Inequality decomposition values: the trade-off between marginality and efficiency

Abstract : This paper presents a general procedure for decomposing income inequality measures by income sources. The methods of decomposition proposed are based on the Shapley value and extensions of the Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games. In particular, we find that Owen's value can find an interesting application in this context.We show that the axiomatization by the potential of Hart and Mas-Colell remains valid in the presence of the domain restriction of inequality indices. We also examine the properties of these decomposition rules and perform a comparison with Shorrocks' decomposition rule properties.
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Submitted on : Tuesday, September 18, 2012 - 3:39:26 PM
Last modification on : Monday, March 4, 2019 - 2:04:14 PM

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Frédéric Chantreuil, Alain Trannoy. Inequality decomposition values: the trade-off between marginality and efficiency. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 2013, 11 (1), pp.83-98. ⟨10.1007/s10888-011-9207-y⟩. ⟨halshs-00733401⟩

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