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Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Abstract : Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for the compromise outcome, but other interpretations are given as well. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We identify the (large) domain on which this solution is single-valued, and present two axiomatic characterizations on subsets of this domain.
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Contributor : Franz Dietrich <>
Submitted on : Friday, April 11, 2014 - 8:09:12 PM
Last modification on : Friday, March 27, 2020 - 2:51:03 AM


  • HAL Id : halshs-00977992, version 1



Irem Bozbay, Franz Dietrich, Hans Peters. Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2012, 74, pp.407-417. ⟨halshs-00977992⟩



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