On the Fishburn social choice function

Eric Kamwa (1)

1 CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management

A Condorcet social choice function is a voting rule that always elects the Condorcet winner when he exists. The Condorcet winner is a candidate who beats all the others in pairwise comparisons. Fishburn proposed a Condorcet social choice function, now referred to as the Fishburn function, and on the basis of some properties he concludes that his rule appears to hold an advantage over the other Condorcet social choice functions. This note uses other properties to reach the same conclusion with a more extended set of Condorcet social choice functions.

Mots clés: Condorcet; Fishburn; clone independence; voting; paradox; social choice function

Domaines: Economies et finances

Eric Kamwa. On the Fishburn social choice function. International Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 11 (2), pp.247-262. ⟨10.1111/ijet.12063⟩. ⟨halshs-01183232⟩