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Article Dans Une Revue History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences Année : 2005

Chance, Explanation, and Causation in Evolutionary Theory

Résumé

Chance comes into plays at many levels of the explanation of the evolutionary process; but the unity of sense of this category is problematic. The purpose of this talk is to clarify the meaning of chance at various levels in evolutionary theory: mutations, genetic drift, genetic revolutions, ecosystems, macroevolution. Three main concepts of chance are found at these various levels: luck (popular concept), randomness (probabilistic concept), and contingency relative to a given theoretical system (epistemological concept). After identifying which concept(s) of chance fit(s) with these levels, the question is raised whether these concepts can be reduced to a smaller number, and whether chance in evolutionary theory has a subjective or an objective sense.
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halshs-00791572 , version 1 (21-02-2013)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00791572 , version 1

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Jean Gayon. Chance, Explanation, and Causation in Evolutionary Theory. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 2005, 27, pp.387-397. ⟨halshs-00791572⟩
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