Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities ? - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Autre Publication Scientifique Année : 2011

Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities ?

Résumé

We characterize sequential (preemption) and simultaneous (coordination) equilibria, as well as joint-value maximizing (cooperation) solutions, in a model of investment timing allowing for externalities in both flow pro...ts and investment costs. For two ex-ante symmetric ...rms, either preemption or attrition occur depending on the size of the investment externality. Coordination is less likely with more discounting, as in a repeated game, and more likely with higher growth and volatility. Optimal cooperation involves either monopoly or duopoly investment, the latter being either symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, these characterizations are validated by applications to standard speci...cations of capacity accumulation and of R&D investment. In the former setup, coordination is likelier if installed capacities and lumpy investments are both large. With R&D input choices, if investment synergies are large, coordination and cooperation result in the same outcomes.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
1128.pdf (575.06 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-00639471 , version 1 (09-11-2011)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00639471 , version 1

Citer

Etienne Billette de Villemeur, Richard Ruble, Bruno Versaevel. Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities ?. 2011. ⟨halshs-00639471⟩
136 Consultations
339 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More