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The Qāḍīs of Fuṣṭāṭ–Miṣr under the Ṭūlūnids and the Ikhshīdids: The Judiciary and Egyptian Autonomy

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The second half of the third/ninth and the fourth/tenth centuries are of particular importance for the development of the judiciary in the central lands of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate. At the end of the miḥna and the victory of Sunnism under al-Mutawakkil (r. 232-47/847-61), the caliphate agreed not to interfere in the legal sphere, thus allowing the principal schools of law to complete their development toward their classical structure. In Iraq the qāḍīs were allowed more judicial freedom, thanks to the growing independence of the legal system and to the political weakness of the caliphate, while in Egypt the provincial rulers and two successive dynasties, the Ṭūlūnids (254-92/868-905) and the Ikhshīdids (323-58/935-69), profited from the caliphate’s weakness and imposed their autonomy de facto.

The role played by the judiciary in this process is still unclear, as is the impact of Egyptian autonomy on the development of the local judiciary. In this article, I intend to study the relationship between the Egyptian governors and the judiciary, from the accession of Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn in 254/868 until the arrival of the Fāṭimids in 358/969. My main source of reference is Rafʿ al-ʾisrʿan quḍāt Miṣr, a biographical dictionary written by Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449), which focuses on the history of Egyptian qāḍīs. Although he wrote this dictionary

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4 The only political overview of the judgeship under the Ṭūlūnids is a short chapter in Hassan, Les Tulunides, 222-28. For the Ikhshīdids, see Kāshif, Miṣr fiʾāsr al-ikhshīdiyyīn, 205-27. S. Farrāj’s chapter on judgeship in al-Dawla al-ikhshādīyya (Cairo: Markaz al-Rāya, 2006), 119-25, is a rehashing of Kāshīf’s original work. Some preliminary reflections on the qāḍīs under the Ikhshīdids can be found in the introduction in M. Tillier, Vies des cadis de Miṣr, 237/851-976 (Cairo: IFAO, 2002), 16-33.

5 I will draw on the text edited by Rhuvon Guest, which he appended to his edition of al-Kindī, Kitāb al-Wulāt wa-kitāb al-quadāt (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1912), 501-614. In the following citations, the first
five centuries after the facts, Ibn Ḥajar relies heavily on contemporary works: primarily that of Ibn Zūlāq (d. 386/996), who wrote a now lost Akhbār quḍāt Misr dedicated to the qāḍīs of the Ṭūlūnid and the Ikhshīdīd periods, and secondarily that of Ibn Yūnūs (d. 347/958), author of two biographical dictionaries about Egyptians and strangers who settled in Egypt. Whereas another late author such as Ibn al-Mulaqqin (d. 804/1401-2), who also wrote a book on Egyptian qāḍīs, culled his material in order to construct a hagiographical narrative of judges whom he mostly regards as saints, Ibn Ḥajar did not stray from his sources. Even if he tends to reorganize and synthesize the information provided by his predecessors, as a comparison between his Rafʿ al-ʾiṣr and al-Kindī’s Akhbār quḍāt Misr shows, Ibn Ḥajar usually quotes them faithfully and almost in extenso, avoiding any obvious manipulation. This makes his book a fairly reliable source for the history of the Ṭūlūnid and Ikhshīdīd periods.

In the below several elements will be taken into consideration: (1) the institutional relationship between political power and the judiciary (who appointed the qāḍīs, how were they selected, and did the government choose local scholars or did the qāḍīs come from outside the province?); (2) the financial ties between the governors and the qāḍīs, which were not only symbolic of the delegation of power, but could also denote the subservience of the judiciary to the government; (3) the daily interactions between the qāḍīs and the governors; (4) the judicial practice of the qāḍīs; and (5) their reputation. Although Ibn Ḥajar omits chains of transmitters (isnāds), which probably appeared in Ibn Zūlāq’s book, it is likely that most of the reports regarding qāḍīs were put into circulation and transmitted by elites who were directly concerned with political affairs. Therefore, I assume that the qāḍīs’ biographies...
reflect the views of their contemporaries—other scholars in particular—and the way they looked upon the relationship between the qāḍīs and the government.

**The Ṭūlūnids (254–292/868-905)**

When Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn (r. 254-70/868-84) arrived in Fusṭāṭ as governor (amīr), it had been an established practice for over a century for the caliph to appoint the qāḍī of Fusṭāṭ. The relationship between the judiciary and the central government kept the ambitions of governors in check, since they were no longer the only representatives of the caliph in the province—they had to share power with other officials such as the qāḍī. When Ibn Ṭūlūn sought regional autonomy, two principal problems arose: control of the finances and control of the judiciary. As early as 258/871 Ibn Ṭūlūn discharged Ibn al-Mudabbir, the head of fiscal administration in Egypt, and sent him to Syria. At the same time, he discharged the sāḥib al-barīd, chief of the postal and intelligence services, whose responsibility inter alia was to keep a watch on the province on behalf of the caliphal government. The qāḍī Bakkār b. Qutayba, however, an appointee of the caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 246-70/860-84) and originating from Iraq, held onto his position until his death in 270/884. Ibn Ṭūlūn probably realized that dismissing and replacing Bakkār would be too dangerous. Bakkār was a pious man, respected by the Egyptian populace, and his arbitrary dismissal would have certainly weakened the amir’s position in the province. Moreover, Ibn Ṭūlūn’s political designs relied largely on being able to control income from Egyptian taxes, and the qāḍī Bakkār does not seem to have opposed any of these ambitions. It is also probable that Bakkār was a political asset, from whom Ibn Ṭūlūn expected his government to acquire an aura of legitimacy. However it may be, he chose to keep a qāḍī who was the caliph’s delegate and who received his instructions from Baghdad. This was a risky choice, since Bakkār could easily become a dangerous opponent.

Ibn Ṭūlūn’s policy vis-à-vis the judiciary evolved toward the end of his rule, when a crisis erupted upon Bakkār’s refusing to curse the regent al-Muwaffaq, as requested by Ibn Ṭūlūn. The amir began to hold mazālim or claims court sessions where he dispensed justice

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13 Many reports portray Ibn Ṭūlūn as highly respectful of the scholars, but since we modern historians cannot know whether his actions were dictated by a sincere piety, the cultural environment, and/or a political strategy, we can only consider how his behavior toward the scholars in general and the qāḍīs in particular makes sense in light of his political agenda. In what follows, I will therefore analyze Ibn Ṭūlūn’s relationships with qāḍīs from a political perspective, which is not exclusive of other interpretations.
18 Ibid., 507/58.
himself.\textsuperscript{19} As a consequence, most of the litigants abandoned Bakkār’s court in the mosque, and the old \textit{qāḍī} was left unemployed.\textsuperscript{20} Ibn Ṭūlūn imprisoned Bakkār in 269/883, but never dismissed him officially; he only demanded that the \textit{qāḍī} appoint a deputy who would dispense justice in his stead.\textsuperscript{21} Egyptian judicial autonomy from the caliphate was not yet complete.

It is only after Ibn Ṭūlūn’s death that his successor, his son Khumārawayh (r. 270-82/883-96), completed his work, transforming the judiciary into a provincial institution independent from Baghdad. Bakkār died in 270/884, soon after Ibn Ṭūlūn, but his position was not filled. Khumārawayh succeeded Ibn Ṭūlūn without the caliph’s endorsement, and a war soon broke out between Khumārawayh and the regent al-Muwaqqaf (d. 278/891), which probably prevented the ‘Abbāsid caliphate from appointing a new \textit{qāḍī}.\textsuperscript{22} For seven years, Fustāṭ remained without. Instead, Khumārawayh built up the \textit{maẓālim} court as an important institution and appointed Muḥammad b. ʿAbda as head.\textsuperscript{23} The \textit{maẓālim} exemplified the administration of justice by the political ruler, and by replacing the \textit{qāḍī} by such a court, the new amir probably intended to impose his control over the judgeship.\textsuperscript{24} When his relationship with the central government regained a more peaceful footing,\textsuperscript{25} Khumārawayh took the final step of restoring an official judiciary. In 278/891, Ibn ʿAbda was formally appointed by the caliph al-Muʿtamid (r. 256-79/870-92)—since he was already in charge of the \textit{maẓālim}, it was clear that he answered to the amir.\textsuperscript{26} The right of the Ṭūlūnid amir to appoint his own \textit{qāḍī} was officially acknowledged two years later, in the treaty of 280/893 between Khumārawayh and the caliph al-Muʿtaḍid (r. 279/892-902), in which the Ṭūlūnids were given “for three decades the right to direct Friday prayer, levy the land tax, and to appoint judges and civil/fiscal administrators.”\textsuperscript{27} With the judiciary officially linked to the caliphate during a large part of the Ṭūlūnid period, the amirs had to interact with it cautiously. Ibn Ṭūlūn chose not to impose his

\textsuperscript{19} To assert his legitimacy, Ibn Ṭūlūn wanted to appear a just ruler, which is why he ordered Abū Jaʿfar al-Marwazi to pay off all the debts of the prisoners of the \textit{qāḍī}. Al-Balawi, \textit{Sīrat Ahmad b. Ṭūlūn}, ed. M. Kurd ʿAlī (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, n.d.), 184-85.


\textsuperscript{22} On these events, see Bianquis, “Autonomous Egypt,” 104-105.


\textsuperscript{25} See Wiet, \textit{L’Égypte arabe}, 104.


\textsuperscript{27} Bianquis, “Autonomous Egypt,” 105.
authority on Bakkār by force, but attended his ḥadīth circle regularly and showed considerable respect for his religious knowledge.28 When Ibn Ṭūlūn attended a funeral, it was always he who prayed over the dead person. However, when both he and Bakkār were present, the amir let the qāḍī lead the prayer.29 The prayer over the dead was not just a religious matter: it was usually the prerogative of the highest-ranking person attending the funeral.30 It was, therefore, a symbolic recognition on Ibn Ṭūlūn’s part of Bakkār’s superior religious authority. Moreover, Ibn Ṭūlūn submitted willingly to the judicial process, even renouncing some financial interests in deference to Bakkār’s judgment.31 Bakkār was also able to blame a defendant who had taken an oath before God but who had refused to swear by the head of the amir: Bakkār argued that Ibn Ṭūlūn was merely a human being without suffering any consequences.32 Although Ibn Ṭūlūn’s leniency may be the outcome of his personal respect for the qāḍīs and the Islamic tradition they represented, it can also be read as a political posture. To establish his legitimacy, he had to show that he was supporting the judiciary and thus protecting the quotidian interests of the Egyptians.

The qāḍī’s legal affiliation was not a major concern of the Ṭūlūnids.33 Like Bakkār, Muḥammad b. ‘Abda was a Ḥanafī. However, the last Ṭūlūnid qāḍī, Abū Zurʿa, was a Shāfiʿī. Although the central government usually sent Ḥanafī qāḍīs from Iraq,34 Mālikī and Shāfiʿī law had a long history within the province.35 The Egyptians probably preferred a Mālikī or a Shāfiʿī judge, and it is possible that the Ṭūlūnids initially did not understand local expectations and continued to rely on the Ḥanafī tradition with which they were familiar. Only later did Khumārawayh understand the necessity of appointing a Shāfiʿī judge; perhaps because of his legal affiliation, Abū Zurʿa was regarded as an upright (ʿafīf) qāḍī, in contrast to his Ḥanafī predecessor.36

In exchange for their respect for the judiciary, the Ṭūlūnids asked for the qāḍīs’ political cooperation. Bakkār was expected to attend Ibn Ṭūlūn’s majlis (court) on a regular basis37 and

29 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 509/61.
31 After the death of one of his debtors, Ibn Ṭūlūn asked Bakkār to sell a pious foundation established by the debtor in order to recover his money. Bakkār protested and Ibn Ṭūlūn abandoned his idea. Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 508-509/59-60.
32 Ibid., 511/65.
33 Cf. Hassan, Les Tulunides, 222.
36 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 519/78.
37 Ibid., 511/65. See also an anecdote about Bakkār interpreting Ibn Ṭūlūn’s dreams in al-Dawādārī, Kanz al-durur, 5: 319.
to be seen with the amir on important occasions. Both he and Ibn 'Abda acted as mediators on behalf of the government. When Ibn Ṭūlūn’s son al-ʿAbbās (d. 270/884) revolted against his father in 265/879, Bakkār was ordered to go and bring him back. Muḥammad b. 'Abda helped Khumārawayh regain control of the army after the governor had an argument with high-ranking officers. In addition, the amirs asked the qāḍīs to support them actively with their plan for autonomy. Ibn Ṭūlūn reached the height of his ambition when he invited the caliph al-Muʿtamid to join him in Egypt in 269/883. Al-Muʿtamid was ready to take refuge in Egypt—he was a figurehead in Sāmarrāʾ and effective power was exercised by his brother al-Muwaffaq. The plan failed, however, whereupon Ibn Ṭūlūn convened an assembly of prominent scholars and qāḍīs in Damascus and asked them to depose al-Muwaffaq from his role of heir-presumptive (walī al-ʿāhd) and to curse him. The agreement of the Egyptian qāḍī, Bakkār, was expected to give a strong religious justification for the coup d’état. However, as mentioned above, Ibn Ṭūlūn had misjudged the qāḍī’s loyalty; he refused to support al-Muwaffaq’s deposition and Ibn Ṭūlūn imprisoned him until he died.

The qāḍīs’ political cooperation was acquired by giving financial rewards and offering high salaries. Bakkār received his stipend from the ‘Abbāsid central administration, yet Ibn Ṭūlūn tried to gain his support by offering him a bonus of 1,000 dinars a year. But the pious qāḍī refused to touch this money and eventually gave it back to the amir. Khumārawayh is well known for his generosity, which he regarded as an important way of gaining support.

According to Ibn Ḥajar, he paid Muḥammad b. 'Abda a salary of 3,000 dinars a month.  

39 Al-ʿAbbās exploited the absence of his father, who was heading a military expedition in Syria, to try a coup d'état in Fustāṭ. When Ibn Ṭūlūn, who had been alerted, returned to Egypt, al-ʿAbbās left for Alexandria and then for Barqa with troops and a part of the state treasury. See Wiet, L’Égypte arabe, 95-97; Bianquis, “Autonomous Egypt,” 96.
40 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 221; Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 512/67.
41 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 516/74.
43 Within the framework of his expansionist agenda, Ibn Ṭūlūn occupied Syria in 264/878. He was in Damascus, on his way to Ṭarsūs, when he heard that al-Muʿtamid had left Sāmarrāʾ and was heading to Syria. Ibn Ṭūlūn decided to wait for him in Damascus and to escort him to Egypt. See al-Kindī, Wulāt, 224-26; Bianquis, “Autonomous Egypt,” 101.
47 Hassan, Les Tulunidès, 130ff.
48 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 516/74.
Even if this figure is exaggerated, as suggested by Zaky Mohamed Hassan, Ibn ‘Abda’s salary was much higher than that of his predecessors. Sixty years earlier, the qāḍī ʿĪṣā b. al-Munkadir earned “only” the equivalent of 200 dinars. Ibn ‘Abda was, therefore, a very rich man, who could afford a luxurious house in Fusṭāt. Although Abū Zur‘a’s salary is unknown, he appeared to have been very wealthy, too. He owned large estates in Syria and he threw an extremely expensive feast to celebrate the wedding of his son.

Rewards and high salaries were not only a means to gain the support of the qāḍīs, they were probably also intended to secure the legitimacy of the rulers in an indirect way. The qāḍīs appointed by the Ṭūlūnids spread their wealth and thus gained popularity. By the time Ibn ‘Abda was dismissed and had left Egypt, he was very well liked. Abū Zur‘a was known for his generosity, acting as the benefactor of Egyptians. He even circumvented normal procedures by paying the debts of poor defendants himself. I would like to suggest that his example was not simply a matter of personal generosity, but rather that the Ṭūlūnids expected such behavior. Abū Zur‘a had previously lived in Damascus, where he had a bad reputation. Why did his behavior change once he was appointed in Fusṭāt? The Egyptian rulers gave him the monetary means to carve out a new reputation, one of justice and generosity, which was clearly meant to reflect back on the dynasty itself.

The religious scholars or ʿulamā’, who looked at the rulers with a critical eye, were not fooled by such politics. After Bakkār, the willingness of some qāḍīs to please the governor was all too evident. When Abū Zur‘a first arrived in Egypt, he went straight to Ibn Ṭūlūn’s...
tomb, where he cried and recited the Qur’an. His alliance with the government was later sealed by the marriage of his son to a daughter of the director of finances, Abū Zunbūr al-Mādhārāʾī (d. 317/929). This type of behavior did not make the religious scholars think highly of many Ťūlūnid qāḍīs. Despite his popularity, Ibn ‘Abda was accused of dishonesty when teaching hadīth: he was suspected of transmitting hadīths that he did not actually hear but stole from great masters. Ibn Zūlāq later tried to refute this accusation and suggested that it was due to a misunderstanding. According to him, two hadīth collections containing similar reports were circulating at the same time, and it is only by chance that Ibn ‘Abda’s hadīths were identical to those of other masters. In this light it is highly possible that rumors about his teaching were spread to discredit a qāḍī who was regarded as being too close to the dynasty.

THE ‘ABBĀSID INTERREGNUM (292-323/905-935)

The ‘Abbāsid caliphate re-established its authority in Egypt in 292/905. During the next thirty years, the governors were all sent from central government. The qāḍīs were likewise appointed from Iraq. From 311/924 onward, a hierarchical system of delegation developed: the qāḍī of Fusṭāṭ was theoretically one of the qāḍīs of Baghdad, but the latter never actually came to Egypt, rather he delegated his authority to a deputy (khalīfa), who was in practice the head of the Egyptian judiciary. Such a centralized system of delegation, which developed simultaneously in other provinces, was a way of asserting the caliphate’s authority while seeming to offer flexibility to the local administration of justice.

Despite this system of delegation, which in theory would have allowed the appointment of local jurists, almost all the qāḍīs in this period still came from outside, mostly from Iraq. The only exception is Abū l-Dhikr, an Egyptian from Ikhmīm. This was not a new phenomenon: the Ťūlūnids had maintained the tradition of “importing” qāḍīs from outside, ever since the aftermath of the fourth fitna (civil war) in the early third/ninth century. After
the restoration of ’Abbāsid rule in Egypt, however, the continuing reliance on Iraqi qāḍīs—even non-Ḥanafīs, since Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs also came from Iraq—reinforced the impression that the main offices of state were held by foreigners, and that Egypt was back under the direct supervision of the caliphate.

During the first part of this interregnum, the judiciary symbolized the restoration of legitimate order. The qāḍī would not have been suspected of collaborating with the ruler. To prove their rectitude, the new governors were respectful to the qāḍīs and submitted to their authority. The governor Takīn (r. 297-302/910-15, 307-309/919-21, and 311-21/924-33) sat lower than his station merited (yajlisu dīna martabatihi) while waiting for the qāḍī Abū ’Ubayd ‘Alī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Ḥarb in his court, and Abū Zunbūr al-Mādharāʾī treated the latter with great honor. When a man converted, and then changed his mind and rejected Islam, Takīn began hearing the case at his own court session (majlis), summoning the qāḍī Abū ’Ubayd as a mere advisor. Eventually, however, he did not adjudicate the case himself but let Abū ’Ubayd do it, suggesting that even at the governor’s court the qāḍī was the highest judicial authority. Some qāḍīs used the ruler’s positive attitude toward them to assert their autonomy. For example, the same Abū ’Ubayd refused to call Takīn by his title of “Amir.”

When he arrived in Fusṭāṭ, al-Kurayzī went directly to the mosque and read out his appointment diploma instead of first going to the governor’s palace and greeting him, as was required by custom. And Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm b. Ḥammād, whom Takīn held in high esteem, disobeyed the governor’s instructions at least once.

Some of the earliest qāḍīs during this interregnum had close relationships with the governors, but the overall picture is that the judge was a highly independent moral referee in the province. Abū ’Ubayd was an advisor to Takīn in times of crisis, but he also criticized him and reminded him of the legal consequences of his actions. Thus, the qāḍī established himself as a representative of the people rather than of the government. Abū ’Ubayd took seriously his duty of summoning high-ranking officials accused of misconduct by commoners, and he defended a woman who had complained about al-Mādharāʾī. The

69 Al-Kindī, Wulāṭ, 267-73, 276-78, 280-81.
70 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-ʾiṣr, 525/88. In an assembly, people sat according to their social rank. In the absence of the qāḍī in court, the governor could have claimed his seat. Out of respect for the qāḍī, however, he sat at a lower place and stood up to welcome him, as if he was just an ordinary man.
71 Ibid., 527/90.
72 Ibid., 530/96-97.
73 Ibid., 528/93.
74 Ibid., 534/102.
75 Ibid., 537/105.
76 Ibid., 516-17/74.
77 Ibid., 529/94.
78 By “people,” I mean the group that was not in power. Very rarely do the sources refer to “popular classes” (even the term al-nās often means the notables), and what that might mean in these times can hardly be apprehended. Therefore, the word “people” refers here especially to the civilian elites (to whom belonged the transmitters of our sources) who, although they did not take part in the government, were directly affected by its policy.
79 Ibid., 529-30/95-96.
second qāḍī of the interregnum, Abū l-Dhikr, was appointed in accordance with the wishes of four civil notables, among whom was the Ḥanafī jurist al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933).80

The re-establishment of ʿAbbāsid rule in Egypt thus gave a boost to the development of judicial autonomy. As in Iraq, the government had to show increasing deference to the law and the judiciary. At a time when the prestige of the Ṭūlūnids was still sharp in everyone’s mind,81 this was meant to please the Egyptians and to affirm the legitimacy of caliphal rule over the province. However, one may suspect that the increased freedom of the qāḍīs also opened the way for some of them to commit abuses. Al-Kurayzī apparently appropriated deposits (sg. wadīʿa) and revenue from pious foundations,82 and, perhaps not coincidentally, had a bad reputation as a scholar.83 Paradoxically, a higher degree of judicial autonomy facilitated greater corruption. The main purpose of allowing such autonomy—to show the ruler to be just and legitimate—was not achieved.

This situation developed toward the end of the interregnum, from 317/929—the appointment of Ibn Zabr—onward. The military unrest that roiled Egypt in the late 310s/920s—as a consequence of the perennial difficulty to pay the soldiers84—led the governors to build new political alliances with the qāḍīs, but the qāḍīs role in the unrest is sometimes far from clear. Ibn Zabr was apparently involved in a plot against the vizier ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā (d. 334/946).85 Other qāḍīs, such as Aḥmad b. Qutayba (in office 321/933) or al-Sarakhsī (in office 322/934), took part in intrigues that opposed political factions trying to impose their authority over Egypt.86 It seems that the qāḍīs no longer appeared completely impartial vis-à-vis the governing body.

As said above, most of the qāḍīs were not local, or even of Egyptian origin, during the interregnum. They did not know the inhabitants of Fustāṭ and they had to carry out investigations to find out about them and ascertain their reliability.87 Furthermore, the qāḍīs themselves were unknown when they arrived in Egypt and they were probably regarded more as members of the ruling administration than as reliable scholars and jurists. To assert their authority and be accepted, they had to prove their legal skills and win over the local scholars. A qāḍī could hardly manage the judiciary—especially the administration of pious foundations and other properties—without any knowledge of the local area. Therefore, they usually hired an Egyptian auxiliary (tawallā bi-amrihi) to acquaint them with the local inhabitants and their

81 On the prestige of the Ṭūlūnids and the attempt of one of their last officers, Ibn al-Khalīj, to restore the dynasty, see Wiet, L’Égypte arabe, 113.
82 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-iṣr, 535/102.
83 Ibid., 534/101.
84 Wiet, L’Égypte arabe, 124-27. Taxes now left Egypt for Iraq, resulting in the inability to pay the military and the development of factionalism within the army. See Bianquis, “Autonomous Egypt,” 109-11.
85 Ibid., 541/110-11.
86 Ibid., 546/119, 550/124.
87 For example, Abū ʿUbayd had to carry out an inquiry into the imam from his neighborhood. Ibid., 526/90.
practices, and who probably served as an intermediary between the qāḍī and the notables. Nevertheless, qāḍīs faced difficulties integrating into the local society and were not easily accepted. The arrival in 293/906 of the second qāḍī in the interregnum period, Abū ʿUbayd ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Ḥarb, was followed by a period of tension between him and the religious elite. He argued with the imam of the mosque where he prayed, then he quarreled with his neighbor, a secretary (kātib), who organized drinking parties and insinuated that Abū ʿUbayd was himself responsible for noise in the neighborhood at night. The Egyptian jurist Ibn al-Ḥaddād (d. 344/955) disliked him initially and compared him (pejoratively) to the qāḍī Yahyā b. Aktham (d. 242/857), famous for his love of young men. Abū ʿUbayd was still very unpopular when in 304/916 (or perhaps in 306/918), he was accused of being responsible for the death of a popular Shāfiʿī jurist (faqīh), Manṣūr b. Ismāʿīl. To be accepted, the qāḍīs had to establish peaceful relationships with prominent notables and with the religious leaders of Fustāṭ. Abū ʿUbayd eventually acquired a good reputation by showing himself to be thoroughly incorruptible, to the extent that he paid for the fire (nār) that he took from the baker. Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm b. Ḥammād won over the jurist al-Ṭaḥāwī by attending his lessons and showing him deep respect. Ibn Zabr likewise tried to build a good relationship with al-Ṭaḥāwī.

These strategies were sometimes successful. After a few years in Fustāṭ, Abū ʿUbayd’s reputation was so good that he became a major legal authority. His written decisions (tawqīʿāt) were collected in books and his sayings turned into proverbs. Other qāḍīs failed to be accepted, however. Despite his efforts, Ibn Zabr could not rid himself of his reputation as a bad scholar and was very unpopular. Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid earned the hatred of several prominent jurists such as Ibn al-Ḥaddād and al-Ṭaḥāwī after he threw them out of the great mosque. Some Mālikīs conspired against him, and during the civil war that broke out after the governor Takīn’s death in 321/933, his house was plundered. The unfortunate qāḍī had no choice but to run away. Toward the end of the interregnum, the local inhabitants

88 Ibid., 546/119.
89 Ibid., 526/90.
90 Ibid., 527/91. On Yaḥyā b. Aktham, see Tillier, Les Cadis d’Iraq et l’État abbasid, 443ff. and index.
91 Ibn Saʿīd, Kitāb al-ʾEmughrib fī ḥulā al-ʾEmghrib, ed. K. L. Tallqvist (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1899), 95. Manṣūr b. Ismāʿīl b. ʿUmar al-Tamīmī (d. 306/918) was both a faqīḥ and a poet. The account is that, although he was once very close to the qāḍī Abū ʿUbayd, they quarreled about a legal matter. The tension between the two men escalated until which point a witness testified that Manṣūr had said heretical words. The qāḍī Abū ʿUbayd threatened him with the death penalty if a second witness happened to give the same testimony, and Manṣūr was so scared that he died. See Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-ʾaʿyan, 5: 291.
92 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-ʾiṣr, 529/94.
93 Ibid., 538/107.
94 Ibid., 541/112.
95 Ibid., 529/94.
96 Ibid., 540/109-10.
97 On this event, see Bianquis, “Autonomous Egypt,” 110-11.
98 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-ʾiṣr, 544-45/115-16.
(whether influenced by the leading scholars or not) were apparently fed up with these foreign qādīs, whom they saw as corrupt and in league with an incompetent government. This could explain why Ahmad b. Quṭayba was so unwelcome when he arrived in 321/933, three years before the end of the ‘Abbāsid rule, that the āmma threw stones at him and tore his black robes, which themselves were a symbol of his political allegiance. 99

THE IKhSHĪDIDS (323-358/935-969)

The position of the qādīs changed dramatically under the Ikhshīdīds. The first Ikhshīd, Muḥammad b. Tughj (r. 323-34/935-46), 100 extended his authority over the judiciary in 324/936, soon after his appointment as governor. 101 From then on, most of the qādīs were recruited from among the local scholars—either native Egyptians or men who had lived in Egypt for some time—perhaps to please the discontented Egyptian elite. 102

However, this change in recruitment had pernicious consequences, for it stirred up feelings of rivalry and competition between the jurists of Fustāṭ. Now, any faqīh of high standing could be a potential candidate. The professionalization of the judgeship, which had been well established in Iraq since the second half of the third/ninth century, 103 reached Egypt and offered new opportunities to ambitious scholars. Moreover, the appointing power was in Fustāṭ itself, close to the scholars who could expect to be noticed by the ruler or gain his confidence. Therefore, the number of schemes hatched so as to be appointed a judge increased dramatically during the Ikhshīdid period. Several methods were tried out. 104 One of the easiest was to eliminate a competitor by denigrating him in the eyes of the ruler. This happened to al-Ḥasan b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Jawhari, who was dismissed in 331/942-3 after Bakrān al-Ṣabbāgh—who wanted his position, and ended up getting it—complained about him to al-Ikhshīd. 105 To keep his position, ‘Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. al-Khaṣīb led a group who disparaged Abū Ṭāhir al-Dhuḥlī before the regent Kāfūr (r. 335-57/946-68). 106 His son and successor to the

100 On al-Ikhshīd, see Bacharach, “The Career of Muḥammad Ibn Ṭughj al-Ikhshīd,” 58ff.
102 There are some exceptions, however: Ibn Walīd was perhaps not Egyptian (Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-iṣr, 565/147) and al-Kishshī might have come from Palestine (ibid., 572/158). Two appointees were not native Egyptians but had settled in Egypt: ‘Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. al-Khaṣīb was originally from Iṣfahān (ibid., 576/164) and Abū Ṭāhir al-Dhuḥlī was from Baṣra (ibid., 581/173). In stating that “some” qādīs were Egyptians and “others” foreigners, Sayyida Kāshif did not take into account the important difference between “theoretical” qādīs (who were formally appointed in Baghdad) and “actual” qādīs, nor did she notice that the majority of qādīs in this latter category were Egyptian. Kāshif, Miṣr fi ʿasr al-ikkhshīdiyyīn, 219.
103 Tillier, Les Cadis d’Iraq et l’État abbasside, 357ff.
105 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-iṣr, 571/157. Ibn Ḥajar does not explain the nature of his complaint.
106 Ibid., 578/166.
judgeship, if only for a year, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Khaṣīb, laid traps (makāyid, sg. makīda) at the amir’s court in order to steer his potential rivals off course.  

A qāḍī who wanted to keep his position had to join forces with the ruler. Ibn Walīd (who secured the judgeship for three separate periods, between 329/941 to 336/948) collected for al-Ikhshīd the ransom for Muslim prisoners of war held by the Byzantines, but in order to make a good impression by bringing in a large amount of money, he abused his power and was accused of extortion. Later, Ibn Walīd paid Kāfūr in order to be reinstated in his position. Such a practice was also entered into by ‘Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. al-Khaṣīb and his son Muḥammad. The civilian population of Fustāṭ must have been aware of the competition between the jurists. The madman Sībawayh (d. 358/969), able to articulate what everyone was thinking since his madness protected him from punishment, could therefore publicly warn the qāḍī Ibn al-Ḥaddād of the intrigues of his colleague Ibn al-Walīd in 333/944-5.

The recruitment of qāḍīs by the Ikhshīdids from among the local jurists deepened the gap between professional witnesses (shuhūd) and the Egyptian people. The witnesses, whose number fluctuated but was always limited in quantity, represented an important part of the social elite and they wanted to keep their official positions. The proximity of the appointing power allowed them to play a significant role in judicial policy. Some of them were close to the ruler and could influence him. If a qāḍī reduced the number of witnesses even further by rejecting their integrity, the social position of the whole group could be threatened. They

107 Ibid., 580/169, and Tillier, Vies des cadis de Miṣr, 186.
109 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 567/151, 570/155. Ibn Ḥajar does not specify the amount of money paid to Kāfūr. The practice was seen as corruption; see Tillier, Vies des cadis de Miṣr, 32. Cf. Tyan, Histoire de l’organisation judiciaire, 302-303.
110 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 578/166, 579/168.
112 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 576/163.
would therefore do their best to harm that particular qāḍī by discrediting him with the ruler. A qāḍī who increased the number of witnesses, however, would gain their support. This brought about a rift between their hopes and the expectations of litigants for witnesses could be swayed in court by a qāḍī who supported them. Examples of both instances are the qāḍī ʿUmar b. al-Ḥasan al-Ḥāshimī, who was apparently respected for his judicial acumen but was dismissed by Kāfūr after the witnesses complained about him, and Ibn Walīd, who was hated by the Egyptians for his misdeeds, but was supported by many witnesses whom he had admitted to the profession or whose social position he had strengthened. The involvement of leading scholars and professional witnesses in the political hierarchy and in the competition for judgesship became so intense that they apparently no longer responded to the needs of the civilian population.

Because of the proximity between the ruler and the qāḍī, the latter was more than ever an important political tool in the hands of the government. The qāḍī Ibn al-Haddād was appointed to the mazālim court by al-Ikhshīd, between 324/936 and 327/939, becoming thus a judicial and political rival of the Shariʿa court qāḍī. He was therefore heavily criticized by the inhabitants of Fusṭāṭ. Ibn Badr helped al-Ikhshīd transfer the income of a waqf and assign it to the construction of a qayṣāriyya. The same qāḍī was punished, however, when he refused to cooperate—he was put under house arrest upon his request that a political prisoner be treated with full respect for the judicial procedure. When Ibn Walīd received an official appointment from Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-ʿAbbāsī (qāḍī in Baghdad, 336-39/948-51), he supported Ikhshīdid autonomy by reading the document in the privacy of his home—and not in the public arena of the mosque, as the ʿAbbāsid power would have expected.

Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Khaṣīb gave all his time (inqaṭaʿ ilā) to Kāfūr and supervised the construction of his palace. Abū Ṭāhir al-Dhuhlī was supported financially by Kāfūr, presumably in return for his political support. The mad scholar Sībawayh’s repeated criticism of al-Ikhshīd and his qāḍīs suggests that some Egyptians were not fooled by the political use of judgesship. On the whole, the qāḍīs

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113 Ibid., 575/163.
114 Ibid., 569/154, 576/163. There were still witnesses who hated him, however. See ibid., 568/152.
115 Kāshīf, Miṣr fi ʿaṣr al-ikhshīdīyyīn, 217.
116 Tillier, “Qāḍīs and the Political Use of the Maẓālim Jurisdiction,” 51.
118 Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 562/143. A qayṣāriyya is “a large system of public buildings laid out in the form of cloisters with shops, workshops, warehouses and frequently also living-rooms.” M. Streck, “Kayṣāriyya,” in EJ.
119 Ibid., 568/152. As recounted above, he also collected ransom money for al-Ikhshīd.
120 Ibid., 580/170.
121 Ibid., 583/176.
122 Ibn Zūlāq, Akhbār Sībawayh, 28, 32, 42, 44, 49. The fact that reports about Sībawayh were collected in a book by Ibn Zūlāq implies that his words and deeds were not considered simply anecdotal, but rather socially and/or politically significant. One of his criticisms, of the qāḍī Bakrān’s homosexual behavior, was meant to point out his close contact with the Egyptian rulers. Sībawayh
under the Ikhshīdīds had a sullied reputation. Ibn Ḥajar’s biographies chronicle the many accusations of corruption made against them. Ibn Zābr, who had already been unpopular under the governorship of Takīn, was reappointed twice by al-Ikhshīd (or with his authorization)\(^\text{124}\)—in addition to various abuses, he asked for money to accept new witnesses.\(^\text{125}\) Ibn Wālid was corrupt (\textit{madhkūr bi-l-irtishā’}) and abused his power.\(^\text{126}\) He was hated by the Egyptians,\(^\text{127}\) and so was Bakrān.\(^\text{128}\) Even Ibn Bādr, whose reputation was enhanced by his rigorous administration of the estates of orphans at the end of the ‘Abbāsid interregnum,\(^\text{129}\) was now considered corrupt\(^\text{130}\): he harmed witnesses and, in a pretense of increased meticulousness, doubled the number of witnesses required to testify to the appointment of an agent (\textit{wakīl}).\(^\text{131}\) It is possible that the increasing professionalization of the judgeship led to an actual change in judicial practice, which was then seen as corrupt by contemporaries. But the Ikhshīdīd \textit{qāḍī}s’ undeniable close association with the government and cooperation with the ruler led to a growing chasm between them and the local civilian elite, and this probably helped to damage the aura of judicial independence and impartiality.

The general anger against the \textit{qāḍī}s led to several riots. Some unclear troubles that occurred in Fustāṭ in 331/942-3 might have been caused by the unpopularity of Bakrān.\(^\text{132}\) A riot broke out when Ibn Wālid paid Kāfūr to be reappointed as a \textit{qāḍī}.\(^\text{133}\) When ‘Abd Allāh b. Muhammad b. al-Khaṣīb punished the inhabitants of al-Faramā who had complained about him, the populace revolted and forced him to run away.\(^\text{134}\) And another riot developed when his son Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh was appointed \textit{qāḍī} in 348/959—Kāfūr had to launch an investigation into the reason for the discontent this caused.\(^\text{135}\) Frustration was sometimes so deep that the ruler had no choice but to take the populace’s aspirations into account. For example, when a complaint was lodged against Bakrān, al-Ikhshīd summoned him and punished him. Eventually, he gathered the notables of Fustāṭ (\textit{wujūh al-nās}) and appointed a new \textit{qāḍī} in accordance with their wishes.\(^\text{136}\) In 348/959, after a series of unpopular \textit{qāḍī}s and several revolts against them, Kāfūr eventually agreed to appoint Abū Ṭāhir al-Dhuhlī, again in declared that, to purify him, the \textit{qāḍī} should go down on all fours, have a funnel put up his rectum, and be flushed out with the waters of the Nile. Ibid., 42.


\(^\text{125}\) Ibid., 559/138.

\(^\text{126}\) For example, he asked witnesses to sign a legal document without letting them read it first. Ibid., 568/152.

\(^\text{127}\) Ibid., 565/148, 568/152.

\(^\text{128}\) Ibid., 545/116, 573/159.

\(^\text{129}\) Ibid., 560/139.

\(^\text{130}\) Ibid., 562/142.

\(^\text{131}\) Ibid., 560/140.

\(^\text{132}\) Ibid., 573/159.

\(^\text{133}\) Ibid., 570/155.

\(^\text{134}\) Ibid., 578/166.

\(^\text{135}\) Ibid., 579/168.

\(^\text{136}\) Ibid., 573/159.
accordance with the wishes of the notables and the judiciary staff\textsuperscript{137} (however, he limited the qāḍī’s power by hearing litigants himself at the maẓālim court\textsuperscript{138}).

The Ikshīdīds had to maintain a balance between their policy of judicial autonomy from the central administration (which required that they impose their authority by controlling appointments) and the gratification of local scholars (and its corollary, the satisfaction of the public’s expectations). Because of the increasing complexity of the legal field, this was often problematic. Kāfūr faced more difficulties than his predecessors because he did not initially understand how necessary it was to gain the support of major scholars such as Ibn al-Ḥaddād. His appointment of 'Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. al-Khaṣīb, whom Ibn al-Ḥaddād deeply disliked,\textsuperscript{139} was a mistake that eventually led to urban riots.

On the whole, Ibn al-Ḥaddād, who was head of the Shāfiʿī school at that time,\textsuperscript{140} represented a challenge for the dynasty. On the one hand, because of his prestige and his reputation as a scholar,\textsuperscript{141} the Ikshīdīds could not ignore him. He was therefore appointed qāḍī in 324/936\textsuperscript{142} and regularly attended the governor’s court (kāna kaṭīr al-taraddud ilayhim).\textsuperscript{143} On the other hand, he was to a large extent beyond the Ikshīdīds’ control. Like his fellow qāḍī Ibn Abī Zurʿa,\textsuperscript{144} he showed his fidelity to the ‘Abbāsids by wearing black robes.\textsuperscript{145} Even if the Ikshīdīds were still loyal to the ‘Abbāsids, as their coinage suggested,\textsuperscript{146} they soon claimed their autonomy in judicial matters and tried their hardest to weaken the formal links between the Egyptian judiciary and the Baghdadi qāḍīs.\textsuperscript{147} Ibn al-Ḥaddād’s behavior could therefore be regarded as provocative. Like Abū ᦛ Ubayd ᦛʿĀlī b. al-Ḫusayn b. ᦛARB under Takīn, he adopted a critical attitude towards the government. He dared to criticize Kāfūr in public\textsuperscript{148} and he was suspected of Shiʿite sympathies.\textsuperscript{149} Moreover, he strongly maintained his judicial authority against the will of the government. He kept in prison a debtor whom al-Ikhshīd’s brother and deputy (khalīfa), Abū l-Muẓaffar al-Ḥasan b. ᦛUGHJ (d. 342/953),\textsuperscript{150} wanted to release, and although the latter controlled the prison, he did not dare oppose the qāḍī.\textsuperscript{151} The Ikshīdīds found themselves facing an insoluble problem: they could not do without him, but he was a thorn in their side. This is probably why Ibn al-Ḥaddād was

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 583-84/177.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 584/178.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 554/130, 576/164, 578/166.
\textsuperscript{140} Kāshīf, Miṣr fī 'aṣr al-ikhshīdīyyīn, 306.
\textsuperscript{141} See Ibn Zūlāq, Akhbār Sībawayh, 19.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 552/127.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 555/131.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 562/143.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 552/127, 555/162.
\textsuperscript{147} Tillier, Vies des cadis de Miṣr, 24-25.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 553/127, 555/131.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 555-56/133.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibn Ḥajar, Rafʿ al-īṣr, 567/150-51. On the key issue of prisons in the struggle for judicial autonomy, see Tillier, Les Cadis d’Iraqu et l’État abbasside, 492ff.
appointed qāḍī twice under their rule, but only for short periods.\textsuperscript{152} Al-Ikhshīd even tried to ruin his reputation: he sent him a singer on whose behalf Ibn al-Ḥaddād had interceded, and could therefore claim that the famous jurist was secretly listening to music.\textsuperscript{153}

**CONCLUSION**

The judiciary in Egypt was of political importance for both the Ṭūlūnids and the Ikhshīdids. Nevertheless, the two dynasties adopted different attitudes toward the qāḍīs. The Ṭūlūnids were more interested in the legitimacy that the qāḍīs could offer them rather than in the direct control of their appointments, while the Ikhshīdids were more preoccupied with their authority and they tried to control the appointments of their qāḍīs. In between the two dynasties, after the fall of the Ṭūlūnids, the ’Abbāsids had to re-establish their control over and legitimacy in the province and prove their ability to dispense justice according to the law. Political change and competition for legitimacy advanced the development of judicial autonomy. However, the loosening of the links between the judiciary and the ’Abbāsid governors during the first half of the fourth/tenth century probably furthered corruption among the qāḍīs, and the foreign origin of most of the qāḍīs was also responsible for their increasing unpopularity.

The Ikhshīdids recruited their judges more and more from among the Egyptian scholars as a way to enforce their control, and perhaps also to satisfy the populace’s desire for local qāḍīs. However, this had an unexpected and insidious effect. By creating new opportunities for the Egyptian jurists, the Ikhshīdids brought the judiciary into the political arena. As a consequence, the qāḍīs no longer acted as intermediaries between the people and the government. Their abuses led to several uprisings, while private scholars such as Ibn al-Ḥaddād stood up for the public’s interests.\textsuperscript{154} Ibn al-Ḥaddād (in his capacity of muftī\textsuperscript{155}) was pious\textsuperscript{156} and enjoyed judicial independence\textsuperscript{157} and he was therefore more revered than any other qāḍī.\textsuperscript{158}

To a large extent, this development limited the actual impact of the newly cultivated judicial independence. Theoretically, the legal field now enjoyed complete autonomy from government; Iraqi jurists claimed that judges were largely independent.\textsuperscript{159} In practice, however, as the Egyptian attempt at judicial autonomy shows, involvement of the qāḍīs in political networks increased, and their practical independence was therefore seriously weakened. The professionalization of the judgeship, with its attractive salaries, also added to their willingness to become qāḍīs or to keep their judicial positions, and therefore they were more receptive to political pressure. The Fāṭimid conquest of Egypt in 358/969 changed the situation once again. Since the Fāṭimids could hardly dismiss the much-esteemed Abū Ṭāhir al-Dhuḥlí, who had been appointed by the Ikhshīdīd Kāfūr to agree with the wishes of the

\textsuperscript{152} Tillier, *Vies des cadis de Miṣr*, 12-13.


\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 555/132.


\textsuperscript{156} Ibn Ḥajar, *Rafʿ al-Ēiṣr*, 551/126, 552/126.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 552/126, 552/128.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 552/126-27.

\textsuperscript{159} Tillier, *Les Cadis d’Iraq et l’État abbasside*, 631ff.
Egyptian notables — he had even changed one of his judgments to comply with the inhabitants’ desires —,\(^{160}\) they simply restored the *maẓālim* court and appointed a rival judge.\(^{161}\) The judiciary was again, more than ever, a major political concern.

*List of Egyptian governors and qāḍīs*

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<td>Khumārawayh (270-82/884-96)</td>
<td>Muhammad b. Ḍābū b. Ḥarb (277 or 278-83/890 or 891-96)</td>
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<td>Jaysh b. Khumārawayh (282-3/896)</td>
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<td>Shaybān b. Aḥmad (292/905)</td>
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<td>Abū Manṣūr Takīn (297-302/910-15)</td>
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<td>Abū Manṣūr Takīn (307-309/919-21)</td>
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<td>Hilāl b. Badr (309-11/921-23)</td>
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<td>Aḥmad b. Kayghalagh (311/923-4)</td>
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\(^{160}\) Abū Ṭāhir al-Ḏuhlī had ruled that the son of a Christian woman who had converted to Islam would remain Christian like his father. The caused a furor, with people arguing that it was contrary to the Shīʿite and the Šāfiʿī doctrine, and the judge finally reversed his decision. Ibn Ḥajar, *Rafʿ al-iṣr*, 586/181-82.

\(^{161}\) Ibn Ḥajar, *Rafʿ al-iṣr*, 584/179.

\(^{162}\) The following list does not take into account the “theoretical” qāḍīs of Fusṭāṭ who were appointed in Baghdad and never came to Egypt. For a list including these qāḍīs, see Tillier, *Vies des cadis de Miṣr*, 11-14.
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<th>Governor</th>
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| Abū Manṣūr Takīn (311-21/924-33) | Abū l-Dhikr Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Aswānī (311-2/924)  
Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Kurayzī (312-13/924-25)  
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Isḥāq al-Jawharī (313-14/925-26)  
Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm b. Ḥammād (314-16/926-29)  
ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Zabr (317/929)  
Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm b. Ḥammād (317-20/929-32)  
ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Zabr (320-21/932-33) |
Aḥmad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Qutayba (321/933)  
Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm b. Ḥammād (321-22/933-34) |
Muḥammad b. Badr al-Ṣayrafī (322-24/934-36) |

**Ikhshīdids**

ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Zabr (324/936)  
Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. al-Ḥaddād (324-25/936-37)  
Muḥammad b. Badr al-Ṣayrafī (327-29/939-40)  
ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Zabr (329/940-41)  
ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Shuʿayb (Ibn Walīd) (329/941) |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Qāḍī</th>
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<tr>
<td>Muḥammad b. Badr al-Ṣayrafi (329-30/941-42)</td>
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<td>Abū l-Dhikr Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā (330/942)</td>
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<td>al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jawharī (330-31/942-43)</td>
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<td>Aḥmad b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Kishshī (331/943)</td>
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<td>ʿAṭīq b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṣabbāgh, Bakrān (331/943)</td>
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<td>Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. al-Ḥaddād (333-34/944-45)</td>
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<td>Regency of Kāfūr (335-55/946-66)</td>
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<td>Unūjūr b. al-Ikhshīd (335-49/946-60)</td>
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<td>ʿAlī b. al-Ikhshīd (349-55/960-66)</td>
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<td>ʿUmar b. al-Ḥasan al-Hāshimī (336-39/948-51)</td>
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<td>Kāfūr (355-57/966-68)</td>
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<td>Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. al-Ikhshīd (357-58/968-69)</td>
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<td>Abū Ṭāhir al-Dhuḥlī (348-66/959-76)</td>
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