Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency

Pascal Engel (1)

1 CRAL - Centre de recherches sur les arts et le langage

This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents.

Mots clés: agency; Belief; BELIEF & doubt; EPISTEMICS; LANGUAGE & logic; reasons; RESPONSIBILITY; SOCIAL norms

Domaines: Philosophie

Pascal Engel. Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency. Philosophical Explorations, 2009, 12 (2), pp.205-219. ⟨10.1080/13869790902838522⟩. ⟨halshs-01200549⟩