Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations

Abstract : Mission-driven nonprofit organizations compete for donations through fundraising activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonprofits impose externalities on each others' output. This paper studies the sustainability of fundraising coordination agreements, using a game-theoretic model of coalition formation. We show that three key characteristics determine the stability of cooperation between nonprofits: (i) the alliance formation rule, (ii) the extent to which fundraising efforts are strategic complements/substitutes, and (iii) whether deviation from the agreements is by an individual or by a group of nonprofits. We analyze how the interaction of these three features induces (or not) the stability of Pareto-optimal full coordination in fundraising.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Caroline Bauer Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Monday, January 26, 2015 - 2:52:09 PM
Last modification on : Friday, April 29, 2022 - 10:13:02 AM

Links full text



Gani Aldashev, Marini Marco, Thierry Verdier. Brothers in alms? Coordination between nonprofits on markets for donations. Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, 2014, 117, pp.182-200. ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.04.009⟩. ⟨halshs-01109513⟩



Record views