To vote or to abstain? An experimental test of rational calculus in first past the post and PR elections
André Blais
(1)
,
Jean-Benoit Pilet
(2)
,
Karine van Der Straeten
(3)
,
Jean-François Laslier
(4, 5)
,
Maxime Héroux-Legault
(6)
Karine van Der Straeten
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 742651
- IdHAL : karine-vanderstraeten
- IdRef : 119884348
Jean-François Laslier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 10499
- IdHAL : jean-francois-laslier
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8334-1350
- IdRef : 069975124
Résumé
We test the rational choice model of turnout in the lab. We performed laboratory experiments in which participants had to decide whether to vote or not in a number of first past the post and proportional representation elections. We test the predictions of rational choice theory from three different angles:
(i) First, we compare aggregate turnout with the Nash equilibrium predictions.
(ii) Second, we compare individual decisions with those derived from a rational calculus and count the number of decisions which are consistent with the rational recommendation, and.
(iii) Third, we determine, still at the individual level, whether, at the margin, people are more likely to vote as the expected payoff increases.
The overwhelming thrust of the evidence is inconsistent with the rational calculus paradigm.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
To vote or to abstain? An experimental test of rational calculus in first past the post and PR elections
|
Résumé |
en
We test the rational choice model of turnout in the lab. We performed laboratory experiments in which participants had to decide whether to vote or not in a number of first past the post and proportional representation elections. We test the predictions of rational choice theory from three different angles:
(i) First, we compare aggregate turnout with the Nash equilibrium predictions.
(ii) Second, we compare individual decisions with those derived from a rational calculus and count the number of decisions which are consistent with the rational recommendation, and.
(iii) Third, we determine, still at the individual level, whether, at the margin, people are more likely to vote as the expected payoff increases.
The overwhelming thrust of the evidence is inconsistent with the rational calculus paradigm.
|
Auteur(s) |
André Blais
1
, Jean-Benoit Pilet
2
, Karine van Der Straeten
3
, Jean-François Laslier
4, 5
, Maxime Héroux-Legault
6
1
UdeM -
Université de Montréal
( 302452 )
- 2900 Boulevard Edouard-Montpetit, Montréal, QC H3T 1J4
- Canada
2
ULB -
Université libre de Bruxelles
( 303388 )
- Avenue Franklin Roosevelt 50 - 1050 Bruxelles
- Belgique
3
TSE-R -
Toulouse School of Economics
( 93477 )
- Manufacture de Tabacs, 21 allées de Brienne 31000 Toulouse
- France
4
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
5
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
6
University of Toronto
( 300722 )
- 27 King's College Circle, Toronto M5S 1A1
- Canada
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2014-12
|
Volume |
36
|
Page/Identifiant |
39–50
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Turnout, Vote, Abstention, Election, Laboratory experiment
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.electstud.2014.07.001 |
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