Strong Emergence and Freedom - Comment on Stephan

Max Kistler (1, 2)

1 IHPST - Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques
2 PLC - Philosophie, Langages et Cognition

This chapter makes three critical comments on A. Stephan's chapter 'An Emergentist's Perspective on the Problem of Free Will' and a constructive suggestion for a compatibilist position making use of emergent properties. First, Stephan's 'horizontal emergence' is not synchronic and his 'vertical reduction' requires three steps, not two: indeed, finding a role filler is different from giving a mechanistic explanation of this role filler. Second, unpredictability except by simulation is neither necessary nor sufficient for diachronic structure emergence. Third, Singer's thesis that some part /p/ of the process leading to a free action is conscious, in the sense that /p/ causes a conscious state /m/, is incompatible with the thesis that /m/ is identical with, or supervenes on, /p/, because identity and supervenience are non‐causal relations. Finally, a compatibilist position is sketched according to which our actions are determined by psychological laws at the level of strongly emergent mental properties.

Mots clés: emergence; freedom; free will; determination; compatibilism; reduction; synchronic; diachronic; consciousness

Domaines: Histoire, Philosophie et Sociologie des sciences

Max Kistler. Strong Emergence and Freedom - Comment on Stephan. Cynthia Macdonald, Graham Macdonald, eds. Emergence in mind, Oxford University Press, pp.240-251, 2010, Mind Association Occasional Series, ⟨10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0016⟩. ⟨halshs-00775616⟩