Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value

Sylvain Béal (1) , Éric Rémila (2) , Philippe Solal (2)

1 CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190)
2 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne

The Banzhaf value is characterized on the (linear) space of all TU-games on a fixed player set by means of the Dummy player axiom and Strong transfer invariance. The latter axiom indicates that a player's payoff is invariant to a transfer of worth between two coalitions he or she belongs to. To prove this result we derive direct-sum decompositions of the space of all TU-games. This decomposition method has several advantages listed as concluding remarks.

Mots clés: Banzhaf value; TU-games; Game Theory

Domaines: Economies et finances

Sylvain Béal, Éric Rémila, Philippe Solal. Decomposition of the space of TU-games, Strong Transfer Invariance and the Banzhaf value. Operations Research Letters, 2015, 43 (2), pp.123-125. ⟨10.1016/j.orl.2014.12.011⟩. ⟨halshs-01097165⟩