Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
Sylvain Béal
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 6772
- IdHAL : sylvain-beal
- ORCID : 0000-0002-7085-2714
- IdRef : 095359028
Éric Rémila
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 745868
- IdHAL : eric-remila
- ORCID : 0000-0002-9265-9907
- IdRef : 104534591
Philippe Solal
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 745847
- IdHAL : philippe-solal
- IdRef : 058054499
Résumé
If a player is removed from a game, what keeps the payoff of the remaining players unchanged? Is it the removal of a special player or its presence among the remaining players? This article answers this question in a complement study to Kamijo and Kongo (2012). We introduce axioms of invariance from player deletion in presence of a special player. In particular, if the special player is a nullifying player (resp. dummifying player), then the equal division value (resp. equal surplus division value) is characterized by the associated axiom of invariance plus efficiency and balanced cycle contributions. There is no type of special player from such a combination of axioms that characterizes the Shapley value.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
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Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
|
Résumé |
en
If a player is removed from a game, what keeps the payoff of the remaining players unchanged? Is it the removal of a special player or its presence among the remaining players? This article answers this question in a complement study to Kamijo and Kongo (2012). We introduce axioms of invariance from player deletion in presence of a special player. In particular, if the special player is a nullifying player (resp. dummifying player), then the equal division value (resp. equal surplus division value) is characterized by the associated axiom of invariance plus efficiency and balanced cycle contributions. There is no type of special player from such a combination of axioms that characterizes the Shapley value.
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Auteur(s) |
Sylvain Béal
1
, Éric Rémila
2
, Philippe Solal
2
1
CRESE -
Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190)
( 106420 )
- IUT 30 Avenue de l'observatoire 25009 Besançon Cedex
- France
2
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Date de production/écriture |
2014
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2015
|
Volume |
73
|
Page/Identifiant |
pp. 23-31
|
Commentaire |
CNRS : 2; AERES: A
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
cooperative games
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.11.003 |
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