A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes

Abstract : The Shapley value is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition N when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general model of coalition formation where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need not finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which is weaker than the one in the original paper but allows a much more transparent correctness proof. Moreover, the logical independence of the axioms is proved.
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Ulrich Faigle, Michel Grabisch. A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes. 2013. ⟨halshs-00841259⟩

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