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**Toward a Liberal Mood? A Multilevel Analysis of Public  
Support for State in the European Union Between 1990 and  
2008**

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Partners //



## Abstract

This working paper investigates support for state in the European Union cross-nationally and longitudinally using data from the *European Values Survey*. Analyses are carried out at different levels. At the individual level, we go beyond the opposition between self-interest and symbolic orientations by showing that they both matter and combine to influence statist attitudes. At group level, we assess the issue of parallel opinion moves over time and find uniform, although divided, trends among subpublics. At the country level, we suggest that dynamics of opinion respond to changes in the economic environment, but do not necessarily respond according to a thermostatic model. Our results thus prove relevant for the European case most of the findings previous scholars have highlighted for the American case.

Many cross-national polls today provide evidence of a widespread distrust of capitalism in Europe. In 2009, the opinion that “free market capitalism has some problems, but these can be addressed through more regulation and reform” is shared by a majority of respondents in Germany (75 percent), Italy (59 percent), United-Kingdom (57 percent) and Spain (56 percent). In France (47 percent), it is neck and neck with the alternative opinion that “free market capitalism is fatally flawed, and a different economic system is needed” (43 percent) (GlobeScan-BBC World Service 2009). In another survey conducted at the end of 2010, France and Italy appear to be the most averse to capitalism among European countries. In the two countries, 52 percent of the respondents declare that it “works rather badly but that it is necessary to keep it because there is no other alternative”. Distrust of capitalism is important as well in Great Britain (45 percent), Germany (42 percent) and Netherlands (38 percent) (IFOP-La Croix 2010).

The mainstream media usually assume that the Great Recession has elicited a sudden reversal of public confidence in market economy. Contrary to this common opinion, distrust of capitalism was high in many European countries well before 2007-2008. According to a poll conducted for the University of the Maryland, 50 percent of the French, 32 percent of the Germans, 31 percent of the Italians, 28 percent of the Spaniards and 27 percent of the British were already disagreeing, in summer 2005, with the statement that “the free enterprise system and free market economy is the best system on which to base the future of the world” (GlobeScan-PIPA 2006). This survey, also conducted in 2003, 2005 and 2007, suggests that support for capitalism has been stepping back in Europe since the beginning of the 2000s (GlobeScan-PIPA 2008).

These survey results are somewhat at odds with the popular belief that globalization might fuel public demand for market capitalism and hence generate uniform economic attitudes. Still, while many scholars have proved European attitudes to show no sign of convergence on moral issues<sup>1</sup>, the convergence of economic values remains a controversial topic. For some, globalization shapes similar attitudes and behaviors in the economic realm, thereby leveling national differences. For others, trends toward economic homogenization are dampened down by specific cultural traits or by peculiar institutional arrangements. This article challenges the view of converging economic values by investigating how economic attitudes have moved in the European Union since the beginning of the 1990s.

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<sup>1</sup> Attitudes toward family, marriage or gender relations are moving for example at the same speed toward more equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

## Theoretical and Empirical Background about Shifts and Changes in Economic Attitudes

In political science, the issue of shifts and changes in economic attitudes is usually addressed from two different perspectives. For the upholders of a “minimalist” paradigm (Sniderman 1993), the general public pays little attention to economy and lacks the knowledge to form opinions on economic matters. Economic attitudes are mostly driven by superficial and erratic reactions to contextual information, such as the perceived changes of economic conjuncture or the way political elites and mainstream media frame economic issues. Thus economic attitudes appear to be unstable and inconsistent. They are comparable to “pseudo-opinions” or “non-attitudes” (Converse 2006).

In reaction against this approach, many scholars have emphasized that ordinary people are capable of reasoning about political and economic issues (e.g., Zaller 1992; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993; Popkin 1994; Saris and Sniderman 2004). Another argument has been put forward. Even if individual opinions are likely to get wrong, public opinion can be considered as rational in the aggregate. Individual errors tend to cancel out at the aggregated level, so that collective opinion provides a better understanding of citizens real preferences (Page and Shapiro 1992; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Enns and Kellstedt 2008).

One question has been particularly sensitive for the development of new perspectives on public opinion: To what extent the rationality in aggregate opinion movements is mirrored among all strata of population? Answering this question, Page and Shapiro (1992) formulated what can be referred to as the “parallel publics” thesis. They asserted that social groups tend to change their opinions at the same time, in the same direction, in the same proportions and for the same reasons. Sharply contrasting with the idea that “public opinion does not exist” since subgroups have competing interests (Bourdieu 1973), this thesis stems from the empirical observation that dynamics of public opinion present uniform patterns. Regarding economic attitudes, it assumes for example that subgroups do not strongly differ in the way they perceive economic events; i.e., in the way they receive cues about the economy and accordingly update their attitudes. Therefore, subgroups will somehow react in concert and move as a whole.

For the American case, the “parallel publics” thesis has been fairly well supported by survey data. Using the General Social Survey series from 1972 to 1988, Page and Shapiro’s seminal work first showed striking evidences of parallel opinion movements on economic issue, notably among income groups. With a GSS cumulative file spanning 1973 to 1996, Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002) have also pointed out dynamics of uniform opinion changes. They found that public preferences for more or less government tend to move evenly across the segments of the population with different educational attainment. Enns and Kellstedt (2008) used GSS and American National Election Studies (ANES) data to replicate and extend these findings. They confirmed that the least and the most sophisticated strata of American society change their opinions in tandem. Exploring public preferences for government spending and welfare issues with GSS data from 1974 to 2004, Ura and Ellis (2008) came to the same conclusion of overtime similarity between incomes quartiles. They also showed that marginally, income groups do not react identically and that the wealthy are more responsive to economic stimuli.

Among the large body of cross-national studies investigating economic attitudes in Europe, the issue of uniform opinion movements has – to our knowledge – never been analyzed per se. Our paper intends to fill this gap by gauging the empirical validity of the

“parallel publics” thesis with data from the European Values Survey (EVS), a longitudinal survey research program on basic human values conducted since 1981<sup>2</sup>.

Addressing specifically the topic of public attitudes toward state, we first present a global picture of the data and the main descriptive results on how statist attitudes have evolved in the European Union between 1990 and 2008. Then, we use factor analysis and multilevel modeling to determine what influences support for state. We notably investigate – what is rarely done in the literature – how the major predictors of statist attitudes interplay. We also investigate how they combine with political interest, which is known to be a powerful mediator of social attitudes.

In the second part of the article, we deal with the question of subpublics movements and assess whether they have been shifting in concert since 1990. We also examine the extent to which movements of the general public are driven by certain subgroups, supposed to be more responsive to changes. Finally, trying to reconcile micro- and macro-level dynamics, we consider global inequalities and public policies indicators to provide an explanation for the increasing support for state in the European Union. Our findings indicate that the European public reacts when political elites answer to the growing demand for state protection, but does not necessarily react according to a “thermostatic” model (Wlezien 1995). Thus we discuss in closing the linkage between public opinion and public policies, pointing in particular the topic of democratic responsiveness in European welfare regimes.

## **Data, Descriptive Overview and Methods**

### **A Uniform Decrease of Public Preferences for Economic Liberalism**

Unlike the polls mentioned above, the European Values Survey permits to compare a wide array of countries and to put into perspective various aspects of economic liberalism. Since the second wave of the EVS in 1990<sup>3</sup>, the European are asked to position themselves on a battery of ten-point agreement scales, capturing their economic attitudes with two opposite propositions, one typical of a conservative orientation, the other typical of a liberal orientation. Three questions depict the doctrinal pillars of economic liberalism: competition, private ownership of means of production and state control over firms. Other questions tap opinions about the role of individuals in market economy by addressing individual responsibility, income equality and normative constraints regarding unemployment.

Looking at Figure 1, we can see a progressive erosion of liberal preferences since the beginning of 1990s. This erosion is particularly sharp on questions illustrating the major principles of the liberal doctrine. Support for private property and competition respectively lose about 15 and 10 points of percentage. Crosstabs by country<sup>4</sup> show that liberal preferences tend to step back quite evenly within the European Union. This is the case for private property, even though it falls more in the Baltic States (Latvia, Estonia) and in countries of the former Soviet Union (Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic) where the economy has been gradually liberalized since the beginning of the 1990s. Though a majority of Europeans (58 percent) remains favorable to competition in 2008, support for competition decreases in both

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<sup>2</sup> For presentation and substantive results, see e.g., Ester, Braun, and Mohler 2006; Halman 2008; Halman, Sieben, and Zundert 2012.

<sup>3</sup> The last EVS wave covers forty-seven countries in 2008. For the purpose of comparison, we first focus on the twenty-seven countries of the European Union and, in further analysis, on the twenty-three countries that participated the last three waves.

<sup>4</sup> Summary of variables, descriptive statistics and crosstabs are available upon request.

rich Western countries (Spain, France, Belgium) and less economically developed Oriental countries (Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).

The trend is very similar for the item opposing individual effort and wage equality. Globally lowering from 52 to 34 percent between 1990 and 2008, the opinion that individual effort should be encouraged is less accepted in Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia) and in many rich Northern countries (Finland, Sweden, Austria, Germany). This growing demand for equality is prominent in another question of the EVS. Preference for equality over freedom<sup>5</sup> has raised from 36 percent in 1990 to 42 percent in 2008. This increase is rather homogeneous, as strong in unequal countries (Italy, Latvia, Estonia and Germany where the Gini coefficient is superior to 30 in 2008) as in more equal countries of Northern and Eastern Europe (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Czech Republic and Hungary, where the Gini coefficient ranges between 24 and 26.3).


The aggregate opinions about individual responsibility and duties of the unemployed give a misleading impression of overtime stability. In fact, they move very differently from one country to another. The idea that individuals should take care of their own needs is much more supported in liberal countries (United Kingdom and Ireland). It is also increasing in these countries, where individuals are supposed to meet their needs and where the government is supposed to replace the market only to correct social handicaps individuals are not responsible for. Public preferences for individual responsibility increase as well in most of Eastern countries, probably boosted by the transition from a communist economy to a liberal economy insisting on individual initiative. Individual responsibility is less accepted in social democracies of Western Europe (Italy, Belgium, France and Netherlands) and Northern Europe (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) where “decommodification” – i.e., extension of the public realm – is historically rooted. As often mentioned in the literature about welfare regimes (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 1999; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003), support for public coverage of social needs mainly reflects embedded cultural traits.

The institutional arrangements may also help to understand expectations toward the unemployed. The opinion that the unemployed should accept any job available is low and decreasing in Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), certainly in linkage with social policies guaranteeing both flexibility for the employers and decent standard of living for the unemployed. On the other hand, it is increasing in several Western and Eastern countries (United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary), maybe echoing employment policies making unemployment assistance conditional on active job search.

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<sup>5</sup> Respondents are invited to agree with one of these three statements: “(1) I find that both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance (2) Certainly both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong (3) Neither.”

Figure 1. Evolution of Conservative vs Liberal Attitudes in the European Union between 1990 and 2008



Stressing the dramatically growing disaffection of the Europeans for market economy, the EVS are in line with the polls mentioned above. But also showing that this disaffection varies among countries and depending on the facets of economic liberalism, they depict a more balanced portrait of the Europeans. The general public somehow combines an increasing demand for state intervention, with a high support of certain aspects of the liberal doctrine.


With Figure 2, we reinforce this interpretation using Cronbach's alpha to gauge the correlation between the six questions displayed in Figure 1. In 2008, the global correlation is quite weak for the 27 countries of the European Union ( $\alpha=0.482$ ;  $\alpha$  jumps to 0.584 when the item about wage equality is deleted). This result highlights that Europeans endorse different, if not opposed economic preferences. It also confirms that the general public is not "ideological" (Converse 2006), since economic attitudes are not systematically organized. It must however be noted that economic attitudes are more consistent in Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark) and in Northern Europe (United-Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany). Certainly because the opposition between market and state is more institutionalized in these countries (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Svallfors 2006).

Political sophistication has been argued to influence the ability of giving consistency to attitudes (e.g., Sears et al. 1980; Feldman and Zaller 1992). To assess this influence, we have computed an additive scale with highly correlated variables concerning personal interest in politics, its importance in everyday life, the frequency of political discussions with friends and the follow-up of current political events ( $\alpha=0.75$ )<sup>6</sup>. Figure 2 confirms that the most

<sup>6</sup> The wordings are as follows: « How important is politics in your life? Very important, quite important, not important, not at all important »; « When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never? »; « How interested would you say you are in politics? Very

politically interested (i.e., the upper quartile of the index) combine their economic preferences in a more systematic pattern. Educational attainment is also known to be a relevant indicator of attitudinal consistency – the most educated being generally able to align their opinions and behaviors – and to be linked with political sophistication. Figure 2 shows that the most politically interested Europeans tend to be more economically consistent when they have received tertiary education. Still, some Eastern countries are bucking the trend. In Estonia, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, a high level of education offsets the influence of political interest. It seems that in these countries, the tension between market and state is a more controversial matter among the most educated than among the rest of the citizens.

Figure 2. Consistency of Economic Attitudes across the European Union in 2008



### Disentangling Economic Attitudes

Our descriptive findings suggest that the growing distrust of the Europeans in market capitalism is not a homogeneous phenomenon. It conveys trends that are likely to move differently among countries and among social groups. Various statistical methods are available to make sense of the underlying dimensions captured by a set of scale variables. In some cases, scholars generate an additive index as their dependent variable by aggregating survey questions. Another option is to employ a factorial combination or some other latent class analysis technique. Here, we used principal components analysis (PCA), a particularly suited method to disentangle and prioritize within composite logics of answers. To get a global picture of these dimensions and a better measurement of their overtime variations, we grouped in a pooled dataset the 23 countries that participated the last three EVS waves. Each

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interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interest »; « How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers? Every day, several times a week, once or twice a week, less often, never. »



country is represented by a national subsample of equal size for 1990, 1999 and 2008. About 1000 individuals by country and by round have been randomly selected. All in all, the aggregated dataset contains 68472 respondents.

With a varimax rotation, the PCA yielded two factors (Table 1), pointing out that economic attitudes within the European Union are grounded on two main dimensions<sup>7</sup>. The first factor, by far the strongest and the easiest to interpret, can be described as an interventionism dimension. It accounts for 30 percent of the total variance and gathers most of the items about state control over economy. Though bubbling up from data with different items and less points in time, this dimension is remarkably akin to the *Policy Mood*, a time-series index actually designed to approximate a principal components solution (Stimson 1999; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). Public preferences toward more or less government thus appear to be a central component of both the Europeans and the Americans economic attitudes.

The equalitarian items tap a second dimension that accounts for a variance of 19 percent of the total. This dimension is mainly structured by the opposition between respondents who declare that incomes should be more equal and those who say that there should be greater incentives for individual effort. The item stating that the unemployed should accept any job also loads quite highly on the second factor, suggesting that equalitarian expectations mostly refer to social cohesion and reciprocity (Bowles and Gintis 2000).

Many techniques can be used to assess the cross-national reliability of attitudinal scales (Harkness 2010; Davidov, Schmidt, and Billiet 2011). We checked the robustness of our factors by performing separate PCA for each country and each EVS wave. This complementary analysis reveals that the structure of economic attitudes is very stable over time. Among the twenty-three countries examined, the ranking of the components, their content and the amount of variance they account for, barely change between 1990 and 2008. The conclusion clearly is that support for state and support for equality are prominent everywhere in the European Union. There is, however, an interesting exception with Northern countries. In Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Netherlands, statist and equalitarian items load on one single factor. It indicates that state and social equality are strongly linked in these countries.

Table 1. Factor Loadings of Economic Attitudes (1990-2008, 23 Countries)

	Support for state	Support for equality
The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for	0.70	0.05
Government ownership of business and industry should be increased	0.64	0.26
Competition is harmful	0.64	0.19
People who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want	0.60	-0.42
Incomes should be made more equal	0.02	0.76
Equality is more important than freedom	0.23	0.59

To clarify the statistical effects across countries and to see how they combine with individual characteristics, we extracted the respondents' scores – i.e., their assigned coordinates – on the first factor of the PCA. Then, we performed different multilevel linear models, after standardizing the variables to obtain comparable parameters and ease the interpretation.

<sup>7</sup> KMO (0.671) and Bartlett's test (Chi-Square=17244.42 with p <0.001) indicate a reasonable correlation between the items.

Multilevel modeling is particularly appropriate for cases where individuals are clustered within different geographic units. While ordinary least squares regression assumes restrictive hypotheses as to the independence of error terms (i.e., errors are not correlated serially from one observation to the other; which is a problem with nested data where observations are assumed to be related among different groups) and homoscedasticity (i.e., homoscedastic pattern of errors are difficult to assume since heterogeneity can exist in the relations between observed groups)<sup>8</sup>, multilevel modeling takes into account both dependence of observations and heterogeneity between error terms. On one hand, it permits a more complex specification of the residuals that are estimated at an individual-level and at an aggregate level. On the other hand, instead of constraining the variance of the residuals to be constant, it lets them vary depending on explanatory variables in order to assess variability between observed groups (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Hox 2010; Snijders and Bosker 2012).

The primary objective of multilevel modeling is to explain micro-level variations in a dependent variable while controlling for variations in the mean response between different macro-levels of analysis. Table 2 displays models estimating the impact of different individual-level indicators on attitudes toward state. Model 1 provides, as a first step, the variance explained by country- and individual-level. This “empty” model with no explanatory variable permits to understand whether statist attitudes are more likely explained by differences within or across European countries. The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC=0.28746) indicates that 97 percent of the variance are due to the individual-level, while 3 percent are explained by the country-level. This means that support for state depends more on differences between Europeans than on differences between European countries. Though usual in multilevel analysis of welfare regimes (see e.g., Gelissen 2000; Arts and Gelissen 2001), this first finding has some substantive interest. It contradicts culturalist explanations basically assuming that national traits are irreducible and that countries differ more than individuals.

### **What Determines Support for State: Self-Interest and Symbolic Attitudes**

The literature about economic attitudes usually deals with two opposite explanations. According to the theory of hedonic rationality, economic attitudes are principally motivated by narrow self-interest (Hirschman 1997). Individuals develop economic preferences that are congruent with their personal interest, or at least with how they represent themselves their own interest. On the opposite, for the upholders of symbolic politics theory, economic attitudes are mostly driven by deeply rooted values and beliefs (e.g., Sears et al. 1980; Sears and Funk 1990). Notably, symbolic orientations have been argued to shape economic attitudes through organized schemes of ideological predispositions inherited from early socialization by parents and peer groups (e.g., Almond and Verba 1989; Inglehart 1990).

Empirical studies on welfare attitudes have proved both explanations relevant. Higher levels of support for state have been observed among people identifying with the left or with left-wing parties (Jæger 2006; Jæger 2008), confirming that welfare preferences are strongly correlated with other ideological beliefs (Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Jacoby 1994; Gelissen 2000) and can somehow be considered as attitudinal translations of general political values. Socially disadvantaged groups, notably transfer classes, have also been found to exhibit a stronger demand for public policies that they allegedly perceive as benefiting or protecting them (Papadakis and Bean 1993; Svallfors 1997; Edlund 1999). The same applies to the middle class, which is usually considered as providing the prime consumers of many social

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<sup>8</sup> KMO (0.671) and Bartlett’s test (Chi-Square=17244.42 with  $p < 0.001$ ) indicate a reasonable correlation between the items.

services, such as education or health programs (Baldwin 1990; Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 1999).

Here, we proceed in three stages. First assessing the self-interest hypothesis, we regress on statist attitudes with employment status and household income (Model 2). Household income is coded into quartiles. The wealthiest subgroup (Q4) is taken as a reference. A dummy variable grouping those who do not declare their income (Income DKNA) is added in order to keep and compare this important segment, accounting for 17 percent of the sample.

Then, we estimate the effect of political values to gauge whether symbolic orientations can moderate the influence of self-interest (Model 3). We use two subjective measurements. Political orientation is computed from self-positioning on a classical ten-point political scale. It is divided into four categories: left (1-4), center (5-6), right (7-10) used as a reference, plus one category (Political orientation DKNA) for those who do not declare their political orientation (about 24 percent of the total sample). As a proxy for political interest, we also introduce the additive index displayed in Figure 2. The least interested are taken as a reference. A dummy variable (Political interest DKNA) is added grouping the 7853 respondents for which some observations lack to calculate the index (11.5 percent of the sample).

Finally, trying to overcome the opposition between self-interest and political values, we focus on their combinations. With Model 4, we introduce a full interaction effect between income and political orientation to assess whether income exerts a differential influence over the Europeans who identify with the left and with the right. With Model 5<sup>9</sup>, we evaluate another interaction. We let political interest vary depending on political orientation, to see if sophistication modulates support for state identically within each ideological group.

In all the five models, gender, age and age at completion of education (playing here the part of a proxy for educational attainment) are added as control variables. Since the regressions are performed on a pooled file, we also add a dummy variable for each EVS wave (EVS 1999 and EVS 2008) to control for change and for the impact of the context over time.

Table 2: Multilevel Analysis of Public Support for State in the European Union (1990-2008)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Estimate	Std. Err.	Estimate	Std. Err.	Estimate	Std. Err.
Women			0.161***	(0.008)	0.151***	(0.008)
Age (std)			-0.0035	(0.004)	0.0022	(0.004)
Age completed educ. (std)			-0.053***	(0.004)	-0.054***	(0.004)
Income - - (ref. ++)			0.280***	(0.013)	0.253***	(0.013)
Income -			0.235***	(0.013)	0.214***	(0.012)
Income +			0.144***	(0.013)	0.127***	(0.013)
Income DKNA			0.095***	(0.014)	0.086***	(0.014)
Worker (ref. Self-employed)			0.269***	(0.017)	0.237***	(0.017)
Unemployed			0.563***	(0.023)	0.518***	(0.022)
Retired or non-worker			0.266***	(0.018)	0.240***	(0.018)
Employment status DKNA			0.275***	(0.038)	0.243***	(0.037)
EVS 1999 (ref. EVS 1990)			0.171***	(0.009)	0.141***	(0.009)
EVS 2008			0.264***	(0.009)	0.252***	(0.009)
Left (ref. Right)					0.603***	(0.012)
Center					0.276***	(0.010)
Political orientation DKNA					0.316***	(0.012)
Political interest - (ref. - -)					-0.028*	(0.011)
Political interest +					-0.046***	(0.011)
Political interest ++					-0.045***	(0.013)
Political interest DKNA					0.061***	(0.016)

<sup>9</sup> Model 4 and Model 5 are not displayed here but available upon demand.

Intercept	0.00019	(0.035)	-0.674***	(0.034)	-0.886***	(0.016)
	Estimate	Std. Err.	Estimate	Std. Err.	Estimate	Std. Err.
Residual variance (individual-level)	0.971	(0.005)	0.933	(0.005)	0.895	(0.005)
Random intercept variance (country-level)	0.029	(0.008)	0.025	(0.007)	0.023	(0.007)
N individual-level)	68472		65856		65856	
N (country-level)	23		23		23	
Intraclass correlation (%)	2.87		2.62		2.51	
Deviance	192410		182411		179692	
AIC	192416		182443		179738	
BIC	192443		182589		179947	

std=standardized; \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

We can summarize Model 2 by saying that statist attitudes are strongly linked to social vulnerability. In tune with the literature about welfare attitudes, we find that the disadvantaged groups somehow follow their own interest and are more supportive of the state. Looking at income groups in the upper panel of Table 2, we note that the effect of income is quite linear. The lower the household income is, the more individuals endorse statist attitudes. As to employment status groups, compared to the self-employed, all Europeans are more likely to support public policies. It is especially the case of those who depend on state transfers or who indirectly benefit from them; i.e., the unemployed, the retired and the non-workers.

Moving to Model 3, we can point out the great influence of political orientation and hence confirm findings from previous scholars. Strictly comparing the magnitude of the estimates, self-identifying with the left rather than the right leads to support state more strongly than being poor or being unemployed. Political interest also has a significant but negative impact on public preferences. The most sophisticated segments of the European population are associated with a lower level of support for state<sup>10</sup>. But introducing political variables in the model does not deflate the coefficients for income and employment status. Put differently, self-interest and symbolic orientations both determine welfare attitudes.

Turning now to control variables, we can notice that women are statistically more disposed than men to favor state intervention. This complies with the literature stating that women show more concern for equality and redistribution, but are often dependent on the state as well – whether they are the entitled recipients of social aids, whether they are public sector employees (Sainsbury 1996) –. While the beta for age does not approach statistical significance, the influence of age at completion of education is highly significant. Moving up on the scale of formal educational attainment increases the probability of supporting state. This is also the case for survey context. Holding the others explanatory variables fixed, the Europeans are much more interventionist in 2008 and in 1999 than in 1990<sup>11</sup>.

Though self-interest and political values both influence welfare attitudes, they are likely to interplay and exert a differential influence among subgroups. Figure 3 plots the


<sup>10</sup> Although the effect of political interest is modest in terms of standardized coefficients, it would be a mistake to assume that it is deflated by political orientation. The coefficients for political interest are the same when Model 3 is estimated without political orientation. However, one should stay cautious with comparing coefficients when attitudinal variables are introduced both sides of a regression model (in other words, when explaining attitudes with attitudes). Here, the statistical assumption that political orientation is uncorrelated with the error term (i.e., with the unobserved political attitudes that can also influence support for state) remains questionable (Jæger 2008).

<sup>11</sup> Looking at the random effects, we can compute that Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively reduce the variance between individuals by 13, 20, 17 and 8 percent. And the variance between countries by 4, 8, 8, and 8 percent. As to models evaluation with standard statistical criteria (deviance, AIC, BIC), they all perform better than the empty model.

marginal predictions<sup>12</sup> for Model 4, in which we let income vary between ideological groups. It shows that income has a highly contrasted impact on the left and on the right. While the rightist groups stick to their personal interest and are significantly less supportive of the state when they are rich, leftist groups tend to share the same degree of support and appear to be as statist whether they are rich or poor. In other words, political orientation moderates the influence of self-interest, but only among left-wing identifiers. So, the attitudinal gap between the rich and the poor is particularly wide among right-wingers. And poor right-wingers are significantly less averse to state intervention than their wealthy counterparts.

This differential effect of income is very stable over time. It can be observed in 1990, 1999 and 2008. This suggests that the political coalition on economic attitudes is much more solid within the left than within the right. On the right, the convergence of economic preferences seems to be strongly disrupted by income variations; the difference between poor and rich right-wingers being almost as large as the difference between poor right-wingers and poor left-wingers.

Figure 3: Support for State for Ideological Groups Depending on Income (Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals)




The influence of ideology on support for state is further reflected in the interaction between political orientation and political interest (Model 5). Figure 4 shows that leftist and rightist groups endorse welfare attitudes that are all the more polarized since they are interested in politics. Put another way, the attitudinal gap between the left and the right is the largest among the most politically interested segments of the European population; but this gap narrows as their political interest decreases.

<sup>12</sup> A marginal effect measures the change on the conditional mean of a dependent variable that is produced by a 1-unit change in one of the explanatory variables. In linear regression models, it equals the slope coefficient. For a dummy independent variable, the marginal effect is the difference between predicted values at 1 and at 0 (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Marginal effects can't be estimated for interaction terms since the value of an interaction term can't change separately from the values of its component terms.

The substantive finding here is that political interest plays a major role in shaping economic attitudes, by permitting individuals to convert their political predispositions into strong and divided statist opinions. Our results also suggest that the most politically aware tend to align on the pro- and anti-statist stances of their respective political elites, while the least sophisticated look the same and adopt average attitudes. This recalls that citizens are not equally permeable to the underlying ideological differences of their economic attitudes.

Figure 4: Support for State for Ideological Groups Depending on Political Interest (Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals)



## Micro- and Macro-Dynamics of Support for State in the European Union

### From Parallel Publics and to Parallel Countries

Multilevel modeling stresses two crucial results. Support for state is significantly more important in 2008 and 1999 than in 1990, but it is also significantly different among social groups. The “parallel publics” thesis entails a different story we now turn to. One blind spot of the overall movement of the Europeans toward more state is that it may conceal different, if not opposite changes among subgroups. This blind spot is well-known (see e.g., Page and Shapiro 1992; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). The question therefore becomes: To what extent the liberal trend identified at an aggregated level, is mirrored among different subpublics?

Figures 5 and 6 plot the regression lines drawn through scatterplots of predicted values for different social groups. These predictions stem from a model that replicates Model 3, but in which we also estimated the variance of random slopes for the EVS waves. Computing random slopes in addition to random intercepts is a next step in multilevel modeling. It deals with the fact that an explanatory variable may have a differential effect within levels, out of

its mean effect across levels. With Model 3bis, we let countries and waves vary together, thus testing the hypothesis that the influence of context on statist attitudes may be different from one country to another. The predicted values displayed in Figures 5 and 6 are computed from both individual- and country-levels. They include linear predictions from the fixed-effects part of the model and contributions based on predicted random effects.

The two figures show a remarkably similar pattern. Between 1990 and 2008, all social groups have shifted toward more statist positions. This is true for gender and age groups. Employment and income groups appear to be more polarized, especially between the unemployed and the self-employed who exhibit a large gap in terms of predicted values. But both subpublics have developed an increasing support for state. The same applies to educational and ideological groups. Though the left and the right show very different levels of support, they evolve in concert.

We can figure out more precisely the size of these gaps by projecting them on a ten-point scale. For example, the gap between left- and rightwing identifiers represents a difference of 0.63 in terms of predicted values (the mean value equals -0.34 for rightists and 0.29 for leftists). Since the range for predicted values equals 2.68 (-1.51 to +1.17), this difference would be tantamount to a gap of 2.35 on a ten-point scale ( $0.63 \times 10 / 2.68$ ). We can estimate the same way the gaps between the unemployed and the self-employed (2.57) or between the rich and the poor (1.38). Still, reasoning in terms of average predicted values is very misleading since mean values do not correspond to any real observation. Should we consider the more concrete gap between a leftist unemployed women and a rightist self-employed man, it would represent more than half of a ten-point scale (5.15). The crucial result here is that even though they move in tandem, the Europeans remain fiercely divided over statist attitudes.

Figure 5: Support for State for Different Subgroups Depending on EVS Wave (Predicted Values)




Figure 6: Support for State for Different Subgroups Depending on EVS Wave (Predicted Values)





Figure 7 tells quite the same story of uniform movements across countries. It clearly shows that between 1990 and 2008, statist attitudes have been increasing in nineteen of our twenty-three countries. In Bulgaria, Portugal and Romania, the regression line is flat though slightly downward, suggesting that statist attitudes might be more stable than decreasing. The regression line is much steeper in United-Kingdom, confirming the Brits growing rejection of state intervention (Park and National Centre for Social Research 2012). Our results are somewhat at odds with post-materialist hypotheses assuming that individuals should be more and more attracted by personal autonomy and self-accomplishment values (Inglehart 1977). Contrasting with the idea that Europeans would gradually get free from the material need for state protection, we find that both materialist and post-materialist values may coexist in times of economic crisis.

Another substantive finding stems from the random effects component of Model 3bis. In this model, the covariance between the intercepts and the slopes is highly significant, with a correlation of -0.9065. It means that the variations between the average levels of support for state among countries, are strongly and negatively linked with the variations between the average levels of supports among survey years. Put more simply, differences between the European countries tend to shorten from one EVS wave to the other<sup>13</sup>. This indicates a converging move of European Union countries toward an increasing demand for state protection, as one can guess by looking at the global graph displayed at the bottom right of Figure 7.

<sup>13</sup> We are therefore entitled to estimate random slopes in our further analysis.



Figure 7: Support for State in European Union Countries Depending on EVS Wave (Predicted Values)



### Who Moves when Support for State is Rising?

Though our results tend to prove right the “parallel publics” thesis for the European case, one question remains unsettled: Have social groups been moving in the same proportions? Put differently, who makes the liberal mood move? In the literature, this question usually addresses elites influence within public opinion: How far the changes in the general public are driven by the changes of the most sophisticated or the most enlightened segments of the population, presumed as being the most responsive to changes (e.g., Enns and Kellstedt 2008)?

We provide some answers with Figure 8. It compares the slope coefficients of the subpublics graphed in Figures 5 and 6. It also displays in which quartile of the predicted variable, the coefficient for each subgroup is located in 1990 and in 2008. It is a simple way of presenting the starting point, the direction and the amplitude of each subgroup movement. Figure 8 shows that all subgroups kind of move in tandem and roughly at the same speed, generally shifting from one quartile to the upper quartile.


Two of the most averse subgroups to state intervention – i.e., the wealthiest respondents (0.41) and the right-wing identifiers (0.38) – display coefficients slightly superior to the average coefficient (0.28), perhaps indicating some kind of catching up with the prevailing pro-welfare opinion<sup>14</sup>. The same catch-up phenomenon with the liberal mood may

<sup>14</sup> In line with Ura and Ellis results (2008), this finding also suggests that the wealthy may show a higher responsiveness to their changing environment.

be at work among the most educated, which are shifting from Q1 to Q3. Still, since all educational groups show very similar coefficients, we can conclude with Enns and Kellsted (2008) that the most educated do not contribute to the overall change more than the others. Looking at the least mobile subgroups, we can notice that they are either alienated from politics (income DKNA, political interest DKNA), either distant from the labor market (retired, non-workers and somehow the self-employed); which might explain why there are less responsive to economic and political stimuli.

Another important question is how intently the liberal mood moves? Coefficients displayed in Figure 8 may seem quite weak. Between 1990 and 2008, an “average” European will indeed see its statist score increase by 0.28 on a scale of predicted values ranging from -1.51 to +1.17. Projected on a ten-point scale, it represents a minor shift of one point in 18 years ( $0.28 \times 10 / 2.68$ ). However, as mentioned above, this is a very abstract reasoning. If we consider a leftist unemployed women, the slope coefficient would jump to 0.6 and entail a shift by 2.5 points on the same ten-point scale. Moreover, we must keep in mind that the shift predicted here is a systematic one. The same woman should in fact move by 2.5 points on all ten-point scales encompassed by the dependent variable; which is not the most likely outcome with regard to the non-ideological nature of economic attitudes. Still, our results are consistent with Page and Shapiro’s general thesis: Opinion changes are rare and proceed at a slow pace when they occur.

Figure 8: Correlations between Support for State and EVS Waves



## How Inequalities and Public Policies Shape Support for State

Following the literature on welfare retrenchment and attitudes toward government in times of economic crisis (e.g., Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby 1999; Castles, Leibfried, and Lewis 2010), we posit that the increasing support for state expresses a growing demand for state protection in Europe. We also posit that this demand is a way for the general public to answer to inequalities rising or perceived as rising. Thus we elicit respondents living in countries being or becoming unequal to be more supportive of the state than respondents living in more equal countries. We also elicit public expenditure to play an important part. According to welfare regimes theory, we hypothesize that historically rooted architectures of welfare states promote peculiar norms and values among the public. Notably, we expect people living in social democratic welfare regimes (i.e., Denmark, Finland, Netherlands or Sweden) to exhibit a higher support for public spending (Larsen 2006).

To test these hypotheses, we use the Gini coefficient from 1999 to 2008. Most of the information comes from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions Database (EU-SILC). It has been completed with World Income Inequality Database for the few countries where the Gini values were not documented by EU-SILC in 1999. From Eurostat Database, we also retrieve the total expenditure on social protection per head of population between 2000 and 2008. The influence of these macro-indicators on support for state is estimated with two different multilevel models. Gender, age, age at completion of education, income household and political orientation are introduced as control variables.

Looking first at model 6 in Table 3, we can observe that, as expected, the Gini coefficient in 2008 has a significant impact on statist attitudes when individual variables are controlled for. The higher the Gini in a country, the more important the probability its inhabitants foster state intervention. It seems plausible to hypothesize that people living in unequal countries are inclined to endorse strong preferences for state protection and to favor generous public policies.

More subtle variations appear when we consider the Gini evolution in Europe. One could think that the probability of supporting state would be higher in growing unequal countries. This is far from being the case. On the opposite, public demand is less important in countries where the Gini coefficient has been increasing between 1999 and 2008. This finding can be explained in two ways. First, it is consistent with the thermostatic model of responsiveness. When inequality rises, the general public responds by asking for less state intervention (Kelly and Enns 2010). Alternatively, our finding also complies with symbolic politics theory. Increasing inequalities usually weaken public trust in institutions. Thus they may lower support for state intervention.

Since we have computed a cross-level interaction between low-income and Gini evolution, we can assume that this effect is particularly relevant for the poor. They are significantly less in favor of state intervention when they live in a country where income inequalities have been rising. This result also suggests that sociotropic preferences matter and that they can even offset the influence of egotropic preferences<sup>15</sup>. We have also tested the linear combination between Gini and social expenses evolutions, to assess whether increasing social expenses can moderate increasing inequalities. But this variable does not appear to be significant<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> With sociotropic evaluations, individuals mostly take into account the overall performance of their economy (Kiewiet 1983).

<sup>16</sup> The significance of the coefficients is a tricky question in multilevel models since tests of significance with standard-errors are not relevant for the variance components. Macro-level variables raise another problem. Since we have an exhaustive list of countries, we should strictly speaking neglect statistical inference and focus on comparing the coefficients.

The impact of social expenses is not congruent with what is expected. Model 7 shows that public demand for state protection is lower among people living in countries with strong spending on social protection in 2008 (in descending order, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, France and Belgium). This somewhat contradicts welfare regimes theory. As Figure 6 also illustrates, support for state can indeed be higher in Eastern and Southern Europe than in social democratic or Christian welfare regimes. Still, we find the unemployed to be significantly more supportive of state in countries with high social expenses. This demonstrates that all subpublics do not necessarily develop the same attitudes toward welfare policy. In some cases, self-interest may prevail over social norms originating from institutional arrangements.

Model 7 also highlights that public spending evolution does not necessarily moderate public demand for state intervention. Rather, support for state significantly increases when social expenses increase. Although we also find that the unemployed exhibit a decreasing support for state in countries with increasing social expenses, the crucial result here is that the general public does not always follow a thermostatic pattern – i.e., claim for less state protection when social spending grows, and vice versa (Soroka and Wlezien 2004; Brooks and Manza 2007) –. Notably, computing a linear combination between Gini and social expenses evolutions, we find that support for state not only raises when social expenses increase, but also raises when Gini increases along with social expenses. This demonstrates that even if rising income inequalities exert a strong moderating influence on support for state, this influence is not sufficient to counteract the leverage effect of increasing social expenses on public demand for state.

Table 3: Multilevel Analysis of Public Support for State in the European Union (1990-2008)

	Model 6		Model 7	
	Estimate	Std. Err.	Estimate	Std. Err.
Women	0.187***	(0.007)	0.187***	(0.007)
Age (std)	-0.00972*	(0.004)	-0.0101*	(0.004)
Age completed education (std)	-0.0755***	(0.004)	-0.0760***	(0.004)
Political orientation (std)	-0.106***	(0.004)	-0.106***	(0.004)
Income (std)	-0.0671***	(0.003)	-0.0664***	(0.003)
EVS 1999 (ref. EVS 1990)	0.176***	(0.029)	0.177***	(0.029)
EVS 2008	0.266***	(0.055)	0.265***	(0.055)
GINI (std)	0.0853**	(0.029)		
GINI evolution (std)	-0.0832**	(0.027)		
Income -- x GINI (std)	0.0001	(0.009)		
Income -- x GINI evolution (std)	-0.0227*	(0.099)		
Social expenses (std)			-0.0817**	(0.030)
Social expenses evolution (std)			0.0646*	(0.030)
GINI evolution x Social expenses evolution (std)	0.0618	(0.027)	0.0687*	(0.033)
Unemployed x Social expenses (std)			0.0755***	(0.017)
Unemployed x Social expenses evolution (std)			-0.0415*	(0.016)
Intercept	0.213***	(0.049)	0.212***	(0.054)
	Estimate	Std. Err.	Estimate	Std. Err.
Residual variance (individual-level)	0.921	(0.005)	0.921	(0.005)
Random intercept variance (country-level)	0.114	0.036	0.133	(0.041)
Variance slope (EVS wave)	0.017	(0.005)	0.017	(0.005)
Covariance random intercept/slope (EVS wave)	-0.041	(0.013)	-0.045	(0.014)
N individual-level)	65856		65856	
N (country-level)	23		23	
Intraclass correlation coefficient (%)	1.81		1.83	
Deviance	181670		181661	
AIC	181704		181695	
BIC	181859		181850	

std=standardized; \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

## Discussion and Conclusion

A growing body of empirical studies have investigated economic attitudes in the US since the 70s. Using comparable data in twenty-three countries of the European Union, the results presented in this article strongly confirm for the European case most of what previous scholars have shown for the American case.

While the popular belief depicts Europeans as averse to capitalism and nurtured by a “passion for equality”, we find that their economic attitudes are not as consistent as one might think. Though distrust of capitalism is growing among European countries, Europeans are not “ideological”. They do not perceive liberal and conservative preferences as exclusive. This substantive finding can be reconciled with recent studies demonstrating that most Americans are “conservative egalitarians” and mix philosophical conservatism with operational liberalism (Bartels 2008; Page and Jacobs 2009; Marsden 2012).

Our results also comply with the literature about over-time parallelism in attitudinal changes. Between 1990 and 2008, all Europeans have moved in quite the same proportions toward more support for state. The EVS data used in this article hence provide no evidence of economic values convergence among subgroups. With regard to statist attitudes, huge differences remain within the European public and these differences have basically been translated. We notably observe a wide, permanent attitudinal gap between the left and the right. In addition, this gap increases when leftists and rightists are more interested in politics. Contrary to the scientific belief that ideological cleavages have been weakening in Old Europe (Clark and Lipset 2001), our results lead to the conclusion that ideology still matters; and even seems to matter much for the Europeans when it comes to statist attitudes.

However, these parallel movements are not necessarily driven by similar rationales. The “parallel publics” thesis assumes that subpublics have a common understanding of economic and political stimuli coming from their environment. Thus they can respond accordingly and move in the same direction. Our results only partly verify this assumption. On one hand, we find that the poor and the general public evenly react to rising inequalities by becoming more statist. But on the other hand, we also find that the general public is more supportive of state when social expenses increase, while the unemployed become less statist. The same kind of discrepancy may be at work between left- and rightwing Europeans. Even though they both display an increasing support for state at the aggregate level, they may become more statist for very different reasons. Qualitative methods could bring further insights on how social groups perceive state responsibility in times of economic crisis. In-depth interviews would also prove relevant to probe into the arguments people advance when they oppose the liberal mood.

Our findings are finally useful for policy makers since they help to understand why welfare retrenchment remains a controversial issue in Europe. It is tempting to consider the growing support for state as a popular reply to what is sometimes pictured as a conservative consensus of the political elites. We must stress that these parallel publics do not really constitute parallel, silent majorities. European public opinion remains very composite. It combines an increasing demand for state with deeply rooted conservative preferences. So, what is at stake with the liberal mood may not only be the growing mismatch between citizens’ expectations and the capacity of European political elites to respond to them. But, more subtly, the capacity of elites to meet the public’s growing demand for state protection without upsetting its conservative views of the economic realm.

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## Support Information

### Summary of Variables and Descriptive Statistics

Wording	Type	Mean (1)	Standard deviation (1)
(1) Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas (10) Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people	Numerical (1-10)	4,15	2,33
(1) Private ownership of business and industry should be increased (10) Government ownership of business and industry should be increased	Numerical (1-10)	4,89	2,30
(1) Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves (10) The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for	Numerical (1-10)	4,70	2,57
(1) People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits (10) People who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want	Numerical (1-10)	4,50	2,69
(1) Incomes should be made more equal (10) There should be greater incentives for individual effort	Numerical (1-10)	5,95	2,75
(1) I find that both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance (2) Certainly both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong (3) Neither	Categorical (1, 2, 3)	-	-

(1) European Union 2008, n=27.

### Evolution of Conservative Positions on Economic Issues Depending on Countries (% $\Delta$ 2008-1990)

	Competition good (1-4)	Private ownership increased (1-4)	Incentives to individual efforts (7- 10)	Freedom above equality	Unemployed take any job (1-4)	Individual responsibility (1-4)
Austria	-20	-29	-33	-12	-10	-19
Belgium	-7	-6	-7	-5	5	-7
Bulgaria	-8	-24	8	13	30	3
Czech Republic	-24	-23	-30	-14	6	-7
Denmark	0	-10	7	2	-4	-11
Estonia	-17	-31	-30	-14	20	7
Finland	-24	-28	-32	-19	-23	-6
France	-19	-13	-2	-7	-21	-10
Germany	-2	-19	-31	-7	8	5

Great Britain	2	-5	-21	-6	18	23
Hungary	-17	-36	-21	3	16	7
Ireland	-8	-14	-23	0	2	8
Italy	-9	-12	1	-3	0	-9
Latvia	-18	-27	-11	-10	20	14
Lithuania	-26	-13	-37	-20	9	20
Netherlands	-7	-3	-6	6	10	-2
Poland	-14	-12	-38	4	-4	3
Portugal	-2	-9	10	-1	1	11
Romania	-8	-3	-39	6	10	15
Slovak Republic	-6	-18	-18	-1	17	16
Slovenia	-11	-14	-33	22	-8	7
Spain	-16	-16	-3	6	-14	-2
Sweden	-8	-7	-30	-8	-9	-19
European Union (23)	-10	-15	-18	-3	1	1

#### Coefficient Estimates for Multilevel Linear Regression Models

	Model 4		Model 5	
	Estimate	t-value	Estimate	t-value
Women	0.152***	(20.15)	0.151***	(19.85)
Age (std)	-0.000521	(-0.12)	0.0102*	(2.37)
Age completed educ. (std)	-0.058***	(-13.97)	-0.066***	(-15.91)
Worker (ref. Self-employed)	0.236***	(13.80)	0.244***	(14.25)
Unemployed	0.523***	(23.25)	0.565***	(25.17)
Retired or non-worker	0.245***	(13.82)	0.277***	(15.63)
Employment status DKNA	0.246***	(6.58)	0.282***	(7.54)
EVS 1999 (ref. EVS 1990)	0.164***	(17.91)	0.133***	(13.52)
EVS 2008	0.250***	(26.63)	0.222***	(23.62)
Left (ref. Right)	0.926***	(36.99)	0.356***	(12.52)
Center	0.416***	(18.28)	0.190***	(7.90)
Political orientation DKNA	0.475***	(14.59)	0.213***	(8.79)
Income - - (Q1) (ref. ++)	0.452***	(18.04)		
Income - (Q2)	0.426***	(17.54)		
Income + (Q3)	0.253***	(9.65)		
Income DKNA	0.287***	(10.45)		
Left*Q1	-0.441***	(-12.63)		
Left*Q2	-0.427***	(-12.51)		
Left*Q3	-0.292***	(-7.88)		
Left*Income DKNA	-0.476***	(-12.22)		
Center*Q1	-0.171***	(-5.48)		
Center*Q2	-0.211***	(-6.88)		
Center*Q3	-0.122***	(-3.66)		
Center*Income DKNA	-0.195***	(-5.60)		
Political orientation DKNA*Q1	-0.215***	(-5.48)		
Political orientation DKNA*Q2	-0.231***	(-5.85)		
Political orientation DKNA*Q3	-0.123**	(-2.86)		
Political orientation DKNA*Income DKNA	-0.179***	(-4.24)		
Political interest - (ref. - -)			-0.0822**	(-2.98)
Political interest +			-0.182***	(-7.28)

Political interest ++			-0.317***	(-11.77)
Political interest DKNA			-0.0154	(-0.46)
Left*Political interest-			0.112**	(2.91)
Left*Political interest+			0.272***	(7.73)
Left*Political interest++			0.622***	(16.83)
Left*Political interest DKNA			0.0467	(1.01)
Center*Political interest-			0.0315	(0.96)
Center*Political interest+			0.107***	(3.53)
Center*Political interest++			0.193***	(5.73)
Center*Political interest DKNA			0.0402	(1.02)
Political orientation DKNA*Political interest-			0.0557	(1.61)
Political orientation DKNA*Political interest+			0.131***	(3.88)
Political orientation DKNA*Political interest++			0.145***	(3.84)
Political orientation DKNA*Political interest DKNA			0.0888*	(2.19)
Intercept	-1.062***	(-26.54)	-0.624***	(-14.47)
	Estimate	Std. Err.	Estimate	Std. Err.
Residual variance (individual-level)	0.892	(0.005)	0.895	(0.005)
Random intercept variance (country-level)	0.238	(0.007)	0.265	(0.008)
N individual-level)	65856		65856	
N (country-level)	23		23	
Intraclass correlation coefficient (%)	2.60		2.88	
Deviance	-179503		-179717	
AIC	179565		179779	
BIC	179847		180061	

std=standardized; \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001