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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2010

Empiricism, Rational Belief and Objectivity

Résumé

There are several ways of conceiving objectivity -- scientific objectivity in particular -- and, accordingly, several ways of defending or attacking particular construals of it. According to one conception sometimes labelled "realism", objectivity in science is a semantic, modal and metaphysical notion: a scientific theory is objective insofar as it tells the truth about the way the world is independently of its epistemic accessibility to us. So, for instance, the Newtonian theory of gravition is objective insofar as it tells the truth about the motion of particles submitted to gravitational forces. What it tells us, the realist contends, holds or is the case whether or not the physical world is accessible to us. The conception is semantic insofar as the notion of truth is involved, modal insofar as the conception of the possibility of a mind-independent natural world is involved and metaphysical insofar as a conception of a certain way the world is is involved. Philosophers as diverse as Berkeley, Kant and Dummett's antirealist will then ask: if this were the case, how could we know anything about it ? How could we even form a bona fide conception of its possibility ?

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halshs-00792193 , version 1 (21-02-2013)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00792193 , version 1

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Fabrice Pataut. Empiricism, Rational Belief and Objectivity. Philosophy of Science, Sep 2010, Odessa, Ukraine. ⟨halshs-00792193⟩
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