K. Abbink, Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: an experimental study, European Journal of Political Economy, vol.20, issue.4, pp.887-906, 2004.
DOI : 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.10.008

K. Abbink and H. Et-hennig-schmidt, Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment, Experimental Economics, vol.65, issue.3-4, pp.2-103, 2006.
DOI : 10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z

K. Abbink, B. Irlenbusch, and E. Et-renner, The moonlighting game, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.42, issue.2, pp.265-277, 2000.
DOI : 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00089-5

K. Abbink, B. Irlenbusch, and E. Et-renner, An Experimental Bribery Game, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol.18, issue.2, pp.428-454, 2002.
DOI : 10.1093/jleo/18.2.428
URL : http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/18/2/428

J. Alm, B. Jackson, and M. Et-mckee, Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance, American Economic Review, vol.82, issue.4, pp.1018-1026, 1992.

J. Alm, G. H. Mcclelland, and W. D. Et-schulze, Why do people pay taxes?, Journal of Public Economics, vol.48, issue.1, pp.121-159, 1992.
DOI : 10.1016/0047-2727(92)90040-M

O. Ashenfelter and D. E. Et-bloom, Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence, American Economic Review, vol.74, pp.111-124, 1984.
DOI : 10.3386/w1149

O. Ashenfelter, J. Currie, H. S. Farber, and M. Spiegel, An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems, Econometrica, vol.60, issue.6, pp.1407-1433, 1992.
DOI : 10.2307/2951527

L. Babcock and G. Et-loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.11, issue.1, pp.109-126, 1997.
DOI : 10.1257/jep.11.1.109

L. Babcock and G. Et-pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral Approach, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.28, issue.2, pp.2-341, 1999.
DOI : 10.1086/468054

G. S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Journal of Political Economy, vol.76, pp.2-169, 1968.
DOI : 10.1002/9780470752135.ch25

G. S. Becker, M. Grossman, K. M. Et, and . Murphy, Rational Addiction and the Effect of Price on Consumption, American Economic Review, vol.81, pp.2-237, 1991.

G. S. Becker and K. M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, Journal of Political Economy, vol.96, issue.4, pp.675-700, 1988.
DOI : 10.1086/261558

M. K. Block and V. E. Et-gerety, Some Experimental Evidence on Differences between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.24, issue.1, pp.1-123, 1995.
DOI : 10.1086/467954

G. E. Bolton and E. Et-katok, Reinterpreting Arbitration's Narcotic Effect: An Experimental Study of Learning in Repeated Bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior, vol.25, issue.1, pp.1-1, 1998.
DOI : 10.1006/game.1997.0633

G. E. Bolton and R. Zwick, Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior, vol.10, issue.1, pp.1-95, 1995.
DOI : 10.1006/game.1995.1026

G. B. Chapman and B. H. Et-bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, Applied Cognitive Psychology, vol.10, pp.6-519, 1996.

R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, The Journal of Law and Economics, vol.3, pp.1-44, 1960.
DOI : 10.1086/466560

R. Cooter, Expressive Law And Economics, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.27, issue.S2, pp.585-608, 1998.
DOI : 10.1086/468036
URL : http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.589.6796

D. L. Coursey, E. Hoffman, and M. L. Et-spitzer, Fear and Loathing in the Coase Theorem: Experimental Tests Involving Physical Discomfort, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.16, issue.1, pp.1-217, 1987.
DOI : 10.1086/467829

R. Croson, Experimental Law and Economics, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, vol.5, issue.1, pp.25-44, 2009.
DOI : 10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131609

C. A. Deck and A. Farmer, Bargaining over an Uncertain Value: Arbitration Mechanisms Compared, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol.23, issue.3, pp.3-547, 2007.
DOI : 10.1093/jleo/ewm012

D. Dickinson, A comparison of Conventional, Final Offer, and Combined Arbitration for Dispute Resolution, Industrial & Labor Relations Review, vol.57, pp.2-288, 2003.

N. Eber and M. Et-willinger, L'Économie expérimentale, p.123, 2005.

A. Falk, E. Fehr, and U. Et-fischbacher, On the Nature of Fair Behavior, Economic Inquiry, vol.41, pp.1-20, 2003.

H. S. Farber, An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.5, issue.4, pp.683-705, 1980.
DOI : 10.1177/002200278002400407

H. S. Farber, Splitting-the-Difference in Interest Arbitration, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol.35, pp.1-70, 1981.

Y. Gabuthy and N. Et-jacquemet, Une ??valuation exp??rimentale des modes ??lectroniques de r??solution des litiges, Revue ??conomique, vol.58, issue.6, pp.6-1309, 2007.
DOI : 10.3917/reco.586.1309
URL : http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_586_1309

Y. Gabuthy and N. Et-jacquemet, Économie expérimentale et droit, Analyse économique du droit, Deffains B. et Langlais E. (éds), pp.335-369, 2009.

Y. Gabuthy, N. Jacquemet, and N. Et-marchand, Does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements? Experimental evidence, European Economic Review, vol.52, issue.2, pp.2-259, 2008.
DOI : 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.04.004
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00259453

R. Galbiati and P. Et-vertova, Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games, Games and Economic Behavior, vol.64, issue.1, pp.1-146, 2008.
DOI : 10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.004

J. P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.2, issue.2, pp.2-279, 1973.
DOI : 10.1086/467499

J. Gruber and B. Et-koszegi, Is Addiction "Rational"? Theory and Evidence, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.116, issue.4, pp.1261-1303, 2001.
DOI : 10.1162/003355301753265570

F. Guala, On the scope of experiments in economics: comments on Siakantaris, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol.26, issue.2, pp.2-261, 2002.
DOI : 10.1093/cje/26.2.261

G. W. Harrison and J. A. Et-list, Field Experiments, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.42, issue.4, pp.1009-1055, 2004.
DOI : 10.1257/0022051043004577
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00736951

G. W. Harrison and M. Et-mckee, Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem, The Journal of Law and Economics, vol.28, issue.3, pp.3-653, 1985.
DOI : 10.1086/467104

J. Hicks, The Theory of Wages, p.247, 1932.
DOI : 10.1007/978-1-349-00189-7

E. Hoffman, K. Mccabe, and V. L. Smith, Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, American Economic Review, vol.86, pp.3-653, 1996.
DOI : 10.1017/CBO9780511528347.009

E. Hoffman and M. L. Et-spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, The Journal of Law and Economics, vol.25, issue.1, pp.1-73, 1982.
DOI : 10.1086/467008

E. Hoffman and M. L. Et-spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.14, issue.2, pp.2-259, 1985.
DOI : 10.1086/467773

E. Hoffman and M. L. Et-spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.15, issue.1, pp.1-149, 1986.
DOI : 10.1086/467807

C. A. Holt and S. K. Et-laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: New Data without Order Effects, American Economic Review, vol.95, issue.3, pp.3-902, 2005.
DOI : 10.1257/0002828054201459

S. Huck, H. Normann, and J. Et-oechssler, Does Information about Competitor's Actions Increase or Decrease Competition in Experimental Oligopoly Markets?, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.18, pp.1-39, 2000.

S. Huck, H. Normann, and J. Et-oechssler, Through Trial and Error to Collusion*, International Economic Review, vol.65, issue.1, pp.1-205, 2004.
DOI : 10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00037-2
URL : http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/series/sfb-373-papers/1999-57/PDF/57.pdf

N. Jacquemet, Microéconomie de la corruption, pp.118-159, 2006.
DOI : 10.3406/rfeco.2006.1586
URL : https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00259459/file/RFESurvey.pdf

N. Jacquemet, J. Rullière, and I. Et-vialle, Contr??le des activit??s ill??gales en pr??sence d'un biais d'optimisme, Revue ??conomique, vol.58, issue.3, pp.3-555, 2007.
DOI : 10.3917/reco.583.0555

N. Jacquemet, J. Rullière, and I. Et-vialle, Monitoring optimistic agents, Journal of Economic Psychology, vol.29, issue.5, pp.5-698, 2008.
DOI : 10.1016/j.joep.2007.10.002
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00272928

C. Jolls and C. R. Et-sunstein, Debiasing through Law, Journal of Legal Studies, vol.35, pp.1-199, 2006.

D. Kahneman, J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Et-thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, Journal of Political Economy, vol.98, pp.6-1325, 1990.

W. M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, The Journal of Law and Economics, vol.14, issue.1, pp.1-61, 1971.
DOI : 10.1086/466704

M. Lefebvre, P. Pestieau, A. Riedl, and M. Et-villeval, Les attitudes sont-elles différentes face à la fraude fiscale et à la fraude sociale ?, 2012.

S. D. Levitt and J. A. Et-list, Field experiments in economics: The past, the present, and the future, European Economic Review, vol.53, issue.1, pp.1-1, 2009.
DOI : 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.12.001

R. D. Mckelvey and T. Et-page, An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem, Experimental Economics, vol.3, pp.3-187, 2000.

G. Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, Northwestern University Law Review, vol.99, pp.3-152, 2005.

C. Montmarquette, L'??conom??trie des donn??es exp??rimentales : d??fis et opportunit??s, ??conomie & pr??vision, vol.182, issue.1, pp.1-7, 2008.
DOI : 10.3406/ecop.2008.7748

A. H. Munnell, A Non-libertarian Paternalist's Reaction to " Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 48th Annual Conference, 2003.

R. B. Myerson and M. A. Et-satterthwaite, Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading, Journal of Economic Theory, vol.29, issue.2, pp.2-265, 1983.
DOI : 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0

H. Normann and B. Et-wallace, The Impact of the Termination Rule on Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment, International Journal of Game Theory, vol.41, pp.3-707, 2012.

T. Offerman, J. Potters, and J. Et-sonnemans, Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment, Review of Economic Studies, vol.69, issue.4, pp.4-973, 2002.
DOI : 10.1111/1467-937X.00233

A. Olken, Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia, Journal of Political Economy, vol.115, issue.2, pp.200-249, 2007.
DOI : 10.1086/517935

M. J. Osborne and A. Et-rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, p.352, 1994.

C. R. Plott, Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.20, issue.4, pp.1485-1527, 1982.

R. A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.2, issue.2, pp.2-399, 1973.
DOI : 10.1086/467503

R. A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, Stanford Law Review, vol.50, issue.5, pp.5-1551, 1998.
DOI : 10.2307/1229305

G. L. Priest and B. Et-klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.13, issue.1, pp.1-1, 1984.
DOI : 10.1086/467732

M. Rabin, Psychology and Economics, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.36, issue.n°1, pp.11-46, 1998.

C. Rehmus, Interest Arbitration " , in Portrait of a Process: Collective Negotiations in Public Employment, pp.212-268, 1979.

J. K. Robbennolt and C. A. Et-studebaker, Anchoring in the courtroom: The effects of caps on punitive damages., Law and Human Behavior, vol.23, issue.3, pp.353-373, 1999.
DOI : 10.1023/A:1022312716354

E. Roe and D. R. Et-just, Internal and External Validity in Economics Research: Tradeoffs between Experiments, Field Experiments, Natural Experiments, and Field Data, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol.91, issue.5, pp.5-1266, 2009.
DOI : 10.1111/j.1467-8276.2009.01295.x

M. Ross and F. Et-sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol.37, pp.3-322, 1979.

A. E. Roth, Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview, The Economic Journal, vol.98, issue.393, pp.393-974, 1988.
DOI : 10.2307/2233717

R. Selten, A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, Where Four Are Few and Six Are Many, International Journal of Game Theory, vol.2, pp.1-141, 1973.

N. D. Siakantaris, Experimental economics under the microscope, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol.24, issue.3, pp.3-267, 2000.
DOI : 10.1093/cje/24.3.267

V. L. Smith, An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior, Journal of Political Economy, vol.70, pp.2-111, 1962.

V. L. Smith, Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science, American Economic Review, vol.72, pp.5-923, 1982.
DOI : 10.1017/CBO9780511528354.018

L. R. Stanley and D. L. Et-coursey, Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to Litigate or Settle, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.19, issue.1, pp.1-145, 1990.
DOI : 10.1086/467845

C. Sunstein and R. Et-thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, pp.1159-1202, 2003.
DOI : 10.1017/cbo9780511618031.039
URL : http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1307&context=law_and_economics

R. H. Thaler and C. R. Et-sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, 2008.

R. E. Thomas, The Trial Selection Hypothesis without the 50 Percent Rule: Some Experimental Evidence, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol.24, issue.1, pp.1-209, 1995.
DOI : 10.1086/467958

A. Tversky and D. Et-kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Science, vol.185, issue.4157, pp.1124-1131, 1974.
DOI : 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124

J. Tyran and L. Et-feld, Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-deterrent*, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol.1, issue.1, pp.1-135, 2006.
DOI : 10.1023/A:1026257921046