Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

Navin Kartik (1) , Olivier Tercieux (2, 3) , Richard Holden (4)

1 Columbia University [New York]
2 PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
3 PSE - Paris School of Economics
4 UNSW - University of New South Wales [Sydney]

We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.

Mots clés: Behavioral mechanism design; Implementation; Lying costs; Separable domain

Domaines: Economies et finances

Navin Kartik, Olivier Tercieux, Richard Holden. Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty. Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 83, pp.284-290. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011⟩. ⟨halshs-00943301⟩