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European Union Cohesiveness at the UNGA: A comparative and critical approach

Laurent Beauguitte, CNRS, UMR IDEES

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Introduction

In the last decade, the cohesiveness of the European Union (EU) at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has become a popular topic of investigation in Political Science literature. While studies on regional behaviour at the UNGA have long been made, the first by Margaret Ball, only recently has attention been focused on the EU in this framework. Although in the 1970s this issue was investigated in a few papers, it has only become the object of wider attention in the early years of the new millennium.

Yet unlike many previous papers by north-American academies, these studies make scanty use of quantitative methods, just giving an overview of the percentages of common votes. Nor do most of them make any reference to the large body of literature on regional behaviour in general, but

4. Karen E. Smith (op. cit.) is the only author using percentage to launch a factorial analysis.
consider the EU a relevant political organisation, separately from the general environment of the UNGA. In other words, the increasing cohesiveness of the EU, expressed mainly by the percentage of common votes, is hardly ever considered in relation to a) the global evolution of the UNGA or b) the behaviour of other regional groups.

The aim of this paper is to measure the cohesiveness of the EU at the UNGA from 1985 until today. The departure date was established mainly on the basis of data accessibility: before 1985, data on results of votes and records of official meetings were frequently missing, thus precluding an exhaustive quantitative analysis. Cohesiveness is examined from two complementary standpoints. First, by investigating voting trends from a global viewpoint, including all UN member states, while checking whether a subgroup including all or some EU members appear as a coherent unit - subsequent enlargements being taken into account (e.g. the cohesiveness measured in 1985-1986 involves 12 member states, whereas that measured in 1996-1997 involves 15 member states). Then, a comparison is made between the internal cohesiveness of the EU and that of other regional groups (ASEAN, Rio Group, Arab League). If, far from being as integrated as the EU from a political or economic perspective, these organisations achieved internal cohesion equivalent to that of the EU, the frequently described European exceptionality in the UN system might be reconsidered.

Our main hypotheses are the following:

- like all regional groups of an equivalent size, the EU is increasingly frequently adopting common positions (regarding both votes and speeches) at the UNGA;
- the convergence is not applicable to all themes or all countries - for example, France and the United Kingdom have peculiar views on nuclear issues and disarmament, depending on their nuclear power status and permanent membership in the Security Council;
- in speeches, the EU currently appears to be the only group with a common approach on nearly all topics, although some other regional groups tend to follow this pattern.

The first part of the present paper describes the data and methods used to validate our hypotheses. The second part deals with the global evolution of the UNGA system from 1985 until now; the EU is not considered here as a relevant unit of analysis \textit{a priori}, but only as a potential cohesive group. The third part considers the regional groups as relevant units for analysis, and compares their degrees of cohesion.

**Data and methods**

We consider two sources as potentially relevant in testing our hypotheses. One is the outcome of voting on resolutions since 1985. Since the reliability
of any public database is bound to contain errors (regarding codes and results), we built up our own database - starting with raw recorded results available on Unbisnet and controlled using official records of UNGA meetings. The following four attitudes for a voted resolution were recorded: yes, abstain, no, non-participation in voting (the latter was considered a separate item since we are of the opinion that abstention and non-participation cannot be considered equivalent).

The structure of our database is as follows:

- A table resolution providing UN code, date, key-words, full title, results for the above four modalities;
- A table for each country providing several codes and names (ISO3 code, Correlates of War project code, official and short name in English and French), date of entrance (and exit if occurring);
- Delegation size at different periods, percentage of non-participation at sessions, etc.;
- A table providing information on the different groups represented at the UNGA (creation, enlargements, official website);
- A table with three columns (country, resolution, position) for votes.

The structure of the database allows items to be extracted using several criteria. It is for example possible to extract all votes on disarmament from 1985 until today involving members of the EU9, 12, 15 or 27.

We first calculated the percentage of non-participation at voting on resolutions; in cases in which it was greater than 30, the state name was deleted.

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6. Such as, for ex., http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten. Since the writing of this paper, many improvements were made on this database which appears now as reliable as possible.

7. Unbisnet, an online UN database (http://unbisnet.un.org/indexf.htm), available in the six official UN languages, provides for access to an impressive amount of documents on items including votes, statements and records of meetings.

8. Some specific sessions are examined in this paper, the references for the corresponding PV are: session 45 (1990-1991), A45PV36, 44, 47, 48, 54, 59 and 65 until 71; session 50 (1995-1996), A50PV47, 48, 49, 69, 87, 90, 93, 96, 97 and 99; session 60 (2005-2006), A60PV41, 45, 56, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 68, 69, 72, 79, 82 and session 64 (2009-2010), A64PV27, 39, 54, 55, 58, 62, 66, 68, 72, 101 and 108. PV are not available for session 40 (1985-1986) and 42 (1987-1988) so voting records issued by Unbisnet were the only material used to analyse these two sessions.


10. ISO3 code is a 3 letter code published by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) to represent countries, dependent territories, and special areas of geographical interest, facilitates comparisons between databases.

11. This situation remains quite exceptional in the history of the UN, but is reminiscent of Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen or German Democratic Republic.
before further calculations were made; if they had been kept, a super-cohesive group sharing only their absence would have been created. A list of deleted states per session appears in Appendix A.

Speeches were studied using different sources. First, the Unbisnet interface was employed to obtain data on the number of speeches made per (civil) year by state representatives and group speakers. Unfortunately, this approach provided aggregate results for UNGA itself, and the six commissions plus the dozen of committees issued by UNGA. This first source was completed by making an analysis of official records of the plenary sessions of UNGA. Indeed, small delegations hardly attempt to participate in all meetings or committees. By narrowing the speech analysis to the plenary session, the reliability of the comparison between states and groups was enhanced.

We considered four options for declarations made in speeches: 1) in the name of a state; 2) in the name of a group, 3) in the name of the state supporting a group declaration, 4) other types.

To visualise findings, we followed methods from Social Network Analysis and Cartography. Nodes represent states or groups, whereas links represent common voting behaviour or support to a declaration.

Numerous quantitative techniques are available for producing a world regionalisation starting from a country versus resolutions matrix. Although these methods are more descriptive than explicatory since motivations for grouping cannot be identified, they do represent a convenient tool for achieving our aims.

Global perspective on voting behaviour

One problem concerning the treatment of votes regards the four available voting modalities: for a given resolution, a member state at the UNGA can

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12. This threshold, which is quite arbitrary, was used notably by S. Y. Kim, B. Russett, The New Politics, op. cit.; I therefore used it for comparative purposes.


vote for, against, abstain, or not participate in the voting. One source of ambiguity lies in the difference between abstention and non-participation. Many authors choose to aggregate these modalities, mainly for technical reasons (for launching a factorial analysis it is more convenient to have three qualitative modalities coded -1, 0 and 1). From a thematic perspective, these modalities can hardly be considered similar. Abstention is often chosen when a state does not wish to show frontal opposition, and non-participation is, rather, proof of absence.

The method used starts with the state / resolution matrix and calculates a similarity matrix that, for each pair of countries, provides a percentage of similar votes ranging from 0 (two states that always voted differently) to 1 (two states that always vote likewise). However, this method has one major drawback: it does not distinguish between minor and major divergence among countries. The table 1 shows an exemplary hypothesis.

Table 1 – Theoretical country profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country code</th>
<th>Resolution 1</th>
<th>Resolution 2</th>
<th>Resolution 3</th>
<th>Resolution 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Abstention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Abstention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Abstention</td>
<td>Abstention</td>
<td>Abstention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For resolutions 2 and 3, the divergence between countries A and B is greater than that between A and C (A votes yes, C abstains). The method yields the same similarity score (0.5) for the three countries and, by simplifying relational patterns between countries, does not take these different degrees of agreement into account; however, it is a convenient tool for highlighting the main structures of the UNGA votes.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the results obtained using a classification procedure (CONCOR) which groups together states ascribed to the same relational profile. The map in Figure 1 shows the regional structure based on voting behaviour before the end of the cold war, that in Figure 2 the current situation. The major inertia of clusters produced is quite surprising: one ‘North’ appearing against one ‘South & East’ bloc. In 2009, the East appeared smaller, due to the fact that now eastern European countries behave like western ones, but the main fracture between developed and less developed


17. This inertia was found by authors using different approaches for data selection and clustering. See E. Voeten, op. cit.
countries continues to be a dominant pattern. The voting pattern of Turkey, one of the few countries showing a marked change, is becoming more and more like that of western countries.

In the above perspective, the EU constantly appears as part of a bigger group that includes close neighbours (Norway, Switzerland), and countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan) akin to it from a perspective of culture and development. This bloc does not adhere to the division proposed by Samuel Huntington in his Clash of Civilisations? but more or less follows an economic cleavage between North and South. This inertia also depends on the structure of resolutions voted at the UNGA. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is the subject of more than one third of all resolutions voted on in each session. Regarding this issue, the ‘West’ strives for a balanced stance, while other members share a pro-Palestinian approach, and this partly explains their cohesiveness.

**Figure 1** - Regional clusters in 1987-1988 (session 42)

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Figure 2 – Regional clusters in 2009-2010 (session 64)
The above maps show the regionalisation produced by a clustering analysis launched on the similarity matrices regarding voting behaviour. For the three sessions, the same rules are employed for the deletion of non-voting states (greater or equal to 30% of non-participation in voting), method of clustering (CONCOR) and number of classes (4).

In order to examine the situation of European countries more closely, we used the similarity matrix as a weighted graph with states as nodes and the values of similar votes as links. The size of the matrices increases during the period (151*151 in 1985; 158*158 in 1995 and 174*174 in 2005); to attain comparable figures, the density of links is taken in order to dichotomise the network. Tests were made with 15, 10 and 5% of higher links, the last one providing the clearer pictures. The graphs shown in Figure 3 therefore represent the 5% higher scores of similar voting behaviour.

**Figure 3** - Graphs showing voting convergence patterns at the UNGA (density 5%)

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19. The density is the actual number of links divided by the maximum possible number of links. With \( N \) as the number of nodes and \( L \), the number of links, then the density of a graph is equal to \( L/N \times (N - 1) \).

20. An extensive reexion on this threshold issue can be found in L. Beauguite, L’Assemblée générale, op. cit., 125-129.

21. A component is a maximal connected sub-graph including at least two nodes.
three dates examined. A link between two states indicates that they share at least 91% of similar votes for the year 1985, 88% for 1995 and 94% for 2005.

The progression of member states involved in these components is impressive, as shown by the increasing density of links. The size of the main component is 5 for 1985 (4 links, density 20%), 31 for 1995 (496 links, density 53%) and 36 for 2005 (948 links, density 75%). Importantly, the density shown in the graph decreases as the number of nodes increases. This always involves two types of state outside the EU: those (Norway, Iceland) that could be EU members but do not wish to be and those (e.g. New Zealand) whose cultural values are akin to those of the states in the EU. Secondly, France and the United Kingdom always stand apart from the main components, mainly due to their specific positions regarding nuclear issues and disarmament.

EU: a regional group among others or a UN system leader?

In studies on the EU at the UN, the former is invariably considered an important actor in the latter system, one indicator of its importance being the increasing convergence in voting patterns. Yet, this voting is hardly ever compared to that of other regional groups, perhaps because scholars believe that the EU is so exceptional (in its degree of political and economic integration) that it is incomparable. However, in our view, the EU is, at first glance, a regional group among others. The increasing convergence between EU member states is a relevant indicator only if it does not reflect a general tendency. Moreover, in our view, this tendency is not exceptional, but it represents a trend involving all regional groups. Now, with the end of the so-called bipolar world and the advent of financial and economic globalisation, countries are investing more than ever before in regional construction.

For comparative purposes, the groups considered must be present at the UN (notably regarding statements made) and of similar sizes (it would be useless to compare the EU voting behaviour with the Group of 77’s - more than 130 states today). We performed the test by comparing the trends of the EU with those of the ASEAN, Arab League, Rio Group (see box 1) and the UNGA as a whole. The lack of an African group is due to the low level of integration in most of the groups of that region (except maybe SADC22) and, above all, because of the high degree of non-participation of some African states. The latter factor also explains the absence of CARICOM (see box 2). States that did not vote at 30% or more of all votes were excluded before data processing.

22. The Southern African Development Community, created in 1992, is a regional group dominated, politically and economically, by South Africa (Official website: http://www.sadc.int/).
Box 2 – Regional groups

Only permanent members are listed. Extra information can be found on the respective group websites.


The Arab League, founded in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Transjordan (renamed Jordan in 1949), Saudi Arabia and Syria, has 22 member states (Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian - whose participation has been suspended in November 2011 - Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Palestinian territories). It obtained permanent observer status at the UNGA in 1950 (Resolution A/RES/477(V)). (Sources: http://www.arableagueonline.org/ and Unisnet).

The Rio Group, created in 1986, comprises 23 Latin American and Caribbean States. Despite its presence at the UNGA (numerous statements), it has not yet obtained permanent observer status.

The CARICOM (Caribbean Community), created in 1972 and comprising Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, was awarded permanent observer status at the UNGA in 1998 (A/RES/53/5). (Sources: http://www.caricom.org/ and Unisnet).

Of course, not all these groups are fully comparable. If regional integration is one aim of the Rio Group or the ASEAN, it is not an aim for the Arab League. Nevertheless, the comparisons made do help us verify whether EU behaviour is unique or not. The size of the groups considered is listed in Table 3, and their internal coherence is given in percentages in Table 4.

For all sessions and groups, the level of internal coherence is significantly higher than the global coherence at the UNGA. The EU started overtaking all other regional groups considered in the 1990s and the increasing number of member states did not prevent this tendency, thus confirming findings.

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23. The sizes of delegations from some regional groups are specified in Appendix B.
Table 3 – Size of groups compared (number of member states)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>45</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>55</th>
<th>60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC/EU</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Group</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 – Mean percentage of common voting positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>45</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>55</th>
<th>60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC/EU</td>
<td>71.19</td>
<td>66.33</td>
<td>88.62</td>
<td>93.01</td>
<td>93.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>85.14</td>
<td>96.30</td>
<td>84.57</td>
<td>87.91</td>
<td>87.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab League*</td>
<td>85.01</td>
<td>94.40</td>
<td>83.80</td>
<td>85.56</td>
<td>91.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Group</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>71.39</td>
<td>85.09</td>
<td>86.84</td>
<td>84.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global**</td>
<td>64.54</td>
<td>68.16</td>
<td>65.68</td>
<td>70.24</td>
<td>68.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Session 50, minus Comoros and Somalia; Session 55, minus Mauritania and Somalia; Session 60, minus Comoros (non-voting rate > 30%). ** minus non-voting rate > 30%. Source: Unbisnet and ODS (data collected and calculations made by the author).

in previous studies. Like the Rio Group, the ASEAN has maintained a stable level of internal coherence since session 50. Surprisingly, in view of the delicate relations between some states involved in it, the Arab League is one of the most cohesive groups at the UNGA; this may depend on the topic of the vote: the Palestinian question concerns roughly a third of all resolutions voted at each session - unanimity against Israel (and USA) may be the dominant cohesive factor in this group.

On considering the statements made at the UNGA, the situation appears quite different, the EU clearly dominating all other groups (Table 5) and the Nordic group being integrated step by step. On the contrary, the Arab

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Table 5 - Number of declarations per group/year at the UNGA (committees and commissions included)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC/EU</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Group</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Group</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Unbisnet (data collected by the author in September 2010).

League is the most silent group (1-4 statements a year). The declarations made by the ASEAN and, even more, by the Rio Group are very interesting, statements being made in common increasingly often, covering a growing range of topics.27

The EU was the first group to gradually create a norm regarding group declaration (statements beginning with ‘On behalf of the European Union, I have the honour to address the General Assembly’; ‘my delegation fully subscribes to the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union’). Moreover, on examining official reports, it emerges that, except for the reform of the Security Council, the EU is the only group to produce statements on all topics considered at the UNGA.

Conclusion

The main utility of the approach used in the present study is first and foremost that it validates all research made regarding EU convergence from a comparative point of view. If the EU at the UNGA is merely one regional group among many, it is still the most cohesive and present in debates. Nevertheless, other groups are also present and united, notably the Rio Group headed by Brazil. This trend could reflect the consequences of globalisation; states tend to build regional structures and, even in a ‘state-centric’ organisation like the UNGA, these groups slowly change the pattern of their relations.

It goes beyond the scope of our study to evaluate the utility of cohesion

27. This situation also concerns the Pacific Island Forum and the CARICOM.
for the EU. As underlined by Creed\textsuperscript{28} and Lucarelli and Fioramonti\textsuperscript{29}, the quest for common votes and common speeches is a demanding task. One undesired side effect seems to be the lack of contact outside the sphere of the EU, which appears to be both a cohesive group and an island isolated from the outside world.

Appendix A : Deleted States (percentage of non-participation)

Session 40 (1985-1986) : South Africa (100), Dominica (74), Belize (68), Saint Kitts and Nevis (68), Solomon Islands (53), Albania (52), Seychelles (37), Gambia (32).

Session 45 (1990-1991) : South Africa (100), Cambodia (97), Liberia (97), Sao Tome and Principe (97), Equatorial Guinea (96), Panama (72), Grenada (47), Saint Kitts and Nevis (36).

Session 50 (1995-1996) : Central African Republic (100), Dominican Republic (100), Iraq (100), Sao Tome and Principe (100), Somalia (100), Yugoslavia (100), Comoros (99), Liberia (99), Palau (94), Seychelles (94), Saint Kitts and Nevis (84), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (81), Gambia (80), Turkmenistan (80), San Marino (78), Uzbekistan (67), Equatorial Guinea (54), Tajikistan (54), Rwanda (49), Saint Lucia (48), Democratic Republic of Congo (48), Angola (45), Dominica (43), Kyrgyzstan (41), Madagascar (41), Grenada (39), Sierra Leone (32).

Session 55 (2000-2001) : Central African Republic (100), Guinea Bissau (100), Iraq (100), Liberia (100), Seychelles (100), Somalia (100), Tuvalu (100), Kiribati (99), Niger (99), Palau (79), Democratic Republic of Congo (76), Sao Tome and Principe (76), Dominica (75), Rwanda (75), Congo (73), Turkmenistan (67), Equatorial Guinea (66), Saint Kitts and Nevis (61), Uzbekistan (57), Afghanistan (54), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (52), Yugoslavia (52), Bosnia-Herzegovina (49), Albania (48), Suriname (45), Mauritania (43), Lesotho (40), Malawi (40), Chad (37), Tajikistan (37), Gambia (36).

Session 60 (2005-2006) : Kiribati (99), Equatorial Guinea (97), Seychelles (97), Chad (91), Saint Kitts and Nevis (89), Nauru (87), Swaziland (83), Sao Tome and Principe (68), Rwanda (67), Gambia (62), Sierra Leone (61), Congo (46), Democratic Republic of Congo (46), Comoros (39), Central African Republic (34), Tonga (34), Bosnia-Herzegovina (30), Liberia (30).


\textsuperscript{29} Sonia Lucarelli and Lorenzo Fioramonti, eds, \textit{External perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor} (London : Routledge, 2010).
<table>
<thead>
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<td>African Union</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Commonwealth Secretariat</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC**</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Central American Integration System **Organisation of the Islamic Conference


**Appendix B : Delegation size at the UNGA**

Sample of delegation size regarding ‘Intergovernmental organisations having received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the GA’: