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Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election

Abstract : Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors “exclusive” candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor “inclusive” candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons: the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01113068
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Submitted on : Wednesday, February 4, 2015 - 12:28:34 PM
Last modification on : Friday, April 29, 2022 - 10:13:02 AM

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Antoinette Baujard, Herrade Igersheim, Isabelle Lebon, Frédéric Gavrel, Jean-François Laslier. Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election. Electoral Studies, Elsevier, 2014, 34, pp.131-145. ⟨10.1016/j.electstud.2013.11.003⟩. ⟨halshs-01113068⟩

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