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Social capital and viable territorial development in Kabylian community
The central role of the regional identity

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Abstract

Using a decomposition of social capital nature, this research performs an original analysis of the interactions between the social, the environmental, the governance and the economic sphere and their impact on a viable development in Kabylia (Algeria). In this region, the "art of association" is the expression of territoriality. When the governance is weak and/or when there is distrust in institutions, populations, according to their culture and to their territory, get organized to find solutions to the missing public goods. In Kabylia, the survival of an ancestral social organization (tajmaat) which has anchored in tradition and rooted values sometimes allows the local populations to overcome their difficulties. This paper demonstrates that the respect for deeply rooted regional identity as a cultural heritage, is necessary to perpetuate viable territorial development.

Key words: social capital, territorial development, community, regional identity, Kabylia

Introduction

A territory is the result of a process of co-construction by interacting actors. It is the fruit of history, myths, values and traditions but also exogenous or endogenous constraints (natural, human, economic …). It is a reality crystallized in various configurations (clusters, local productive systems …) and specific governance systems. Informal organizations (not registered as association or NGO), social orders inspired of ancient community structures (tajmaat, popular assembly of the Kabylian village) remain effective to this day in Kabylia (mountainous region of Algeria).

The specific ties which unite the actors of a territory can be examined in light of the social capital concept which joins three types of relations: inter-group, intra-group and environmental (for example ties to the ground, tamurt imazighen in Berber language). If social capital indicates the norms and the values which govern collective action, a "quality created between actors" (Burt, 1995: 601 in Lallement, 2003: 5) or an “ability to be tied” (Alexis de Tocqueville spoke about the “art of association”), then it is also the expression of the territoriality. As underlined in Hanoteau and Letourneux in 1893, all the Kabylian community is embedded in the “art of association and solidarity” as well as in the slightest interests of the private life, the family, the village, or the tribe. It's why our analysis is based on this concept of social capital that can be viewed as both an individual and a communal resource.

According to Gagnon et al. (2008: 1), the viable territorial development can be defined as being the expression of a social change characterized by the rise of the partnership, the emergence of multiple actors, alternative solutions beside the economic superstructures and the introduction of social and cultural criteria next to purely economic rationalities. The interactions between the social, the environmental, the governance and thus the economic sphere are involved.
The first part of this article deals with the genesis (classical sociology literature) of the polysemous concept of social capital (developed by Weber (1921), Bourdieu (1980), Coleman (1988) …) and its nature: cognitive social capital (mental processes, values, norms … which predispose the agents to cooperate), structural social capital (organizations in which the individuals act), governmental social capital (institutions or organizations) and the civil social capital (associations, NGO, traditional governance systems of oral transmission). The second part is a discussion about the nature of social ties (Coleman, 1988, Woolcock, 1998, Loudiyi, Angeon and Lardon, 2004, Angeon, Caron and Lardon, 2006) and characterizes ties in Kabylia. In the third part, we analyze a possible link between environmental capital, social capital and viable territorial development (Gagnon et al., 2008). Our conclusion is that the survival of an informal governance system of the villages, anchored on ancestral traditions, offers missing public goods but is not sufficient to perpetuate a territorial development process. If inhabitants of tamurt Imazighen possess a consequent civil cognitive social capital, a distrust in the governmental structural social capital is negative for a viable territorial development. Conversely, the negation of their regional identity\(^1\) could impact the system dynamic.

1. Social capital

1.1 Genesis of a polysemous concept: the classical sociology literature

David Hume spoke about “sympathy” or “moral sense”, Adam Smith argued that the market require “moral sensibilities”, Adam Muller (German social critic) that stock of “spiritual capital” largely determines its economic fortunes … (Woolcock, 1998: 159-160). The concept of social capital has a long history. Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) are considering four different types of social capital corresponding to each of the major classical sociological theoretical traditions:

- From Durkheim and Parsons: “value introjection” (i.e. the idea that values, moral imperatives, and commitments precede contractual relations and inform individual goals other than strictly instrumental; introjection is the idea of internalization of the standards so that to act in conformity). “Value introjection [norm of reciprocity into consensually established beliefs] is a first source of social capital because it prompts individuals to behave in ways other than naked greed; such behavior then becomes appropriable by others or by the collectivity as a resource” (Porte and Sensenbrenner, 1993: 1324).

- From Simmel: “reciprocity transactions” (i.e. norms and obligations that emerge through personalized networks of exchange, norm of reciprocity in face to face interaction). “Social capital arising from reciprocity transactions consists of the accumulation of "chits" based on previous good deeds to others, backed by the norm of reciprocity” (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993: 1324). Individuals are not expected to behave according to a higher group “morality”, but rather to pursue selfish ends.

- From Marx and Engels who analyze the emergence of working class consciousness: “bounded solidarities” (i.e. that adverse circumstances can act as a source of group cohesion). An emergent sentiment within a community that has faced with common adversities lead to the observance of norms of mutual support, appropriable by individuals as a resource in their own pursuits. This source “of social capital […] focuses on those situational circumstances that can lead to the emergence of principled

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\(^{1}\) Regional identity relates to how we identify ourselves in relation to others according to what we have in common (cultural background, language, values, beliefs and social tradition …).
group-oriented behavior quite apart from any early value introjection” (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993: 1324).

- From Weber: “enforceable trust” (i.e. that formal institutions and particularistic group settings use different mechanisms for ensuring compliance with agreed-upon rules of conduct). In his posthumous book Économie et société published in 1921, Weber pointed out that three types of resources improve living conditions: economic resources, political resources and symbolic resources (social relationships). “Social capital is generated by individual members’ disciplined compliance with group expectations”, by particularistic rewards and sanctions linked to a group membership (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993: 1325).

Questions have to be answered: Does social capital refer to the sources or the consequences of group membership? Can different types of social capital be identified empirically? How valuate benefits and costs of the possession of social capital? The “new sociology of economic development” (ethnic entrepreneurship studies (micro level) and comparative institutionalist studies of state-society relations (macro level) during the 70’s until 90’s) is considered as the most extensive empirical research and coherent theoretical advancement. The idea of embeddedness (or autonomy) developed by Polanyi3 is reintroduced to contemporary sociologists by Granovetter who argued “between the oversocialized approach of generalized morality and the under-socialized one [(neo-classical economists suppose that individual utility-maximizing behavior characterize economic behavior all the time and in all places)] … [, the embeddedness] … assumes that the details of social structure will determine which is found” (in Woolcock, 1998: 162), and incorporated into substantive research on economic development in the late 80s. At the micro level embeddedness refers to intracommunity ties, whereas at the macro level it refers to institutional capacity and credibility. Three common claims emerge from this literature:

- All forms of exchange are inherently embedded in social relationships,
- Embeddedness could take several forms: culture practices, social ties …,
- Embeddedness has benefits and costs.

1.2 Several useful definitions of social capital

The first use of the term social capital (with a meaning similar to the one now adopted) occurred in 1916 with Hanifan’s4 definition: “Those intangible assets [that] count most in the daily lives of people: good will, fellowship, sympathy and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit” (cited in Woolcock, 1998).5 However, the concept of social capital was discussed little prior to the late 1980s by the economists. Bourdieu attempted the first systematic study of social capital. In 1980, he gives the following definition: “social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 119), or, in other words, in the membership to a community, as a set of elements which are not only endowed with common properties (susceptible to be perceived by the observer, by the others or by themselves) but are also close by permanent and useful

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3 The concept of embeddedness was originally coined by Karl Polanyi and his associates (Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 1957) in their analysis of trades and markets (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993: 1321).
4 Lyda Judson Hanifan is the author of ‘The Community Center’(1920).
connections (Bourdieu, 1980: 2). Social capital is presented as the effect and as the cause of social institution. It is an individual resource inherited from a particular social class, an attribute of the group or of the social network (Kamanzi and al., 2007: 129). It explains the social class disparities. Here, social capital reflects the saying “It’s not what you know, it’s who you know” (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 225).

Coleman (1988: 98) defines social capital as a variety of entities with two characteristics in common: "They all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate actions within that structure.” Coleman outlines “two broad intellectual streams in the description and explanation of social action” (Coleman, 1988: 95). The first one is a sociological approach: the individuals, in a social and cultural environment, are subject to norms, rules, and obligations (the actor is a product of his environment). The second one is an economic approach: independent individuals seek to fulfil their goals constrained by the social context (norms, interpersonal trust, social networks, social organizations that are important in the functioning of the society). Social capital is defined by interpersonal relations that characterize a social order. It is not only seen as a stock held by powerful elites, but its value for all kinds of communities, including the marginalized or powerless. Coleman also highlights the links between micro and macro: the (private) resources that an individual removes from the valuation of his social capital impact the macroeconomic level. Nevertheless, questions remain unanswered: what are those social entities that facilitate individual goal attainment and where do they come from? What are the mechanisms through which social structures affect economic action?

Robert Putnam also presents remarkable works around this concept (1993, 1995, 1996 and 2000). With this work, social capital is redefined and becomes influential in development studies. His definition underlines the utilitarian character of social relationships and behavior and the strategic attitudes of the individuals. If Bourdieu (1980) points out the private use of this resource (he analyzes how can "elites" use their social networks to keep their privileges), Putman underlines its collective aspect: within a group "irrigated" by interpersonal relations networks, trust and reciprocity ease collective action (Houard and Jacquemain, 2006: 8).

Putman (2000) argues that social capital “allows resolving collective problems, increasing individual benefits by mutual cooperation, ensuring compliance with established norms and alleviating the individual burden in carrying out their missions” (Kapucu, 2011: 25). Bourdieu and Colman argued that social capital is not embodied in any particular person but rather embedded in people’s social relationships … but was realized by individuals. Putnam, conversely, argued that social capital is a resource that individuals or groups of people possess or fail to possess (DeFilippis, 2001, 785).

Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) define social capital as “those expectations for action within a collectivity that affect the economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members, even if these expectations are not oriented toward the economic sphere”.

Other authors, such as Francis Fukuyama locate the source of social capital within culture. Fukuyama assumes that a society’s stock of social capital is enhanced by dismantling the State (Woolcock, 1998: 157).

1.3 Social capital and organizations

We can observe two streams of the social capital: the first one in terms of values and norms and the other one in terms of relational networks. In other words, it is the distinction between the cognitive social capital (that is the mental processes of the individuals, the values, the norms, the faiths etc. which predispose the agents to cooperate) and the structural social capital (that is the structures, organizations in which the agents act) (Uphoff, 2000). Collier (1998) also differentiates two interdependent types of social capital: the governmental social
capital (institutions, State, public sector) and the civil social capital (organizations emerging from the civil society). Once crossed, these two visions of social capital, allow us to raise a typology of the concrete nature of this concept in the style of Sirven (2000) (i.e. Figure 1).

Figure 1 - Concrete nature of the social capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the social capital</th>
<th>Structural social capital</th>
<th>Cognitive social capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil social capital</td>
<td>Associations, NGO …</td>
<td>Norms, values, faiths, “art of association and solidarity”, trustworthiness …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental social capital</td>
<td>State, local institutions…</td>
<td>Laws, political system …</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even nowadays, the ancient oral tradition governance system of the Kabylian villages (tajmaat) survives in spite of vicissitudes (mutations due to migrations, political conflicts…) through what we call today the “village’s committees” and runs parallel to local formal institutions. This why could discuss of an informal civil structural social capital (informal because it runs parallel to formal institutions and as long as village’s committees are not registered as associations). These committees possess their own budget, fed by contributions of the villagers and emigrants of the village, gifts … to finance collective utility projects implemented thanks to collective work (pavement of streets, pipelines of drinkable water…). However, before dashing into important infrastructure projects, the committees contact the local institutions (city hall, daïra …) to be in conformity (technical norms…). Tajmaat (which is a male organization and where the elders or the heads of the families can take part) possesses the political, administrative and judicial power in the village. Hanoteau and Letourneux specified in 1893 that this political and administrative organization was one of the most democratic (that could be discuss…) and, at the same time, one of the simplest we can imagine. Bourdieu (1958) pointed that traditional sociopolitical structure could be presented as a succession of concentric circles (i.e. Figure 2).

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6 The actual tendency is to declare committees as association to perceive subventions and open a bank account.
Sheik Mohand identifies the basements of the Kabylian community as being *tajmaat*, the value of the effort and the importance of the fellowship (Adli, 2010-b: 47-48). The head of the village (*Amghar* or *Amqran*), yearly rotating, is elected by the members of *tajmaat*, composed of representatives of the village’s families (*taman*). *Tajmaat*, real court of justice, applies its decisions to all domains of life, according to the law of the village (*azref tardart* (*tardart* significates village)), a kind of Constitution based on the equality of citizens (Adli, 2010-a: 181). There is no “social ponderation”. The non-compliance with these laws, today called the internal rules of the village (which can be drafted in a series of articles), can give rise to a financial penalty or a social avoidance. As an example, if one day an able villager doesn’t want to work for a collective utility project he has to pay a fee to the village (the amount of this fee depends on the internal rule but generally it’s the equivalent of the salary of a worker).

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7 Kabyle poet (1836-1901).

2. Social ties: nature and typologies

2.1 Nature of social ties

The nature of the ties is specified by the well-known World Bank (2000) typology: the bonding ties, the linking ties and the bridging ties. The bonding ties unite individuals of identical status (horizontal ties). Those ties can be the ones existing within a family, a tribe, an ethnic group, a village, a community, close friends ... distinct social groups “that shape one’s very identity, values, and priorities” (Woolcock, 1998: 154). Bonding ties characterize community relations that is people having the same representation system, but aim towards a "relational closure" (Coleman, 1988) ... even can result in discrimination. “Many civil or military conflicts are fuelled when strong intra-group bonding, based on ethnic, religious or national identity, results in and/or plays off suspicion and distrust of other groups”.9

The linking ties characterize interactions between agents across a cleavage that typically divides society (vertical ties between social classes). They have to be reaffirmed and are characterized by reciprocity transactions. Their frequency tends to result in the convergence of representations. Finally, the bridging ties link distant agents; this distance can be geographical (an emigrant from the village) or the tie is not permanently activated. The bridging network is a virtual one. The relation can be punctual, intermittent and the respected rules are similar to "an agreement without mutual commitment" (Angeon et al., 2006: 10). Bonding, linking and bridging ties “can assist in the increasing of trust between individuals, and as such, promote a healthy and expanded social network” (Kapucu, 2011: 24). According to the World Bank, the bridging network between members of the same community or with the members of other communities can assist in obtaining better public services, an improvement of the infrastructures or to access certain markets or the credit.

Loudiyi et al. (2004: 10) define three categories of simplified actors: the first one is a a collective of individuals without specific common objective (a group: G), the second one is a productive group (PG), a collective having a finalized common goal and sharing common rules and the third one is the institutions (I). To these three simplified actors, the authors associate recognizable qualities, dominant nature of social capital. To G, they associate the "live together" (bonding tie), to PG they associate the "produce together" (linking tie) and to the institutional actors (I) they associate the "organize together" (bridging tie). The evolution of an actor in another one results from the evolution of their role and to the presence of a dominant tie.

Bonding ties are important in Kabylia. The family is a social primary unit: its members share a deep vision of the life in society. The most important, is the “will to live together”, shared by all the inhabitants (Adli, 2010-b, 20). Without the family and the respect to its norms, individuals “will front of huge disappointments". A popular expression specifies moreover: "in his isolation a man is always disqualified" ("awhid yenghat ccraâ") (Adli, 2010-b: 20-21).

The Kabyle village, territorial and political primary unit, relies the citizens. Horizontal ties unite the villagers who share the same system of representation. However, the distant ties with the emigrant community (bridging ties) are important to the development of the villages because they financially contribute to the budget and they also transfer knowledge. We could say that it’s “the strength of weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973). The village’s committee is a productive group (PG) in the manner of Loudiyi et al. (2004), a collective of actors having a finalized common objective, sharing common rules that can give rise to penalties (financial

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ones, social exclusion, etc.) if they are not completed. The villagers are the core of the territorial informal governance system.

The Kabyle community is characterized by the survival of tiwiza\textsuperscript{10}. Tiwizi is a Berber feminine word which comes from the verb iwiss (to help). Tiwizi is a voluntary work for the community or an individual. The word tiwiza, which is a plural, is sometimes written touiza (arabized term), or twiza. In the ordinary language it means mutual aid, solidarity, voluntary service, voluntary work or generosity. It deals with the sharing of the collective work to offer the missing public goods (pavement of a street, construction of water pipelines, …) or the solidarity towards those who need help (elders, orphans, an owner of olive ground in the season of the picking …). According to Mohamed Azergui\textsuperscript{11}, tiwiza arose because, historically, the Berber community (in Algeria, Morocco…) has never known neither slaves, nor serfs, nor system of sharecropping. Tiwiza establishes a cooperation contributing to the community development. Thus, we can say that the "civil connectivity" (Gagnon and al., 2008: 1), which testifies to the presence of a dense meshing in a community, is strong in Kabylia.

\textbf{2.2. Autonomous social ties}

Woolcock (1998: 164-165) proposes an interesting typology of the social ties. According to him, macro level refers to state/society relations and the micro level refers to intra-community ties. At the macro level, autonomy refers to institutional capacity and credibility. At the micro level, autonomy supposes that community members have access to a range of non-community members. From that, we propose different possibilities in Figure 3. If the autonomy cases (I) and (III) seem positives because they generate trustworthiness (macro level) or possibilities of larger opportunities (micro level), case (II) and (IV) should be more problematic because they generate distrust in institutions or extra-community members, even conflicts.

\textsuperscript{10} Tiwiza survives even if we can see a relative social disintegration due to the migrations, to the transformation of the family (more conjugal homes), to the consequences of the civil war during the 90’s or to the urbanisation.

\textsuperscript{11} See the article “Tiwizi (or tradition amazigh of active solidarity)” By Azergui Mohamed on the site: http://tawiza.x10.mx / Tawiza131 / tiwizi.htm [accessed on 2th January 2014].
Figure 3 – Autonomous ties at the micro and macro level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Autonomous (FAIRNESS)</th>
<th>Not autonomous (UNFAIRNESS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macro level</strong></td>
<td>(I)</td>
<td>(II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior policy makers behaviors are ethics (pursuing collective goals, recruiting and rewarding on the basis of merits …) = ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY</td>
<td>Senior policy makers are connected to key industry leaders, are playing for self-interest … = CLIENTELISM, ENDOGENEITY politics/economics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ Institutional credibility</td>
<td>→ Perception of corruption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ Trustworthiness</td>
<td>→ Distrust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ Revolts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro level</strong></td>
<td>(III)</td>
<td>(IV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community members have access to a range of non-community members = INTEGRATION / EXTRA COMMUNITY LINKAGES</td>
<td>High intensity of intra-community ties and closure = COMMUNITY ENCLOSURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ Opening</td>
<td>→ Intergroup discrimination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>→ Larger opportunities</td>
<td>→ Intergroup conflicts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: personal.

In case (I), the idea of “organizational integrity has its origins in Weber, who argued that economic development was intimately associated with the emergence of formal bureaucracies and the universal rule of law […] which provided the secure and predictable basis on which individual interests and abilities could be channeled into attainment of larger collective enterprises” (Woolcock, 1998: 169). In case (IV) we could speak of “excess of community” used by Edward Banfield (Woolcock, 1998: 171).
Thus, Woolcock (1998: 176-177) argues that developmental outcomes depend on prevailing combinations of the state’s organizational capacity and its engagement with the responsiveness to civil society and proposes an original typology of the nature of the state (i.e. Figure 4).

Figure 4 – Nature of the state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY (Corporate coherence and capacity)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYNERGY</strong></td>
<td>(Corporate coherence and capacity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low (I) Anarchy (Collapsed states)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High (II) Inefficiency, Ineffectiveness (Weak states)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYNERGY</strong></td>
<td>(State-society relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High (III) Predation, Corruption (Rogue State)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High (IV) Cooperation, Accountability, Flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Developmental state)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The corruption, which is a product of specific historical circumstances, is considered as one of the most problematic factor for doing business in Algeria after inefficiency government bureaucracy and access to financing.\textsuperscript{12}

3. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND VIABLE TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT IN KABYLIA

3.1 Social capital and trustworthiness

Ties intensity is often presented as an explanatory discriminating element of economic development. Putnam underlines that if the North of Italy is more developed than the South it is due to a better social capital endowment. Social capital could be the result of historical experiences (Putnam, 1993). Rose (2000) demonstrated that the Russian leaders of organizations such as churches, clubs, political parties … mobilize to offer the missing public goods in case of failure of the state (in Fafchamps, 2007: 12). But, are the civil social capital and the governmental social capital substitutable or complementary? According to Sirven (2004: 136), they are complementary in case of fair governance (participatory, consensus oriented, transparency …) because the implementation of ties with the civil society favors social cohesion. Nevertheless, dangers may appear, even in the presence of fair governance, when the community is composed of isolated groups (the most powerful group can then monopolize the governmental structures, a latent conflict endangers the community). In case of bad governance (low corruption perception index …), the community is in conflict with itself and there is a possibility of civil war. The lack of efficiency of the state can be mitigated by an important “informalisation” of the economy or the organization of the civil society. We adapted below (i.e. Figure 5) the various situations described by Sirven (2004: 137).

Figure 5 - Typical case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social gouvernemental</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social civil capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>(II)</td>
<td>(I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Civil wars, regionalism, ....)</td>
<td>Exclusion, Accaparation of gouvernemental structures …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>(III)</td>
<td>(IV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic informalization …</td>
<td>Good governance, Social cohesion, Social and economic well-being …</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There is substitution among the civil social capital and the governmental social capital in the cases (II) and (III) and complementarity in the cases (I) and (IV). This figure allows an interesting key for reading last decades of the Algerian history when Algeria experienced a civil war (“Black decade”) and an important informalization of the economy since the end of the 1990s.

To Arrow, if the study of the social ties is interesting, the word social capital in itself is subject to controversy. It supposes the duration, sacrifices in the present for future profits and the alienability (Arrow, 1999: 4). Yet, to him, the essence of social relationships is that they

\textsuperscript{12} The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013, 88.
are built for other reasons than their economic value (Arrow, 1999: 3), which questions the second condition. Solow agrees, writing that social capital is a set of elements like trustworthiness, ability to cooperate and to coordinate, habit to contribute to the common effort even if nobody looks (Solow, 1999: 7). We should better discuss the “behavior pattern” embedded in a specific community. Dasgupta (2010) agrees too, writing that it is the development of the trustworthiness between the people that conditions economic development. He defines the social capital as networks between people able to establish and maintain trust. But, if social capital operates in a bad environment, he can hinder the economic development, even engender an economic decline. In Algeria, the social solidarity is often of an informal nature, it exists through the family in the broad sense, the village and the personal networks called "personal connections" (tamusni or in the plural timusniwin in Berber language). We hear frequently expressions like “I have personal connections in such administration”, "I am going to call my personal connections" ... But "personal connections" can get closer to the "dark side" because it is also used to obtain privileges (to find a job, to quickly obtain a telephone line …). Even the World Bank recognizes “that personal connections can be used to unfairly discriminate, distort and corrupt” (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 226).

The question of trustworthiness settles differently if we assume that Human is rather selfish, rational or if we admit that he is guided by considerations. The notion of “given word” is very important in Kabylia. Traditionally, it is by the said by its metaphors, the loyalty, the bravery, the science and the knowledge, the value of the work and the given word that a Man can claim he is rich (Adli, 2010-b: 18). These immaterial values (tirugza) define the argaz (tabargazt in the feminine), a word which could be translated as a courageous or honest man, a man we can place our trust in ... These ethics are either transaction rules or the trustworthiness between people who don’t know each other but belong to the same community. You are a “genuine Kabyle” if you act like an argaz. In the Kabylian traditional society, the practices of exchanges are not only of economic order (redistribution …) but they also matter with the symbolic world (honor) (Abrika, Paranque, Perret, 2014).

To Dasgupta (2010), if the institution hasn’t been reliable in the past, it is very difficult and take time to knock down their belief. Then, the transactions will be developed at the individual level. It is undeniable that in Algeria the problem of the trustworthiness into the formal institutions (Government, local institutions…) is accurate particularly in Kabylia that characterized by an history peppered with revolts against the power (Berber Spring in 1980, Black Spring in 2001 …) and by its resistance during the colonizations (Ottoman, Arab, French…). An applied research of Perret and Abrika (2014-b) demonstrates that trustworthiness into institutions and public institutions representatives is extremely weak in Kabylia, particularly at the level of the closer institutions (Wilaya …) and we know that the Algerian corruption perception index is low (34/100 in 2012 according to International Transparency). During the Black decade, inhabitants of mountainous Kabylian villages felt “abandoned” by the State and they used to create self-defense committees. They also felt economically neglected so taajmat was the only way of implementing local development projects (bottom-up development). We can think that adverse circumstances have acted as a

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13 “Tirugza” fait référence à la valeur sociale de l'individu, son courage, sa capacité à affronter, à tenir parole” (Salem Chaker).
14 “Argaz” (plur. irgazen) signifie chez les tous Berbères du Nord (Touaregs exclus): "Homme" (adulte, en âge de porter les臂mes). Le sens de la racine lexicale dont le mot est issu, RGZ, et bien conservé en touareg et signifie "marcher, marcher en file indienne". Argaz, qui a une structure morphologique d'adjectif, est donc étymologiquement "le marcheur, le piéton, le fantassin". Argaz est évidemment investi de lourdes valeurs symboliques et sociales : il connote les idées de "faire front", "courage"” (Salem Chaker).

source of community cohesion: it deals with the “bounded solidarities” (Marx and Engels). That could explain the importance of community bonding ties and the survival of tajmaat. We place our trust in the family, in close friends or in the inhabitants of our village.

3.2 The viable territorial development

As an individual resource, “social capital plays a prevalent role in economic performance as an individual, organization, and country through its support of increased informational flow and reduction of transaction costs” (Kapucu, 2011: 24). The viable territorial development (VTD) points out the relations between the social and environmental variables (quality of the human development, well-being) through the notion of capital (Gagnon, 2008: 2). If the social capital concept, although being polysemous, is well known today, still environmental capital is less usual. The environmental capital refers to given and constructed natural, economic, human and cultural capital. The viability supposes the sustainability of a dynamic system thus it deals with criteria of equity (an income distribution preserving the social peace, …) and criteria of ethics (virtuous behavior pattern between the actors and between the actors and their natural environment, …). Their non-compliance generates tensions between the actors of the system and open conflicts (strikes, revolts, civil wars …). A viable development supposes the respect of the "Alive" (respect of the Human and respect of natural environment). The respect for deeply rooted social identities and practices subject to evolution (tiwiza tends to get lost as other forms of solidarities evolve), must be taken into account to preserve the balances (avoid social tensions ….). The trustworthiness between the actors and between the actors and their institutions must be strong so that a territorial dynamics is viable.

Gagnon and al. (2008: 5) identify three strategic factors of the territorial dynamics: the integration of a territory in a regional area (it sends back to the idea of the opening, the transactions …), the “civil connectivity” and, finally, in absence of favourable socioeconomic characteristics, the territories where the actors are dynamic, proud of their regional identity, where there is a participative governance and a long-term vision. The informal participative governance is undeniable in Kabylia, the pride of the "kabylity" and its values is obvious but a long-term vision is missing. We voluntarily use this word "kabylity" rather than "berberity" because Kabyles are not only proud to be Berbers but are also proud to belong to a territory which has a long tradition of resistance and rebellion. In this community, there is a cultural intergenerational transmission of cooperative values and of the history of Kabylia and heroes (Kahina the Berber queen (7th century) …). However, being proud of membership in a community embedded in a specific territory should not be transformed into community enclosure that is dangerous to the integration into the regional or national area. The results of the applied research implemented by Perret and Abrika (2014-b) demonstrate that there is not community enclosure dangerous for economic development in Kabylia. The scheme presented below (i.e. Figure 6) the different variables synthesised (environmental capital and social capital desegregated in three parts) which could have an impact on the territorial development viability. Values or qualities impacting a process of virtuous development are also indicated through dotted line arrows.
• **The link between the cognitive civil social capital and the informal structural social capital**

Deep-seated social attitudes perpetuate the committees of villages which survive only if the Kabylian identity remains alive. This identity is still strong and the Berber language remains spoken. Kabyles are proud of their regional identity and there is an intergenerational transmission of the history of Kabylia and values (democracy …). We could discuss of cultural heritage.

• **The link between the cognitive civil social capital and the environmental capital**

We know that social capital “is one of the core values which have a positive effect on individuals as well as organizational effectiveness” (Kapucu, 2011: 25). The “connectivity”, the “art of association”, has an impact on the development of the environmental capital (new business start-up, creation of associations, positive externalities of the mutual aid …) in which Human lives. Social norms, attitudes, culture or beliefs predominating in a particular territory play critical and determining roles in his development. Conversely, the environmental capital development changes the importance granted to certain values (familial solidarity may
decrease when social redistribution increases). “The contrasting view, maintained here, is that the norms, social capital or culture are themselves affected by society’s institutions, such as the market, and by the actions of economic entities, such as firms” (Francois and Zabojnik, 2003: 5).

- **The link between the informal structural social capital and the environmental capital**
  Even though, local authorities and associations are usually involved in natural resources management, in Kabylia, the public collection of household waste is poor and the lack of garbage dumps is a real danger for the environment. It’s why, as an example, a village named Zouvgga, thanks to the awareness of its committee, conducts actions to protect its natural environment (acquisitions for trash cans …). Zouvgga is today known as the cleanest village of Kabylia. The “connectivity” impacts on the level and on the quality of the environmental capital. Conversely, we can suppose that a cleaner environment would be an incentive to take care of wildlife and flora.

- **The link between cognitive civil capital and structural social capital and the cognitive governmental social capital**
  If civil social capital is strong in Kabylia (social identity and values), the distrust in the governmental structural capital is obvious (Perret and Abrika, 2014-b). This situation could explain the pessimistic speeches about the future of this territory we frequently hear on the spot. It seems to be necessary that the authorities propose a vision of the future and restore trust, while respecting a strong regional identity, to generate a viable development dynamic. If the last condition is not respected, the dynamics of the system could be impacted by violence/tensions/conflicts.

- **The link between structural and cognitive government social capital and environmental social capital**
  The governance and the legislation impact on the environmental capital. For example, the quality of the public school impacts on the accumulation of human capital which can itself impact on the evolution of the governance thanks to the transmission of values (democracy, respect…).

- **The link between informal structural social capital and the governmental structural or the cognitive governmental social capital**
  Governmental structural informal (*tajmaat*) and formal structural social capital (State) can be complementary or subsidiary to implement collective local projects (Perret and Abrika, 2014-a), but a complete substitution from one to another would mean: either "the independence" of the Kabylian village (only the informal structural capital subsists) or the “collapse”, even the negation of the traditions of organization (only the governmental social capital subsists).

**CONCLUSION**

Social capital concept was, at first, associated with a strictly individual utility. However it was later connected with more collective concerns (as governance and community development). In Kabylia, a territory where *tajmaat* (informal structural social capital) anchored in the tradition (cognitive social capital) survives, the "art of association" or "the propensity to generate ties" is also the expression of the territorality (an *argaz* belong to the Kabylian community anchored in a specific territory). In the case of ineffective formal governance and/or when there is reliable distrust in governmental institutions, the populations, according to their culture, their history and their territory, get organized to find solutions. It is the survival of an ancestral social organization (*tajmaat*), underlain by specific values (democracy, mutual aid …), which sometimes, allows the Kabylian population to overcome its difficulties. Nevertheless, the high degree of density and closure characterizing the village...
relations which condition the implementation of collective works could be question by a larger scale (what about the arrival of numerous non-native residents?). In the village, which is the territorial and the political primary unit, citizens share the same system of representation and are proud of their identity. Bonding ties and tiwiza are the core of the informal governance. Local coordination, through the village committee and collective utility work that which offers missing public goods, impact the process of territorial development and environmental protection. Informal social structural capital has implications for economic development and poverty reduction in the village. The involvement in committees and tiwiza is the evidence of the inhabitants’ involvement in the village political debate, mobilization for the village development and protection of the Kabylian culture (you are an argaz if you freely help the others…) perpetuate the traditions. If ties are potential resources, they become a capital when they are activated. The committees’ development projects demonstrate that there is a transformation of the “art of association” into social capital. As such, community ties constitute an important source of social capital. The underlying culture gives rise to a possibility for collective action. The production of resources results from the long tradition of reciprocity, from a culture and from practices embedded in a specific territory. Social capital can be used alongside other resources such as human capital, physical capital or economic capital.

Governmental structural formal and informal social capital may be complementary. In case of total substitution of one for another, two situations could arise: either a situation of "independence" of the village - which could impact the integration in the sense of Gagnon and al. (2008) - or a disappearance of the ancestral governance systems. In both cases, social tensions (between population and central government) could appear and impact the territorial development.

A process of viable territorial development needs a quality of the ties between the actors (Men, organizations and ground). Improving the trust of the population in the politicians and the institutions is a long process, and, to reach it, it seems necessary to respect a number of rules of good behavior pattern which reintroduce some ethics in public affairs. But ethics is also a private affair. It is necessary because, as we saw it, to” call the personal connections" can also recover the "dark side".

Social capital reflects a community's resources in terms of social organizations or formal networks based on trust (structural social capital) as well as less tangible, informal elements of trust, altruism, mutual aid, solidarity … experienced among individuals in a particular community (cognitive social capital). In the case of Kabylian community, it seems clear that social identity defense is the key element of the system dynamic. All around the world when peoples fear for their social identity the risk of extremism gets closer (revolts, pro-independence claiming …). Finally, we agree with Francois and Zabojnik (2003: 3) when they write “from an economist’s perspective cultural explanations generally leave too much unexplained […]. But if norms or culture are critical, ignoring them will always lead to incomplete explanation, and, worse still, may result in misguided policy recommendations”.

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