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Stable syndicates of factor owners and distribution of social output: a Shapley value approach

Abstract : The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive of a player to join a syndicate in an environment of team production and payoff distribution according to Shapley value. We consider an economy in which a single output is produced by an increasing returns to scale production function using two inputs: labor and capital. By assuming that syndicates of factor owners can form, we are interested in their stability, i.e., the willingness of the members of the syndicate to stay in the syndicate. Our analysis, based on the Shapley value, allows us to find a fair imputation of the gains of cooperation and the conditions under which syndicates are stable.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00651185
Contributor : Fabrice Valognes <>
Submitted on : Thursday, December 15, 2011 - 11:25:03 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 14, 2021 - 1:20:51 PM
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Fabrice Valognes, Hélène Ferrer, Guillermo Owen. Stable syndicates of factor owners and distribution of social output: a Shapley value approach. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2012, 39, pp.553-565. ⟨10.1007/s00355-011-0622-6⟩. ⟨halshs-00651185⟩

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