Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Breaking Collusion in Auctions Through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Market

Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00642537
Contributor : Nelly Wirth <>
Submitted on : Friday, November 18, 2011 - 11:37:39 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, October 27, 2020 - 2:34:37 PM

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : halshs-00642537, version 1

Citation

Michel Mougeot, Florence Naegelen, Benjamin Pelloux, Jean-Louis Rullière. Breaking Collusion in Auctions Through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Market. Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2011, 13 (5), pp. 829-856. ⟨halshs-00642537⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

216