Does bargaining matter in the small firms matching model?
Olivier L’haridon
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 173019
- IdHAL : olivier-lharidon
- ORCID : 0000-0001-8786-4765
- IdRef : 067070744
Sébastien Pérez-Duarte
- Fonction : Auteur
Résumé
In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm's matching model of unemployment. First, we show that the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are easily implementable within search-matching economies. Second, our results show that even though the traditional results of bargaining theory apply in the context of search-matching economies, they are quantitatively weaker than expected compared to the results established in the earlier literature. In addition, and excluding a model with on-the-job search, it appears that the policy implications of labor taxes and employment protection are not very sensitive to the choice of the bargaining solution.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Does bargaining matter in the small firms matching model?
|
Résumé |
en
In this article, we use a stylized model of the labor market to investigate the effects of three alternative and well-known bargaining solutions. We apply the Nash, the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions in the small firm's matching model of unemployment. First, we show that the Egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are easily implementable within search-matching economies. Second, our results show that even though the traditional results of bargaining theory apply in the context of search-matching economies, they are quantitatively weaker than expected compared to the results established in the earlier literature. In addition, and excluding a model with on-the-job search, it appears that the policy implications of labor taxes and employment protection are not very sensitive to the choice of the bargaining solution.
|
Auteur(s) |
Olivier L’haridon
1, 2, 3
, Franck Malherbet
4, 5
, Sébastien Pérez-Duarte
1
CREM -
Centre de recherche en économie et management
( 894 )
- 7 place Hoche, BP 86514
35065 RENNES CEDEX
- France
2
IUF -
Institut universitaire de France
( 56663 )
- Maison des Universités 103 Boulevard Saint-Michel 75005 Paris
- France
3
TEPP -
Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques
( 188024 )
- Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée
5 boulevard Descartes - Champs sur Marne
Bâtiment Camus
77454 Marne-la-Vallée Cedex 2
- France
4
X-DEP-ECO -
Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique
( 444480 )
- École Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau Cedex
- France
5
CREST -
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
( 2579 )
- 5, Avenue Henry Le Chatelier
91120 Palaiseau
- France
|
Page/Identifiant |
42-58
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2013
|
Volume |
21
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Search and matching models, bargaining theory, Nash, egalitarian, Kalai-Smorodinsky
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.labeco.2012.12.002 |
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