A sharing mechanism for superadditive and non-superadditive logistics cooperation

Abstract : The lack of a stable, fair and generally applicable sharing mechanism is one of the most noticeable impediments to the implementation of logistics cooperation. Most of the current literature on the sharing mechanism in logistics cooperation focuses on superadditive logistics cooperation games, neglecting the probable occurrence of other types of games resulting from coordination cost and unequal partners. In this work, we propose a sharing model based on game theoretic solutions, taking account of the bargaining power of players to identify a fair in-Core allocation. Under full cooperation assumption, we generalize this model for non-superadditive logistics cooperation games with coordination costs at different levels. The games with empty Core are also studied within the model.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00876006
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Submitted on : Wednesday, October 23, 2013 - 2:26:34 PM
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Xiaozhou Xu, Shenle Pan, Eric Ballot. A sharing mechanism for superadditive and non-superadditive logistics cooperation. International Conference on Industrial Engineering and System Management, Oct 2013, Rabat, Morocco. ⟨halshs-00876006⟩

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