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Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations

Abstract : We characterize sufficient conditions for full and decentralized disclosure of hard information in organizations with asymmetrically informed and self interested agents with quadratic loss functions. Incentive conflicts arise because agents have different (and possibly interdependent) ideal actions and different incentives to coordinate with each others. A fully revealing sequential equilibrium exists in the disclosure game if each player's ideal action is monotonic in types and types are independently distributed, but may fail to exist with non-monotonic ideal actions or correlated types. When biases between players' ideal actions are constant across states, complete information is the Pareto dominant information structure. In that case, there is a fully revealing sequential equilibrium in which informational incentive constraints are satisfied ex-post, so it exists for all possible prior beliefs, even when players' types are correlated. This existence result applies whether information disclosure is private or public, and is extended to partial certifiability of information.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00652279
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Submitted on : Thursday, December 15, 2011 - 11:17:45 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 19, 2021 - 11:08:50 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, December 4, 2016 - 11:20:18 PM

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00652279, version 1

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Jeanne Hagenbach, Frédéric Koessler. Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations. 2011. ⟨halshs-00652279⟩

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