Facilitating collusion by exchanging non-verifiable sales reports

David Spector (1, 2)

1 PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
2 PSE - Paris School of Economics

A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. This paper shows that such communication between competitors may facilitate collusion even if all private information becomes public after a delay. The exchange of sales information may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallocation mechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price wars as a tool for mutual disciplining. In some cases, efficient collusion cannot occur unless firms are able to engage in such communication.

Mots clés: Collusion; Communication; Politique de la concurrence; Jeux répétés

Domaines: Economies et finances

David Spector. Facilitating collusion by exchanging non-verifiable sales reports. 2015. ⟨halshs-01119959⟩