Equilibrium risk shifting and interest rate in an opaque financial system
Résumé
We analyse the risk-taking behaviour of heterogenous intermediaries that are protected
by limited liability and choose both their amount of leverage and the risk exposure of their
portfolio. Due to the opacity of the financial sector, outside providers of funds cannot
distinguish“prudent” intermediaries from those“imprudent” ones that voluntarily hold
high-risk portfolios and expose themselves to the risk of bankrupcy. We show how the
number of imprudent intermediaries is determined in equilibrium jointly with the
interest rate, and how both ultimately depend on the cross-sectional distribution of
intermediaries'capital. One implication of our analysis is that an exogenous increase in
the supply of funds to the intermediary sector lowers interest rates and raises the number
of imprudent intermediaries. Another one is that easy financing may lead an increasing
number of intermediaries to gamble for resurection following a bad shock to the sector
'scapital, again raising economywide systemic risk.
Domaines
Economies et finances
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2013-challe-mojon-ragot-equilibrium-risk-shifting-and-interest-rate-in-an-opaque-financial-system-vauteur.pdf ( 770.77 Ko
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