Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case

Abstract : In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or extended unanimity preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (2002), Nehring (2006), Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (2010a).
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas
Contributor : Franz Dietrich <>
Submitted on : Friday, April 11, 2014 - 8:27:29 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, November 17, 2020 - 11:18:13 AM

Links full text




Franz Dietrich, Christian List. Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2013, 40, pp.1067-1095. ⟨10.1007/s00355-012-0661-7⟩. ⟨halshs-00978004⟩



Record views