and to develop agriculture, no effective steps have yet been taken to stop the inflow, the housing conditions except in the centre deteriorate, and the people are an obvious target for communist propaganda. Spectacular improvements in the tourist part of the city cannot conceal this. At the moment many people are pinning their hopes on Monsieur Karamanlis, but something concrete must be done for them in the next few years if there is not to be a reaction. Greece, in fact, needs economic help, and it is to be hoped that if Britain signs the Treaty of Rome she will not overlook her traditional rôle of friend and protector here. After all, in these days protection is as often an economic as political or military function.
6. Meanwhile, the twin factors of Greek political and strategic value, based on her geographical position, have certainly not diminished. Greece still blocks the physical expansion of the Soviet empire to the Eastern Mediterranean. And she is at present the only democracy in Eastern Europe. The interest of Greece to the West lies in whether or not she can demonstrate, and that near home, that a small under-developed country can turn herself into a modern viable state while remaining a democracy.

7. I am conscious that these reflections are very general in character, and they suffer from the usual drawbacks of such reflections. Looking back over four and a half years, I am struck by the changes which have occurred. It is true that in some ways they may be called superficial. But it is almost impossible to-day to imagine, for example, the extent to which the Cyprus question overshadowed everything else three years ago. Then, the whole national effort of Greece seemed to be absorbed by this one issue. Now, as I have mentioned, the Greeks are pre-occupied by very different problems. The Greek character, I suppose, does not change basically, but the Greeks can adapt themselves to a changing situation. Their parochial outlook is being broadened and the changes come fast. They are emotional people, and whatever they undertake they do with an intensity of feeling which Anglo-Saxons sometimes find hard to comprehend. They have escaped altogether that Puritan influence which imposes on the Anglo-Saxon world a certain subservience to laboriously worked out principle. The Greek morality is of a different order: if they obey a code at all they do so in the Byzantine tradition simply because it is a code, and for the rest they follow their emotions. One result of this is that they can operate quite happily on two different levels at the same time. They can have a public face and a private one. They are not plagued by the bugbear of consistency. In public, at any rate truth is not something to be sought objectively: rather it is that which corresponds most nearly to the picture one would like to see. In private, however, the Greek will often admit by his actions, if not by his words, that there is a gap between the real and the ideal. This can be useful, since he may be prepared to do privately that which he would not acknowledge publicly, as we saw on occasions during the Cyprus affair. Naturally, the public face must always be respected if results are to be obtained. Once this is understood, it is seen that the Greeks have great qualities. They are brave and generous. They are capable on occasions of great endurance, subject always to their changes of mood. Outside Athens social and political circles, at any rate, they are not yet corrupted by materialism nor softened by too much comfort. Perhaps indeed, the apparent contrast between the ancient and the modern, symbolised by the Acropolis and the modern city, is not quite so marked as it appears. Time has dealt kindly with the Acropolis and the clutter of buildings and statues which it once contained probably detracted from the simplicity of the site as we know it to-day. And then, the ancient Greeks themselves were probably not so very orderly in their daily lives. Variety, activity and struggle are elements that go to make up most worthwhile human characters. The modern Greeks may be all too human, but at least they are not prigs. And, finally, of all
nations they must be among those who are friendliest to foreigners. It has been a great pleasure as well as a privilege to have spent four and a half years in this country, where we have received an infinity of kindnesses from people in all walks of life, and I have indeed been lucky that the political clouds of the first years gave place to the clearer skies of steadily improving Anglo-Greek relations. To quote the motto of the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, founded in the Ionian Islands in 1818, it is permissible to see in this improvement “Auspicium melioris aevi”.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship’s obedient Servant,
Roger Allen

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**FO 371/163444**

J.N.O. Curle (Embassy Athens) to K. D. Jamieson (Foreign Office)

Subject: Present political life in Greece
Athens, August 30, 1962

Dear Kenneth,

Political life in Greece is in the doldrums, but the Centre Union and the Government continue to snarl at each other in spite of the heat and the holidays. Papandreou and Co. make speeches from time to time in the provinces. They and the Opposition newspapers seize in any pretext for attacking the Government or the monarchy. The main recent themes against the Government have been their inefficiency over American aid, the concessions made by Mr. Averoff to the Turks and the exorbitant profits being made on medicines. The monarchy are being attacked for the alleged construction of expensive new royal residences in various parts of the country (these usually turn out to be mares’ nests) and for abuses over the importation of duty-free cars. (It is being rumoured that Papandreou in his vanity no longer has his eye on the office of Prime Minister but in that of President if he can bring the monarchy down; this however is significant rather of the lengths to which rumour goes here than of the seriousness of Papandreou’s attack on the monarchy). Papandreou and Venizelos have announced that they will not attend the Government’s reception for the United States Vice-President, on the ground that they have not been invited to the dinner party before-hand at which serious talk might be possible. The Government accuse them of hoping to involve the Americans in their own political campaign.
2. The Centre Union have applied to hold a public meeting in Athens on October 29 (the anniversary of the “fraudulent” elections and the after Oxi Day, a national holiday) at which their campaign will come to a head.

3. We have the impression that this “unending struggle” against the alleged illegality of the Government leaves the population as whole apathetic. Allowing for Mediterranean hyperbole, all the foregoing does not amount to much more in Greek political life than stock Opposition tactics at home.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Ankara and Washington.

Yours ever,
J.N.O. Curle
United States of America
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Schnee) to the Department of State

Subject: Domestic Political Situation
Athens, June 17, 1955

Rally

The Rally Government continues to exercise its mandate more efficiently than any Greek Government in the post-war period, but it is the Embassy’s opinion that the prospects of its receiving a fresh mandate – or even continuing as a cohesive political factor – after the present Parliament completes its term are not very strong. The Rally has never lost its original character, for which it gets its name, of a grouping of diverse political elements; it has not evolved into a political party. The union is bound mainly by the loyalty of the various elements to Field Marshal Papagos personally and by the fact that only he is acceptable as a leader to a substantial majority of the group. As there is little evidence that the Rally leadership will be able in the coming months to develop that homogeneity which they have failed to achieve during the past thirty months we must reckon with the probability that the Rally will remain an effective force only so long as the Marshal continues to play an active role. We hope that the Marshal will be willing to carry on at least until May or June of next year. Some of his close associates, however, are apparently still hopeful that he will head the Rally ticket in the next election, if only as titular leader.

Present Opposition

The Opposition continues to be divided into small factions which give little indication of being able to combine into larger groupings with the capacity for political leadership. However, two essential factors which will dictate the future course of the Opposition parties are not as yet established. First is the system under which the next election will take place. The majority system and, to a lesser extent, the reinforced proportional system will require the Opposition to combine into two or three major groupings. The simple proportional system would encourage parties to enter the elections under their own banners with perhaps some combinations being created for the elections. The second factor bearing upon the regrouping of the Opposition is that there is no clear concept as to when the next general elections will take place. It is characteristic in Greece that political deals which result in parties joining forces for the elections are rarely effected before the eleventh hour.

While it is to be anticipated that the various elements in the Opposition will join forces, before the election if the majority system is followed or after the election in order to form a government if the simple proportional system is followed, there is little or no probability of large segments of the current Opposition joining forces in a cooperative effort which would be based on agreed positions concerning major political, economic and defense policies and political tactics. Thus, if depended upon...
their own resources, the Opposition could probably not produce anything substantially better than the uneasy and superficial coalitions characteristic of Greek post-war politics and which by their incompetence encourage subversive or other extremist movements.

Probable Future Developments

Political Combinations

If the majority system is used in the next general elections, it is very likely that something akin to the Popular Front will be organized from out of the present Opposition. The recently announced program of the Liberal Democratic Union led by Mr. Venizelos is compatible with the programs espoused by the extreme left although a breach has developed between Venizelos and EDA over the form in which cooperation is to be achieved. A popular Front may well attract elements, such as some followers of Venizelos, who are clearly anti-Communist, but it may also attract and be strengthened by others such as Mayor Katsotas who, while personally strongly nationalistic, are susceptible of being exploited by the Communists. The Democratic Party led by Svolos and Kartalis would in all probability play a leading role in such a combination and one would anticipate that the EPEK leaders would also effect at least some measure of cooperation with any strong Leftist coalition.

Papandreou would probably continue to refuse to join any movement which strongly resembled a Popular Front and so would many other Opposition leaders including Tsaldaris and probably Markezinis, but it is doubtful whether they would receive sufficient public support to offer the prospect of providing an effective government.

Whether or not a Popular Front is formed, and regardless of the electoral system to be used, there is a definite sentiment, the strength of which cannot at this time be judged, in favor of forming a political party which would offer new personalities and a program responsive to current problems. Supporters of the new-party concept believe that the personalities leading the current Greek parties are discredited and that the parties themselves have only an artificial basis, which formed the basis of Greek politics from 1910 onwards but which ceased to have current validity before the war and which is completely divorced from the issues which Greece has been called upon to face in the post-war period. It is anticipated that this new party would appeal to both Venizelists and anti-Venizelists and therefore to both the Rally and elements of the current Opposition. It would make a very strong effort to attract men who have not heretofore been associated with the leadership of the older parties.

The Embassy finds considerable merit in this idea of a new political party outing across older political lines, but it is too early to tell whether such a group would be successful. Supporters of such a development include, among other present members of the Opposition, George Mavros, Panayotis Pipinelis and Gregory Kassimatis. Constantine Karamanlis of the Rally is known to strongly favor this thesis.
and Constantine Rodopoulos, President of the current Parliament appears to have views which are compatible with a development along these lines. This possibility is believed to have been discussed by the aforementioned in rather general terms. Karamanlis might fill the role of titular leader of the new party. Insofar as the public is concerned he is the most popular man in the Rally Government, would probably be acceptable to most of the “new party” supporters including Kassimatis and Ropopoulos, and probably Mavros, and is known to be intent upon playing a more prominent role in the political life of the country. Karamanlis is also known to have made a very favorable impression upon the Palace. In the event Field Marshal Papagos leads the Rally in the next election, Rodopoulos and Karamanlis will probably remain with the Rally and it would be more difficult to find an effective leader for a new party.

The disadvantages of dispersal are, of course, clear to the Rally, many of whom undoubtedly desire a solution along the lines of a collective leadership, Papaligouras, the Minister of Coordination, in accelerating the investment program and apportioning the FY’56 budget is clearly endeavoring to establish a record upon which the Rally could base a political campaign. The ineffectiveness of Papandreou as an Opposition leader is due, in part, to the fact that has deliberately kept himself available for draft as a successor to the Marshal as leader of the Rally. Markezinis must also find it difficult to give up the hope of leading the organization which he created and which has given Greece its first protracted period of comparative stability. Despite the pressure to unite, the potential adherence of blocs now in the Opposition and its good record, the fact is that without the Marshal, the Rally is only an association of individual leaders offering a dependable nationalist program but little hope of continuity of policy or leadership.

Probable sequence of Events

In the event the Marshal withdraws from politics before the full four years of his government have expired, the probable reaction of most party leaders, the deputies and the Palace will be to gain time during which the political forces can recover from their present state of disorganization in order to present the electorate with political alternatives which at least on the surface offer the prospect of effective government. To gain this time, the Rally deputies would probably unite to support a government headed by current Rally leadership or any other government which would be proposed by the King. It is also probable that this government would not be a service government but would be a transitional government (i.e., political government). Under these circumstances it will be noted that a considerable amount of political influence is necessarily gravitating towards the Palace. The choice of a transitional government might have an important bearing on the subsequent elections. For example, were His Majesty to select someone like Karamanlis, who in turn would pick for his cabinet other men who share his views regarding the development of a new political party, such a government could effectively use the intervening three or four months to strengthen its position before electorate.
There are of course numerous other alternatives from which His Majesty could make a choice. It is believed that there remains in the Palace a large residue of goodwill towards Sophocles Venizelos, and there is of course the alternative of the continuation of the Rally.

In the period immediately following a withdrawal by Marshal Papagos, the Rally deputies would probably support any leadership continuing the Rally Government. The various conflicting elements, Stephanopoulos, Karamanlis, Kanellopoulos, etc., would agree to work together in a transitional government. Whether a reorganized Rally could win another election is less clear. The Rally would have its best opportunity under conditions in which it alone provided a rallying point for the nationalist elements of the older parties. Once elected, the centrifugal force governing the path of the older political leaders would probably soon be exerted. The ensuing crisis might then provide the occasion for the development of a new party as the Palace would be called upon to choose a new government or successive governments.

IDEA, at this time, remains a potential political force. Despite the fact that it includes a few hotheads who readily talk about taking action under this or that condition, it is the Embassy’s opinion that under present circumstances, including the reserved attitude of the Palace, the absence of a strong political leader and the divisions within the IDEA organization, it will not have the capability of moving effectively except under conditions in which there is an apparent and immediate danger to the national security. Even under such conditions, many people in authority would prefer to have the necessary measures taken in a manner which places credit and responsibility on the Army as such, and other security forces, rather than the IDEA group.

Role of the Embassy

The basic interests of the United States could be jeopardized if a Popular Front were elected. There is a real danger that the Popular Front would legalize the KKE – move favored be many politicians on the Opposition and Rally – and would permit the release of Communists under procedures which would heap substantial additional durdens upon the already strained Greek internal security forces. However as a Popular Front would undoubtedly include some nationalist elements, the U.S. objectives would be to counter the Communist and extreme Leftist elements while maintaining a relationship with the nationalist personalities which would permit them to strengthen their influence within the Popular Front if it were elected. The Embassy believes that it has during the past year had some success in pursuing such a line by directing attention to the dangers which are inherent in the re-emergence of the Communists as a “respectable” political force.

A government made up of the older parties along lines characteristic of the post-war period would not immediately threaten U.S. objectives in Greece but would undoubtedly herald the return of political instability which would soon have its economic and other repercussions. It would be in the interest of the U.S. Government
actively to support the idea of a coalition of this type only if it were a principal alternative to a Popular Front government.

Whether it would be in the interest of the U.S. to support a new party would depend upon the form it took and the personalities it involved. A party headed be some of the present Rally leaders and supported by competent members of the Opposition and which had the prospect of gaining substantial popular support would be a healthy contribution to the political development of Greece. It would be unwise for the Embassy to become too closely identified with such a group although our appreciation for the past accomplishments of the individuals involved might be expressed on appropriate occasions. In the event that such a party would be an alternative to a Popular Front government, U.S. support might be somewhat stronger although limited by the requirement that the Embassy retain a position which would leave it the possibility of influencing the course of a Popular Front government.

As regards the IDEA, the Embassy usually avoids any discussion of the subject, limiting its remarks to observations about the importance of strengthening Democratic institutions and procedures.

In any event, not excepting the participation of the Rally in the next election, it would not be in the interests of the U.S. to lend public support to one nationalist group against another. The fact that the Greek people look towards the United States for leadership in the struggle against Communism would however require us to take a stand, preferably in private conversations, should we find there is a danger of Communist penetration of nationalist organizations to a degree which threatens the national security.

For the Ambassador
Alexander Schnee
First Secretary of Embassy

 Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Penfield) to the Department of State

Subject: Greece’s Disengagement from United States Policy
Athens, November 4, 1957

In recent weeks and months the Embassy has reported to the Department a series of increasingly frequent instances wherein Greece and the United States have found themselves, primarily in the political and psychological spheres, at odds on major and minor matters of policy. For several weeks officers of the Embassy have studied these instances in the contexts and believe that they are of sufficient
importance to constitute a trend which, if it continues, will prove inimical to the accomplishments of American foreign policy objectives in Greece, in the Balkans and in the Middle East. The trend, for lack of a better label, may be described as a “disengagement” on the part of Greece from the essentially “American” policy which she has followed since the end of the Second World War.

This recently accelerated disengagement has become manifest in three fields: (1) in Greek domestic politics and the Greek national psychology; (2) in matters affecting the Middle East; and (3) in Greece’s attitude toward Communists, Communism and the Communist Bloc of states.

It should be said at the outset that this dispatch is considered to be chiefly an analysis of a trend which the Embassy considers to be of major importance to United States and Western interests in this part of the world; it is not intended to be a balanced report of the entire picture of Greece and her domestic and foreign policies of the moment. Furthermore, in order to identify for the Department in the clearest and briefest manner possible the factors which constitute this now recognizable trend, no attempt has been made to provide bulky documentation to substantiate the thesis. However, few items will be mentioned in this despatch which are not already to be found in the Department’s files among previous telegrams and reports submitted to Washington by the Embassy and by other United States agencies operating in Greece. Here it is our purpose to tie together all the factors of this trend primarily to identify and assess them, so that having once been recognized they may be dealt with by the Embassy and the Department.

Summary and Conclusions

Greece today remains formally and officially tied to the United States and her NAT Allies and will continue to be so tied for the foreseeable future. The United States is – and for some time to come will probably remain – the paramount foreign power in this country, as it has for the past ten years. But we are passing through a period when our influence and prestige among the Greek people and with the Greek Government are undergoing a reassessment and readjustment in a changed world situation. We can no longer be as certain as we have been in the past that we shall have Greece’s support in foreign policy matters that are critical to us. In the Middle East our policies and our actions in the past few years, with very few exceptions, have been the contrary of what Greece has considered to be her own best interests. In the Cyprus issue most of all we have failed in Greek eyes to support the Greek position, and to the Greeks there is no more important problem in this decade. Toward the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc Greece’s attitude has undergone an accelerated process of softening in the past year and a half and she less frequently asks for or accepts our advice in her dealings with the Bloc. She feels that we have ignored what she considers to be her special position in the Middle East and that we have supported more strongly her ancient enemy, Turkey, instead. The other reasons for this drift toward divergence and disengagement are manifold; some are of a minor and transitory nature, but other are deep, permanent, even normal and natural, and will be
difficult to correct. Unless they are corrected, however, there is a distinct possibility that Greece will find herself ultimately in the neutral bloc or in a “non-bloc” alignment where, we have reason to fear, a growing number of Greeks today already feel themselves psychologically.

DOMESTIC SCENE

For ten years we have been much in evidence in Greece. The American presence in the Athens area in particular has been a solid and inescapable fact of life for the Greeks. Despite a great amount of retrenchment since 1953 and despite reductions which are still being made in some of our activities in Athens, other functions are increasing in scope simultaneously. We number now almost 4,000 in the official American community, including dependents. Many of us live an hermetically sealed American existence, blessed with commissary, post exchange, medical, dental and schooling facilities of our own. Our hundreds of brightly colored, late model cars with their distinctive license tags are seen at all hours on all the main thoroughfares of Athens and its sprawling environs. We can afford to rent some of the best homes and to employ servants. Most of us have studied enough Greek to make our simplest wants known, pidgin fashion, to shopkeepers and to our servants; but, counting a fair number of Greek-Americans among us, not more than a few dozen or so can speak Greek well enough to carry on more than the simplest conversation with the average Athenian.

At a conservative estimate at least 20,000 Americans must have been stationed in Greece in the past ten or twelve years, yet in the recent USIS public opinion poll 65 percent of those interviewed claimed never to have met an American. Certainly we have been seen by a far greater percentage than this, but this is illustrative of our belief that we are seen from afar; that we have not succeeded in “getting through” to the Greek people. In recent years it has served the interests of virtually all papers to ridicule the Americans in Greece in their humor and gossip columns and in their cartoons. The mild envy and jealousy which might be expected toward us from a man in the street who is continually been told that he has one of the lowest per capita incomes in Europe has been fanned into smouldering resentment in recent years by the press which sets us even further apart from the Greek people by emphasizing, exaggerating and distorting the extraterritorial aura which surrounds us here. Although the normal Athenian accident rate is about ten times the magnitude of the American rate, press space given to each accident involving an American is in an inverse proportion. This “iniquitous extraterritoriality” is a popular theme in Athens which even the normally pro-American papers occasionally feel they can play on to prove that they are not American lackeys and because they know that it pleases their readers. The Department will recall, for example, that the Government waited for nine months after the signing of the 1956 Status of Forces Agreement before it felt sufficiently sure of its ability to ask for its ratification by the Recess Committee of Parliament instead of by the full body, and then the vote was on straight party lines, with the entire Opposition membership voting against ratification of the Agreement.
and mumbling threats to raise the issue again in the current session. In the past few days EDA has formally moved to reopen debate on the Agreement.

Our conspicuously special position in Greece has thus become a source of resentment besides constituting a gap which militates against finding a practical common denominator between ourselves and the average Greek citizen, who is undoubtedly bored with constant reference to how the Americans with their Truman Doctrine “saved Greece from the Communists”. Even an American official traveling in the provinces finds it a relief when the local nomarch, mayor or metropolitan neglects to include his thanks for American aid in his speech of welcome. In any case, the welcoming ritual has now come to include a hope that (a) more American aid will be forthcoming; and that (b) the American people, with their known dedication to the principles of democracy and self-determination, will help liberate their oppressed brothers on Cyprus from the tyrannical yoke of British colonialism. In recent years, as the Department will appreciate, a direct and satisfying response to such traditional opening gambits has been impossible. Representatives of the United States Mission find themselves in such circumstances on scores of occasions each year. These two points are, on the one hand, the most natural in the world for any Greek to mention at a public event at which Americans are present, the first being required by Greek devotion to the tradition of philoxenia and the second being almost the sine qua non for retention of governmental or ecclesiastical office in the Cyprus-minded Greece of today. On the other hand, the American official can hold out no hope of United States cooperation in meeting either desideratum.

On the first count, there is the overall question of the amount of our defense support and economic assistance to Greece, which will probably begin to decrease now from year to year. Here, however, it might be well to reiterate the view recently framed by the Country Team that there is a level of economic aid below which we fear that the Government of Greece will find it less and less advisable to continue its policy of identification with that of the “American factor”, or to out it crassly, as the Opposition does daily, to dance to our tune. If this is an indication that Greece may at some time in the future place a dollars-and-cents value upon her cooperation with us, it is an indication which we believe warranted and worthy of careful consideration.

On the second count, the question of Cyprus, little need to be said here except to express our conviction that, despite a few instances of general public satisfaction with specific evidences of American charity toward Greek policy, there is a net feeling that we have let Greece down on what has been to her the most important single issue of this critical decade. Cyprus is the key to much of our troubles with Greece. When the Greek public sees its desires with respect to Cyprus supported without sting in the United Nations by the Afro-Asian Bloc, by Tito, and, however tardily and hypocritically, by the Soviet Bloc, and sees the United States and each of its partners in NATO either thwart those desires or remain indifferent or neutral toward them, it lends an ever more receptive ear to those who in public speeches and in the daily press ask what Greece’s ties with the West have gained her and why she
should continue to maintain them. To many Greeks, and to an increasing number of
them, this seems a logical question.

One is entitled to wonder how the Greek people – after being finally rescued
as short a time as eight years ago from inclusion in the Soviet bloc of states
themselves – could possibly forget the lessons they learned. It must be said that while
almost no Greek yearns to see his country become another satellite, many thousands
of them have already forgotten. For almost all of them the memories of the bitter days
of the Civil War are dimming. Human nature, the struggle for a bare livelihood,
preoccupation with other political matters, a confident feeling that “it couldn’t happen
again”, a supreme national confidence in their ultimate ability to best anyone in a
battle, a business deal or in diplomatic negotiations, all play a part on various levels in
causing Greeks to concern themselves less and less with the Communist danger. The
events in Hungary last year, admittedly because of their coincidence with the more
immediately important Suez issue, made little impression upon the Greeks. Even the
Greek Government, on the rare occasions when it has seen fit to mention the Soviet
subjugation of Hungary, feels obliged to draw comparisons between Cyprus and
Hungary. The lesson was lost on the Greeks to all intents and purposes.

Then there is the fact of sheer boredom. The Greek public, in common
apparently with much of the rest of the West, has gradually become suffused with
preachments about the dangers of international Communism. It is perhaps only an
evidence of human nature that a people can become as bored by constant repetition of
the “big truth” as of the “big lie”. There is no vivid consciousness of a clear and
present danger any longer except the specter which haunts all of us, that of a Third
World War fought with nuclear weapons. In this respect the Greeks are perhaps
neither more nor less prone to burying their heads in the sand than are other Allies of
ours. There is also undoubtedly a feeling that if it comes to a question of a local war
with Albania or Bulgaria she would have the support of at least Yugoslavia and, in the
case of Bulgaria, possibly of Turkey, through the now all but dead Balkan Pact.

Another consideration which should be borne in mind is that the conditions
which made mutually desirable the almost unprecedented closeness and intimacy of
the Greek-American relationship in the years following the promulgation of the
Truman Doctrine no longer exist, either in Greece or in the Balkans at large. It is to a
large extent a measure of the success of our policy here that Greece has been
increasingly able to exercise her reborn sense of independence in the world’s
councils. It is also natural and normal that a proud nation of self-respecting
individualists like the Greeks would want to do so. Thus much of the current process
of readjustment appears to be a rather natural and unsurprising reaction against United
States tutelage, over the past ten years. Our future relationship with Greece will
probably tend to be more on a plane with our relationship with other NATO countries.
It is hoped that it will not be less.

To state the matter briefly, we and our policies have become less popular with
the Greeks in recent years and months and we see no evidence of the existence of any
force which will reverse this trend in the immediate future, barring an immediate
settlement of the Cyprus issue in a manner satisfactory to Greece or a very large increase in the amount of American economic assistance.

GREECE, THE U.S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST

For more than two millennia the Greeks have been accustomed to rather close relations with the Middle East. There have been sizeable Greek colonies in Egypt and other Arab countries since ancient times. Today the Greek community in Egypt numbers about 70,000 (of whom 50-55,000 are actual Greek nationals), making it by far the largest overseas colony next to that in the United States. Held together by an innate consciousness of its Hellenism, by language and by the ties of Orthodox Christianity, its existence has been a source of considerable pride as well as profit to Greece through the years. The existence of this community has been also perhaps the most significant determinant in the shaping of Greece’s Middle Eastern policy since the end of the war. No Greek government could remain long in office if it took any step which resulted in injury to the Greek community in Egypt, from which have come some of Greece’s wealthiest and most influential families and which has been an important source of the immigrants’ remittances without which Greece’s balance of payments picture would be even more unfavorable.

During the Suez crisis a year ago, no doubt remained that the sentiments of the Greeks were almost unanimously pro-Egyptian. Our condemnation of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt was for the Greeks one of the most popular acts of United States foreign policy and measurably strengthened our prestige here. Yet on the question of Nasser’s seizure of the Canal, Greece hardly dared speak out for fear of retribution upon the Greek community in Egypt. Greek pilots filled the breech when the old Canal pilots walked out, yet numerous Greek employees of European firms lost their positions when the sequestration decrees were enacted.

The “Egyptianization decrees” of January 14, 1957 could, if strictly enforced, result eventually in most of the Greek community leaving Egypt. Hundreds have already done so, and the current rate of departure is reliably reported to be about 500 per month. Greek holdings are affected in a material way. Yet the protests of the Greek Ambassador and the entreaties of the Prime Minister during the visit in August have failed to elicit any concrete promise from Nasser that the Greeks of Egypt will be spared the effects of Egyptianization except for a vague commitment that he will consider the Greek position carefully.

Greece holds Egyptian credits to the extent of about $12 million as a favorable balance on its clearing agreement with Egypt, an account which Egypt is not in a position to settle unless the United States, as Nasser rather cleverly proposed to Karamanlis, would be willing to release to Greece a portion of Egypt’s frozen American assets. This, the Department has already expressed our willingness to do. The sum involved is a large one for Greece. As long as there is a hope that the balance can be recovered, Greece will think twice before doing anything to offend Egypt.

There are also the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates in Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch (Damascus), the remaining symbols of a period of even greater Hellenic
prestige in the Middle East. Greece will not willingly engage in any international political acts which would result either in the expulsion of these three patriarchates or in the complete loss of Greek influence over them. The modern Greek consciousness of the concepts of Hellenism and national honor come into play. This is not the place perhaps to expatiate upon what the Embassy believes to be the growing influence of Moscow on the Patriarchates of Antioch and Alexandria.

We have learned lately from usually reliable sources that, during his August talks with Nasser, Karamanlis was asked to consider Greece’s becoming a partner in a “Belgrade-Athens-Cairo Axis”. Karamanlis is reported not to have rejected the concept outright, but to have promised to have his Government consider the proposition. When a newsman who accompanied the Prime Minister’s party to Egypt asked him on board the plane on the return flight to comment on whether he had discussed such a matter with Nasser, Karamanlis is said to have exploded indignantly and denied that there had been any such conversation. Since Nasser has accepted an invitation to make a state visit to Greece, although no date has yet been set, it is expected that this subject will recur. If, as seems probable, a prospective state visit to Greece by Nasser were tied in with a visit to Yugoslavia, his reported proposition might well receive serious consideration by all three governments. The effect of such an alignment upon Greece’s commitments to the West through NATO provides a fertile field for speculation.

Chief among Greece’s complaints with our policy in the Middle East has been our attitude toward the Baghdad Pact, and alliance which the Greeks unanimously consider a British apparatus thinly disguised to save what is left of British influence in the area. When discussing the Baghdad Pact most intelligent Greeks are kind enough to attribute United States involvement in it to undue British influence upon us. In the Greek mind, however, the Baghdad Pact rests upon the keystone of Turkish military power and is “directed against Egypt”, two perfectly sound reasons to the Greek mind why nothing good can come of it and why every indication by the United States of greater interest and participation in the Pact can be expected to bring forth a spate of editorials and speeches in Athens which are not pleasant for us to hear.

Whether Greece does or does not in fact occupy a position of prestige and influence in the Middle East may be debated, but the fact of the matter, in so far as the United States is concerned, is that Greece deeply and sincerely feels that she does have a special position vis-à-vis the Arab states, all of whom have consistently supported Greece’s Cyprus policy. At the time of the visit to Athens of the Richards Mission last May Greek officials, at high and low level, who spoke with the Mission hammered at the thesis that Greece has a unique position and role to play in the Middle East. Greece considers herself the “bridge” between the West and the Arab world. Greece offered herself to the United States as an intermediary through which many of the aims of the American Doctrine could be fostered on the ground that, while the United States might be widely suspect by the Arabs as aspiring to the power and position of the departed “Anglo-French colonialists”, Greece was under no such suspicion. Serious proposals were made by cabinet ministers who met with the
Mission that the United States should channel some of the economic measures it proposed to take under the Doctrine through Greece. A Middle Eastern type of OEEC based in Athens was mentioned. It was obvious from the enthusiastic way in which this prospect was raised that it had been under consideration for some time. Minister Without Portfolio, Gregory Kassimatis, restated this serious Greek view of Greece’s role in the Middle East to Department officers while in Washington recently and again asked what Greece could do to act as a “bridge” for at least the economic aspects of our Middle Eastern policy. The Embassy regrets that it has yet received no indication that the Department has given any consideration to acknowledging Greece’s role in the Middle Eastern scheme of things, beyond a line in a recent OCB paper suggesting that we should not encourage Greece to take any initiative in the Middle East on our behalf. This is the sort of principle which bulks large to little Greece; it is one of the cornerstones of her self-respect.

It may be worth remembering the pride with which the Greeks showed off their military establishment to a visiting Jordanian military mission just a few weeks before the critical events of the past summer. Many Greek Government and military officials have expressed their conviction to us that the same Jordanian officers returned home convinced that a small country could afford to get along with the United States without losing its independence. Whether or not the visit to Greece made any such impression upon the Jordanian officers is not the question; the significant fact for us is that many influential friends of the United States here sincerely believe that it helped and they are willing to engage in similar efforts again, to assist us with their concept of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

To revert again to the question of the Doctrine it can be said that the Government feels that it has received nothing but trouble from the ungrudging adherence it gave last May. It was one of the major points of attack by the Opposition parties on the Government during a special session of Parliament in late May. Although it cannot honestly be said that Greece – or any but the most leftist of the political parties – is opposed to the announced principles of the Doctrine, the Opposition felt obliged to attack the Government’s adherence because it was given without prior consultation with the main leaders of the Opposition and, if some reports can be credited, even over the objections of some of the members of the Cabinet. One does not have to be a seer to predict that the Doctrine will again become a political football when it suits the purposes of the Opposition. For one thing Greece neither asked for nor received a single penny for her adherence and within a few months saw the Sixth Fleet rushed to the coast of Syria and Israel in a flamboyant show of force against Syria and saw the spectacular airlift of arms to Jordan. The latter was an occasion for almost unanimous condemnation of our tactics in the Middle East as well as for another extensive public soul-searching about the wisdom of Greece’s following our lead in the Middle East.

It will also be recalled that in September, when both the President and the Secretary of State had made public statements of our fear that Syria was becoming a country under Soviet domination, the Prime Minister of Greece told a group of
foreign journalists in effect that Greek took nowhere so serious a view of the Syrian situation. He attributed Syria’s recent behavior chiefly to reasons of “nationalism”. Now, as the despatch is being drafted, the Greek press, in commenting upon the Secretary’s remarks in his press conference of October 16 in which he warned the Soviet Union that the United States would retaliate at once by attacking the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union attacked Turkey, is unanimous in declaring that Greece will not enter any war to come to the defense of Turkey, regardless of her commitments under the North Atlantic and the Balkan Pact.

The Department is aware that the Government of Greece has in effect refused to honor a Greek agreement to permit us to establish a second land-based VOA transmitter in Greece – on Rhodes, in this instance out of fear that we would be broadcasting material distasteful to the Arabs. Greece’s open support of the Syrian position in the United Nations during the past week has placed her in what has been termed a position of “conspicuous divergence” not only from United States but from united NATO policy. The Foreign Minister’s assurances to the Ambassador that the Greek spokesman, Stratos, had been chastised for exceeding his instructions by the warmth of his support, were in reality only a slight variation in degree to an otherwise clear indication of Greece’s true attitude on Middle Eastern problems today. The latter instance is also perhaps illustrative of the existence of a certain amount of schizophrenia in Government circles regarding Greece’s ultimate role in the world scene.

With allowances for possible inaccuracies it is still perhaps worthwhile recording here that in the recent USIS public opinion poll in Greece 55 percent of those interviewed favored Egypt’s behavior in recent times and 40 percent gave their opinion of Nasser as “very good”. In the same poll 62 percent of those interviewed said that they had never even heard of the Eisenhower Doctrine and only 25 percent of those who had heard of it had even an approximate idea of its aims.

A search of the horizon reveals almost no instance in the past year to encourage us in the belief that we shall have Greece’s support in our policies in the Middle East until a solution reasonably satisfactory to Greece of the Cyprus question is found; until concrete proof of our concentration on economic rather than military measures for the accomplishment of our aims can be demonstrated, and until Greece feels that she can work alongside the United States as a self-respecting equal who will be consulted from time to time in advance of our moves. The alternative, we fear, is a progressive disengagement from what Greece considers to be an amateurish and clumsy policy based upon panic and patch-work.

ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNIST BLOC

The number of Communist Party members in Greece is very small. The number of fellow-travelers who will follow the party line quite regularly and slavishly is also very small. Still, as in other Western countries, the Communists have an influence far beyond their numbers. Although the KKE (Communist Party of Greece) is outlawed and most of its leaders in exile, its interests are fostered openly in Greece.
today by EDA, the United Democratic Left, which controls 16 seats in Parliament, about 5% of the total. This percentage is misleading, however, since EDA candidates in the last (1956) elections polled approximately ten percent of the total ballots cast. While this was a larger percentage of the popular vote than they had received in any previous election since the Civil War, it did not represent their greatest victory; their real victory was that pro-Communist candidates stood for election on a popular front ticket with all the other parties at present comprising the Opposition. Communism was thus returned to respectability in 1956, seven short years after the end of the bloody Civil War, which had set Greece back a generation.

While the formation of the popular front – however limited its objectives – was perhaps the greatest milestone on the KKE’s road back, it is by no means the only significant indication of a growing tolerance for Communism and things Communist in modern Greece. The Embassy has had reason for concern in steadily and increasingly frequent evidences of Communist infiltration in virtually all sectors of Greece’s political, economic and social life. This phenomenon does not appear to be accompanied by any growth in the influence and power of the KKE as such; it is rather a growth in Soviet influence fostered by the Soviet Embassy in this country. The KKE remains quite split and shaken as a result of ideological disputes and personality clashes which have rent it since the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It seems probable, however, that the KKE (or at least its “legal arm”, EDA) may be the ultimate beneficiary of the softening attitude toward Communism which has become quite generally discernible. Whereas the KKE’s scope for action is limited by its bloodstained record and by the appeal it has to limited segments of society, the Soviet influence is not directed toward any one class, but runs the entire gamut of the political, commercial, labor, academic, cultural, scientific, athletic and even the religious aspects of life in Greece today.

There has been a great increase in the number of Communist publications in circulation with an entire network of salesmen and promoters who engage in door-to-door canvassing and who offer attractive installment terms to their subscribers. At the beginning of this campaign the Russian works circulated were of the pre-revolutionary variety to which the Kremlin has not objected. These were gradually replaced by works on history, finance and social problems and finally by translations of the significant works of such personalities as Lenin, Stalin and Mao-Tse-tung. One source reports that Soviet historical works alone in circulation in Greece since 1953 have totaled fifteen separate publications in twenty-one volumes, comprising 8,204 pages. In addition to the above, the Soviet Embassy and those of the other Communist nations maintaining relations with Greece are issuing periodical “news” bulletins in hundreds of copies each month and the full, unadulterated Moscow line is available to the general public in Avghi, a well edited paper in a city not renowned[sic] for the quality of its press.

Since 1954 Greeks have been joining new and ever more numerous “front” societies, clubs, leagues and institutes, such as the “Greek Union for the Rights of the Individual and the Citizen”, “Greek Committee for International Appeasement and
Peace”, “Greek-Soviet League”, “Greek-Czechoslovak League” and the “Friends of New China”. The Embassy has reported only in recent months the extent to which these and similar organizations have effectively sponsored campaigns and positions in support of Soviet policy such as those for the discontinuance of nuclear tests, protests against the Government’s reported willingness to have NATO nuclear weapons on Greek soil and campaigns for the repeal of the Government’s “exile” policy for active Communists. A roster of the non-Communist public figures who have been beguiled into signing such petitions would contain the names of many prominent personages in the arts, sciences, labor, education and religion. In each of such cases the aim was in clear opposition to known United States policy or interest.

Today visits of Greek politicians, newspapermen, scientists, trade union leaders, musicians and other artists to the Soviet Union and its satellites occur with an alarming lack of adverse comment, whereas until 1953 it would have been unthinkable for any nationally-minded Greek to even mention a desire to visit any Communist state save Yugoslavia. The impressions of such visitors on guided tours of Russia and its satellites are carried serially in most of the Athens papers, regardless of their political orientation. During the present calendar year the average has reached about one delegation per month leaving for Communist lands. The largest was the Greek delegation of eighty-three who attended the Moscow Youth Festival and who traveled in the USSR for eighteen days at a cost of about $35 per capita. The impressions of Soviet Union and the satellites with which these people return are frequently very favorable, if only because of the fact that Moscow is the largest city that most of them have ever seen, a cleaner, more modern city than Athens, with higher buildings and a fine subway system and better transportation, bigger factories, etc. Materially and superficially the lot of the average Russian farmer or factory hand is probably at least as good as that of his counterpart in this impoverished land, one of whose chief distinctions is the possession of one of the lowest per capita incomes among the members of NATO. The naively favorable impressions of what these Greek travelers have seen are also due perhaps to their ignorance of actual conditions in the West, to their gratitude for having been invited – with all expenses paid in most cases – and to a feeling of indebtedness for the hospitality and friendly treatment which they received everywhere.

The traffic is a two-way street. In the past year and a half groups headed by such personages as Dimitri Shepilov and Ilya Ehrenburg, through delegations of municipal councillors, mayors, dancers, and circus performers, for the Soviet Union have visited Greece. Athletes from all the Balkan countries except Albania have been competing in the Athens Stadium in the past few years and this year witnessed the largest group of Russian tourists to be seen in Greece since the end of the War. Such cultural exchanges can be expected to increase in frequency next year.

In the commercial field each passing year sees an increase in the volume of trade between Greece and the Eastern Bloc and, on the part of the Greek businessmen, an increasing desire for more and more trade contacts. (See Embassy’s Despatch No. 293, dated October 30, 1957,) it is not necessary here to treat at length the methods
used by the Soviet and satellite trade missions to entice potential importers into dealings with them. The prices of their products are non-competitive and the profit percentages for Greek importers and distributors can be arranged conveniently beforehand. One has only to stand on a street corner in Athens to see the scores of new and cheap Skoda cars and trucks now in circulation or windowshop for increasing quantities of East German tools, fabrics, and cameras and for “Bohemian” crystal. The temporary dislocation of normal trade channels due to the Suez affair appears to have been a critical turning point and marked a period of accelerated commercial contacts with the Soviet orbit. It has recently been reported in an Athenian paper that businessmen who have been assisted to make profitable trade deals with the Soviet Union are being visited afterwards by representatives of the Soviet Embassy who suggest that they should make a “voluntary” contribution to such organizations as the “Greek-Soviet Friendship League”, the implication being that there will be no more business with Russia unless a contribution is forthcoming. In this way, pro-Soviet organizations are able to boast that they are completely supported from Greek sources.

It is not desired to overemphasize the extent of Soviet economic penetration in Greece since the Embassy believes that Greece’s foreign trade, which is still 90% with the West, will remain largely unchanged for some time to come. Nor has there been any Soviet effort to engage in capital investment so far in Greece, although this is a possibility that may one day have to be faced and one that most politicians here would find rather difficult to resist. As it is, other foreign capital investment, chiefly West German, is beginning to increase and with it there is created a diffusion of Greek economic dependence upon outside capital formerly directed almost exclusively toward American sources. One danger sign however is that the Communists are currently engaged in efforts to buy the Greek Bank of Chios in order to assist them in their endeavor to infiltrate the Greek agricultural cooperatives.

In the psychological field, one of the outstanding Greek national characteristics, which even astute Greek observers have discerned and documented, is their “short memory”, a tendency to forgetfulness and consequent tolerance. Despite a remarkable economic recovery, the problem of “under-employment” remains largely unsolved. The diet is somewhat better than it was ten years ago, yet the increased income which the majority of farm families get still goes for more food, not, as in most other countries of the West, for home appliances, better housing or an automobile. The average Greek is still too preoccupied with this struggle for a decent living to bear constantly in mind the lessons we thought he should have learned from four years of war and occupation and from five years of intermittent civil war. He searches and hopes for something better and will listen in his coffee-shop to anyone who will even promise him something better.

We have rather substantial reasons for believing, for example, that the average Greek has looked favorably on the numerous conspicuous anti-Western moves of Nasser since our refusal to help him build the Aswan Dam; that he was so engrossed in the Suez affair that he had little interest in what was going on in Poland and
Hungary at the same time; that while he may have read something in the paper about the “Eisenhower Doctrine” he does not understand what it is all about; that Western Germany is not a “more popular” country with him than are Britain and France; that his opinion concerning Yugoslavia – which provided a supply pipeline for years to his Communist compatriots – ranges from “good” to “no strong feelings one way or the other”; that US lack of support for Greece’s Cyprus policy probably influences his attitude toward us today more than does his gratitude for nearly two billion dollars worth of economic aid; that his opinion for Tito and Khrushchev is about equal, ranging from “good” to “no strong feeling”; that he considers that the Russian films he sees – in ever increasing frequency – do no particular harm to Greece. Such indications of his thinking have been made available to us recently through the public opinion poll conducted under USIS auspices. While allowances must be made for errors and for the inexperience of the personnel engaged, it would be trite to say that we cannot afford to ignore any evidence which indicates that in 1957 the average Greek holds opinions on many important international matters which are not shared by Americans.

More startling to read than any other figure taken from the USIS public opinion poll is that about 47 percent of the population feel that Greece should be aligned with neither the East or the West. The proportion so inclined rose to 50 percent among those having higher education. There is small comfort when we read that 37.5 percent of all those interviewed thought that Greece’s best interests are served by continuing her Western alignment and that only 4 percent felt that Greece should transfer her allegiance to the Communist Bloc. Stated baldly, this means, if true, that we are not winning the battle for the Greek mind; that those who are devils on the international scene to us are not devils to the Greek; that increasingly frequent approaches by the Greek Government and by individuals to the Soviet Bloc would not be unpopular with two out of three Greeks. It could mean that many Greeks today are already ideologically and philosophically in the neutral bloc. It could also mean that he either has forgotten the lesson that ended only seven years ago or that he never learned a lesson at all.

One of the most encouraging results of the USIS poll was an indication that among the members of the Greek armed forces pro-Western sentiment remains relatively high, and pro-Communist sentiment is lowest. It is our belief that the armed forces will remain as perhaps the greatest bulwark of the West in the changing Greek scene. In the event of any real ganger of Communist subversion they would undoubtedly again play a role in the domestic scene. It is hoped that they will also prove to be a counterweight in the trend toward neutralism.

What all the foregoing means to the United States opens an extremely wide realm for speculation. While it is not desired to overemphasize the results of the recent public opinion poll on which most of the immediately preceding paragraphs were based, it is well to state that most of the observations in this despatch have not been based on the public opinion poll, but rather on a feeling of awareness of late that the United States has been losing ground in Greece, that our position here has been
gradually weakening for a variety of reasons, some documentable and others hard to assess or come to grips with. The total picture is not, of course, one of unmitigated gloom as Greece is still committed to her Western allies and, in any showdown with the Soviet Bloc, she would today – and undoubtedly tomorrow – be one the side of the United States and the West. But there have lately become evident trends which should give the United States concern for Greece’s position the day after tomorrow.

THE GENERAL PERSPECTIVE

By the nature of its subject this despatch has had to paint a rather dark picture of the current state of Greek-American relations. While it treats admittedly of only one side of the whole story it is a side which, until recent weeks, had been of very small significance and which was not an important factor in our relations with Greece. The trend toward disengagement – or, as Liberal Leader George Papandreou has phrased it, “psychological dis-association” – of Greece from American policy has recently become a fact, recognized and deplored by the Embassy as well as by responsible figures in public life in Greece. We are certain from remarks made by the Prime Minister to the Ambassador that no one deplores this drift more than Constantine Karamanlis, himself, who assures us that regardless of the prominence of the present trend Greece will remain loyal to her NATO commitments. Similar sentiments have been expressed to us privately by other high Government personages and by members of the Opposition as well. Unfortunately the latter will undoubtedly proceed as usual in the current session of Parliament to berate the Government publicly for being “American lackeys”. Politics in Greece is like that. The unfortunate thing about this whole matter is that no one in public life, with the exception of the King, has expressed any strong feelings of late that Greece must resist a drift away from her NATO ties and toward of softening attitude on Communism.

On the economic side, the Embassy feels that there do not exist the same grounds for concern as on the political. Greece’s volume of trade is 90 percent with the Free World and cannot be easily or abruptly changed. The economic ministers of the present Government are realistically aware of Greece’s continuing dependence on the West as a market for her exports and as a source for the investment capital which she needs. Also realistically (and privately) they are willing to face up to a gradual tapering off of American economic aid, knowing that less aid is in itself a measure of Greece’s growing economic prosperity, as its capacity to absorb US surpluses decreases. Their sense of duty to their country will, however, require them to protest loudly at any mention of decreased assistance.

The Greek tendency toward forgetfulness and tolerance will undoubtedly act in the United States’ favor once the Cyprus issue has been solved. Just as the Greeks already seem to have forgotten what they suffered under the Germans, the Italians and their own Communists, they will, after a time, begin to forget that we have not followed a pro-Greek policy on the Cyprus question. Also, as long as Greece has Slavs on her northern borders she is not likely to cut all ties with those who will be
willing to defend her against attack from that quarter, regardless of how much hot- and-cold blowing she does on other matters.

Indeed a similar report could be compiled containing counter-indications to many of the factors treated in this despatch. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the Department will give careful and thoughtful study to the contents of the present despatch which, represents the serious and well considered view of the Embassy that we have reached a new stage in Greek-American relations in which many of our decade-old assumptions and rules-of-thumb are no longer valid. During the current process of Greek readjustment every move on our part which affects Greece assumes a double importance.

For the Ambassador:
James K. Penfield
Counselor of Embassy

NARA, RG 59, 781.00/4-858
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Horner) to the Department of State

Subject: The Missile Base Question: A Political Shadow Play
Athens, April 8, 1958

One of the most interesting aspects of the Missile Base Question is the continued ambiguity of its role in the current political campaign in Greece. While missile bases are commonly agreed to be a major campaign issue, few Greek politicians, aside from the Communists, appear to have formulated clear position on the question, which remains a potentially embarrassing one both for the non-Communist parties and for the West. The resulting situation has been curious and surely, to the politicians, profoundly dissatisfying. The Missile Bases Question remains for the time being in a twilight atmosphere, politically luminous but not yet incandescent.

There are a variety of reasons for this. In the first place, Greece has not yet been asked to accept missile bases. How best to answer a hypothetical question taxes even the ingenuity of Greek politicians. There is, furthermore, a furtive assumption shared by a growing number of Greeks that NATO does not intent to request Greek base sites even after the election, having decided for both political and military reasons (most of them unflattering to Greece) to establish bases in neighboring Turkey and Italy. This assumption is two-edged, for if correct the establishment of missile bases in Turkey but not in Greece might arouse Greek jealousies and fears to the point that a current of pro-base sentiment could be set in motion. In these terms
the straightforward condemnation of bases could have long-range disadvantages of which most Greek politicians are acutely aware.

Still another inhibiting influence is exerted by the fact that the first and, to date, the only party to adopt a completely unequivocal stand on the missile bases issue is the Communist-line EDA which has been flatly opposed ever since the question was raised at the Paris NATO meeting in December. EDA’s early and extremely vocal preemption of an anti-base position has complicated the issue for the nationalist parties of the Center and forced them to search for formulae which will permit exploitation of the issue without aligning them with the Communists.

A final and by no means negligible consideration has been the intensive political maneuvering in which missile bases, along with other issues, have been embroiled. The Markezinis Progressive and to a lesser extent the other splinter parties have apparently regarded the missile bases question as an important element in their negotiations with EDA for the formation of an electoral front. While Markezinis appears to have decided independently to oppose bases, it is likely that he hoped that his stand would gain from the Communists certain concessions on other aspects of the platform. At this writing, however, the projected coalition appears to have collapsed, leaving Markezinis and the other small parties to work out whatever position on missile bases they may think profitable.

The net result of all this has been to shroud the bases question in a film of unreality. The parties have sparred with the issue but except for EDA have not really come to grips with it. Alone among the major non-Communist parties the Liberals have spelled out their position (see below), which seeks to link bases with the Cyprus problem, but while the Liberal policy is clever it may be transparently so and criticism of the Liberal formula is already being voiced in the press. The central problem for the non-Communist is how to formulate a policy that does justice to the merits of a complicated issue, without, on the one hand, losing votes to EDA, or, on the other, adopting a pale carbon of the Communist plank. Whether other non-Communist parties can find a better solution than the Liberals remains to be seen as their platforms are announced.

The Yugoslav Interpolation

A measure of the present uncertainty over bases can be seen in the amount of partisan press speculation that purports to reveal the “real” American position on bases and in the small tempest caused by Yugoslavia’s announced opposition to missile bases in Italy. Regarding the latter, reports were current for days that a Yugoslav note opposing Greek bases was en route to the Foreign Office, or had already been delivered, and speculation along these lines continued even after the Prime Minister stated publicly on March 28 that he had no knowledge of reported Yugoslav proposals for an “atom-free” zone, including Greece.

Certainly the Yugoslav attitude has been a source of concern to ERE. On March 17, ex-Foreign Minister Averoff informed the Counselor of Embassy that the Yugoslavs had privately expressed their opposition to Greek missile bases, both to the
Greek Ambassador in Belgrade and to President of Parliament Rodopoulos during the latter’s visit to Yugoslavia. According to Averoff he had thereafter called the Yugoslav Ambassador and let him know that continued Yugoslav comments on Greek defense policy were both inappropriate and embarrassing to Greece. While public expressions of Yugoslav opposition to bases in “neighboring countries” have continued, reports of a note on the subject from Belgrade to Athens appear unfounded.

On April 1 Anghelos HORAFAS, Oficcer in Charge of Balkan Affairs in the Greek Foreign Office, informed Embassy representatives that the Yugoslav Ambassador, Micho PAVITCHEVITCH, in conversation with Permanent Under Secretary SKEFERIS, had discounted completely reports of an imminent Yugoslav note. None of this, however has stilled the anxieties of the Greek nationalist politicians who fear that further Yugoslav demarche would help mobilize anti-base sentiment in Greece to the consequent advantage of the Left. The continued deterioration of relations with Turkey has served in Greek eyes to emphasize the value of Yugoslav friendship, and Yugoslav pronouncements are given added weight in Greece both because of a certain admiration among Greeks for Tito’s policy of non-alignment and because Yugoslavia is regarded as Greece’s only Balkan friend.

Party Positions

After EDA, which is against bases, and the Liberals, who have their own rather evasive formula, the positions of the Parties become increasingly fuzzy. Some are ambiguously in favor of bases and some ambiguously opposed.

In the former category is ERE and its leader, Constantine Karamanlis, who has not expressed himself publicly on the bases question since his resignation a month ago. As Prime Minister, Karamanlis had gone to the Paris NATO meeting with a proposal that the nations of the Atlantic Alliance decide as a group whether to establish missile bases on their territory. This principle he termed one of “universitality” and it was apparently designed to avoid the embarrassment that he foresaw for the Greek Government in bilateral discussions. The Greek proposal was, however, rejected in favor of bilateral talks between NATO and each of the member states.

Upon his return from Paris Karamanlis stated only that NATO had not accepted the principle of universality and that the question of missile bases in Greece had not arisen.

This brief statement is as far as Karamanlis has gone on the subject. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that ERE, whether it says so or not, is essentially in favor of missile bases and that impression is unlikely to be shaken even if ERE hedges in its platform.

The Populist Party Union, a motley assortment of dignified but temperamential Rightists, is definitely uncommitted on the missile base question. Since it is scarcely conceivable that a principled and pro-Western personality like Populist co-leader Kanellopoulos would reject bases out of hand, some compromise formula is likely,
calling perhaps for a later decision to be made in terms of Greek national interests within the context of the Western Alliance.

Markezinis and his Progressives, as noted above, have been willing to bargain with bases. Markezinis has rationalized his willingness to oppose them by citing the positions of Norway and Denmark and reaffirming his party’s faith in the western alliance. Communist EDA has found this policy hard to swallow and disagreement over the point has apparently contributed to the breakdown of the coalition talks between Markezinis and EDA, which was unwilling to support a platform that opposed bases “from within” the western alliance. Among the other small parties, DKEL and the Agrarians are known to oppose bases and EPEK seems to have been so preoccupied with its struggle for survival that it has not yet formulated any announced position.

The most interesting and revealing of the party positions is that of the Liberals. The Liberal plank on missile bases accurately reflects the dilemma that most non-Communist politicians face in formulating a “missile policy”. These politicians believe that categorical support for missile bases would be politically inexpedient; they sense an apprehension about the bases among many Greek voters; they know that EDA will play on these fears to the best of its ability; and, lastly, they realize that if the play is to be taken away from EDA they must do more than echo the Communist position.

The Liberal plank is an ingenious attempt to resolve this dilemma by making the cession of missile bases by Greece contingent on the application of self-determination to Cyprus. The relevant paragraphs of the plank read as follows:

“As regards the bases issue the Liberal Party believes that it is no part of Greece’s commitments to the Atlantic Alliance. And this is proved by the refusal of many countries to cede bases, while they remain attached to NATO”.

The plank then accuses Karamanlis of having secretly promised Greek bases to the NATO allies and promises to invalidate such secret agreements when it comes to power. It concludes: “The Extreme Left refuses the bases not in order to protect Greece but in order to serve its masters…Only the Liberal Party is in a position to apply a Greek foreign policy while the Right-wing and the Extreme Left are applying a serving policy”.

Whether the Liberal position on missile bases will satisfy Greek voters remains to be seen. The Liberal leadership has sometimes out-foxed itself in the past and its critics are already pointing out that if missile bases are good for Greece they should be accepted and if bad rejected, not hitched with political twine to the Cyprus question.

Conclusion

The real meaning of these intricate maneuvers may be that missile bases will remain a difficult issue for the non-Communist parties to handle on its merits. How it will affect their chances in the election is problematic. The fact that no one has yet asked Greece to cede bases; the fact that no party including ERE, unequivocally
supports them; the fact that the Communists have seized the standard of outright opposition, but, unaided by other parties, may not be able to generate intense inter-party rivalry over the question; these factors imply that the May 11 election will be won or lost on other issues.

While the U.S. can expect to be clouted right and left over missile bases in the coming weeks, the real danger may be a future one, for it is evident that if the bases question does not figure as an explosive element in the current election, neither will it be disarmed. The Embassy cannot say how widely shared is the concern over missile bases which has been voiced in recent months by educated and articulate segments of Greek opinion. It is apparent that most Greek political leaders believe it to be widespread and that none, however well-disposed to the West, is willing to come out flatly in favor of missile bases in Greece.

Whatever Government is installed in the May elections, this unchallenged assumption by the country’s political leadership that public opinion is opposed to missile bases could pose grave problems for the west should it be determined later that bases were necessary in Greece.

For the Ambassador
John Evarts Horner
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

NARA, RG 59, 611.00/4-2558
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Penfield) to the Department of State

Subject: Greek Foreign Policy During the Last Year of the Karamanlis Government and Prospects for the Future
Athens, April 25, 1958

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The culmination of Greek foreign policy in 1957, as in all recent years, was the Government’s presentation of the Cyprus Question at the United Nations. The results were gratifying to most Greeks. Their delegation – led once more by Foreign Minister Averoff and with the somewhat disquieting presence of Archbishop Makarios hovering in the background – succeeded in pushing through the Political Committee a resolution specifically endorsing the application of self-determination to Cyprus. Although the resolution failed of a two-thirds majority in the Plenary Session
was thus technically defeated, the vote was generally interpreted in Greece as a moral victory and vindication of the Greek position.

The United Nations debate highlighted what for Greeks is a deepening psychological dilemma. They found themselves once again supported on the Cyprus question by the Soviet Bloc and opposed by the overwhelming majority of their western allies. Their frustration was compounded by the fact that most non-Communist Greeks realized that, however painful their disappointment with the allied attitude toward Cyprus, Greece could not, in the last analysis, afford to cut itself loose from the West. Greece was still receiving substantial, if reduced, amounts of economic and military assistance from the United States and the post-war development of the Greek economy continued to be gratifying. Greece’s trade pattern, although reflecting increasing commercial intercourse with the Soviet bloc, continued to rely heavily on western goods and markets. At the end of 1957 Greek credits to the bloc were in most cases above agreed swing limits and there was a limited demand in Greece for bloc products except for petroleum. Beyond these factors were Greece’s cultural and ideological affinity for the west and the harsh memories of Soviet and satellite intervention in the Bandit War.

Thus Greek frustrations over protracted failure to achieve a Cyprus settlement chafed against the obstinate advantages of the western alliance. The result was a marked querulousness in Greece’s attitude toward its western allies; considerable wishful discussion of a new “national policy” of non-alignment; a tendency to magnify irritations consequent to the American presence in Greece; and, generally, a controlled but perceptible disengagement from the West.

The Soviet Union, seeking to profit from this disaffected mood, exerted steady pressure throughout 1957 to expand and multiply its contacts with Greece, whether political, economic or cultural, and to improve Greek relations with the satellites. Greco-Bulgarian talks on border delineation, reparations and the normalisation of diplomatic relations continued through the year, successfully in the first category, unsuccessfully in the others. Albania, with evident Soviet prompting, made repeated overtures to improve relations with Greece. Although these overtures were rebuffed, Greece assumed the initiative in reaching an agreement with Albania to undertake a joint mine-sweeping operation of the Corfu Channel, to begin in March 1958 and continue through the mid-summer. The Roumanians were likewise active and their proposal for a Balkan Conference, although rejected by the Karamanlis Government, was favorably discussed by some Greeks as a means of reasserting Greece’s former role in the Balkans.

The anomalies of the Greek position will figure prominently in the general elections scheduled for May 11, 1958. While the resignation of the Karamanlis Government was precipitated by domestic political factors (see Embassy Despatch No. 712, dated March 24, 1958), some of the major issues of the campaign, notably Cyprus and the missile base question, are likely to be in the general area of foreign policy. These problems, real enough in themselves, make somewhat synthetic campaign issues. No Greek Government, of whatever political coloration, will be able
to solve the Cyprus problem unilaterally and Greece has not yet been asked to cede missile bases. In this sense the issues are national rather than electoral and signify a crisis in Greek values and loyalties which, until it is resolved, will aggravate internal instability in Greece and complicate, though not necessarily damage materially, its relations with the West.

I. THE RECORD: Developments from January 1957 to March 1958

A. Suez and Hungary

The opening of 1957 found Greece, like the rest of the world, still under the shadow of events in Hungary and Suez. It was clear even then that of the two Suez loomed as the most important in the Greek mind. Primarily as a result of Anglo-Greek antagonism resulting from Cyprus, the average Greek was infinitely outraged by Anglo-French moves in Suez than by Soviet repression in Hungary. The Karamanlis Government was mindful of prevailing sentiment. In addition, the Government’s preoccupation with the Greek community in Egypt and its overall relations with the Arab world made it hard for the Government to share – at least publicly – the West’s growing concern over Communist penetration in the Middle East and the irresponsible behavior of President Nasser.

In an effort to offset what it realized was an unfavorable reaction in the West to the Greek attitude in this period, the Government expressed support for the principles of the Eisenhower Doctrine shortly after its proclamation. It soon became apparent that this move had been made without adequate political preparation. Opposition criticism increased in volume. In May the Richards Mission came to Athens to discuss the American doctrine. (Foreign Minister Averoff was absent attending the NATO Council meetings in Bonn.) The Opposition was now calling for an all-out debate on Greek foreign policy, a development that Karamanlis was eager to avoid. Acting hastily, he recessed Parliament, only to reverse himself immediately thereafter under pressure from the Opposition and the King. In the ensuing debate, however, the Opposition was unable to press home its advantage and Karamanlis emerged stronger than before.

B. Cyprus

In the early spring of 1957 there were hopes that the steady deterioration of the situation on Cyprus might be arrested. In March Archbishop Makarios was released by the British from his year-long exile in the Seychelles. EOKA, the Cypriot terrorist organization, issued a declaration of truce. These developments, coupled with the fact that the Greek delegation at the United Nations earlier in the year had lent its support to an innocuous resolution calling for a “peaceful, democratic and just” solution of the Cyprus problem, suggested that progress was possible. At this apparently propitious moment the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, offered NATO’s good offices to mediate the dispute. While the offer may have appeared logical to the West it did not to the Greeks. They doubted Lord Ismay’s impartiality and, almost as much, the
impartiality of NATO itself, where the allied strength of Britain and Turkey could block any settlement favorable to Greece. The Karamanlis Government rejected the NATO offer in polite terms and then, to balance the ledger, made a series of gestures designed to reaffirm Greece’s ties with the West. These gestures, which may have seemed more significant in Greece than in the countries they were meant to mollify, were the following:

1) Greek Ambassador Mostras was returned to London after a year’s absence. In a warm message delivered on his arrival he expressed hope for the amicable settlement of Anglo-Greek problems and optimism about the chances for a Cyprus solution.

2) Outgoing British Ambassador Peake was officially entertained by the King and Foreign Minister and was awarded a high decoration.

3) Greece withdrew its opposition to the appointment of British Admiral Edwards as NATO CINCMED.

4) The Government withdrew objections to Turkish and British participation in NATO War College visits to Greece.

In truth, these were small gestures, though well-meant. A more significant move, as noted above, was prompt Greek endorsement of the American Doctrine for the Middle East. Viewed together, these actions indicated that Karamanlis was seeking to keep abreast of Greek public opinion while at the same time reassure the West that Greece was not slipping into neutralism.

As the year unfolded the pressures on Karamanlis to “do” something about Cyprus mounted again. His circumstances were rendered more precarious than ever by the presence in Athens of Archbishop Makarios, elegantly quartered in the Hotel Grande Bretagne and with offices almost next door to the Foreign Ministry. It soon became clear that Makarios intended to maintain a psychological initiative on the Cyprus problem vis-a-vis the Government. His headquarters were the scene of constant comings and goings; he received innumerable delegations; made many speeches and issued countless statements. Some of the latter took the form of comments on actions of the Greek Government and posed the awkward question of who was running Greek foreign policy. While the Government succeeded in avoiding an open breach with Makarios, it is apparent that Karamanlis and his Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff, became increasingly exasperated by this state of affairs, the more so because until the Archbishop could return to Cyprus there was little that could be done about it.

During the summer and fall there were many rumors that Makarios was planning extensive trips outside Greece to promote world-wide support for Cypriot self-determination. When at length it was announced that he intended to visit United States in September the Greek Government regarded it as a mixed blessing. The 12th Session of the General Assembly was ready to convene and the Archbishop’s presence in New York at that time could only add to the responsibilities of the Greek delegation during the Cyprus debate. Makarios’ departure occurred in a somewhat
strained atmosphere, reports having been received from Washington that he was unlikely to be received by the President or the Secretary of State.

In December the General Assembly came nearer to meeting Greek wishes with respect to Cyprus than it ever had before. After much in-fighting and some rather acrimonious debate in the Political Committee, the Greek delegation succeeded in engineering the Committee’s approval of a resolution containing the following operative paragraph:

“The General Assembly … expresses its earnest hope that further negotiations and discussions will be undertaken in a spirit of cooperation with a view to have the right of self-determination applied in the case of the people of Cyprus”.

The vote was 33 in favor; 20 opposed; and 25 abstaining. Prominent among those in favor of the Greek resolution were the members of the Soviet Bloc. Equally prominent among those opposed were the majority of Greece’s NATO allies. The United States abstained.

While the Greek resolution likewise obtained majority support in the Plenary Session it did not receive a two-thirds majority vote and consequently failed of adoption. Nevertheless, the results were interpreted in Greece as a moral victory and tended to increase the prestige of Prime Minister Karamanlis and his beleaguered Foreign Minister, Mr. Averoff.

C. Missile Bases

The question of Greek missile bases was first raised in Greece at the time of the Bonn NATO meeting in the spring. The matter was disposed of temporarily in the ensuing Parliamentary debate when the Opposition proved itself unable to mount an effective attack against the Government on this or any other issue. There remained however an undercurrent of speculation about missile bases, founded on a generally-shared assumption that NATO planned to request nuclear base rights from Greece and that Karamanlis planned to cede them.

At the NATO “summit meeting” in Paris in December the Greek Prime Minister seemed mindful of this speculation. He went to Paris with a formula which he termed one of “universality” – i.e. the NATO powers would accept or reject missile bases as a bloc. By this means he hoped to avoid the embarrassments of bilateral negotiation of base rights which he felt would be subject to partisan exploitation, especially by the Extreme Left. The Greek formula was not accepted, however – a development that cannot have greatly surprised Karamanlis, who returned to Athens with a laconic announcement of the results of the meeting and a statement that the question of Greek missile bases had not arisen.

Since then the Communist-line EDA has done its best to bring the pot to a boil. Early in 1958 a series of protest meetings were scheduled. Two of the first meetings, one in Piraeus and one in the Island of Mytiline where the Extreme Left has considerable strength, failed badly due to effective counter-measures by the Interior Ministry and the police and this took much of the steam out of the Communist campaign. According to CAS, the Communists then decided to change their tactics,
working more through Front groups, circulating petitions and playing on the fears of non-Communist Greeks. After the resignation of Karamanlis in March EDA’s objective became one of turning missile bases into a key electoral issue. During this period EDA’s newspaper, Avghi, began to feature a daily missile column, decorated with dark, sausage-shaped missiles and devoted entirely to anti-base propaganda.

While at this writing the Communists have not succeeded in making missiles bases appear to be an urgent national issue, the nationalist parties have handled the subject with extreme caution and it is evident that Greece’s political leadership believes that a significant under-current of anti-base feeling exists in the country. This assumption poses obvious problems for the West whether or not the missile bases issue plays an important role in the May elections. (See Embassy Despatch No. 750, dated April 8, 1958.)

D. Relations with the Arab World

Throughout 1957 Greece followed a policy of undeviating support for Arab aspirations. Decidedly opposed to the Baghdad Pact, both because of British and Turkish membership and because of the anti-Pact sentiments of the southern tier of Arab states, Greece has tended to regard with favor, or at least sympathy, the activities of the uncommitted Arab states. Obviously, the existence of influential Greek communities in the Arab world, notably in Egypt, has played a dominant part in the formulation of the Greek attitude.

Greece’s objective of maintaining cordial relations with the Arabs has led to such actions as Greek support of Syria in the United Nations at the time of the Turkish-Syrian dispute. The visit of Karamanlis and Averoff to Cairo; the visit of Averoff to the Sudan; the visits of the Lebanese President, the Libyan Foreign Minister and the Egyptian Finance Minister to Greece; all these were in furtherance of the same objective.

In rationalizing their courtship of the Arabs, Greek officials emphasize their belief that Greece can serve as a bridge between the West and the Arab world, a point that they stressed with especial vigor to the Richards Mission. In support of this they contend that the Orthodox communities in the Arab world represent an effective lever on Arab policies. There has been no indication so far, however, that Greek influence has been significant in the formulation of any major Arab decision. In the case of Egypt, the Greek Government has even had indifferent success in protecting the interests of the wealthy and deeply-rooted Orthodox community in Alexandria which, under the pressure of Nasser’s “Egyptianization” policies, has been steadily whittled down in size and influence.

e. Relations with the West

Throughout 1957 the Greek Government continued to view its relations with the West at least partially through the range-finders of the Cyprus question. In these terms the Greeks found the western attitude disappointing. While, as noted above, Greek relations with the United Kingdom were somewhat improved during the course
of the year the changes were little more than skin-deep. The release of the Archbishop; the conciliatory policies of Cyprus Governor General Sir Hugh Foot; and Greece’s qualified victory in the United Nations; all contributed to a moderation in the intensity of Greek feelings which was gratifying but, in each case, temporary. The visit to Athens in January, 1958, of British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd raised some hopes in Greece that the British had dismissed once and for all the Turkish-supported scheme of partition as a solution to the Cyprus problem and that a new British initiative would be forthcoming. Nothing materialized, however, and in the first quarter of 1958 it was evident that pressures were building up again which would be brought squarely to bear on whatever Government was installed in the May elections.

If there was intermittent relaxation in the Greek attitude toward the United Kingdom during the year the same could not be said of relations with Turkey. Whereas in the past there had been a tendency to label Turkey the stooge of Britain and to attribute Turkish views on Cyprus to British provocation, it became harder and harder to discount the depth of Turkish feeling as animosity between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities increased and Ankara became louder and more insistent in its sponsorship of partition. While this realization may have introduced a note of realism into Greek thinking it did nothing to improve relations with Turkey.

The United States caught its own share of brick-bats on the Cyprus issue. The American attitude of friendly impartiality fell far short of what the Greeks wanted from their closest ally. Greek resentment carried over into other areas. In May the unfortunate killing of left-wing Deputy Sarafis by an automobile driven by an American airman raised new protests against the “extraterritorial privileges” of American personnel in Greece. The speedy action of the American Ambassador in accepting Greek jurisdiction over the case removed some of its sting however. In the summer the Parliamentary Recess Committee ratified the amended Status of Forces Agreement, Government deputies and one Independent voting in favor of ratification, the Opposition against.

There were other signs of Greek restlessness. In the fall a USIS-sponsored public opinion poll showed a significant amount of neutralist feeling among the cross-section of Greeks interviewed. The controversy over missile bases (see above) reflected some of the same sentiments. As the elections approached these dissatisfactions were translated by the political leadership into ringing declarations of national independence and increased sensitivity to any implication of U.S. interference in the campaign.

In effect, Greece was experiencing a psychological rather than an actual disengagement from the United States and its other western allies. A combination of circumstances encouraged the process. For a decade Greek-American relations had been very close, closer, it may be argued than the relations between any two countries can or should be for long. It was neither to be expected nor hoped that Greece’s dependence on the United States would be permanent. The Cyprus problem dramatized this fact to the Greeks by posing a situation in which they could not act in
concert with their western allies and could not act independently of them. It forced the Greeks to tote up, as they had not done before, the “price” of the western alliance. In this sense the process of redressing Greece’s relations with the west may be a healthy one in the end, for it scarcely possible to appraise accurately the advantages of an alliance without at the same time realizing its disadvantages. During the Bandit War and in the years of internal reconstruction that followed, no such appraisal was possible. What is going on in Greece today may be regarded as a somewhat delayed regularization of Greece’s relations with the West.

If a danger exists it is simply that the Greeks may over-correct the balance in their foreign relations. It is a risk to be carefully watched but not yet, in the Embassy’s judgement, to be feared unduly. For the present, Greece’s readjustment may be primarily important in the effect it exerts on the country’s internal stability. In the conduct of its external affairs, Greece may be expected to exercise its independence on marginal issues but there is no present reason to believe that any non-Communist Government would wish to go further.

F. Relations with Yugoslavia

Greece’s relations with Yugoslavia were conspicuously cordial during the period under review. In July the King and Queen paid an informal visit to Tito at Brioni. Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj visited Athens in October. There were three reciprocal visits of Greek and Yugoslav military delegations, the same number that had occurred the previous year. The Greek press, almost without exception, reserved its most complimentary adjectives for President Tito and his chief lieutenants and accorded respectful treatment to Yugoslav policies of non-alignment that bordered on outright admiration.

Several factors served to promote Greek-Yugoslav friendship. One was Yugoslavia’s steady support for the Greek position in Cyprus. Another was the deterioration of Greek relations with Turkey, which tended, in the Greek eyes, to emphasize that Yugoslavia was Greece’s “only Balkan friend”. A third was the genuine, if latent admiration felt by many Greeks for Tito’s neutralism, a feeling that was encouraged by their conviction that Greece was being let down by its western allies. As long as these elements continued to exert their influence, Yugoslavia could be expected to occupy an especially favored place among Greece’s friends.

G. Relations with Soviet Bloc

A significant factor affecting Greece’s attitude toward the Soviet Bloc in 1957 was the vocal and unqualified support that the Bloc continued to give to the Greek position on the Cyprus problem by its votes and speeches at the United Nations. That the Soviet attitude had some psychological effect on the Greek public is probable and the noticeable improvement that occurred in Greece’s relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites, an improvement taking pace only seven years after the termination of the Bandit War, can best be understood in the context of Cyprus and the general
process of readjustment in Greek foreign relations which the Cyprus problem has catalyzed.

There was a general increase in contacts between Greece and the Soviet Bloc during the past year. It has been noticeable at almost all levels of activity, ranging from the cultural through the commercial and political. Numerous Greek delegations have visited the Soviet Union and the satellites, including labor groups, journalists, politicians, scientists and artists and there has been a reciprocal flow of Soviet delegations into Greece. The largest group of Greeks to visit the Soviet Union in 1957 were the eighty-three who attended the Moscow Youth Festival in July. This delegation, which was carefully screened by the Greek Government, returned with generally favorable reactions to what they had seen – a response that was echoed by other Greeks to whom the Embassy talked after visits to the Soviet Union.

In the commercial field there has been an increase in trade between Greece and the Bloc, although in an overall context the level continues to be relatively low. An inhibiting influence on trade relations has been exerted by the limited demand that exists in Greece for Bloc products except for petroleum although this may not remain true in the future. By the end of the year Greek credits to Bloc were in most instances above agreed swing limits. Nevertheless, the willingness of the Soviet Union to absorb increased amounts of Greek exports, such as tobacco, and the ability of the Bloc to offer its own manufactured goods at non-competitive prices imply that trade relations between Greece and the Bloc will continue to expand.

From a political standpoint, the year was characterized by prolific Soviet efforts to promote the regularization of Greek relations with the Balkan satellites. Bulgaria pushed hard to achieve normal diplomatic relations through a series of talks on border delineation and the long-standing problem of reparations. Discussions between Greek and Bulgarian military negotiators were reasonably successful on the subject of border demarcation. There was little or no success on reparations, however, and Greece has made no move to designate an Ambassador in Sofia.

On September 10 the Roumanian Prime Minister, Chivu Stoica, proposed the convocation of a Balkan conference to consider a six-nation non-aggression and cooperation pact among Greece, Turkey, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Roumania. The bid was rejected by the Greeks on the basis of their existing problems with Albania and Bulgaria. While the Government’s refusal seemed to accord with the feeling of most non-Communist Greeks that the time was not ripe for such a conference, the Roumanian proposal raised once more the question of Greece’s proper role in the Balkans and whether indefinite insulation of the Balkan satellites is either possible or desirable.

Albania continued to press both publicly and privately for the restoration of normal relations with Greece. Greek claims to Northern Epirus were as usual an important deterrent to the establishment of diplomatic relations. However, agreement was reached on a joint mine-sweeping operation in the Corfu Channel which began on March 15, 1958, and was expected to continue through the middle of July. During the
course of the year the Albanians permitted the repatriation of several groups of Greek hostages abducted during the Bandit War.

The Soviet Union itself adopted a generally mild and conciliatory tone toward Greece throughout the year. One exception occurred in April 1957, when Soviet Ambassador Sergueev, under instructions, admonished Foreign Minister Averoff strongly against permitting nuclear bases on Greek soil. A week later Moscow Radio repeated the warning. The result was flare up of popular resentment among Greeks against Soviet interference in Greek internal affairs. Popular feeling subsided when the Soviets did not press the argument further.

In general, it may be said that by the end of March 1958, Greek relations with the Soviet Union had improved all along the line. In good measure this improvement could be attributed to the “readjustment” of Greece’s foreign relations to which reference was made above. More specifically, in the continued absence of a Cyprus settlement satisfactory to Greece and assuming continued Soviet Bloc support for the Greek position, the improvement was likely to proceed and conceivably to accelerate in the coming year.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS

Certain conclusions can be drawn from the record of Greek foreign policy in the year under review. Following are the Embassy’s conclusions, together with indications of what the United States may expect from Greece in the coming year:

(1) Greek preoccupation with the Cyprus problem has encouraged a qualified and somewhat belated readjustment in Greece’s relations with the West, including the United States. Greece’s “disengagement” from the West is at present more psychological than actual. Greece still needs its close ties with the West and most non-Communist Greeks realize that it does.

(2) Concurrently there has been a shift toward more “normal” relations with the Soviet Bloc.

(3) As long as the Cyprus problem remains unsettled it will have an abrasive effect on Greece’s relations with the West, creating a progressively deeper psychological dilemma for the Greeks. While there is presently no evidence to suggest that Greek disaffection over Cyprus could swing the country into the arms of the Soviets it can, and doubtless will, have an unsettling effect on the country’s internal stability.

(4) Under almost any non-Communist Government Greece can be expected to steer an increasingly “independent” course in its international relations. This may be especially true of Greek actions on marginal issues – i.e. issues that do not imply a shift in basic loyalties – notably in the Middle East where Greece will continue to criticize U.S. support for the Baghdad Pact and promote an American rapprochement with the uncommitted Arab states.

(5) Greece’s period of readjustment will make relations with the United States more complicated and sensitive but there is no reason to suppose that they will thereby become unsatisfactory. Given a certain amount of patience, mixed with
firmness on important issues, the United States may find that shifts in the emphasis of Greek foreign policy lead to a more normal Greek-US relationship – a development that would be in the American interest as well as that of Greece.

For the Ambassador:
James K. Penfield
Counselor of Embassy

NARA, RG 59, 781.00/5-2158
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Horner) to the Department of State

Subject: Foreign Minister Evangelos AVEROFF Addresses National War College
Athens, May 21, 1958

A fairly lengthy address given yesterday to a visiting group of the National War College, and the ensuing question period, provided an opportunity for the Ambassador and certain Embassy officers to obtain the views of Greek Foreign Minister Evanghelos AVEROFF on both Foreign and domestic matters. While many of the theses developed by Mr. Averoff may already be known to the Department, or perhaps could be logically deduced, they are reported here for their general background interest.

Mr. Averoff began by analyzing the principal pivots of Greek external policy as dictated by Greece’s geographical position and historic past. He described these as:
1. The abiding need for friendship with Turkey;
2. The requirement that Greece also have the support of stronger nations in the age-old effort to hold back the Slav tide;
3. The desirability of “neutralizing” some part of Greece’s 1,200 km land frontier;
4. Greece’s imperative need for a backdrop or rear echelon.

With respect to Turkey, Mr. Averoff stressed his belief that, despite the long Ottoman domination of Greece, there is no basic animosity between the two countries and peoples, and he referred to various events, including talks he and Prime Minister Karamanlis have had with Turkish leaders, to show that there is a strong empirical element leading these two countries to collaboration. In referring to the dispute over Cyprus as a major cause of current less cordial relations, the Foreign Minister seemed to be confident that if and when this dispute is settled there will be no deeply-rooted reason impeding the restoration of cordial Greco-Turkish relations.

Greece’s foreign policy, declared Mr. Averoff, is founded on its membership in NATO. Despite dissatisfaction with lack of support from its NATO allies on its
Cyprus claims, there is no possibility of Greece’s faith in NATO being weakened. In this regard, possibly or even probably catering to his audience, Mr. Averoff asserted that only the presence of the United States in NATO mitigated against much stronger resentment of NATO neutrality on Cyprus.

The third point made by the Foreign Minister refers of course to Yugoslavia. He expressed faith in the Greek policy of friendship towards Yugoslavia on largely pragmatic grounds, and, while indicating Greece does not take Yugoslav friendship for granted, he thought Yugoslavia had long ceased to be a “communist” nation and was evolving in the ideological direction of a new amalgam of state socialism coupled with certain capitalistic elements.

Greece’s rear echelon is North Africa and the rest of the Arab world. Mr. Averoff stressed the necessity for Greek friendship with the Arab nations on both political and economic grounds. Only with Iraq is Greece on less than cordial terms. Responding to a question, he indicated little faith in the Baghdad Pact, but thought Greece now is more or less impelled to give it support as it is in existence and even an imperfect instrument must be used to meet the most important danger facing us all — the Soviet menace. Significantly, however, Mr. Averoff implied that Greece’s policy toward the Arab world will continue to be an independent one, not necessarily on the same lines as our own. This, he thought, was perhaps in the common interest of the West, and Greece could serve a useful role vis-à-vis Nasser and others by projecting the Western viewpoint.

In analyzing the May 11th Greek national elections, the Foreign Minister did not exhibit any complacency, and his remarks were chiefly interesting as reflecting future ERE policy to curb communism. Since, as he said, the abnormal population bulge of the 1925-50 period is now coming of voting age, it behooves the Government to take seriously the prospect of EDA actually improving on its 25 percent share of the Greek electorate. Concrete measures “decided upon” by the Greek Government are reported by separate despatch. To complement these, Mr. Averoff stated the Government will take prompt and energetic measures to curb subversion, including propaganda, and will resume sending offenders to detention camps on the islands.

For the Ambassador:
John Evarts Horner
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Berger) to the Department of State

Subject: Greece under Caramanlis: April, 1961
Athens, April 12, 1961

1. On the eve of Prime Minister Caramanlis’ visit to the United States it may be useful to survey briefly the Greek political scene and the position of the Caramanlis Government as it begins the fourth and final year of its present term. Greece in 1961 is in mid-passage. Politically, the old ways of doing things are breaking down. The Greek way of life is changing and the question is whether Greece’s institutions – its political leadership, its business, its schools and its Church – are flexible enough to meet the change, whether they will have to be propped up by authoritarian supports (as under Metaxas), or whether they will be the first causalities in a social revolution.

2. The by-now familiar picture of an enlightened conservative government leading the Greeks toward political stability (more or less against their will) while it builds prosperity with hard drachmas is true in a limited sense. Caramanlis has survived politically for over five years, a remarkable achievement in Greece, and the economic outlook has continued to improve, although many basic problems remain to be dealt with. It is no exaggeration to say that more Greeks lead a better life today than at any time in modern Greek history. But the problem is that at the very time when the country is straining to close the gap between rising expectations and an economy severely handicapped by nature and nepotism, it has to face the competition of more highly developed countries if it is to survive as a free democracy allied with the West. And all this with little experience, few models, and only the dimmest insight into European ways of doing business.

3. Greece’s social and political administration is out of touch with the changes occurring in Greek life. Seen against the backdrop of the international competition Greece faces it is hopelessly inefficient. Athens University continues to grind out law students at the rate of several hundred a year but has no faculty of economic or public administration. The business community operates with a code of ethics more Byzantine than European. The labor movement is divided into warring factions whose leadership exploits the grievances of the workers for personal privilege and power. The Church quietly decays and the Crown searches not too intelligently for its place in Greek society.

4. It is however the political leadership of Greece which is most at fault. At a time when half the Labor force is unemployed or underemployed; when urbanization is breaking down the family unit around which Greek society has been structured for generations; when new ideas and new hopes are spreading into distant mountain villages; when roughly one-fourth of the Greek electorate votes Communist; at such a time too many of Greece’s political leaders seem to have no better answer to Greece’s
problems than to play the game of political charades with which they have diverted themselves for years. The nationalist opposition leaders in particular behave as though there were no national problem that cannot be solved by a new electoral law.

5. The strength of Caramanlis lies not only in his political astuteness but in the fact that he, better than his rivals, better even than the leaders of Communist-controlled EDA, realizes the need for a program of social, political and economic reform. His dilemma is that his deficient administrative talents have not been sufficient to build out of the generally poor material at hand an organization capable of carrying through his program. The Prime Minister is a one-man band. On Fridays he thumps his drum in the Commerce Ministry. On Mondays he clashes cymbals in Agriculture. There is no real orchestration of the Government because there is no orchestra.

6. This is certainly nothing new. In modern times Greek governments have either been impotent or authoritarian. Political parties have been nonexistent in the western sense. The electorate has traditionally gravitated toward individual political leaders whose appeal was magnetic rather than rational and whose careers constituted the plot of Greek political life. This old way of political life, galvanized as it has been to some extent by Caramanlis’ will and industry, might still be adequate to squeak Greece through the accelerating basic changes in Greek society, and even perhaps past the dangers of a strong Communist party, but it is hardly adequate to meet present challenges plus the new competition which Greece faces from abroad.

7. The next Greek election is bound to be an important one. For the older generation of Greek politicians, notably for Papandreou and Venizelos, it will probably be the last election. Caramanlis faces a different kind of challenge. He will go to the country stronger than his individual opponents but weaker than in 1958. The situation has obvious dangers for him and for Greece. His problem is that, recognizing himself to be the best hope, and possibly the only satisfactory hope for Greece at the moment, he is inhibited by that knowledge form taking the political risks which alone can produce the moral and practical leadership Greece now needs. Caramanlis has demonstrated in the past a measure of political courage, but the present stakes are such that the temptation is strong to regard compromise with the old way of doing things as the only safe course.

8. How Caramanlis intends to meet his challenge as well as his opportunity will be demonstrated by his decisions in the matter of an electoral law and possibly a Government reshuffle. For the public the choice is between a new deal or a patched-up version of the old model. If Caramanlis should choose a course which has even the appearance of having been dictated only by partisan expediency, he will have missed the opportunity to build the strong moral, psychological and practical base for the social and economic program he envisages for Greece. In a very real sense the next two or three years will see Greek democracy and the monarchy put to a very fundamental test.

Samuel D. Berger, Charge d’ Affaires ad interim
Despatch from the American Embassy in Athens (Brewster) to the Department of State

Subject: A Winter of Discontent, some implications on the current political maneuvering in Greece

Athens, March 26, 1962

1. It is apparent that the Center Union's campaign to nullify the results of the October 29, 1961, elections is turning into a broader and more fundamental attack on several of the governing institutions of Greece; what started four months ago as a disgruntled effort on the part of the defeated opposition to challenge the legitimacy of the elections, and therefore of the Caramanlis Government, is becoming an effort to challenge the legitimacy of certain Greek institutions, such as the Palace, the military leadership, and the internal security forces which, in the minds of the opposition, exerted undue influence on the conduct of the elections. To understand the significance of this challenge, and to estimate the lines of its probable development, it is useful to consider briefly the electoral debate itself and to see what, if anything, the opposition has proved by its campaign.

2. The general charge advanced by the Center Union against the Dovas Service Government is that the conduct of the elections was characterized by force and fraudulence (“via kai nothia” in the euphonic Greek phrase). The evidence adduced by the opposition to support the charge falls into two categories: (a) evidence designed to show that many voters, especially in the Athens area, were illegally registered, and that military voting registers were not made available to party representatives for inspection within the time specified by law; and (b) evidence of police pressure on individual voters in some provincial areas.

3. While the Center Union, for purposes of its campaign, has tended to lump the evidence together, and to draw from it extravagant conclusions about a “master plan” to rig the elections in favor of ERE, objective examination of the evidence makes clear that much of what the opposition has been talking about is not malfeasance but nonfeasance. That is, with respect to the civilian vote the opposition has proved numerous technical violations of the law, especially as it affects the registration of voters, but has failed notably to prove that the elections as a whole were rigged. Thus, despite all the time that the opposition has spent rooting through the registers, not a single case of double voting has so far been proved and the Government has been able to show that a number of illegally registered voters were in fact supporters of the opposition.

4. With respect to the military vote and the activities of the police and para-military TEA forces in the provinces the evidence, while scattered, is somewhat more
persuasive. Numerous [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports tend to confirm that the Army high command bent every effort to deliver a heavy vote for Caramanlis and that General Kardamakis, the Chief of Staff of the Hellenic Army and a long-time associate of the Prime Minister, was deeply involved in the electioneering. The pre-electoral activities of TEA and the gendarmerie do not appear to have been so explicitly pro-ERE; the mission of the internal security forces was to hold down the vote of the extreme left. Nonetheless, in at least one instance, that of the Police Chief in Methoni, the Courts have found evidence of strong-arm methods employed against a non-Communist, and it is permissible to question the wisdom of allowing provincial constabulary to intervene in free elections even when motivated by anti-Communism.

5. The conclusions to be drawn from these observations are the following: (a) while there was no widespread adulteration of the civilian vote, the administration of the elections was poor and open to abuse by all parties; (b) the Army leadership was overly involved in the campaign and inadequate restraints were placed on the activities of the internal security forces in the pre-electoral period.

6. It is probable, as some Government spokesmen have said, that similar conclusions could have been drawn from any Greek election, including those conducted by the present opposition leaders. However, what was acceptable, or at any rate accepted, practice in 1951 or 1956 may not be so today. The Center Union, under the purple banner of Papandreou's oratory, has ridden off in all directions and in so doing has created much confusion about the real issues raised by its attack on the election results. These issues do not, as the Center Union would have us believe, pose the question, “who should govern Greece?” They do, however, raise important questions about the way Greece should be governed.

7. If we accept this line of reasoning, it becomes easier to see why the Greek public's response to the Center Union campaign has been mixed and why the campaign itself has shifted emphasis so markedly in recent weeks. There has from the beginning been a measure of reserve and skepticism in the public's attitude toward the Center Union and especially toward its leadership. No serious observer of the Greek political scene believes that Papandreou and his ill-assorted coalition command as much popular confidence as Caramanlis, and once this is admitted the most extreme of the opposition charges become transparently ridiculous. Many people believe, however, that the Palace, the Army leadership and the internal security forces intervene too much in the political life of Greece, and that the sluggishness of government administration, its apparent unresponsiveness to individual needs, has created a potentially dangerous gap between the governing class and the governed.

8. For this reason public opinion, which was apathetic about the Center Union's attack on the election results, has appeared more receptive to its attacks on the Palace. It
explains why many intellectuals who have little or no use for the leadership of the Center Union nevertheless feel that in questioning the impartiality of the Army leadership and the gendarmerie the opposition is performing a useful service. Finally, it indicates how, almost without realizing what they are doing, the Center Union leaders find themselves conducting a very different campaign from the one they began four months ago. In recent weeks the implicit issues have simply become explicit.

9. Greece, it is often said, is in mid-passage, but the phrase is usually used to describe a stage in the country's economic development. It is less widely understood that Greece is also in mid-passage socially and politically. Methods of administration appropriate to the conditions of prewar Greece; habits of thought suitable to the period of the Bandit War; royal prerogatives which survived in the atmosphere of an earlier and less enlightened time; these are a few of the anachronisms whose continued existence vexes the public and will trouble the Government until they are resolved. These are real issues, as opposed to the synthetic ones which the Center Union introduced at the beginning of its campaign. The apathetic response of the Greek public to Papandreou's attempt to discredit the elections (which the public correctly identified as political opportunism) has, in effect, forced the Center Union leadership to change the focus of its attack.

10. In these somewhat changed circumstances the danger to Caramanlis does not appear to be especially serious at the moment. The immediate threat was diminished as soon as it became clear that a majority of the Greek public were extremely skeptical about the most violent and politically-motivated of Papandreou's charges. When the Prime Minister was able to ascertain that public confidence in the Government had not been shaken, his position became simpler and his principal concern one of holding together the versatile but high-strung group of men who compose his present cabinet. So far, he has managed to do this with consummate skill. Ministers whose personal loyalty he has reason to doubt—Finance Minister Theotokis and Interior Minister Rallis, in particular—have been those to whom he has assigned responsibility for conducting the Government's defense in Parliament. This strategy has enabled the Prime Minister to avoid direct participation in the election debate and has forced ministers of untested reliability to commit themselves publicly on a subject they might have preferred to finesse. The total effect has probably been to strengthen the cohesiveness of the Government and to lessen the danger that it can be brought down from within, as it was in 1958.

11. The Prime Minister's success in holding together his cabinet also strengthens his position with the Palace. An important objective of the Center Union has been to convince the Royal Family and, to a lesser extent, the American Embassy that the Caramanlis Government is “irregular” and therefore a source of political instability in Greece. When the opposition leaders call for a “transitional” government they are appealing to the Palace to replace Caramanlis with some compromise candidate.
whom they would support until new elections were held. Given the well-known lack of personal rapport between Caramanlis and the Palace, the Center Union reasons that this scheme might be acceptable to the Royal Family if they become convinced (a) that the Prime Minister was not giving them adequate protection from political attack, and (b) that a compromise candidate of their own choice would receive widespread bipartisan support in Parliament. In such a situation the likeliest candidate would be Theotokis, who enjoys close personal relations with the Royal Family, is well regarded by backbenchers of both Government and center opposition, and has no great affection for Caramanlis. Other, more remote possibilities would be Rallis, Minister of Coordination Papaligouras, or Minister of Commerce Pipinelis. It is perfectly clear, however, that this strategy has little chance of succeeding as long as Caramanlis remains in full command of his cabinet and his party. In recent events, there is no sign that his grip is relaxing or that rumored anxieties of the Royal Family are being exploited to his political disadvantage.

12. Indeed, at present it is the Center Union leaders who seem to be in trouble. Papandreou has become enmeshed in a tiresome debate with ex-Liberal members of the cabinet about who is entitled to wear the mantle of the elder Venizelos; the Center Union rank-and-file are deeply divided on how to phrase their criticism of the military leadership and an open letter which the party recently addressed to the Armed Forces, denouncing their present leaders as “unworthy”, was revised so often that its eventual release was anticlimactic; lastly, at a time when public interest is centered on Princess Sophie’s dowry, the financing of the Queen’s Fund and other matters involving the Royal Family, the Center Union finds itself half in, half out of Parliament and created a further impression of confusion by rushing off to Crete on March 18 for a mass rally on the elections.

13. Assuming that public confidence in Caramanlis remains unshaken, we are justified in concluding that the Government will ride out the present agitation. In its fumbling way, the Center Union has found in the Palace and in some questionable political activities of the military and internal security forces valid issues with which to attack Caramanlis. Its confused handling of these issues, however, provided the Prime Minister with the time he needs to fashion at least temporary solutions to the most pressing of his problems. It is to be hoped that he will do more than that. Basic reforms are long overdue in Greece’s internal security legislation, in the way the country conducts its elections and in the way the Royal Family comport themselves. The changing character of the election debate has clearly demonstrated that it is in these areas that the Greek public is looking for effective action from the Government.

For the Ambassador
H. Daniel Brewster
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs
The Greek Government feels that its needs for special assistance for its defense effort are not fully recognized by the United States Government and other NATO members. They have not fully accepted that United States grant aid is to be terminated on June 30, 1962 and are further disturbed by the recommendations of the NATO Wisemen that grant aid is no longer required although some soft balance of payments loans should be made in 1963 and 1964 to assist Greece in maintaining its current levels of defense expenditure without grant aid. Unless action is taken to reassure the Greeks of continued United States and NATO recognition of their contribution to NATO defense and indications of willingness to assist in meeting their problems, there could be a serious loss of confidence by the Greeks in NATO and potentially embarrassing situation at the Ministerial meeting in Athens.

Background

The Greek Government is currently in a mood of depression because of its assessment that the United States Government and other NATO countries have not fully realized the problem arising from the impact of its defense effort upon the economy of Greece. Two recent events have given rise to a feeling of insecurity and questioning of the value of the NATO alliance on the part of the Greeks. The first event was the termination of the United States grant aid to Greece as of June 30, 1962. The other event has been the submission of the NATO Wisemen report to the North Atlantic Council which recommends that no further grant aid need be given to Greece but that long term, low interest rate loans in the amount of $60 million for 1963 and 1964 be available to Greece through a special consortium arrangement under OECD.

The Greek Government contends that it cannot carry the present defense burden, which is around 4.6% percent of GNP, without grant assistance to cover local currency expenses. The Greeks have therefore indicated to General Norstad that they are contemplating a reduction of military forces in 1963 to levels which General Norstad informs us are unacceptable in light of NATO defense needs. The Greek Government has taken strong exception to the Wisemen report and initially threatened to reject it outright. It now appears that the Greeks may be persuaded to accept the report in principle provided the North Atlantic Council agrees to a statement prepared by Secretary General Stikker which would establish a special study group of certain NATO countries to make a further examination of Greek defense needs and consider
ways and means of raising additional resources which Greece would need to maintain a satisfactory defense effort.

Discussion

We have informed the Greeks that they cannot expect further grant aid from the United States and that we will view sympathetically applications for foreign exchange costs of projects or programs which meet current AID criteria.

The Greek Government contends that their basic problem is a shortage of local currency which they require to help cover the defense budget as well as the investment budget. Our Embassy and Mission have made some preliminary estimates of how much an internal financing gap may exist and these differ widely from Greek assumptions. However, we do not consider the budget “gap” of deficit to be an appropriate basis for determining the amount of assistance for Greece. We are trying to move into a position where we all be financing exchange cost of projects and programs in the future.

We are in the process of considering several applications for specific projects totaling $69 million (three development banks - $45 million; second Acheloos hydroelectric project - $21 million; and private loan for Piraiki-Patraiki textile plant - $3.5 million). These applications have been in process for almost one year and an AID loan officer was recently in Athens to discuss further details concerning these loans. It is hoped that action may be taken on some of these loan applications within the near future.

Ambassador Labouisse has recommended that consideration be given to project or program loans amounting to possibly $30 million in FY 1963. The Embassy is collaborating with the Greek Government in attempting to identify the dollar import component of the public investment budget which might provide the basis for such loans. This is well within the limits we have been considering for Greece.

The extent to which we might be prepared to consider a general program loan not tied to specific projects or development programs would depend on a complete analysis of total resources available to the Greeks and their projected budgetary expenditures including maintenance of a defense effort at current levels and increased proportionately with the growth of the economy.

We do not feel that we can make a realistic assessment at this point of Greek needs for balance of payments support in FY 1963 pending the results of the study now going on in Athens to identify activities that we might finance as well as the size of the balance of payments deficit in 1963. Before the Greeks formulate the 1963 budget, it will be necessary to discuss with them the level of defense expenditures we would like to see them maintain in 1963, and at that time we will probably have to be more specific about the kind of assistance we are prepared to extend. Greece will be presenting its development program to the OECD in June, and this should provide a basis for OECD action to mobilize external assistance for Greece. There is no problem in financing of the Greek budget in FY 1962.
There is a clear necessity, however, for reassurance of the Greeks at this particular point in light of their reaction to the termination of supporting assistance and their dissatisfaction with the Wisemen’s report. This is of special significance because of the consideration of the Wisemen’s report at Athens and the fact that considerable pressures will be placed on the United States delegation at the Athens Ministerial meeting. It appears that Secretary General Stikker has reached a compromise on the Wisemen’s report whereby Greek requirements for defense will be subject of further study. This may avoid embarrassment to the United States at the Athens meeting.

We do feel, however, that it would be desirable if you could again reassure the Greeks of our continuing commitment to their security and state that, although our aid will now assume a different form, we are prepared to continue our economic assistance to Greece and will give sympathetic attention to sound loan applications on a project basis and when the Greek plan is further refined and developed to consider a program loan.

NARA, RG 59, 611.81/7-1762
Memorandum of Conversation

Participants
The Secretary of State
His Excellency Alexander A. Matsas, Ambassador of Greece
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Subject: Greek-American Relations
Washington, July 17, 1962

The Secretary, noting recent suggestions that Prime Minister Caramanlis seemed a little discouraged and anxious that American attitudes toward Greece had changed, welcomed the opportunity to reaffirm to the Ambassador our steady friendship for his country. The Secretary recalled his talks with Prime Minister during the NATO meeting in Athens. After those talks he had thought, despite some differences of perspective, that the two sides had understood each other. As the Greek Government knew, patterns of United States foreign assistance have been changed by Congressional actions to give more flexibility for development lending and at the same time to cut back defense support. The new arrangement reflected the need to use our foreign aid funds most effectively; it was also related to serious gold-flow problems here. Unless our customary export surplus were maintained we would be hard pressed to continue our overseas military and economic assistance programs on which rest the hopes of the free world. These adjustments have in no way affected our
attitude toward Greece, with whom our relations have been close and strong since the
difficult days of 1947.

The Secretary added that we have great respect for the contribution that
Greece has been making to its defense and its development. Nor were we in any sense
negligent of the Greek situation. Our strong fleet based in the Mediterranean
underscored our calculations of the importance of the southern flank of NATO. Even
though the Berlin problem attracted attention to the central front, our view has always
been that the security of NATO was indivisible.

The Secretary noted the multilateral efforts to assist Greece currently being
made in the NATO working Group and in the OECD. He did not know whether or
how we could help speed up their work, but had the impression that the NATO
countries wanted to be helpful to their Greek ally. It would be advantageous for
Greece to press its own case in the NATO capitals since many countries were now
seeking assistance in Europe and we have had to urge many causes.

The Ambassador, expressing gratitude to the Secretary for discussing these
matters with him, said his Government would find the Secretary’s comments very
helpful. The Greek people had a great and profound appreciation for United States’
help. At the same time, the process of adjustments of the American aid program,
which the Secretary had described, happened to coincide with an extremely critical
period for Greece. The anxiety and even some sort of anguish which had become
evident in Athens arose because the Greeks feared they might find themselves in a
gap in which older forms of aid would not be replaced immediately by newer forms.
As he had previously said to Mr. Talbot, the Ambassador pointed out to the Secretary
that his Government feared a tendency in NATO Working Group to cut down the
specification of Greek needs in order to bring them within visible resources, rather
than to judge the essential Greek problem and how to meet it.

The Secretary observed that the United States was not asking Greece to reduce
its defenses. We were all likely to go through some very nervous weeks and months
ahead. This was true because we saw no willingness by the Soviet Union to respect
our vital interests in Berlin nor have we reached agreement on any central issue.

The Ambassador spoke of very strong pressures on Greece, for example
30,000 former Communist bandits currently assembled in the region of Skopje.
Greece was the only non-Slavic and non-Communist nation in its area. Its people
were not militaristic but they were extremely conscious of their defense needs. Should
the Government have to reduce defenses expenditures, it would be a terrible blow.
Indeed, it would mean the amputation of the northern provinces. This was the
background of what at times must seem to Americans to be Greek obsessions with
their parochial problems.

The Secretary asked if there might also be a psychological element in the
picture. In the late 1940s we had the stimulation of fighting together to restore order
to Greece. Later came the rather invigorating task of building up NATO. Recently, in
contrast, we have been setting down to the long haul. The alliance was now soundly
based. It had a great task to go forward with and Greece was part of that as in the
Common Market, etc. With fewer exciting developments in the immediate area of Greece, other issues had come to preoccupy our minds. However, he wished to make it clear that if other countries caught the headlines this was not evidence that we cared less for Greece.

The Ambassador responded that the Greeks were realistic in seeing the center of NATO leadership as the United States. Nothing would succeed if the United States failed. Nevertheless, in looking at the progress that has been made it would be a great mistake not to see the real weaknesses and dangers that remain, such as the regional dangers in the area of Greece.

The Secretary replied that surely there could be no misunderstanding on that matter in Greece. The Sixth Fleet was not around as tourists. Agreeing with this, the Ambassador said that nevertheless demoralization and great danger could result if the Greeks should come to the point of having to cut down their defenses.

The Secretary suggested that there might be another reason for the concerns to which the Ambassador had referred. It might be that the Kennedy Administration had not spoken enough encouraging word about one specific country or another. There was a reason for this, but perhaps we had not sufficiently explained that reason in our private talks with our friends. We did not want to dilute the meaning of words. When we have spoken of what the NATO Alliance means to us we meant the whole NATO Alliance. This obviously included Greece. The Ambassador should know that when Prime Minister Caramanlis visited President Kennedy he had made a deep impression on the President and this had remained, even though perhaps we had not reiterated this fact frequently.

The Ambassador said that these words were gratifying. The real answer, however, would be in substance rather than in words. The NATO Resolutions in Athens had been welcome but implementation was the important thing. Could the Secretary’s interest be invoked, therefore, in getting the Paris discussions forward?

Agreeing that this was important, the Secretary instructed Mr. Talbot to see whether a way could be found to press the groups in Paris toward an early conclusion of their efforts. Mr. Talbot explained that thinks were moving forward but that there were some difficulties, including the British position on Greek bonds. Taking up this topic, the Ambassador described it as another area of concern. The Greeks were worried that others might get more favorable terms. Any international or domestic good that Greece might attain from setting its debts would overcome should Communist debtor countries then get more favorable terms.

In conclusion the Ambassador observed that all the preoccupations he had brought to the Secretary’s attention stemmed from the Greek Government’s anxiety that the public should wholeheartedly support the Alliance. The Secretary asked the Ambassador to give his warm regards to the Prime Minister and to tell him that we would renew our efforts to advance the NATO and OECD actions to a conclusion.
NATO
M.C. 27
Military Committee. Association of the Turkish and Greek Governments with
the Military Planning of NATO
23 October 1950

REPORT BY THE STANDING GROUP
to the MILITARY COMMITTEE
on
ASSOCIATION OF THE TURKISH AND GREEK
GOVERNMENTS WITH THE MILITARY PLANNING OF NATO

1. The Fifth Session of the North Atlantic Council considered the request of the
Turkish Government for admission into the North Atlantic Treaty. They were of the
opinion that at the present stage of development of NATO it was not feasible to
extend the Treaty to either Turkey or Greece, but that arrangements might be made to
permit these two countries to be associated, as appropriate, with such phases of the
military planning work of the NATO as are concerned with the defense of the
Mediterranean.

2. On 9 October 1950, the North Atlantic Defense Committee requested the Standing
Group to consider this matter and take such steps as are necessary to provide for the
appropriate inclusion of Turkey and Greece in North Atlantic Defense Planning in the
Mediterranean Area.

3. M.C. 22/2 states that a practical solution in the Mediterranean area is “to make a
separate overall Naval Command directly responsible to the Standing Group, which is
the authority responsible for coordinating the requirements of all Fronts. This
Command, however, should not be established at this time.”

4. Those Allied objectives in the Mediterranean which it is desired to accomplish
prior to the outbreak of hostilities and those sought through Greek and Turkish
military efforts in the event of war might be enhanced if Turkey and Greece were
associated with the NATO planning now.

5. In view of their announced interest in NATO it should be acceptable and desirable
from the point of view of the Greek and Turkish Governments to participate in any
discussions concerning those areas and phases of military planning with which it
would be appropriate for them to be associated.

6. The following steps should be taken at present to associate Turkey and Greece with
appropriate phases of NATO planning as are concerned with the defense of the
Mediterranean.
(a) The Turkish and Greek Governments each should be invited at an early date to send a military representative to discuss with the Standing Group the problem of associating Turkey and Greece, where appropriate, in North Atlantic Defense Planning in the Mediterranean.

(b) These military representatives of the Turkish and Greek Governments should discuss with members of the Standing Group those areas wherein participation and planning would be mutually advantageous to NATO and the Turkish (Greek) Government and the machinery through which this planning might be achieved.

7. At a conference on 23 October 1950 the Standing Group discussed the above proposals with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Turkish Army, and these proposals appeared to be satisfactory to him.

RECOMMENDATION

8. It is recommended that the Military Committee note the proposal outlined in paragraph 6 above and advise the Defense Committee at their forthcoming meetings.

M.C. 38/2 (FINAL)
Military Committee. Command Arrangements Regarding Greece and Turkey
21 February 1952

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
DECISION ON M.C. 38/2
A Report by the Standing Group on
COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING GREECE AND TURKEY
Note by the Secretaries
1. At the First Meeting of their Sixth Session on 11 February 1952, the North Atlantic Military Committee amended M.C. 38/2 and then approved the recommendations in paragraph 4 of the amended report.

2. At the Meeting of the Committee of Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Council held at 1030, 21 February 1952, M.C. 38/2 was further amended with respect to the title and to paragraph 3 and it was agreed to recommend approval of the report by the North Atlantic Council.

3. Holders of M.C. 38/2 are requested to replace the decision sheet on page 1 with the enclosed corresponding pages and to destroy the removed pages by burning. Subparagraphs 3 c, d, e and f on page 2 should be renumbered as b, c, d and e.

4. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of M.C. 38/2.
REPORT BY THE STANDING GROUP

to the NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE

on COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING GREECE AND TURKEY

1. Since the meeting of the Council in Rome, at which the Standing Group were instructed to submit their recommendations for the Command Arrangements when Greece and Turkey became members of NATO, the Standing Group has conducted a wide series of discussions and examinations.

2. A complete solution of this problem has not proved possible within the time available and further study is required, notably on the over-all naval command arrangements in the Mediterranean. On other points, however, a wide measure of agreement has been reached and the Standing Group accordingly submits the following proposals to the Military Committee for their consideration as a partial and interim solution of this problem.

3. On the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO:
   a. The Ground Forces and Air Forces of Greece and Turkey assigned to NATO will operate under the over-all command of SACEUR through Commander-in-Chief, Southern Europe.
   b. The Naval Forces of Greece and Turkey will remain under their National Chiefs of Staff. The operations of these forces will be closely coordinated with those of all other naval forces in the Mediterranean.
   c. Detailed command arrangements of SACEUR’s Southern Command, as required by the foregoing, will be worked out by SACEUR in agreement with national authorities and submitted to the Standing Group for approval by the Military Committee.
   d. With the proposals at subparagraphs a, b, c and d above, the only organizational change to existing NATO command structure in the Mediterranean would be the addition of the Turkish and Greek land and air force commands under the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Europe.
   e. The position as regards the system of command of naval forces in the Mediterranean area and their coordination with land and air forces will be postponed for further consideration, with the object of submitting an agreed report to the Council at its next meeting. Progress on the organization of the Middle East Command will be reported to the Council at its next meeting.

   RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is recommended that the Military Committee:
   a. Approve this solution as an interim measure.
   b. Direct the Standing Group to continue its study of command of naval forces in the Mediterranean Area and their coordination with land and air forces and to submit a definitive report on this to the Council at its next meeting.
   c. To transmit this report to the North Atlantic Council for approval in order that the recommendations herein may be implemented.
Standing Group Memorandum. The NATO Military Command Structure
11 August 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC
CHANNEL COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: The NATO Military Command Structure

1. The Standing Group has under consideration the promulgation of a document listing the major NATO Military Commands and the first echelon of the subordinate commands and the broad areas of functional and geographical responsibility of these commands. This document will be strictly factual. It is intended only as a handy reference to existing terms of reference and not as a medium for amending these.

2. Copies of the draft publication on the subject are contained at Enclosure. It is requested that:
   a. SACEUR review this publication and supply the material for Appendix “B” to Enclosure “B”, and copies of “General Instructions for SHAPE Major Subordinate Commanders”.
   b. SACLAN'T review this publication and supply the material for Appendixes “G”, “H”, and “I” to Enclosure “B”.
   c. CHANCOM review this publication.

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APPENDIX “D”
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE

SHAPE/376/53
30 March 1953


TO: Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy

1. You are hereby designated Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), and this directive hereby cancels the 19 June 1951 letter of General Eisenhower to you.

2. As Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, your primary mission in the event of war will be the defense of the territories of the NATO nations
within the area of your command responsibility. Your plans and operations will be in accord with Strategic and Operational Guidance furnished you by this headquarters.

3. In peace, your responsibilities will include the development of plans and the necessary preparations for the execution of your wartime responsibilities, and for international combined training of assigned national units, and such earmarked forces as may be made available for that purpose.

4. a. In peace, you will have operational control, to the extent necessary for the discharge of your assigned responsibilities (paragraph 3 above), over all the forces assigned to your command.

b. In war, you will have operational control over all forces assigned and attached to your command.

c. The extent of your responsibility in both peace and war for the coordination of their logistic support and for provision of base facilities will be covered by separate instructions.

5. You will effect close and continuous cooperation with adjacent Allied Commands and with NATO national authorities as appropriate.

6. The Southern European area of your command responsibility will, subject to the limitations indicated in this paragraph, comprise:

   Italy, Greece (including Crete), Turkey and the islands of the Aegean. National Coastal Waters will be a national responsibility. The division of responsibility in war between the National Territorial Commanders and the Allied Commanders, including the planning and preparation therefor in peace, will be as prescribed in M.C. 36.

NOTE 1. French North Africa and Corsica which, although included in the Southern European area, are French zones of the Interior.

The control and the defense of these zones is the direct responsibility of the French, who will grant the Allied Commanders under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) all facilities necessary for the efficient conduct of their operations. Requests for such facilities will be made through SACEUR. SACEUR shall have authority to conduct such combat operations in these zones, including French North Africa, as he deems necessary for the defense of Western Europe.

NOTE 2. The Islands of Sardinia and Sicily are also included in the Southern European area, but remain an Italian responsibility under conditions parallel to those above.

7. There will be within your command two land sectors:
   a. An Italian sector under an Italian Army officer, Commander, Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (COMLANDSOUTH).
   b. A Greek/Turkish sector under an American Army officer, Commander, Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe (COMLANDSOUTHEAST).

8. The commander of the Greek/Turkish sector (COMLANDSOUTHEAST):
   a. Will be responsible under CINCSOUTH for the over-all conduct and coordination of land operations from the Caucasus to the Balkans, both inclusive.
b. Will locate his headquarters at IZMIR. This headquarters will be of a level comparable to an army group headquarters. The staff will be international.

c. Will exercise command through separate army commands in Greece and Turkey under Greek and Turkish officers, respectively.

9. Located with the headquarters of COMLANDSOUTHEAST there will be a tactical air force headquarters, responsible to Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH).

10. You will have subordinate to you on a covert basis for war planning and formally under operational command in event of war, or earlier if so directed by the Standing Group:

   a. The Commander, Allied Forces, Austria.
   b. The Commander, Anglo-United States Forces, Trieste.

11. In addition to the land and air forces assigned to your command, the heavy carriers, amphibious and support forces of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, referred to hereafter as the Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH) remain assigned to your command.

12. A Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCAFMED) has been appointed, directly subordinate and responsible to SACEUR. In war, CINCAFMED is charged with the conduct of naval operations, other than those of the STRIKFORSOUTH, in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. He is charged with the responsibility of mine warfare, submarine, and anti-submarine operations in this area, and with the support of adjacent commands.

13. In the interest of the safety of all concerned, and to enable STRIKFORSOUTH to execute to the best advantage the missions assigned to it by you, there must be coordination of the movements of the STRIKFORSOUTH with those of other submarine, surface and air forces operating in the area. CINCAFMED will exercise this coordination on my behalf with respect to surface forces and submarines operating in the area and also with respect to such air components as may be under his operational control or may at the time be subject to his coordination. This does not authorize CINCAFMED to change missions of forces of other commands passing through his area, although he may request Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (COMSTRIKFOKSOUTH) to deal with a sudden emergency when this is all important, repeating his request to CINCSOUTH.

14. Necessary coordination of naval operations in the Black Sea with land and air operations conducted by CINCSOUTH and other Allied Commanders in the Black Sea/Turkey area will be as directed by SACEUR.

15. With respect to air operations, there will be air units from many different commands operating over the Mediterranean and the countries bordering it, and the closest coordination of these activities between the commanders concerned will be essential. It is not envisaged that the commander of any one of these forces will be singly responsible for effecting the over-all coordination necessary. The manner of this coordination will be the subject of separate instructions. You will thus collaborate
with other commanders concerned in the development of the necessary arrangements to establish an efficient air information and movement control organization.

16. The coordination in war of air defense measures of land-based aircraft in the air defense of NATO nations bordering the Mediterranean, and within agreements concluded between national authorities, will be the responsibility of CINCSOUTH.

17. Your responsibilities for the defense of an extensive and varied area and CINCAFMED’s naval responsibilities in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, which include the security of your sea lines of communication, make it essential that the closest coordination and cooperation should exist between your two commands. To this end, your organization will include the means for maintaining close day-to-day contact with CINCAFMED. Similar instructions have been issued to CINCAFMED.

[SIGNED] M. B. RIDGWAY
General, United States Army

APPENDIX “E”
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
PARIS, FRANCE
SHAPE/377/53
30 March 1953


TO: Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean, Malta

1. You are hereby designated Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCAFMED) and as such you will be directly subordinate and responsible to SACEUR.

2. The area of your command responsibility will be:
   a. The whole Mediterranean and Black Sea, excluding the islands therein.
   b. Such naval and air bases as are assigned to you.

3. As used herein, the term “Mediterranean” shall be understood to include the Black Sea.

4. Your responsibilities in war include:
   a. The security of sea communications in the entire Mediterranean.
   b. Support of adjacent commands.
   c. Coordination of logistic support and base facilities for all forces assigned to you, within the framework of agreements arrived at with national authorities.
   d. Coordination of mine warfare.
   e. Submarine operations.
   f. Anti-submarine operations.
g. Organization for the naval control of shipping. The exact organization will be prescribed later because of the important national interest involved.

h. The coordination of certain air operations over the Mediterranean. This will be covered by separate instructions.

i. Conduct of Maritime Air Operations. This will be covered by separate instructions.

5. Your peacetime responsibilities will include:

a. The development of plans and the preparations necessary for the execution of your missions.

b. The organization for and conduct of international combined training of national units earmarked for your command in war which can be made available for such training during peace.

6. a. In war, you will have operational control over all forces assigned to your command.

b. The extent of your responsibility in both peace and war for the coordination of their logistic support for provision of base facilities will be covered by separate instructions.

7. The heavy carriers, amphibious and support forces of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, referred to hereafter as the Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH), remain assigned to Commander-In-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH).

8. In the interests of the safety of all concerned, and to enable STRIKFORSOUTH to execute to the best advantage the missions assigned to it by CINCSOUTH, there must be coordination of the movements of STRIKFORSOUTH with those of other submarine, surface, and air forces operating in the area. You will exercise this coordination on my behalf with respect to surface forces and submarines operating in the area and also with respect to such air components as may be under your operational control or which may at the time be subject to your coordination. This does not authorize you to change missions of forces of other commands passing through your area, although you may request the Commander Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe to deal with a sudden emergency when this is all important, repeating your request to CINCSOUTH.

9. You will establish an integrated staff, comprised of officers from all nations concerned, in a headquarters ashore.

10. a. The Mediterranean will be divided into areas for the exercise of those functions which are of either local or national nature. The Commanders of national areas will be responsible to you for the Allied tasks but will be under their own national authorities for those tasks which are strictly national in character, subject to the necessary coordination by you. I shall consult with you and the national authorities concerned, in the development of my recommendations to the Standing Group for the delineation of those areas.
b. The current agreements concerning the establishment of a French area in the Western Mediterranean and an Italian area covering the approaches to Italy will remain valid, except that the commander to whom these area commanders will be responsible will be you instead of CINCSOUTH.

c. The primary responsibilities for the French area commander will be as defined in the current agreement, including, inside the French area, the security and protection of all LOC’s.

d. In addition to the French and Italian areas, a Gibraltar area will be established and an area or areas in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean. The Gibraltar area commander will be responsible both to you and to the appropriate commander in the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic’s (SACLANT’s) command. The boundary between SACLANT’s and your command will be as mutually agreed between SACEUR and SACLANT, subject to Standing Group approval. Recommendations as to the new area or areas in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean will be submitted to SACEUR for approval in accordance with paragraph 10a, above.

11. You will effect close and continuous cooperation with adjacent Allied Commands and with NATO national authorities as appropriate.

12. National Coastal waters will be a national responsibility. The division of responsibility in war between the National Territorial Commanders and Allied Commanders, including the planning and preparation therefor in peace, will be as prescribed in M.C. 36.

13. Necessary coordination of naval operations in the Black Sea with land and air operations conducted by CINCSOUTH and other Allied Commanders in the Black Sea/Turkey area will be as directed by SACEUR.

14. Your organization will provide for the command of the air components assigned to you, and for the coordination of air operations as between your area commanders and with those of other commanders who will be conducting operations over the Mediterranean, e.g. Strategic Air Command; R.A.F. Bomber Command; Middle East Air Force; and Southern European Command, as well as national air units and transit aircraft. It is not envisaged that the commander of any of the above forces will be singly responsible for effecting the over-all coordination necessary. The manner of this coordination will be the subject of separate instructions. To this end you will collaborate with other commanders concerned in the development of the necessary arrangements to establish an efficient air information and movement control organization.

15. The extensive and varied nature of Allied operations in the Mediterranean and Southern Europe makes it essential that the closest coordination and cooperation should exist between your command and Allied Command Southern Europe. To this end, your organization will include the means for maintaining close day-to-day contact with CINCSOUTH. Similar instructions have been issued to CINCSOUTH.

[SIGNED] M. B. RIDGWAY, General, United States Army
SGM-600-54
Standing Group Memorandum. Capabilities Plan Allied Command Europe 1957
10 September 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES
SUBJECT: Capabilities Plan Allied Command Europe 1957
(Standing Group Modified)

1. Attached, for your information, is a synthesized copy of SHAPE 330/54. The original document has been modified by deleting all references to numbers of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and the size of the atomic delivery capability. No other changes were made.

2. Since knowledge of the number of weapons and atomic delivery capability is not needed to evaluate SACEUR’s study, it was decided, for security reasons, to limit this knowledge to a few individuals. I can assure you that SACEUR used realistic assumptions on the number of weapons and atomic delivery capability. I can further assure you that they are ample to carry out the operations SACEUR outlines in his study.

[SIGNED] J. LAWTON COLLINS
General, U.S. Army
Chairman

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
Paris, France

SHAPE/330/54 (SG Modified)
1 July 1954

PREFACE

1. The enclosed Capabilities Plan, 1957, A.C.E., has been prepared in accordance with the Standing Group directive SGM-53-54.

2. This is a capabilities plan only insofar as numbers of major force units are concerned. Specifically, it is based upon the employment of major force units in the numbers estimated to be available in mid-1957.

3. This plan, and the assessments therein, are not dependent for their execution upon the provision of additional major force units. They are dependent, however, upon the satisfactory completion of an important series of measures and corrective actions to develop the necessary state of operating effectiveness and readiness, and the capability of supporting the major forces shown. Re-phasing of certain units, and the improvement of manning, training and equipping are envisaged in, and essential to the plan.
4. The original intelligence estimate on which this plan was based was prepared by the Intelligence Division, SHAPE, and based on all information available to SHAPE from national sources as well as NATO sources. Subsequently, SG 161/6 (The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities 1954 – 1958) was received, and the estimate was amended accordingly. Certain information recently reported concerning Soviet air preparations – new type jet bombers, improved fighter and fighter/bomber performance, use of improved natural surface landing fields – has been taken into account generally, but specific revision of the intelligence estimate has not been made.

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ENCLOSURE “H” TO SHAPE 330/4
(Pages 1 – 9)

MAJOR CAMPAIGN NO. 8
TO COMBAT THE SOVIET LAND ADVANCE IN GREECE

I. ALLIED OBJECTIVES

1. The initial operational mission set forth in the basic paper, para. 25, leads to the following Allied objectives for this Campaign:

   a. To prevent any Soviet land advance into a position capable of severing the Mediterranean.

   b. Delay a Soviet advance in Northern Greece so that planned mobilization can be carried out.

   c. To hold Northern Greece and Thrace maintaining, to the extent possible, a continuous front in this sector to the maximum extent available forces and circumstances will permit.

II. THE CAMPAIGN OUTLINE

2. With a view to retarding the advance of Soviet bloc forces, and limiting the extent of this advance to a minimum, operations will be conducted in the threatened sectors of Greece, employing land, air and naval forces available. Maximum advantage will be taken of the support provided incident to the operations of Yugoslav forces. Air and naval air support available from forces outside the Greek area will be employed in coordination with these operations; plans and preparations will be made for delivery of atomic strikes against any major Soviet concentrations which may develop, the destruction of which would be of major effect against Soviet operations in the Greek area. Minimum essential preparations will be made to hold positions which will prevent Soviet penetration in force to the Northern or Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Where such penetrations threaten to severance of the Mediterranean LOC, a maximum Allied effort employing land, air, naval and amphibious forces, with all forms of atomic support, will be made to oppose this action.
III. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

3. The defense of Greece, in addition to its inherent importance for the protection of the people and the territory of that country, has a further major influence on the collective defense effort. The Greek mainland occupies a position which, if occupied by the enemy, would gravely affect the outcome of operations in Southern Europe.

4. In order to cover Greek mobilization which will take place largely in the Larisa area, protection must be provided through D / 30 when all mobilization arrangements should be complete. Such protection can best be accomplished by holding the enemy as far to the North as possible.

5. The Greek coastal Islands would be possible areas for submarine support. It can be assumed that by the time that such areas could fall into enemy hands, their submarines would be operating and would be in need of re-fueling. The problem of finding suitable bases for this purpose would be of prime importance to the enemy. The denial of the Greek Coast and islands should materially contribute to protecting the Mediterranean LOC.

6. It does not appear that Greek airfields could be used effectively by the Soviets against the Mediterranean LOC so long as an air threat exists from neighboring theaters and the Soviets do not produce a LOC through the Bosporus and/or the Adriatic to support these fields.

7. The Greek and Turkish defence positions in Thrace, although adjacent, are not dependent on one another for land support. Nevertheless, the destruction of one would allow for decisive forces to be deployed against the other. However, the support which Greek forces would obtain from Yugoslavia is vital. Yugoslavia by denying the Monastir and Vardar approaches allows Greece to hold on the Struma without undue concern for her flank and rear. Should, however, Greece have to watch and hold these three historical lines of attack unaidsed, it is doubtful if she could prevent a determined enemy from penetrating her defences and eventually destroying her power to resist. Therefore, it is essential that the approaches to Greece should be held by the combined efforts of Yugoslavia and Greece and that plans and operations for this must be closely coordinated.

8. The approaches to Greece from the North are limited and restricted and enemy forces using them, would be vulnerable to atomic attacks, particularly if the Southern exits were blocked as a preliminary to such attacks.
IV. SOVIET FORCES AND RESOURCES

Land Forces

9. It is estimated that the Soviets will provide ground forces as follows for the campaign in this area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Attack from S.W. Bulgaria</th>
<th>In Albania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Divs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 (9 Soviet, 6 Bulgarian)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecz</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. The major threats are estimated to be: (a) through Greek Thrace against the Struma position with 6 divisions; (b) through Yugoslavia south of Vranje and attack through the Vardar Valley and Monastir Gap with 9 divisions. The Albanian units are considered to pose only a limited guerilla threat. There are at the present time no Soviet divisions in Bulgaria, therefore, should the enemy decide to ignore surprise and build up his forces in Bulgaria for a D-day attack, ample warning would be given of his intentions and the necessary precautions could be taken.

Air Forces

11. Soviet bloc tactical aircraft facing Allied forces in Italy, Greece, Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean area estimated to consist of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soviet – Tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In addition to above there will be 15 Ftrs and 5 Tpt located in Albania.

12. It is not considered realistic to estimate the portion of the above forces which might be allocated against Greece since nearly all are in range of all four southern sectors and their use will depend upon circumstances and enemy intentions, however intelligence estimates forces of the following general order of magnitude might be specifically used in this effort:

- Ftr: 250
- GA: 150
- LB: 150
- Tpt: 25
- Recce: 25

Total: 600
Atomic and Thermo-nuclear Weapons

13. An initial estimate of reasonable Soviet use of their assumed atomic and thermo-nuclear stockpile included allotments of atomic weapons against NATO troop concentrations in Allied Command Europe.

14. Considering possible reasonable employment of these weapons against NATO forces in the area of this campaign, taking into account the importance to the Soviets of an early outlet on the Mediterranean, it is estimated that they might utilize a small number of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons against NATO land forces and supporting supply installations in this area.

15. Actual and potential Allied air facilities in Greece which might be worthwhile atomic targets, consist of 5 fields suitable for bombers (8000 /) and 4 fields suitable for fighter bombers (6000 /). It may be assumed, therefore, that the Soviets might expend a small number of atomic weapons against the Allied air complex in Greece. In addition, there are two major ports (Athens and Salonika) which might warrant Soviet atomic attack.

16. It is felt that the Soviets would deem the above ports and airfields of greater use to them if seized in an undestroyed state. Accordingly, it is questionable if they would attempt to destroy them at least initially. If Allied operations from these facilities endangered the Soviet plan of action however, or if the Soviet campaign in Greece were to fail, it is to be expected that the Soviets would employ such offensive means still at their disposal to attack certain of these facilities.

V. ALLIED FORCES AND RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THIS CAMPAIGN

Land Forces

17. Major ground force units available to the Allies in this area include:

a. National Time Phasing
M / 3: 3 Inf. Divs, 6 Border Regts
M / 15: 5 Inf. Divs
M / 30: 4 Inf. Divs

b. Operational Effectiveness rates (SHAPE estimate)
M: 3 Inf. Divs, 3 Border Regts
M / 15: 3 Border Regts
M / 30: 7 Inf. Divs
M / 45: 2 Inf. Divs

Note: The composition of the Greek Army is under review at the present time.

18. Allied tactical air forces available for use in the area of this campaign include:
Type
FB (D / 1): 50 *2 Squadrons
FB: 150
TR: 18
TC: 32
IDF: 75
AWF: 12
* Note: These two FB Squadrons (US) are to redeploy from peacetime bases in France on D / 1 to the Eastern Med area.

Naval Forces
19. The naval contribution to this campaign is discussed in Campaigns 2 and 4.

Atomic and Thermo-nuclear Weapons
20. The allocation of Allied atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons against troop targets has been made based upon an estimate of reasonable Allied utilization of the assumed Allied inventory of such weapons through D / 30.
21. Planned additional uses of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, at least a part of which would tend to contribute indirectly to this campaign include substantial effort against airfields, interdiction targets, dumps, ports, depots, and Soviet Command Headquarters (See Campaigns 1, 2 and 4).
22. One or more guided missile units should be allocated to the support of this campaign when these can be made available, in order to provide a close support all weather capability and additional depth and flexibility to the system.
23. To conduct operations to contain and destroy the threat in the area on or forward of the Greek/Yugoslav frontier, and along the Struma River. The form of operations will depend upon closely integrated Greek - Yugoslav planning and cooperation and Allied ability to protect vital supply lines in the area. The aim will be to destroy the enemy forces with atomic weapons as far to the North as possible and preferably prior to penetrating Greek or Yugoslav territory.

VII. PLANNED OPERATIONS
24. The accomplishment of the objective set forth in para. 1 of this paper in light of the above concept will require:
   a. Delaying action North and East of the Struma.
   b. Denial of the Greek coastline in furtherance of the anti-submarine campaign.
   c. A major effort to hold the Struma area to enable mobilization to be completed.
   d. Close coordination of operations in Northern Greece with Yugoslavia.
   e. Preparation for the neutralization, if necessary, of Albania.
25. The three main threats are across the Struma, down the Vardar Valley and through the Monastir Gap. Greek Thrace could not be held against determined enemy attack with the forces likely to be available to NATO in mid-1957. A forward defence position including the Struma and Vardar approaches can and should be established, taking full advantage of the difficult, coverless terrain over which any attack on the Struma would have to be conducted. The timing and extent of the threat through the Monastir Gap would be dependent upon the planning and preparations between Greece and Yugoslavia. A defensive position on this gap should be established.

26. To the rear, a “backstop” position should be established by reserve units in the Larissa area, which should conduct their post D-day training on that position.

27. Struma-Strumitsa Position. One D-day infantry division should be deployed on this position. Reconnaissance forward should be carried out. One D-day division supported by armour should be deployed on the Vardar approach to hold this position and, at the same time, give depth to the Struma position by serving as a reserve and counter-attack force.

28. Monastir Gap. One D-day infantry division should be deployed in this position at the outset to meet any sudden Soviet thrust through Southern Yugoslavia.

29. Reserve Forces. The Greek post-D-day divisions should be moved forward into reserve, where training should continue until committed.

30. Albania. Plans and preparations must be made for the possible participation of Greek forces in the neutralization of enemy activities based in Albania.

Atomic and Thermo-nuclear attack

31. Soviet bloc forces advancing from Bulgaria into Southern Yugoslavia and Greek Thrace would be exposed to atomic and thermonuclear attack which should create a substantial amount of destruction. These attacks would be carried out in conjunction with delaying operations. Additional attacks would be made against Soviet Bloc forces in strength in the Struma area, or in the Vardar and Monastir areas if they are able to advance through Southern Yugoslavia.

32. The atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons estimated to be available for this campaign (paragraph 20 above) are considered sufficient to cope with the estimated Soviet capability thru D / 30. Taking into account the total width of sectors in which operations might take place, and the estimated Soviet force which might be employed, it is considered that the operations in this area might approximate one “typical” corps sector (See Encl “J”).

Operations of Greek Naval Forces

33. Greek Naval Forces will be engaged in the protection of sea LOC’s and interdiction operations, both tasks being covered in detail in Campaign Nos. 2 and 4.
Allied Air Operations

34. Offensive strikes by fighter bomber forces will aim at locating and destroying Soviet forces threatening or attacking this area. Since the Soviet air threat will be dealt with primarily by atomic strike forces allocated to this task in Campaign No. 1, the main objective of the forces paragraph l above, will be to delay, disrupt and destroy the land formations facing Allied defensive positions. Atomic weapons will be used whenever suitable targets can be spotted or generated.

35. At the outset of hostilities Allied tactical air forces in this sector will assist, when and where practical, SACEUR’s initial air atomic delivery effort against the target complexes selected for immediate attack on the outbreak of hostilities. See Campaigns 1, 2 and 4. The fighter bomber effort on this task will consist of sweeps and escort missions to saturate Soviet air defenses so as to better the chances of delivery vehicles penetrating to their objectives.

36. The conventional fighter bomber effort required for this campaign versus that obtainable from Allied resources estimated as available in mid-1957 is assessed as follows:

{table with f/b sorties etc.} […]

In addition, periodic conventional support may be provided by 6th Fleet carrier forces when and at such times as it does not impede their primary assignments.

37. The estimated Soviet tank strength on which conventional sortie requirements are primarily based (See Encl “J”) is approximately 1,500 of which 1/2 might be in forward echelons at any time.

38. Allied air reconnaissance forces will strive to locate and identify Soviet forces and movements, while concurrently conducting such pre-strike, weather, and BDA operations as allocated to them, per pre-D-Day plans, in support of the overall atomic delivery effort. An analysis of the reconnaissance estimated as required, and that available for allocation from mid-1957 resources indicates: (See Encl “A” for factors).

{table with reconnaissance sorties} […]

39. Adequate transport and troop carrier forces are essential to the effective conduct of this campaign due to the paucity of overland LOC’s, the relative vulnerability of these, and the need for communications with the Greek Isles, Italy, and Turkey. The only forces for this task are those set forth in para 18 above (2 TC Sqns of 32 A/C U.S.). Some additional support will also be derived from mobilized civil air resources.

Coastal LOC Operations

40. Special consideration must be given to the security of coastal sea LOC’s in this campaign area. In wartime 40% of the support for forces in Northern Greece must
use coastal sea lift, because of the limited road and rail capacity, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory air defence situation in this area. (See Campaign No. 1). A possible means of providing an element of support may be the maintenance, on a stand-by basis in peacetime, of an adequate number of LST’s in the Eastern Mediterranean available for utilization in wartime for logistic purposes.

VIII. ANALYSIS OF THE CAMPAIGN

Land Situation

41. The maximum Soviet threat against Northern Greece is estimated at 15 divisions, 6 into Greek Thrace and 9 through Southern Yugoslavia. The full weight of these forces, on the assumption that their initial attack in strength is as indicated in the Intelligence Estimate, would probably not be felt before D / 15 in Thrace and somewhat later to the west. Greek forces available to oppose the Soviet offensives include 3 divisions and 3 border regiments initially available, and 7 additional divisions phased in through D / 30. The initial Soviet preponderance would thus be of the order of 4 to 1, decreasing to approximately 2 to 1 after M / 30.

42. This preponderance of Soviet forces to Greek forces would, in the absence of other factors, create a strong presumption that the Soviets would be able to conduct successful offensives in this area. However, the nature of the terrain, the likelihood that a considerable part of the Soviet forces will be delayed in Yugoslavia, and the Allied ability to attack sizeable Soviet concentrations with atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons make it unlikely that the Soviets could successfully concentrate and manoeuvre forces exceeding the defensive forces by more than a ratio of 2 to 1.

Air Situation

43. Campaign No. 1 discusses the air defense situation, and provides for the necessary measures aimed to neutralize Soviet air capability, so that the tactical air forces in Greece can concentrate on operations against the Soviet land threat. The conventional air forces available for, and allocated to the above task (par 18) are not considered adequate by comparison with those available for an equivalent task in other areas. The period D / 4 to D / 12 (that of the first major Soviet attack and Allied counter-attack) will be critical in that at least 8 FB Squadrons would be needed (versus 6 available) during this period even assuming they suffered no serious prior losses and their U.E. strength has been maintained.

44. The air reconnaissance forces available and allocated are quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate to accomplish the minimum reconnaissance required to ensure the effective delivery of the atomic effort envisioned against troop concentrations plus that needed by the land and air forces for their normal operations. The RT33 A/C programmed cannot reach the north shore of the Black Sea. Due to this deficit, these forces cannot be expected to contribute to Campaigns 1, 2 and 4 which count upon area reconnaissance for their support. This shortcoming is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the target systems of these latter campaigns are within range of reconnaissance based in the Center and in Italy.
45. The reconnaissance shortage constitutes a serious weakness since in an atomic situation as foreseen inadequate intelligence cover, which includes air reconnaissance, would lead to wastage of weapons or failure to identify targets, with a resulting increased threat to the successful accomplishment of our mission.

46. In view of the fact that Greek lines of communication are few and relatively vulnerable the early availability of adequate transport aircraft to re-supply land and air forces with critical items, and to assist in the general circulation of personnel and logistics, assumes great importance. The 3 Greek squadrons available, and allocated, in this area are considered inadequate to provide the above services to the other 7 air squadrons and 10 divisions which will be engaged. The shortage of air transport constitutes a serious, though not critical weakness in the prosecution of this campaign. Special study should be given to augmenting the air lift before, or after, D-day, either from military or civil transport resources, together with a general study of the logistic problem in Greece and Southern Yugoslavia with a special reference to the advisability of forward stockpiling.

Atomic Situation

47. The Allied allocation of atomic weapons against troop concentrations is considered adequate to support this campaign, and possibly to offset the Soviet numerical superiority in air and land forces in this campaign. The delivery of the planned atomic and thermo-nuclear attacks should reduce if not eliminate Soviet ability to sustain major offensive pressure in this area.

48. SACEUR’s atomic delivery capability will be adequate as planned for this campaign and to contribute to operations against the fixed target systems in Campaigns 1, 2 and 4.

49. From an operational standpoint it is desirable to provide one or more guided missile battalions, and several Rocket Batteries (H.J.) in Greece where availability and the development of appropriate arrangements for administrative support and control will permit.

Risks and Weaknesses

50. In light of the above, the following are considered to be major areas of weakness and risk which require corrective action at an early date:

a. The lack of firm assurance of adequate military coordination with Yugoslav operations in this area in the period under consideration.

b. The extreme vulnerability of the LOC in this area, particularly coastal sea LOC.

c. The deficiency in conventional air support and air reconnaissance.

Estimate of Capabilities:

51. The first area of weakness indicated above is the only one that appears capable of jeopardising the objective as given in para. 1a. The risk concerning the LOC, particularly if combined with a deficiency of conventional air, could jeopardize
the objective given in para. 1b. But Yugoslav cooperation can be improved, and the
air support and air recce shortcomings can be corrected. There remains only the
weakness resulting from the vulnerable LOC, which can be greatly lessened if steps
are taken at once to examine all methods of improving the situation and adopting
those most suitable.

CM(58)141 – Part II Greece
Greece

6th December 1958

REPORT ON THE 1958 ANNUAL REVIEW
COUNTRY CHAPTER ON GREECE

I. INTRODUCTION
Greece has accepted the requirements of M.C. 70 as a whole and is willing to make all
efforts to increase the combat effectiveness of her forces. In addition, she plans to
maintain and build up a significant number of land forces and naval units which, in
the opinion of the Greek authorities, are essential to the reinforcement of NATO
forces or to fulfil tasks arising from the application of the forward strategy and to
protect sea transport and communications. The NATO military authorities are
concerned that these additional goals appear too extensive for the period under
review. They accordingly welcome the Greek authorities’ statement that they will
do no more than maintain their additional forces at their present state of readiness in
order to build up as a priority the forces required by M.C. 70.

2. Notwithstanding the exceptional burden imposed on her by the consequences of
war, by the destruction caused by earthquakes and the imperative needs of her
economic development, Greece devotes a substantial part of her national resources to
defence. The high level of Greek defence spending, which approaches the limit of
what the country can afford, is, without doubt, one of the causes of the budgetary
deficit which has hitherto been met only with the help of funds provided under United
States economic assistance. Mutual Aid, American and Canadian, plays an essential
part in the support of the Greek defence effort, covering as it does practically the
whole of Greece's equipment requirements and a significant part of the operating
costs of the armed forces.
II. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

Army

3. The contribution to NATO for the years 1958 and 1961 and the MC 70 requirements for 1961 and 1963 will be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Plans</th>
<th>MC 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>end 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div RCT</td>
<td>Div RCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJOR UNITS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>5 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Echelon</td>
<td>3 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Echelon</td>
<td>1 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSILE UNITS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little John</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacrosse</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest John</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal/Sergeant</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. In addition, Greece intends to maintain:
   (a) two 2nd echelon divisions as a potential source of reinforcement. This is envisaged in M.C. 70;
   (b) one further 2nd echelon division under national command, not envisaged in M.C. 70, as a source of reinforcement for the forces under NATO command;
   (c) five light infantry regiments under national command for security duties in the communications zone.

5. Greek army plans are in accordance with the 1963 M.C. 70 requirements from 1961 onwards.

6. The equipment for the first Honest John battalion will not be delivered to Greece until 1959. This means that Greece will activate only one battalion in 1959 compared with the requirement for one battalion in 1958 and two battalions in 1959. The Greek plans for the build-up of nuclear weapons units from 1960 onwards should meet M.C. 70 requirements provided that the equipment, for which delivery dates are not yet known, is received in time.

7. To increase the striking power of the army, Greece intends to activate the organic tank battalion in each infantry division, to increase the number of howitzers in the M-day infantry divisions and to continue to study and conduct tests to decide on a new infantry divisional structure. The NATO military authorities support these plans. They cannot, on the other hand, comment on Greek plans for bringing the two M-day and the six 2nd echelon light infantry regiments to full RCT strength in the absence of
sufficient details of their reorganization. They consider that first priority should be given in any case to the build-up of all M-day and 1st echelon units to minimum standards.

8. The allocation of non-organic support units for M-day and 1st echelon combat forces, as indicated in the tables of the reply, is not satisfactory.

9. In spite of an increase of the overall strength and percentage of regulars, the effectiveness of the Greek army is still affected adversely by the low manning level of M-day and 1st echelon units. Greece hopes to be able to increase it by 1960. Further increases of regular cadres of assigned units are necessary. The reserve training of 1st echelon units is not in accordance with NATO standards.

10. Good progress is being made in modernisation and replacement of weapons, but much remains to be done. Although improvements have been made, critical shortages still exist in almost all major items of TO&E equipment. Except in a few items, no reserve of equipment are reported.

11. Stocks of ammunition are unbalanced and, in general, well below the level recommended by M.C. 55/1. The situation regarding spare parts for MDAP equipment has improved, but remains critical for other than MDAP equipment. Much of the signal equipment is obsolete.

Navy

12. The contribution to NATO for the years 1958 and 1961, and the M.C. 70 requirements for 1963 will be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category (1)</th>
<th>Country Plans</th>
<th>MC70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>end 1958(2)</td>
<td>end 1959(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers (DD/DDG)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Escorts (DE)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines (SS/SSG/SSR)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Minelayers (CMC)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Minesweepers (MSO)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Ship Tank (LST)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Craft Tank (LCT)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Category A: available between D-day and D+2
Category B: available between D+2 and D+30
(2) All vessels except submarines are under national command
13. The 1961 contribution compared with the 1963 requirements of M.C. 70 shows a shortfall of two submarines and four ocean mine-sweepers and a surplus of three ocean escorts. Five ocean escorts are becoming obsolete and cannot be economically modernised.

14. In the view of the Greek authorities, the composition of the Hellenic naval forces, in order to fulfil, their mission, should exceed the M.C. 70 requirements (plus the complementary requirements by the NATO military authorities for 1963) by:
   - 2 destroyers (instead of 2 ocean escorts, the total number of which should be decreased from 6 to 4)
   - 1 coastal escort
   - 26 minesweepers

The NATO military authorities are not prepared at present to support these increases.

15. Great effort has been made to improve the D-day readiness of the Greek naval forces, and the modernisation programme in progress has yielded good results, but extensive obsolescence problems still exist which will become acute in a few years' time. While the peacetime personnel ceiling has increased, shortages persist in specialized officers, engineers and certain specialized petty officers. Important measures have been taken to overcome these personnel difficulties, including increased output of naval schools, and lengthening of compulsory service.

16. Maintenance facilities and the dispersal of D-day ready ship continue to improve.

17. Although the general level of ammunition holdings has improved, further action is required to build up stocks to the level required by M.C. 1.

18. A large part of the communications equipment must be considered as obsolescent, though progress has been made in modernization of ships’ electronics and communications equipment. Large deficiencies exist in RATT, TACAN and ECM equipment.

Air Force

19. The contribution to NATO for the years 1958 and 1961, and the M.C. 70 requirements for 1961 and 1963 will be as follows:
| SQUADRONS/AIRCRAFT                          | Country Plans | MC 70     |
|                                          | end 1958      | end 1961  |
| Light Bomber/Fighter Strike (LB/FB Strike) | 1/25          | 1/25      |
| Light Bomber/Fighter Bomber Attack (LB/FB Attack) | 5/125         | 3/75      |
| Reconnaissance (Recce)                    | 1/18          | 2/36      |
| Light Weight Reconnaissance (LW Recce)    | -             | 1/20      |
| All Weather Fighter (AWX(F))             | -             | 2/32      |
| Interceptor Day Fighter (IDF)             | 3/75          | 2/50      |
| Transport (TC)                           | 1/16          | 1/16      |
| MISSILE UNITS                             |               |           |
| Surface-to-Air (SAM)                      | -             | 1         |

20. Equipment for two AWX squadrons will be delivered to Greece in 1959. Subject to receipt of the other aircraft from MDAP, the planned size of the Greek air force from the end of 1961 onwards will meet the 1961 M.C. 70 requirements, which remain the same for 1963.

21. The activation of the first NIKE unit is shown for 1960 instead of 1959, owing to the delay in the delivery of equipment.

22. While the aircrew/aircraft ratio is above M.C. 55/1 interim standards and the aircraft combat ready rate is one of the highest in NATO, the pilot combat ready rate will only be 75% at the end of 1958. Both the overall strength and regular strength (officers and NCOs) have increased, and efforts are being made by the Royal Hellenic Air Force to implement plans for further personnel increases.

23. In spite of some improvement, the TO&E requirements for on-base equipment has in no case been achieved, and difficulties exist in stockpiling consumable supplies. No war reserve exists in certain items of TO&E equipment, or of rockets and droppable fuel tanks.
24. Good progress has been made in equipping the EW and C&R system, and all units, with one exception, are operational 24 hours per day. The effectiveness of the system, however, is hampered at present by shortages in communications.

25. Despite some improvements, M.C. 60 requirements for dispersal of airfields have not yet been achieved.

26. The Greek authorities hope to be able to establish a missile training range in Crete, which, they would be willing to make available to the member countries.

Military Recommendations
27. In view of the military considerations detailed above, the NATO military authorities recommend that Greece should attain the force requirements at Annex, and the standards of readiness laid down in M.C. 55/1, amplified by Commanders’ guidance, and, to that end, should implement the following recommendations:

(a) Give priority in all services to manning, training and equipping the minimum essential forces set forth in M.C. 70, with emphasis on M-day Forces.

(b) Give priority to the build-up of balanced non-organic combat and service support units for M-day and 1st echelon forces, and raise the readiness status of a portion of 2nd echelon combat support units in the army to 1st echelon.

(c) Make every effort to provide AWX capability as required by M.C. 70.

(d) Implement a national long-term replacement programme in the navy in order to solve the obsolescence problem.

(e) Continue to provide for the army TO&E equipment requirements and to replace obsolete and worn out equipment, with priority being given to M-day and 1st echelon units.

(f) Continue to improve the logistic support capability of the air force, giving particular attention to providing additional ground support and maintenance equipment to fulfil combat units, TO&E requirements and improve the equipping of off-base logistic support units.

(g) Continue efforts to ensure early completion of communications support required for effective operations of the EW and C&R system.

(h) Raise the training of reserve elements of 1st echelon forces to SHAPE Recommended Standards.

(i) Build-up holdings of supplies and ammunition, for all services to the levels recommended in M.C. 55/1.

(j) Continue to increase the ratio of combat readiness of pilots to M.C. 55/1 standards.

(k) Continue measures to meet the personnel requirements, particularly with regard to increasing the regular content, which are made necessary by phasing in of modern equipment in the Royal Hellenic Air Force.
(I) Continue efforts to meet requirement of M.C. 60 in the Royal Hellenic Air Force.

(These recommendations are in order of importance, without regard to service)

III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Equipment and Production
28. Large deficiencies in equipment and ammunition exist in the three forces, but the situation appears to be the most serious in the army. In many cases there are even shortages in initial equipment. The large variety of equipment of different origin – in many cases obsolete – held by the Greek forces increases the cost of maintenance and repairs.

29. With the exception of very few items, Greece is completely dependent upon the continuation of external aid. Substantial deliveries of equipment and ammunition have been received during the last few years and have resulted in some improvement in holdings, but the situation remains unsatisfactory in many equipment categories. Some national production facilities exist, but lack of funds prevent the Greek Government from fully exploiting these resources, particularly as regards ammunition.

30. Should the Greek Government find it possible to increase the amount of national funds allotted to the procurement of equipment and ammunition, priority should be given to the latter, with a view to increasing the level of stocks and to maintaining a minimum level of activity in the ammunition factories.

Defence Finance
31. The evolution of the Greek defence budget is evidence of the significant additional effort made by Greece in 1957: an increase in the numerical strength of the forces was, in fact, rendered necessary by the forming of new units issued with MDAP equipment already delivered and assurances that there would be further deliveries.

32. The 1958 defence credits are slightly lower. The expected United States' financial aid (drachmae 400 million) was not received. On the other hand, thanks to special United States' aid in the form of “common user products” (drachmae 195 million), there was some alleviation of the corresponding budget charges.

33. According to the estimates, the defence budget will be somewhat bigger in 1959. The Greek authorities state that the Defence Ministry budget will, if necessary, receive additional funds to enable it to meet the maintenance and operating costs incurred by deliveries of MDAP material and equipment. Broadly speaking, the bulk
of the defence budget continues to be applied to maintenance and operating costs. As regards capital expenditure, the share allotted to the procurement of major equipment is still remarkably small except in the case of the navy.

34. The Greek defence effort is strongly backed by external aid (United States and Canada) in the form of deliveries of material and equipment, and is assisted by the allocation to the general budget of United States aid counterpart funds. MDAP represents more than one-third of the total resources devoted to the Greek defence effort, and covers not only practically the whole of capital expenditure but also a significant part of operating and maintenance costs.

35. To meet the M.C. 70 goals alone, Greece would have to plan for a sharp rise in personnel strength, particularly in the army (50,000 more men between now and 1963), as well as a substantial increase in maintenance and operating costs to bring its forces up to NATO standards. The supplementary goals which Greece has set herself, even if they are only given a lower priority, will place a further strain on limited resources.

36. In the field of equipment and operational reserves, the many existing deficiencies, some of them critical, can only be made good if a great deal more external aid is provided. Furthermore, the constitution of missiles unit is primarily dependent on Mutual Aid.

37. By and large, even on the assumption of sufficient external aid to cover these various requirements, the fulfilment of M.C. 70 goals alone (for the period 1958-1963) would seem to call for an annual increase in defence expenditures (according to the NATO definition) averaging about 17% as compared with the 1958 level. In order to do so, the budget of the Defence Ministry, which centralises all the expenditures entailed by the build-up and improvement of the Greek forces, would have to be increased by about one quarter in relation to the present level. It is unlikely that the whole impact of this substantial additional effort could be borne by the Greek budget.

Economic Considerations
38. Although the defence effort, as a proportion of the national product, declined from a peak of 8.5% in 1951 to 6.2% in 1957, it is still fairly high as compared with other NATO countries, and places a heavy burden on the as yet little-developed Greek economy. From 1951-1957, allowing for the rise in prices, the national product, in real terms, has increased by 47%, and it would appear that the increase in the real value of defence expenditures has been of the order of 15%.

39. Military expenditures in 1950 still absorb one-third of budgetary revenue from national sources; moreover, the additional revenue provided by the United States counterpart funds has diminished considerably. As a result of this reduction and of
increased expenditure, mainly for public investment, the budget, which has been in balance over recent years, is likely to show a deficit in 1958. With the tailing-off of receipts from offshore orders, military transactions directly entering the balance of payments, after providing a net gain in foreign currency up till 1956, have subsequently resulted in a deficit. Moreover, the rise in imports, the difficulty of selling Greek agricultural products in foreign markets, the slump in merchant shipping, and the reduction in United States economic aid, have caused a drop in gold and currency reserves since 1957.

40. Production of military equipment in Greece is very limited; since the cessation of offshore orders, the principal economic problem in this field is how to keep in operation the ammunition factories. Expansion of military construction, (two-thirds of which are under the NATO infrastructure programme) has a favourable economic effect to the extent that it increases openings for the employment of labour, but also calls for engineers and skilled workers whose numbers are still small. Similarly, military personnel, in spite of its increased strength, does not create any problem for the labour market except in respect of technicians.

41. Although financial stability has been restored and production has risen rapidly during the last few years, the standard of living is still very low and unemployment is wide-spread (about a quarter of the total labour force is unemployed or under-employed). To remedy this situation, the Government has drawn up a long-term economic development programme which provides for an annual increase in the national product of 5%. The authorities count on part of the capital required for this effort being found abroad. Furthermore, the adjustment of the Greek economy, in particular of its new industries, to the keener competition which will develop in Europe, raises serious problems. International co-operation in favour of Greece, in the form of loans, greater opportunities for the marketing of Greek agricultural products and orders for ammunition, would strengthen the economic basis of defence. It would, in any case, be difficult to require Greece to spend appreciably more in foreign currency for defence. However, since the burden of certain essential investments is to fall on the budget, military expenditures could not be greatly increased without endangering financial stability.

42. The satisfaction of M.C. 70 requirements and the maintenance of the additional Greek forces at their present level would require not only a substantial increase in the national budgetary effort, but also in Mutual Aid deliveries, as well as in United States’ economic, aid. However, a national budgetary effort of the necessary scope would seem to be beyond the financial and economic capabilities of Greece. Taking into account the present comparatively high level of military spending and the burden represented by the programme of economic expansion which is designed to raise living standards, the defence effort of Greece can at best only be increased in step with the expansion of the nation's resources. It would, therefore, be unrealistic to
count on the possibility of raising the proportion of the national product at present devoted to defence. Even if they were sealed down to the M.C. 70 goals alone, Greece’s military plans appear difficult to implement, at least in their entirety and within the time limits envisaged.

43. Partial achievements, greatly desirable in the interests of the Alliance, are nevertheless feasible. Although the Greek authorities are not yet in a position to indicate the extent to which the defence budget could be increased in future, they have stated that they would endeavour to maintain at its present level the share of national resources devoted to defence. The Greek Government has always expressed willingness to increase its financial effort, in order at least to increase military personnel, on condition, however, that the necessary weapons and equipment are supplied through external aid and that the Greek economy receives the necessary support from the Atlantic allies.

International Staff Recommendations
44. Taking into account the vital need for continued economic developments, the International Staff recommend that the Greek Government should:

   (a) pursue its efforts to increase defence expenditures progressively and in relation with the growth of the national product and at least ensure full use of the equipment received under external aid;

   (b) give priority, in allocating financial resources available for defence, to the build-up of the minimum forces required by the NATO military authorities, in order to enable Greece to meet, as far as possible, the quantitative and qualitative requirements of M.C. 70.

[…] {An Annex of two pages follows}
PO/60/166
Private Office of the Secretary General. Preparation of the Summit Meeting.
Enquiry in the NATO Countries on East/West Contacts and Exchanges. Text of
Reply by Greece
10 February 1960

SECRETARY GENERAL [PAUL-HENRI SPAAK] TO PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: PREPARATION OF THE SUMMIT MEETING. ENQUIRY IN THE
NATO COUNTRIES ON EAST/WEST CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES. TEXT
OF REPLY BY GREECE

I am forwarding herewith the text of the reply by the Greek Government to the
questions set out in document PO/60/30 on East/West contacts and exchanges.

2. The Greek Delegation has informed me that the reply to the financial section of this
document will be forthcoming at a later date.

P.-H. Spaak

Reply by the Greek Government to Document PO/60/30

Before replying point by point to the questionnaire in document PO/60/30, the Greek
Delegation would like to explain, as briefly as possible, how it envisages the tactical
conduct of East-West negotiations.

There are two schools of thought in the West. One maintains that negotiations
with Russia should not differ in any way from similar negotiations with a Western
State, i.e., that from the outset, clear evidence should be given of a spirit of
conciliation, any gesture avoided which might be construed as even slightly
unfriendly, the greatest possible meekness displayed in the face of provocation,
slander or mere boorishness.

The second school maintains that, while of course avoiding all unnecessary
disgressions of speech, the attitude of the Western diplomats should be modelled on
that of the Russians, i.e., that a very firm line should be adopted, care taken not to
give the slightest impression that one-sided concessions might be obtainable, no insult
or libel allowed to pass unchallenged.

The Soviets would obviously much prefer the West to adopt the tactics
advocated by the first school. The ability to rant and rail without any risk of
disagreeable truths being flung back and to be inflexible with a more malleable
adversary, greatly increases their self-confidence, enhances their prestige abroad and
– last but not least – eventually even succeeds in giving some sectors of Western
opinion a guilt complex.

The Soviet Government therefore does – and will do – everything in its power
to discredit the most unyielding of the Western diplomats in the eyes of their
compatriots by calling them warmongers, or at least belated advocates of the cold
war, and to set against them all the simpletons, wishful thinkers and defeatists. It does
this in the hope of creating an atmosphere which, in the ensuing confusion, will
enable it to obtain concessions without having to make any itself.

The Greek Government – and this statement surely needs no further repetition
– believes that everything is to be gained by a sincere détente between East and West
and it will continue its efforts to bring it about, but it holds that only the tactics of the
second school of thought can prevent potentially dangerous misunderstandings and
lead to a balanced easing of tensions. The fact that it was due to the firm attitude
adopted by the West that, not so long ago, the Berlin blockade was lifted, and, in
1959, the Soviet ultimatum regarding the same city was withdrawn, naturally
increases our conviction that we are right.

1. Propaganda and Non-Interference in Domestic Affairs

It is common knowledge that the Greek Government maintains that East-West
negotiations cannot even be relatively successful unless they can at least put a curb on
Soviet attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Western countries. If the
outcome of the Summit negotiations still left the Soviets a free hand in the
propaganda field, whatever other concessions the Kremlin might make with respect to
East-West relations would prove to be illusory.

There is no getting away from the fact that the Kremlin only has one idea –
and Mr. Khrushchev has proclaimed it without beating about the bush – namely, to
pursue the war by every means except recourse to arms, until our democratic
institutions are swept away and power in our countries is vested in a minority at the
service of Moscow. Apart from specifically military action, the most effective weapon
at the disposal of the Soviets for the attainment of this goal is subversive propaganda
in all its forms, including, naturally, the fomenting of sedition, presented to the world
as spontaneous internal movements. There is all the more reason to hope for the
cessation of this propaganda, because, viewing it objectively, we are forced to the
conclusion that, even if the West wished to do so, it could never equal the Soviets in
this field.

The freedom of the press and the control which parliaments exercise over
State expenditure – to say nothing of the respect for the individual taught in our
countries – would make it impossible for any democratic government ever to have the
use of a propaganda machine so efficient, so freely financed, and so profoundly
amoral as that of the Soviets.

There will probably be no difficulty during the forthcoming East-West
negotiations in getting Soviet Russia to accept the principle of non-interference. The
Communists, knowing that world opinion regards acceptance of this principle as a
prerequisite for a détente, have been clever enough to take the lead and to include it in their proposals, as they did in May 1958, and have done on other occasions. Moreover, this is also how they claim to interpret what they call the “Camp David spirit”.

To show up the Soviet by proving their duplicity is not very difficult either. Taking Greece alone, their broadcasts in Greek afford ample evidence of the extent of their interference in our domestic affairs. Across the Iron Curtain, there is a secret transmitter, at present in the Bucharest area, which, claiming to be “The Voice of Truth”, gives three broadcasts a day in Greek on the wavelengths 30.2 and 37.2. These broadcasts consist of an endless flow of venomous abuse of the Government, aimed at undermining national security.

Furthermore, all the principal official radio stations beyond the Iron Curtain regularly broadcast programmes in Greek, and these, too, are frequently of a subversive and libellous character. It is also well known in Greece that the Soviets, at the time of the general election in 1958 heavily subsidised the Communist or near-Communist candidates. It has not been forgotten that, the Soviet Embassy officials, especially towards the end of the electoral period, scarcely troubled to conceal the confabulations they held with their Greek protégés. However, the most convincing evidence of the bad faith of the Soviets when they speak on non-interference is furnished by the postage-stamp bearing the likeness of one of the Greek Communist leaders at present serving a prison sentence in Athens, which was issued by the Soviet postal authorities in November 1959, at a time when the “spirit of Camp David” was supposed to permeate the Moscow rulers.

To discomfit the Soviets by once again proving their bad faith might help to relieve our feelings, but would do little to bring us nearer to the goal now proposed, which is a détente in East-West relations if, in spite of such manoeuvres, the Soviets, for once, are sincerely desirous of attaining it.

All things considered, the best course would appear to consist in issuing a joint announcement solemnly condemning all subversive propaganda and interference of any kind in the domestic affairs of other countries and at the same time to get Soviet endorsement of a very clear and detailed definition of subversive propaganda and unwarrantable interference. Even if this move proved successful, it would not of itself afford a complete guarantee that the Soviets were about to turn over a new leaf and religiously keep their plighted word. However, they would find it far more difficult to continue their subversive propaganda activities. The Russians are [much] too shrewd not to realise the extent to which world opinion would turn against them if they infringed too openly obligations freely and solemnly accepted.

It has sometimes been maintained that obligations of this kind, even though they are mutual, should not be entered into with the Soviets, since they might act as an obstacle in the way of the propaganda which the West sends, or would like to send, across the Iron Curtain. This opinion appears to be quite without foundation. The West has no use for propaganda as understood and sent out by the Soviets. Free comparison of the two systems is all it wants. An attempt to portray without bias the
Western way of life to those living behind the Iron Curtain does not constitute subversive propaganda, and neither would similar action by the Soviets in respect of ourselves. Propaganda can only be held to be subversive if it contains deliberate falsehoods. The West has no desire for, or interest in, such propaganda. In our own countries, with the freedom of information which is characteristic of the West, it can, in any case, not gain credence.

2. Official contacts
The Greek Government sees no need for increasing the number of official contacts with the USSR, since, at least in Greece, the Soviets have so far always managed to take advantage of them for propaganda purposes. Our liberal convictions prevent us from excluding from an official mission leaving for the Iron Curtain countries persons, who, although definitely representative of their trade or profession, are so gullible or lacking in judgment as to risk being taken in by Moscow’s propaganda. The same, of course, cannot be said of Communist delegations, for their members have been very carefully screened so as to eliminate all but those who are quite impervious to all Western influence. Furthermore, and always because of our liberal practices, members of Soviet missions in Greece cannot be subjected to vexatious surveillance or prevented from making whatever contacts they wish. In view of this, Soviet personalities visiting our country openly take advantage of their stay to “boost” the prestige of the Greek Communists with the remainder of the population. It is difficult to see how members of Greek official missions to Russia could reciprocate.

Official visits are, of course, not without their advantages. In spite of the precautions taken by the Soviets, it is not inconceivable that they may open the eyes of a few East Europeans to the realities of the West. On balance, however, the West would appear to derive far less benefit from these contacts than the Soviets. This also explains why Moscow and the Satellite Governments are so keen on them.

3. Freedom of movement for persons
Document PO/60/30 asks to what extent the countries of the Soviet bloc should be urged to abandon the restrictions they impose on personal freedom of movement. To this question we can reply without hesitation that it would be to our advantage if the Soviets applied in this field the liberal policy followed by the NATO Governments in regard to the movements within their frontiers of their own nationals or of visiting foreigners.

We shall deal later, in the paragraph on “tourism,” with the serious problems of East/West exchanges of visitors.

4. Freedom of information in all its aspects (the distribution and sale of newspapers and periodicals, the creation of reading rooms and libraries, cessation of the jamming of broadcasts, the abolition of censorship.)

Here, there can be no uncertainty. We must not hesitate to do all we can to induce the Soviet authorities to recognise all these freedoms. Since on our side there
is no question of renouncing the principle of freedom of information, this is the only means we can employ to avoid being permanently handicapped in this field by the Soviet system of controls. It is also the only effective means whereby those who live behind the Iron Curtain can obtain a true picture of our institutions and ideals, so shaking their faith in Communist propaganda, which gives them such warped notions about life in the Western world.

Furthermore, here we stand on very firm ground. “No hoodwinking of the public by curtailing freedom of information” is a popular cry everywhere, and with everyone.

No good purpose would be served by again explaining the difference between complete freedom of information and subversive propaganda.

5. Cultural and artistic exchanges
We believe that in this field we should primarily seek to intensify exchanges in the many areas in which Western life maintains a higher standard than is the case in the Soviet countries (the applied arts, housing, domestic equipment, cars, women’s wear, hair styles, etc.) always with a view to presenting a true picture of our way of life untrammeled by the restrictions imposed upon the inhabitants of Eastern Europe.

6. Exchanges in the fields of tourism and sport
A Greek statesman has recently said that Western visitors to the countries of the East did not see much, but wrote a great deal on their return home, in contrast to Communist visitors to our countries, who saw a great deal but did not write much.

This “wisecrack” seems to us to sum up the position very neatly. It seems likely to remain true until the Soviet system has undergone structural changes which there is no reason to believe will take place in the foreseeable future.

If exchanges of tourists between the Western and Eastern world increase, the majority of Western governments will be disinclined to exercise discrimination in the matter of passports or, if they do, they will arouse violent protests in several quarters. The Communist governments, on the other hand, are completely free to refuse exit visas to prospective tourists of whom they disapprove, whoever they may be. The mere idea of unsuccessful applicants daring to raise their voices in protest is ludicrous.

Although exchanges of tourists may be of some value to the West in certain cases, we are convinced that, on the whole, the Soviet bloc countries are the ones which derive by far the greatest benefit from such exchanges, which, therefore, should not be encouraged.

The same is true of exchanges in the field of sports. The pseudo-amateurism of certain Western athletes is nothing compared with its counterpart in Russia. When there is question of sending representatives abroad to uphold Russia’s claim to supremacy in sports, there is absolutely no room for the disinterested spirit of the Olympic tradition. Everything is in the hands of political officials and their efforts are directed towards a single aim, namely, to impress foreign countries by a convincing
demonstration of the overwhelming superiority of the Soviets in athletic sports. Since
the masses, in the West, are more interested in sports than in anything else, their use
by the Soviets for purely political purposes is obviously a very paying proposition. It
seems pointless to play the Soviet game by giving it our encouragement.

7. Economic Relations
(a) and (b). The Greek Government is prepared to establish normal economic relations
between Greece and the Communist countries and in particular to increase the volume
of mutual trade. Moreover, it has already embarked on this course to the extent
regarded as possible without incurring political risks.

The Greek Government sees no need for the West to propose this as a topic for
discussion at the forthcoming Summit Meeting, but considers that if it came from the
USSR, the West should not reject it.

(c) Should economic questions come up for discussion, the Greek Government
agrees that the proposals set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of document C-M(58)93 should
still be regarded as valid, with a single exception. This exception is sub-paragraph (b)
of paragraph 6, which refers to the establishment by foreign firms of permanent
offices in towns other than Moscow. The Greek Government has had to refuse certain
recent requests made by Eastern countries for authorisation to open commercial
offices in Greek provincial towns. By way of an exception, authorisation has been
granted for the establishment of a small Rumanian mission in Thessalonica.

The Greek Government is sorry to have to adopt this attitude for reasons of
internal security, but it knows that the trade missions of Eastern countries in Greece
have all too frequently afforded cover for clandestine, subversive activities as well as
carrying on their legitimate activities. It will readily be understood that since the
Greek Government has withheld consent to the opening of Soviet commercial offices
in the Greek provinces, it cannot expect the Soviet authorities to grant such facilities
for Greek firms.

Turning now to more general considerations, the Greek Government feels that,
if there are any economic negotiations at the Summit Meeting, the aim should be to
obtain the Soviet Government’s solemn assurance that trade will not be used as a
means of exerting political or economic pressure. It is highly improbable that the
Soviet authorities would openly refuse to conclude such an agreement and, needless
to say, they are just as unlikely, after entering into the agreement, to comply
scrupulously with its provisions. Here again, however, as already stated with
reference to subversive propaganda, a detailed definition of the practices that cannot
be countenanced might seriously hinder the freedom of action of the Soviets in this
field.

8. Financial problems
The Greek Delegation will let the International Staff have the Greek Government’s
comments under this head as soon as they come to hand.
REPORT BY THE WORKING GROUP ON ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES

The Working Group on Economic Countermeasures, established by decision of the Council at its meeting on 23rd August, 1961, was instructed, inter alia, to give attention to the effects on individual NATO countries of implementing economic countermeasures and means by which adverse effects on these countries could be averted or mitigated.(1)

2. As this problem is essentially an economic one the Working Group invited the Committee of Economic Advisers to study the principles which could govern:
   (a) exceptional assistance which might prove to be necessary to provide to member countries who, given their economic situation and the nature and extent of their trade with the Soviet bloc, would be most seriously hurt by the application of economic countermeasures to the Soviet bloc;
   (b) the co-operation eventually to be put into operation between member countries and, possibly, certain other countries with a view to mitigating as far as possible the adverse effects of economic countermeasures on the economies of member countries and of the rest of the free world.

The attached interim report by the Committee of Economic Advisers deals with the first question only. A report dealing with the second question will be submitted in the near future.

3. Although some representatives have not yet received final instructions from their authorities, the Working Group on Economic Countermeasures agreed that it should be transmitted to the Council.

4. The Council may wish to note the following main comments made by representatives during discussion of the report:
   (a) if, as indicated in the report, the decisions of the Steering Board, which would control the system of co-operation and assistance, have to be taken by a majority, this majority might be weighted so that the number of votes of each member country should be proportionate, for instance, to its financial contribution, or to some other criteria to be defined;
   (b) the system of co-operation and assistance should be provided as soon as it starts to function with the necessary funds in order to enable the Steering Board to extend financial assistance to the countries most seriously hurt;
(c) efforts made to dispose of certain products now exported to the Soviet bloc by the countries likely to be most seriously hurt might affect the traditional exports of other member countries to the free world;

(d) in case certain countries have to obtain parliamentary approval to finance the system of co-operation and assistance, then, with a view to avoiding any publicity in accordance with the general rule adopted for economic countermeasures, this approval should be sought just before the implementation of the economic countermeasures;

(e) in respect of the system of co-operation and assistance, it has been indicated that Portugal might find it difficult to make a financial contribution.

5. The Working Group wishes to make it clear that transmission of this report to the Council does not in any way pre-judge the basic political issue, which is for decision by the Council. The Canadian Delegation, which was unable to be represented at the meeting, reserved its position and requested that this should be so stated.

6. The Working Group on Economic Countermeasures recommends that the Council:

(1) approve the principles set out in this report, subject to the understanding stated in paragraph 5 above;

(2) instruct the Committee of Economic Advisers to consider what further studies could be usefully undertaken, with a view to implementing these principles, and to report in due course.

(Signed)
R. W. J. Hooper
A. Vincent
Joint Chairmen of the Working Group

Principles that Could Govern Co-operation and Assistance to Those Member Countries Most Seriously Hurt by the Application of Economic Countermeasures against the Soviet Bloc

In the spirit of solidarity of the North Atlantic Treaty, a system of co-operation and assistance, in which all member countries will participate, will be put into operation to mitigate the effects of the economic countermeasures taken against the Soviet bloc on the economies of those NATO countries which would be most seriously hurt; the system will begin to function as soon as countermeasures amounting to an interruption of trade relations with the Soviet bloc are applied and will cease as soon as trade relations of those member countries most seriously hurt have regained their normal level. The need to maintain the system in existence after the termination of the
countermeasures should be reviewed on such termination and thereafter, if necessary, at intervals of, say, six months.

2. The purpose of this system will be:
   (a) essentially, and in the first instance, to find out and apply means of securing additional outlets in the free world at normal prices for the principal products which those countries most seriously hurt exported to the Soviet bloc before the application of economic countermeasures;
   (b) insofar as additional outlets prove inadequate, to compensate as far as possible and on an equitable basis those countries most seriously hurt.

3. The system of co-operation and assistance will be placed under the control of a Steering Board where all members will be represented, decisions being taken by a majority in conditions to be decided. The Steering Board will maintain close co-operation between the governments of those countries most seriously hurt and the governments of the other NATO countries. In taking its decisions, it will take account of all the factors affecting the situation, particularly the losses suffered by the countries most seriously hurt and such exceptional advantages as a rise in demand and an increase in prices which could partially compensate these losses, as well as of new outlets which the countries most seriously hurt would be able to offer to other NATO countries to replace the products which they used to import from the Soviet bloc.

4. The Steering Board will provide financial assistance to the countries most seriously hurt in two distinct forms:
   (a) in the form of interest-free loans, to the extent they recognise the need, taking account of the various factors in the situation, particularly of the financial position of the countries most seriously hurt, in order to give them time to seek, with the collaboration of their Allies, additional outlets for the products which accounted for a substantial portion of their exports to the Soviet bloc; these loans might be used for purchase, procurement and storing of these products.
   (b) in the form of once and for all compensatory payments which could amount, at the most, to a total equivalent to the normal value of the products in question which had not found outlets in the countries of the free world; these payments could be made through deduction from the sums which the countries most seriously hurt has to repay on account of interest-free loans which they had previously received.

5. Only those countries whose exports to the Soviet bloc, in the course of an appropriate period of reference, have accounted for at least 10% of their total exports will benefit from financial assistance envisaged in the preceding paragraph. This financial assistance will only be extended for those products the export of which to the Soviet bloc is of significance for the economy of those countries.
6. To permit the financing of the system of co-operation and assistance, all NATO countries will make a contribution determined according to a formula to be established following the example of the burden-sharing formulae used by international organizations, possible taking account of the effects of the countermeasures on the economies of the various NATO countries. The contribution might take the form of the opening of credits, the Steering Board drawing on these credits as the need arises. The sum total of contributions might be fixed provisionally at a certain proportion of the value in dollars of the exports of the countries most seriously hurt to the Soviet bloc in the course of the agreed period of reference.

(1) Addendum to C-R(61)39, Item 1.

Annex:
Table I: Exports Iceland, Greece and Turkey to the Soviet bloc (1955-1960)
Table II: Icelandic exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc by commodities (1959 and January-September 1960)
Table III: Greek exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc by commodities (1959 and January-September 1960)
Table IV: Turkish exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc by commodities (1959 and January-September 1960)

TABLE I
Exports to the Soviet Bloc
1955-1960

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Sources:
MCM-164-61

6 December 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
IN CHIEFS OF STAFF SESSION


References:
   a. MCM-196-60 dtd 27 Dec 60
   b. SG 259 (Rev)(Fin. Dec) dtd 13 Apr 61
   c. MCM-151-61 dtd 24 Nov 61
   d. SGM-171-61 dtd 4 Apr 61
   e. Record MC/CS 26 dtd 20 Apr 61
   f. SHAPE/221/611 dtd 23 Nov 61

INTRODUCTION
1. During the informal discussion of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session held on 14 December 1960, the Greek Member made a presentation, reference a, containing certain ideas related to the “Defense of the Balkans in Accordance with the Forward Strategy Principles”. The principal subjects that this presentation raised for discussion by the Chiefs of Staff were as follows:

   a. The question of the responsibilities of member nations of the Alliance in the event of hostile local action against one of them, without a clear determination whether or not the Soviets are involved in the attack.
   b. The possibilities of carrying out in a more active manner the defense of the Balkan area.
   c. The relative importance of local defensive strength in deterring hostile local action.

The Standing Group reported to the Military Committee by reference b the results of its study at paragraph 1a above. SACEUR’s report on the relative importance of local defensive strength in deterring hostile local action has been distributed by reference c.

2. During the discussions at the 26th Meeting of the Military Committee in April 1961, an interim report by SACEUR on “The Possibilities of Carrying out in a more Active Manner the Defense of the Balkan Area” was promulgated by reference d.
SACEUR stated that the Greek authorities were aware of certain interim conclusions on this subject raised by his subordinate commanders. However, study of this problem will continue in consultation with the Turkish and Greek authorities. In order to clarify the position of the Greek Government, the Greek Representative offered the following explanations:

a. The Greek proposals were in harmony with the present NATO strategic concept but they were intended to represent an application of this concept to the Balkan area.
b. The Greek proposals were put forward to draw attention of the Military Committee to the potential value of this NATO area, which, in the opinion of the Greek military authorities, could offer more to the Alliance than present plans permit.
c. The proposals were not submitted purely in the Greek national interest, but from a sense of duty on the part of a small NATO nation to contribute to the development of the collective military thinking of the Alliance.

3. In his interim report at reference d, SACEUR agreed that Greek proposals were in consonance with the strategic concept of the Alliance and therefore he was in agreement with them. He also stated that his subordinate commanders would continue to discuss and consider this subject, working with the Greek and the Turkish General Staffs, as it was of equal importance to the latter. He pointed out that that the problem was not only one of concept, but one of money, manpower and materiel.

4. After discussion, the Military Committee of Chiefs of Staff session agreed that SACEUR should continue to study the Greek proposal with a view to presenting a paper to the Standing Group for consideration by the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session in December 1961.

DISCUSSION
5. SACEUR’s report, SHAPE/221/61 dated 23 November 1961, entitled “Forward Strategy in the Balkan Area,” was received by the Standing Group on 1 December and is enclosed herewith. There has, therefore, been insufficient time before the 27th meeting of the Military Committee for the Standing Group to prepare useful comments on SACEUR’s report; furthermore, it will be necessary to obtain the reactions of the Ministries of Defense concerned before the Standing Group can complete its report for submission to the Military Committee.

6. The Standing Group feels that in view of the importance of this subject and the short time that has been available for the study of SACEUR’s report, the Chiefs of Staff will not be in a position to reach a final decision. Therefore, the Standing Group is of the opinion that, subject to any further guidance which may be given by the Military Committee, the Standing Group should obtain the reactions of the national
CONCLUSION
7. The Standing Group concludes that they should prepare a report for final consideration by the Military Committee in Permanent Session, taking into account the reactions to SACEUR’s paper of the national authorities concerned and any discussion of this subject which may arise at the 27th Meeting of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session.

RECOMMENDATION
8. The Standing Group recommends that the Military Committee use this brief, and SACEUR’s report at Enclosure 1, as bases for any discussion of this subject at their 27th Meeting, and that they approve the action proposed at paragraph 7 above.

[Signed]
MAURICE E. KAISER
Colonel, U.S. Army
Secretary

ENCLOSURE 1
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
Paris, France
SHAPE/221/61
1220/20
23 November 1961
SUBJECT: Forward Strategy in the Balkan Area
TO: Chairman
Standing Group
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Room 1-E-929, The Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C., U.S.A.
REFERENCES: a. SHAPE/35/61
b. Message, SGN, DEF 990169, MILCOM 103, 10 Feb 61
c. MCM 196-60, 27 Dec 60

1. A feasibility study of a forward strategy in the Balkan area has been completed. In addition to the capabilities of ground combat forces and the logistic system, the overall effects of the Atomic Strike Plan, to include programmed ground delivery units, and the availability of conventional air support have been considered. Outlined below are SHAPE’s findings with respect to: the present concept of defense,
an offensive forward strategy, a forward strategy limited to controlling the Bulgarian border areas, and general war considerations.

2. Present Concept of Defense: The objective of the NATO strategy in the Balkan area to date has been an aggressive defense consistent with the means available. In several border areas the ability to hold the enemy for appreciable periods now exists, whereas in other sectors such containment is beyond current capabilities. It is estimated that:

a. Along the Albanian border, there is a capability sufficient to contain the Albanian threat.

b. In the event Yugoslavia is hostile, operations on the Yugoslavian front would be limited to delaying actions.

c. In the event Yugoslavia is friendly or neutral, the effectiveness of delay along the Greek-Bulgarian frontier would depend upon the strength of the enemy effort. Strong enemy thrusts would necessitate withdrawal to the NESTOS or STRUMA defensive lines.

d. The importance of Turkish Thrace is well appreciated. Major combat elements there are deployed forward of the most favorable terrain in order to fight initially as close to the border as possible.

e. Construction and improvement of fortifications in Northern Greece and forward redisposition of Turkish units in Thrace will improve the combat posture for general war and enhance capabilities to resist hostile local actions. Effective disposition of forces is under constant review to make maximum use of improvements in force and resources.

3. An Offensive Forward Strategy: Military considerations of an offensive forward strategy would require capture and retention of objectives outside Thrace in the KYUSTEDIL-PLOVDIV-KASKOVA-AHKTOPOL area in Bulgaria. Within the present defensive nature of the NATO Alliance such a strategy is not feasible. It would require a force on the order of approximately five extra divisions and consequent increases in supporting arms, including ground atomic delivery units. In addition, there would have to be major improvements in logistics and road systems. The forces necessary for such a strategy are beyond the scope of currently planned goals. This concept will, however, be covered in contingency plans to improve our posture in the event of hostilities occurring in other areas.

4. Forward Strategy Limited to Controlling the Bulgarian Border Areas: The political and psychological advantages of imposing absolute control of areas in the vicinity of the BULGARIAN border are great. However, a sustained defense in this area poses certain military disadvantages, including the use of terrain unfavorable to the defense in Turkish Thrace and lengthening of supply line in both Greece and Turkey. There would be limited depth to the combat zone and it would be supported by poor lines of communication. For such a strategy to be sound it would be necessary
to deepen the zone by including the Aegean Sea as a support and maneuver area. This in turn would require availability at the appropriate time of amphibious and/or airborne forces with the necessary air and logistic support. With such increased depth, the addition of one Hellenic 1st Echelon division in the Greek Thrace area should be sufficient. If the present level of military aid to Greece and Turkey continues, these countries will continue to progress towards a defense capable of controlling their northern borders. Without the additional depth and strength discussed above, however, a serious weakness will continue to exist between the Turkish First Army and the Greek First Army.

5. General War Considerations: Since the same troops would be used for the entire spectrum of conflict there is, of course, a limit to which general war dispositions can be denuded to provide greater strength in forward areas. Increasing the capability and readiness of troops in Eastern Greek Thrace would, however, contribute greater strength for all types of conflict. SACEUR’s revised EDP, which will shortly be submitted to the Standing Group for approval, requires Major Subordinate Commanders to plan for both general war and aggression less than general war. This planning will include examination of the defense of Thrace up to the Bulgarian frontier together with an estimate of the forces required. Again, contingency plans will be, and some already are, prepared for more aggressive operations under appropriate circumstances.

6. Conclusions:
   a. Within the limits imposed by the defensive nature of the NATO Alliance, a basic strategy in the Balkan area which relies on major operations deep into hostile territory is neither politically acceptable nor militarily feasible with presently programmed forces and the anticipated level of external military assistance.
   b. As opposed to such an offensive forwards strategy, the adoption of a forward posture along the line of the Bulgarian frontier would serve to:
      (1) Impress the Bulgarians with the NATO intention to defend Thrace.
      (2) Fill the present gap between the Turkish and Hellenic Armies.
      (3) Provide for the conduct of a vigorous offensive-defense, to include counterattacks to the Bulgarian border.
      (4) Provide a base for possible offensive operations under appropriate circumstances.
   c. To achieve such a forward strategy would require the conversion of the 31st Hellenic Military Command into a 1st Echelon division in the Greek Thrace area.
   d. Contingency plans for the provision of amphibious and/or airborne forces to improve the defensive capabilities of NATO forces in the Balkan area will also be required.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE: [SIGNED] J. E. MOORE, General, USA Chief of Staff
I. Summary Military Appreciation of the Greek Force Contribution to NATO

1. The NATO Military Authorities note the contribution of Greece to NATO and its efforts to improve the combat effectiveness of her armed forces. The Greek participation in NATO co-ordinated production programmes and the efforts made to facilitate the construction of the NATO Missile Firing Installation, Souda Bay, Crete, are welcome.

2. However, the ability of the Royal Hellenic Armed Forces to carry out their assigned missions is adversely affected by the following major weaknesses:
   a. Vulnerability of Royal Hellenic Air Force units and their command, control and logistic system to surprise attack;
   b. Obsolescence of aircraft and ships;
   c. Critical shortages of equipment and operational stocks;
   d. Shortfalls in technicians in the Navy and low manning levels in the Air Force;
   e. Insufficient flying training for pilots.

3. During the period under review, provided that the force programmes now proposed can be implemented, the Royal Hellenic Armed Forces will have a moderate but improving capability to carry out their assigned missions.

4. The Standing Group acknowledges the fact that successful achievement of SACEUR’s proposed programme for Greece is largely dependent upon external assistance for materiel and for the funds necessary to close the financial gap between required defence expenditures and available national funds. Early Council resolution of this problem is urged.

5. Attention is drawn to the final recommendations of the NATO Military Authorities which are set out at Annex I. Annex II shows the planned status of the Greek forces at end-1962, 1963 and 1964, comparing these on the one hand with the firm goals adopted by the Council for end-1962 and on the other with the NATO Military Authorities’ final programme for 1963-64. Annex III contains statistical data in tabular form showing trends in Greece’s defence effort.
II. Summary of main non-military factors affecting Greece’s defence effort

6. The Greek defence effort has been the subject of a special exercise conducted for the most part outside the regular framework of the Triennial Review on the basis of the Resolution C-M(62)58 on “the defence problems of Greece” adopted by the Ministerial meeting at Athens on 5th May, 1962. This exercise has taken the form of a detailed examination by a special working group (set up by the Council in pursuance of paragraph (1) of Resolution C-M(62)58) of the resources which would be needed to enable Greece to fulfil the NATO Military Authorities’ programme. This programme sets out the minimum measures required to maintain the effectiveness of the Greek Armed Forces over the 2-year period 1963-1964 and to provide for indispensable improvement and modernisation. The Greek authorities’ own force plans show no significant differences as compared with the NATO programme, but their implementation is dependent upon the mobilisation of the necessary resources to finance the defence budget and to meet the major equipment needs of the forces.

7. The extent of the resources required to meet the programme as well as Greece’s own capacity to contribute to them, is set out in the report of the Working Group C-M(62)87, which was noted by the Council on 12th September. The main features of the situation are as follows:

Manpower

8. The present strength of the Greek Armed Forces is about 163,000 and in order to attain the interim manning levels stipulated by the programme, should be brought up to about 167,500 by end-1964. The larger part of the increase would fall in the Army. Within these limits and owing to the incidence of low conscript age groups in the period under review, it will be necessary to recruit nearly 8,000 volunteers in addition to the 4,500 regulars which will be needed to raise qualitative standards in the Army and Air Force to those required by the NATO Military Authorities. While much has been and is being done to overcome shortages of technicians, there will remain a problem for some years to come.

Equipment

9. In addition to shortages in unit holdings and a general inadequacy of war reserves, a large part of the equipment of all three Services is obsolete. The modernisation plans for the Army call inter alia for substantial deliveries of combat and transport vehicles: for the Navy, which consists entirely of ships of World War II construction, at least 10 new or modernised vessels will be required during the period under review: the Air Force conversion programme implies the provision of F104G aircraft (22 All-Weather and 18 Strike) as well as 24 Lightweight Reconnaissance aircraft. In the past all such equipment has come from external aid and although only limited information is at present available about future deliveries, the Greek plans have been made on the assumption that the major equipment needed will be forthcoming from the same source.
Finance

10. The Greek defence expenditures for 1962 are expected to amount to $172 million including the equivalent of $18 million represented by counterpart funds of United States economic aid. In addition equipment to the value of $40 million, and consumable items (POL, spare parts, ammunition, etc.) to a value of $33 million are expected from external aid.

11. To meet the NATO programmes it is estimated that in addition to deliveries from aid of major equipment to an average annual value of some $104 million and of consumable items on the present scale, expenditures of $207.4 and $213.9 million would be necessary in 1963 and 1964 respectively. On the assumption that the $18 million of United States counterpart aid will no longer be available after end-1962, this would mean that an average of $56 million should be found in each of the two years over and above the amounts which Greece herself has devoted to defence in the current year.

12. The Working Group considered that part of the additional financial resources necessary to fulfil the Greek military programme could be provided by Greece herself, and that the remaining part would have to be found amongst Greece’s NATO partners. The members of the Working Group, other than Greece, considered that “Greece should be in a position not only to maintain defence expenditures financed from resources of national origin at their 1961 level, but also to increase these expenditures by 4.5% annually.” This would imply that Greece herself should provide an additional $13.6 million towards her defence expenditures in 1963 and $21.2 million in 1964; on this basis defence aid to be provided to Greece by her Allies would amount to $39.3 million in 1963 and $38.2 million in 1964. The Greek authorities have so far been unable to commit themselves to any definite figure, but have “expressed their willingness to contribute to the bridging of the gap which will arise in 1963 and 1964 to the extreme limit of their capabilities, although they cannot envisage unrealistic figures”. They have also stated on a number of occasions that failing the necessary assistance they will be compelled to review the structure of their forces.

13. The formal reply by Greece to ARQ(62) and the examination held in the framework of the Triennial Review have added no new information of a nature to alter the conclusions contained in the Working Group’s report C-M(62)87.

Latest Developments

14. While negotiations initiated in September in implementation of paragraph (2) of Resolution C-M(62)58 are not yet concluded, it is already clear that a number of Greece’s partners are ready as a part of a collective operation to provide special aid towards a solution of Greece’s defence problems during the period under review on the condition that Greece herself will undertake an additional financial effort. This aid might take various forms, detailed arrangements being worked out between Greece and each of the member countries concerned, with the Secretary General responsible for any co-ordinating action which may be necessary.
15. The Greek authorities have stated that, pending completion of these arrangements, they are not in a position to undertake commitments with regard to the Greek forces contribution for the period under review and a reservation to this effect is noted in the Council’s Resolution in Defence 1962 (C-M(62)124(Revised)). As soon as the Greek authorities are in a position to establish definite force plans, it is understood that they will inform the NATO authorities with a view to enabling the Council to approve the firm force goals for Greece for 1963 on the basis of a report to be submitted by the Annual Review Committee.

FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES

1. The Standing Group endorses SACUER’s comments on the individual services of Greece as contained in SHAPE/128/62, 15th October, 1962.

2. The Standing Group urges Greece to implement the following military recommendations in order to attain SACEUR’s proposed programme. These recommendations are listed in order of urgency without regard to service:
   (1) Take every practicable step to improve the survivability of the Air Force squadrons and their command, control and logistic systems.
   (2) Procure modern aircraft.
   (3) Modernise the provide additional TO&E equipment including non-combat vehicles, armoured personnel carriers and communications and electronic equipment for the Army.
   (4) Overcome obsolescence of ships by a replacement and/or modernisation programme.
   (5) Raise pilot flying time, particularly for STRIKE and All Weather Fighter aircrews.
   (6) Raise manning levels in Air Force and Navy, particularly with technicians and communications/electronics personnel in the Navy.
   (7) Build-up operational stocks of equipment and ammunition for the Army.
   (8) Provide adequate resources of furnace fuel oil and anti-submarine ammunition for the Navy.
   (9) Improve the over-the-beach unloading capability

FORCES TABLES
{Forces tables on end-1962, end-1963 and 3rd-1964 for the Army, Navy and Air Force} […]
PROGRESS REPORT BY THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE ON THE DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF THE SOUTH-EASTERN REGION

The present report is intended to complement the Progress Report addressed to Ministers on NATO Force Planning (C-M(64)120). The Defence Planning Committee considered it appropriate to lay before the Ministers at their meeting of December 1964, a brief survey of the defence situation of Greece and of Turkey, at the present time and for the coming years, as it emerges from the various studies recapitulated below, which were initiated following the Ministerial decision of 17th December, 1963. At this stage of the work, it has not been considered possible to go any further, and in particular to make recommendations on the long-term plans to be established on a realistic basis for Greece and Turkey within the framework of the review now in progress of the long-term plans of the Alliance.

PART I - PAST HISTORY AND PRESENT STATUS OF STUDIES

Re-capitulation of the Council’s Decisions

2. During 1963, the NATO Military Authorities drew particular attention to the weaknesses in the fields of tactical mobility, armour and air defence which affect the Greek and Turkish forces responsible for the defence of one of the vital section of the Alliance, namely Thrace and the Straits area. This situation seemed to them particularly serious because, in the light of the disquieting progress being made in these same fields by the opposing Soviet forces.

3. On 17th December, 1963, the Ministers took the following decision on the military situation as a whole in the South-Eastern region, in relation to the economic situation of Greece and Turkey and in the light of the plans of the Alliance for end-1970.

“In view of the concern expressed by the NATO Military Authorities in their Report on the 1963 Intermediate Review (MC/39/15) regarding the defensive capability of the forces in the South-East Region, and in the light of the statements made during the debate; invited the NATO Defence Planning Committee to give the highest priority to the study of the military and economic problems connected with the defence of the South-Eastern Region of the NATO area, and to report to the Council before the next Ministerial meeting if at all possible”.

C-M(64)121
North Atlantic Council Memorandum. Progress Report by the Defence Planning Committee on the Defence Problems of the South-Eastern Region
4 December 1964
Adoption of a Special Procedure

4. Two Working Parties were established to conduct the study required by the Council. They were composed initially only of representatives of the International Staff and the NATO Military Authorities, as well as of Greece and Turkey (Restricted Groups), but it was understood that at an appropriate time all the countries would be invited to participate, and particularly in working out the report to be submitted to the Defence Planning Committee (Expanded Groups).

5. The Defence Planning Committee invited Greece and Turkey, on 31st January, 1964, to submit as soon as possible their replies to the questionnaire on long-term national plans (DPC/D(63)3), as well as any proposals which these two countries might have for resolving their defence problems. The Committee was obliged on 6th March to take note of the fact that these replies would not be received in time to enable it to submit a report to the Council at the forthcoming May Ministerial Meeting at the Hague.

Method of Conducting the Studies

6. As an introduction to the work, a general briefing on the military situation of the Alliance in the South-Eastern Region was presented by the Military Authorities to the members of the Annual Review Committee (5) assembled at the SACEUR Headquarters on 21st April, 1964.

7. When the Greek reply to the questionnaire of the Defence Planning Committee had been received, the first meeting of the “Restricted” Working Group was held on 22nd and 23rd June at CINCSOUTH Headquarters in Naples, followed by a meeting in Paris on 30th July to examine the first replies of the Greek Authorities to the questions raised during or after the Naples Meeting.

8. On receipt of the Turkish reply a first meeting was held for this country on 28th and 29th July at the NATO Headquarters in Paris. During August and September, the Turkish Authorities supplied the additional information requested.

9. The force goals for end-1970 proposed by SHAPE (ALPHA and BRAVO postures) for the Alliance as a whole, including Greece and Turkey, were only made known during August.

10. Furthermore, the Turkish reply to the 1964 Annual Review Questionnaire enabled the current defence situation to be more correctly assessed as well as its military and financial plans for 1965. On the other hand, the uncertainties facing the Greek Authorities as regards the amount of potential aid available in the immediate future from their allies prevent them at the present time from taking a position as regards their plans for the coming year.

11. In the light of the information gathered and of the exchange of views which has taken place, the International Staff have prepared, in co-operation with SHAPE, a first series of working papers and background documents. These were submitted in November for study by the delegations called upon to participate in the enlarged Working Group and comprised the basic material required for the study of the defence problems of Greece and Turkey. These documents were examined for the
first time on the 20th and 22th November. The discussion indicated the direction which would have to be followed when the enlarged Working Groups resume their preliminary studies at the beginning of 1965; they will then be in a position to tackle matters of substance with a better knowledge of the issues involved.

PART II – DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF GREECE

Importance of External Aid

12. Solely to maintain at its present level the Greek military establishment, a financial effort is required greatly in excess of the capacity of the Greek national budget. Indeed, since her accession to the Alliance in 1952, Greece’s defence effort has always been complemented by external resources in the form of:

- deliveries of military equipment and supplies of direct use to the armed forces (aid programmes of the United States and Canada, and recently aid from the Federal Republic of Germany);
- financial aid in support of the defence budget.

Up to 1963, the latter form of aid, took the form of allocations to the defence budget of counterpart funds in Drachmae of United States economic aid. This aid having been reduced since 1963, several of Greece’s NATO partners, wishing to avoid a reduction in the Greek defence effort which would have jeopardised the security of this sector of the NATO area, agreed to grant special defence aid in 1963 and 1964. This aid has taken the form, according to the contributing country, either of supplies for the civil economy, generating counterpart funds applied to increasing defence budget credits, or of deliveries of equipment for the forces. For financial year 1963, for example, external aid in all its forms amounted to about one-third of the total resources at the disposal of Greece for defence purposes.

13. Despite this assistance, and in particular the substantial volume – currently running at about $70 million per year – of the supplies delivered by the United States, the Greek forces are far from possessing the necessary weapons and equipment:

- in the Army, even the M-day units are under-equipped, their modernisation is very incomplete, and the equipment in service is deteriorating at an increasing rate;
- the Greek Navy, with the exception of a few small ships recently provided by the United States, is mainly composed of over-age units for whose replacement no plans exist;
- some modernisation of the Air Force has been undertaken, but only on a limited scale;
- stocks of equipment and supplies are so small that they can be regarded as practically non-existent.

14. The prevailing uncertainty regarding the type and volume of military aid which may be available in the future for the Greek forces makes any long-term planning extremely difficult. Should aid be reduced or terminated, Greece would undoubtedly be compelled to make a drastic reduction in its forces. In 1962 and 1963, the Greek Government has already informed NATO that a cut in its forces could not
be avoided if the aid deemed necessary was not forthcoming. This warning has recently been repeated – for 1965 – during the 1964 Annual Review.

Inadequacy of Budgetary Resources

15. The distinctive feature of the structure of the Greek defence budget is the fact that the forces maintenance and operating costs account for over 90% of expenditure whereas about 7% is devoted to the military construction and infrastructure programmes and only about 2% to equipment. The reasons are that the military establishment of the three Services is about 157,000 men, and that the total number of military and civilian personnel engaged in national security activities represents a high proportion (5.3%) of the active population of the country. However, regulars account for only 16% of the strength – an obviously inadequate proportion in modern armed forces.

16. After remaining virtually at the same level i.e. in the region of 5 billion drachmas, in 1961 and 1962, the defence expenditures of Greece rose to 5.4 billion in 1963. Of this sum, 450 million drachmas ($15 million) have been financed by special advances from the Bank of Greece, in anticipation of the aid which the NATO countries are expected to supply this year. The purely national budgetary effort of Greece, therefore, amounted to about 4.9 billion drachmas, i.e. 4.3% of the national product, which is a very high figure for a country whose standard of living is one of the lowest in the Alliance. According to present estimates, this effort is to be increased in 1964 to about 5 billion drachmas, showing a rise of 1.7% as compared with 1963. The Greek Authorities intend to devote the largest possible share of national resources to the economic and social development recognised as essential from every point of view, and they have emphasised that they would have to take account of this primary need in determining the level of their defence effort during the coming years.

17. The type and volume of aid for defence which Greece is expecting to receive for 1964 from its NATO partners has not yet been decided by the contributing countries. Therefore, as in 1963, special advances amounting to date to 400 million drachmas have had to be made by the Bank of Greece to the Defence Ministry.

Long-term Plans

(i) National Plans

18. The Greek Authorities are fully aware of the need to correct the weaknesses currently affecting their forces, and in particular of the lack of equipment and the inadequate number of regulars and specialists; in reply to the questionnaire of the Defence Planning Committee, they have therefore described the structure and size of the forces which they consider it necessary to possess in 1970. The implementation of national plans would imply total forces exceeding present levels by about 30%. Generally speaking, these forces are larger in number of units than those required by SHAPE for the ALPHA goals; on the other hand, from the qualitative point of view their standard would be appreciably lower than that prescribed by the NATO Military
Authorities for that posture. The national plans are based on the two following assumptions regarding the resources required for their fulfilment:

- that practically all the necessary equipment is supplied under the aid programmes;
- that the portion of the forces maintenance and operating costs which the Greek budget is unable to meet is financed with the assistance of the allies of Greece.

The average figure for equipment requirements, according to the International Staff estimate, would be over $230 million per year, i.e. more than three times the present volume of United States military aid. In addition, the average amount of financial aid would be $80 million per year. The total figure for external aid in all its forms would thus exceed $300 million per year.

(ii) Goals proposed by SHAPE

19. A preliminary analysis shows that the attainment of the goals proposed by SHAPE for end-1970, either under the ALPHA posture or under the BRAVO posture, would in general encounter financial difficulties of the same order as those which would be raised by the implementation of the national plans. The financial aid required to meet the forces maintenance and operating costs would probably be even larger than that entailed by the national plans (since the manning strengths corresponding to the SHAPE goals are higher than those planned by the Greek Authorities). On the other hand, the equipment requirements might be smaller (since the national plans provide for a larger number of units than that required by SHAPE) they would still be substantial, however, and in any case much larger than those which can be satisfied with United States military aid at its present level.

PART III – DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF TURKEY

Importance of External Aid

20. Solely to maintain the Turkish military establishment at its present level – considered by the NATO Military Authorities as clearly insufficient in view of the risk – requires both an economic and financial effort beyond that which Turkey can furnish in the present state of development of her economy, of her industrial production capacity, of her budgetary resources and of her balance of payments situation. Indeed, since her accession to the Alliance in 1952, Turkey’s defence effort has always been complemented by external resources in the form of:

- deliveries of military equipment and supplies of direct use to the armed forces (aid programme of the United States and Canada, and more recently aid from the Federal Republic of Germany);
- financial aid equivalent to the counterpart funds in Turkish pounds of United States economic aid.
21. Despite this assistance, and in particular the substantial volume – at present about $120 million per year – of the supplies delivered by the United States, the Turkish forces are far from possessing the necessary weapons and equipment;

- in the Army, even M-day units are under-equipped, their modernisation is very incomplete, and the rate of deterioration of the equipment in service is increasing;
- the Turkish Navy is almost entirely composed of over-age units whose replacement is not planned;
- some modernisation of the Air Force has been undertaken, but only on a limited scale;
- stocks of equipment and supplies are so small that they can be regarded as practically non-existent.

The prevailing uncertainty regarding the type and volume of military aid which may be available in the future for the Turkish forces makes any long-term planning extremely difficult. Should aid be reduced or come to an end, Turkey would undoubtedly be compelled to make a drastic cut in its forces.

Inadequacy of Resources Allocated to Defence

22. The distinctive feature of the structure of the Turkish defence budget is the fact that the forces maintenance and operating costs account for over nine-tenth of the budget, whereas only one-tenth is devoted to capital expenditures (90% of which is absorbed by military construction and infrastructure programmes and the balance by equipment). The reason is that the total strength of the forces is over 426,000 men for the three services; the civilian and military personnel employed for national security purposes represent a very high proportion – 3.6% – of the active population. However, regulars account for only 17% of the overall strength, and this proportion, in spite of the fact that it corresponds to the very low level of equipment in use, is obviously inadequate in modern armed forces.

23. Turkey’s defence expenditures have increased rapidly during recent years, but the practical effect of such increases has been reduced by the rise in prices and wages. In 1963, those expenditures amounted to about T£3.3 billion (i.e. 5.9% of the national product). A relatively small portion of these expenditures could be attributed to the exceptional source of revenue derived from United States economic aid. Even if that small portion is excluded, Turkey’s own defence effort as a percentage of its GNP still accounts to a very high figure for a country whose standard of living, about $200 per capita, is one of the lowest in the Alliance.

24. In order to devote a larger share of the national resources to the country’s economic and social development, recognised as essential from every point of view, the Turkish Government intends in future to slow down the rate of growth of military expenditures. For instance, for 1964/65 the defence budget was increased only by 3.8% (at current prices) as compared with the previous financial year, and it is planned to slow down the rate of increase to 2.5% in real terms in the coming years.
Long-term Plans

(i) National Plans

25. The Turkish Authorities are fully aware of the weaknesses currently affecting their forces, and in particular of the lack of equipment; in reply to the questionnaire of the Defence Planning Committee, they have therefore proposed a choice of three options for 1965/67, the period to which their study is confined.

First Option: The existing forces would be raised to the qualitative levels – as regards both manpower and equipment – required by NATO but which it has not yet been possible to attain. However, foreseeable resources, from the budget or external aid, would only cover about one-third of the total cost of this option. The Turkish Authorities therefore consider unattainable.

Second Option: This would involve maintaining existing forces at their present level and adopting qualitative standards which, although lower than those required by NATO, are nevertheless considered by the Turkish Authorities as “acceptable minimum standards”. Even then, foreseeable resources could only cover less than half the cost of this option. Its attainment would therefore call for a very sharp increase both in the volume of equipment supplied under external aid and in financial aid to make good the scarcity of national resources.

Third Option: In the absence of help from its allies to provide the additional means necessary to implement the second option, Turkey would be compelled to make a substantial and speedy reduction in its forces, both those assigned to NATO and those maintained under national command. Therefore this third option, the cost of which, moreover, could only be covered up to about three-quarters by foreseeable resources, would result in considerably increased risks from the point of view of the defence of the Alliance and would undoubtedly imply the abandonment of the forward strategy. It is, for these reasons, considered unacceptable by the Turkish Government.

(ii) Goals Proposed by SACEUR

26. The goals set up by SHAPE under the ALPHA and BRAVO postures, which extend to the end of 1970, are difficult to compare with the three national plans for end-1967 summarised above. It seems that these goals would encounter financial difficulties of the same order as those which would be met in implementing the plans prepared by the Turkish Authorities. In fact, the latter’s first option can be considered a first stage towards the ALPHA posture, the second as a stage towards the BRAVO posture.

PART IV – FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT

27. As a conclusion of their recent sessions during which were submitted the background documents established by the International Staff and the NATO Military Authorities, the expanded groups decided that:
(a) the national military authorities of Greece and Turkey, on the one hand, and the NATO Military Authorities, on the other hand, should jointly undertake, with the assistance of the International Staff, further studies with a view to harmonising as far as possible the various force goals prepared by SACEUR and by each of the two countries, taking into account both the threat and the solidarity of NATO member countries in the field of defence;

(b) the Greek and Turkish Authorities, in co-operation with the International Staff, should define, for consideration by the expanded groups, the economic and financial assumptions to be adopted with a view to reaching as far as possible a common estimate of the resources which Greece and Turkey should be in a position to devote to their defence efforts during the period 1966-1970, without compromising the necessary development of their economies;

(c) at a later stage, the cost of the military plans retained for consideration should be estimated in order to determine, by comparing cost with resources, the size of the possible gap to be filled and to envisage the means to do so.

28. Among the other questions discussed at the restricted meetings of the groups, the following for instance should warrant further investigation in the near future:

(a) reconsideration of the order of priority to be given to the Services and to their assigned missions;

(b) possibility of some re-deployment of existing forces and the transfer to the NATO-assigned forces of units at present under national command, or the possibility of drawing on the latter to strengthen the NATO-assigned units;

(c) extent of the assistance which the allied forces would be capable of giving, in an emergency, for the defence of the sector; nature of such assistance and time required for its provision with special reference to the following:

(i) extension of the role and resources of the Mobile Force of SACEUR;

(ii) assistance of strategic reserves;

(iii) recourse to nuclear weapons, and in particular to atomic demolition mines.

It is evident that in due course, the Working Parties will have to take account of the results of the work carried out independently with regard to the “Main Issues” listed in paragraph 23 of the Defence Planning Committee's Progress Report(C-M(64)120) and, in particular, those of specific concern to the South-Eastern flank of the NATO area (local actions, contingency planning, conventional forces, Mobile Force, etc.).

PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS

29. At the present stage of the current studies on the military and economic problems concerning the defence of the South-Eastern Region of the NATO area, the Defence Planning Committee considers it possible to summarise the provisional conclusions it has reached as follows:
(a) Any forces plan for Greece and Turkey for end-1970 must necessarily fit into the framework of the overall long-term plans to be adopted by the Alliance for that period;

(b) The build-up and modernisation of the Greek and Turkish forces to raise them to the desirable level of effectiveness in view of the risks specific to the NATO area for whose defence they are responsible represents, for this period, a burden which these two countries are unable to assume unaided.

[SIGNED] Manlio Brosio
Chairman

ANNEX to C-M(64)121

VIEWS OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH AUTHORITIES ON THE PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE PROGRESS REPORT

The Greek and Turkish Authorities agree with the contents of paragraph 29(a) and (b) of C-M(64)121 but consider that the following additional points should be reflected in the provisional conclusions of the Progress Report.

- Firstly, in order for the Greek and Turkish forces to reach the desirable effectiveness, military assistance above its present level is necessary.

- Secondly, even if SHAPE’s ALPHA posture were to be reached, the South-Eastern flank would still remain relatively vulnerable. If the lower BRAVO posture were retained, external aid (in the form of equipment deliveries as well as financial and economic aid) should exceed to an appreciable extent the average level of past years.

- Lastly, on account of the overriding necessity to secure adequate protection for this NATO area, ways and means must still be sought in order both to bring the effort needed for this purpose to a level which is more consistent with the national resources available to these two countries up to 1970 and to complement it with the adequate supplementary material financial assistance to be placed at their disposal by their allies.