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The Social Democracy of Ideopolises

*A French Illustration of the
Changing Social-Democratic Coalition in Western Europe*

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Abstract

Focused on the French case, this paper aims at investigating a geographical change of electoral support, which is part of wider transformations of the electoral base of the Socialist Party, in particular the trend of working class dealignment. While a specific sociology emerged in “ideopolises”, anchored in the post-industrial and knowledge-based economy, a shift of the traditional socialist electoral support occurred in those cities (but not for all types of elections). We argue that this dynamic has been particularly pronounced in 2007.

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SC. Patterns of Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Reconciling Critical and Secular
Realignments

Introduction

While the media was filled with debates on the “death” of the French Socialist Party (PS) in 2010, the party's resurrection was celebrated during the regional elections of the following year. Even if the leading share of the Left's advancement is due to the Ecologist list (Gougou, Labouret, 2010), the PS managed to retain the near-totality of regional executive posts in metropolitan France¹. It thereby reasserted a double dominance: one, long-standing and that can be dated to the legislative elections of 1978, over the left side of the political spectrum; the other, more recent and shared with its allies, over the Right in local elections since 2004. That said, while three decades ago workers were still a defining constituent and major electorate of the PS, in 2010 the participation of this social group in the regional elections of 2010 did not surpass a third of its members. Beyond the singularity of these elections, the coincidence of these two phenomena – the victory of the socialists and large scale abstention of workers – invokes a broader set of questions: why has the PS remained the hegemonic party of the Left and main rival of the Right, *despite* the realignment of workers, which corresponds to abstention or a rightward-shift of their vote? While many studies from different angles have taken up this realignment and its causes, it is more rare for studies to interrogate the recomposition that is underway in the electoral base of the PS. We intend to follow this second line of research, in order to test the hypothesis of a possible shift of the socialist electoral *dynamic* towards large cities as “ideopolises”. This original method of electoral geography which attempts to analyze the reverse side of the rightward shift of the working class, takes into account both the development of similar research regarding American Democrats (Judis, Teixeira, 2004) and the current academic debates over the nature of the “new” social democracy, of which the identity has taken form over the past two decades. Our triple objective is therefore to adapt the concept of ideopolis to a French context, to measure the extent of the Socialists’ electoral penetration in such cities, and to analyse this concept with respect to the evolution of the party's government and ideological trajectory.

¹ Other than Alsace, retained by the UMP, the presidencies of Corsica and Languedoc-Roussillon respectively fell to a radical leftist (Paul Giaccobi) and a socialist excluded from the PS (George Frêche, since deceased).

Understanding the "divorce" between the working class, the lower classes and the Socialist Party

One of the specificities of the French PS in European Social Democracy is the fact that it comes from a "socialist-democrat" tradition (Seiler, 2003). Among the dimensions of this tradition that distinguish it from the traditional social-democrat model is that of its social base: from this point of view, the PS has always been more inter-class when compared with its social-democrat homologues, due in particular to the competition it has faced since 1920 from the Communist Party. It is no less the case that the lower-class and working-class electorates provided an exclusive support for the progress of the PS in the 1970s and its victory in the presidential and legislative elections of 1981, during which François Mitterrand and the socialist candidates managed to garner more working-class votes than George Marchais and the communist candidates. This underlines the amplitude of the trauma that resulted from the results of Lionel Jospin in the first round of the presidential elections of 2002, when he attracted no more than 13% of the working-class vote. Since then, a series of explanations have been offered for the "divorce" between the PS and the working class (and more generally the lower classes).

While it is not our intention here to explain them in detail, it will be useful for the reader to identify three types of explanation, which can be seen as complementary more than rival explanations.

First, "major trends" were advanced, which identify the sociological evolution of the working class and the transformation of the production techniques as structural causes for the separation between workers and both the act of voting and the traditional parties of the Left. From the 1970s, as the economy saw the expansion of the service sector and the number of workers decreased, industrial restructuring led to the disappearance of entire sectors and the development of small production sites to the detriment of the "large factory" model. To this are added a redrawing of the borders of the working professions themselves, as well as the increased competition resulting from mass unemployment and new demands for profitability. Such centrifugal trends brought about the decline of workers collectives and the sentiment of belonging to the same class of which the Left was perceived as the legitimate representative. This is why new generation of workers never showed the same levels of socialization as those of the "Fordist" period (1936-1975) (Beaud, Pialoux, 1999) which is also true of their levels of politicization. In fact, as Florent Gougou (forthcoming) recalls, the electoral behaviour of

the generations reaching voting age since the 1980s has been marked by a transformation of partisan competition, expressed by the pre-eminence of the cultural dimensions over the socioeconomic dimensions of conflicts.

Second, the responsibility of the Left in power, and particularly of hegemonic socialists at the head of the party, has been widely evoked both in the activist and academic literatures. Regarding the latter, we note here the summarizing chapters devoted to this question by Henri Rey underlining the "relative identity of government management by the Left and the Right" as well as "promises" followed by "disappointments" (Rey, 2004: 81 and 96). Under the pressure of exterior constraints and in a context of the increasing strength of neoliberalism, the socialists had rapidly traded their ambitious Keynesian policy, aiming at social progress, for policies of competitive deflation, aiming at respecting the large-scale equilibriums and the restoration of profit levels. One of the prices to pay was mass unemployment, affecting in particular the lower classes of which Mitterrand as candidate has styled himself the herald. Moreover, real efforts of public policy did not bear the expected tangible fruits for underprivileged groups. Rey mentions that the work policy and urban policy succeed at stemming, respectively, neither the degradation of working and employment conditions, nor the pursuit of "logics of social and spacial segregation" (Rey, 2004: 106).

Third, the professionalization of the PS and the sociological restriction of its elected representatives have also been put forward as factors in the dissociation between the party and the lower classes. Problems such as the gap between the party and society, and politicians who are poorly representative of their constituents would indeed result in a situation where workers and employees, who still make up half of the active population, are strongly under-represented among PS activists, not to mention the unemployed and the marginally employed. Rémi Lefebvre and Frédéric Sawicki have shown to what extent the modest place given to the lower classes in the party is both cause and consequence of the latter's growing logic of professionalism. A cause, since it tends to encourage the party to turn inwards, relying on its elected members and their associates, who in turn control the party to a greater and greater extent. A consequence, since elected members tend to adapt to the demands of small and poorly representative groups of constituents: not only do they not benefit electorally from them, but it is not in their interest to allow newcomers upset their control over sections and networks of support they have patiently constructed (Lefebvre, Sawicki, 2006).

A reconstituted electorate for a "changed" party ?

The effects of structural mutations in the capitalist economy and political competition, the impact of public policy implemented by socialist governments, the consequences of the growing professionalization of a party of elected members concerned with its own internal affairs: these three types of approach, which are of course not exhaustive, complement one another well enough by their theoretical bases and their fields of application. Nevertheless, reflections on a possible reconfiguration of the socialist electorate have been largely in terms of the first approach. Put at a disadvantage by its failures in economic matters, and confronted with the new significance of cultural stakes (which it had already taken into account by the end of the 1970s), the PS has tried to transform these difficulties into electoral advantages. It has therefore adopted a position that is culturally liberal, economically moderate, and socially protective in order, on the one hand, to benefit from the support of salaried employees with university degrees and French citizens of foreign origin – two groups in the midst of marked demographic expansion – and on the other hand, to try to maintain its place in the traditional working class electorate, by presenting a less brutal face than that of the Right. Florent Gougou and Vincent Tiberj, in the context of a reflection on the growing importance of political conflicts of a cultural nature, showed the integration of "bobos" and "new French" into the core electorate of the PS among the party's most loyal voters (Gougou, Tiberj, forthcoming). Despite reservations about the "bobo" terminology, we proceed in the fertile wake of their analysis. More generally, we consider that the contradiction of the PS's relative inability to address social issues and its continued position as the principal party of the Left, can only be understood through the recomposition of its electorate, itself bound to changes in the political project advanced by the party.

Why an Interest in the Ideopolis ?

Our goal in this paper is to identify *a particular dimension of the recomposition of the socialist electorate* by examining its support in specific large cities: the ideopolises. This construct – which we will define below – appear as the urban expression of a post-industrial economy and society, and a social stratification that differs greatly from that of the Fordist period.

First of all, this concept of American origin designates a singular type of city. We can see that the dynamics of social geography observed in all major French metropolitan centres coincides with the sociological evolution of the PS vote that we have just discussed. Accordingly to Christophe Guilluy (2006), French cities have undergone a double process of gentrification and ethnicization. As long as we specify that the first term does not refer to the gentry, i.e. the “*propertied*” bourgeoisie, but rather to the “*intellectual*” bourgeoisie, we find in these two processes the categories "bobos" and "new French" analysed by Gougou and Tiberj. Using the first term in an unambiguous way, Guilluy speaks at length of "middle and upper strata" as opposed to the lower classes for which the spatial evolution (towards outlying suburban and rural zones) coincided with an electoral evolution (a realignment away from the Left). A socialist vote in the ideopolises would correspond *de facto* to a gentrification of the PS electorate, which we will examine in detail.

In fact – and this the key point – middle- and upper-level salaried employees in the ideopolises do not belong to just any economic sector. Alongside the importance of universities and qualified public sector jobs, Guilluy underlines the progression of "management jobs and intermediary professions working in company headquarters" (2006: 91), which are most often involved in global trade. It is this insertion in the globalization of cities where industrial activity has declined, giving way to an economy that is still productive but linked to knowledge, that marks the specificity of ideopolises. At the heart of the development of this knowledge economy there figure: 1) an increasing investment in R&D, education and health, which is reflected by an expansion of "knowledge-intensive activities" and the progress of so-called intellectual education over more classic transmission of know-how; 2) the rising importance of information and communications technologies, which are the bases for knowledge and endogenous growth; 3) "innovation as the rule of the game"; 4) "the rise of highly qualified jobs" (Foray, 2009: 20-37). Outside of neighbourhoods with high concentrations of French citizens of non-European origin, *it is largely the social groups linked to this knowledge economy that constitute our object of study in the ideopolises*. Their integration in post-industrial sectors and their participation in global trade (economic as well as cultural) marks their specificity as much as their levels of qualification. Escaping frequently used general categories, they include "managers", "technical specialists" and "sociocultural specialists", to use the finer-grained terminology of Daniel Oesch (2006), while at the same time being among those who have profited from neo-liberal globalization. This "new urban and globalized sociology" is also a "sociology of mobility" (Guilly, 2010: 90 and 102) to which we can oppose a suburban and rural sociology, rooted, attached to territory and

Nation. This diagnostic conforms to the reflections of Kriesi *et al.* (2008) on the emergence of a new integration/demarcation" cultural cleavage and takes into account the possible conflictual dimension of the PS's and the Left's anchorage in the ideopolises. In fact, if this anchorage is reinforced and proves lasting, there is a risk that tension will increase for a party claiming to defend the underprivileged but that garners its best results from the most privileged part of the "dual France" that has been investigated by the geographer Pierre Veltz. This latter scholar emphasizes that the emerging "archipel economy" carries "risks of a divergence and a growing incomprehension [...] between the universe of those who speak competitiveness and markets, notably in the sphere of large firms, and those who see in these terms only threats and uncertainty" (Veltz, 2005: 50).

Such a tension would corroborate the thesis of the "neoliberalization" of European social-democracy since the 1980s, and the emergence of a new catchall identity, allowing it to assume its inter-class character both in its public policy and its discourse, electoral strategy and party organization (Moschonas, 2002). Nevertheless, a socialist dynamic in the ideopolises would mean something more, reinforcing the thesis of an "Americanization", in an original fashion, of the European Left (Lipset, 2001). The American "ideopolises" effectively figure among the power bases of the Democratic Party: John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira (2004) have shown that in the most technologically advanced cities of the country, the Democrats receive substantially higher support than both the Republicans and their own national results. Inversely, the more one looks away from technologically advanced city centers and towards urban suburbs and rural counties, the more one finds that the electoral support of the Party of the Donkey weakens. Though it could attest to a Democratic-style transformation, such an anchoring for the French PS or other European social-democratic parties is also an indication of a particularly close integration in the current capitalist economic system. The description of "competition by organization and innovation" (Veltz, 2005) unfolding on the international level tends to mask the brutal phenomenon of the commercialization of knowledge, henceforth conceived of as an individual capital to be put to use for strictly utilitarian purposes. The Third Way, according to the analysis of Jenny Andersson² (2010), has helped endorse this mutation of capitalism, passing from a classic

² We note that in this work, Jenny Andersson insists on the plurality of ideas, strategies and public policy gathered under the expression "Third Way". Pointing out the differences between the SAP Swedish and the British new labor that form her case of study, she still finds no less of a common tendency to return to a managerial pragmatism. And this to the point of [evacuating] more or less the horizon from critical dimensions (in its description of the Rio) and utopian (in the willingness for social transformation) that formed the "soul" of social democracy, beyond recurring revisionist episodes (pp. 150-151).

social-democratic logic (according to which “the economy of knowledge, like the Fordist model of the past, is capable of generating growth, the fruits of which would profit all society”) to the logic of submission to a social order characterized by a growing individualism, neglect of “noncompetitive” persons, and the supremacy of capital over the common good. Following this line of thought, Anderson arrives at a conclusion similar to that of Gerassimos Moschonas, of the necessary loss of a crucial part of the social-democracy’s identity which had lasted through the many transformations it underwent during its secular existence. Returning to the evolution of the New Labor, she writes, “it leaves out a whole sphere of utopian thought in the history of social democracy, without which social democracy politics are reduced to creating prosperity and people reduced to productive capital. Without a critique of the structures of knowledge capitalism, the Third Way’s slogan of “tapping potential” leads to a dangerous capitalization of the human self” (Andersson, 2010: 158).

Methodological choices

To measure the level and the evolution of electoral results obtained by the PS in the French ideopolises, a list must be drawn up of the latter based on precise criteria. One of the contributions of this paper is therefore the attempt to determine which large cities have this status, in a context that is different from the United States, through the construction of an ideopolis index. Four dimensions guided our choice of variables: the status of regional metropolis, the presence of the knowledge economy, a qualified population and attractiveness. Our second step was to collect results from cities of more than 100 000 inhabitants and ideopolises for three types of elections, corresponding to three different territorial levels: local, national, and supranational. At the local level, municipal elections were an obvious choice, though they posed an important methodological problem. Even in the first round, the lists presented by socialist candidates are often *already* union lists of the Left. Moreover, an analysis focused on the first round would have rendered invisible the capacity of a socialist candidate to rally his camp and carry the city, in a relatively personalized election. For these two reasons, we have chosen to list results for both rounds of such elections. The interpretation of the results will concentrate on the temporal dynamic of the vote for socialist candidates and on their ability to win or conserve cities, but will not address the distance between an ideopolis and the rest of the territory, as the electoral possibilities are too disparate. On the national level, we choose to study results from presidential elections: not only can the socialist vote be easily isolated in the first round, but the options are identical

throughout the country, which allows us to measure, in addition to the temporal dynamic, differences in electoral support between the ideopolises and the rest of France. Only European elections correspond to the supranational level. As these elections are held in a single round, it is easy to identify the results of socialist candidates.

Results for these three types elections were measured for a period covering 1995-2009. This choice was made of course for political reasons (the opening of a new cycle after the end of the Mitterrand era) but mainly as the time corresponding to the emergence of the French ideopolises. While the 1980s were marked by a dynamic of urban growth centered on the Ile-de-France region, the 1990s corresponded to a progressive extension of this dynamic to the rest of the country. More diffuse, the latter “strongly [benefited] a group of provincial cities that remain strongly linked to the Parisian center and that form (largely due to the impact of the TGV) a sort of developing metropolis-network on the scale of the whole country” (Veltz, 2005: 46).

IDENTIFYING FRENCH IDEOPOLISES: DEFINITION AND APPLICATION

The Concept of the Ideopolis

In *The Emerging Democratic Majority*, Judis and Teixeira (2004: 71-78) define the “ideopolis” as a postindustrial metropolis principally oriented towards “soft-technology” sectors. They complete their definition by specifying that “the ethos [...] tend to be libertarian and bohemian”. For its part, the Work Foundation associates the ideopolis with a “city of ideas” and describes it as “a twenty first century metropolitan version of what we first saw in Italian renaissance city states. The key elements are the airport, the university and the capacity to create new ideas [...] that buoyant demand, intellectual capital and business self confidence help to sustain” (Cannon *et al.*, 2003: 3). In other words, the concept of the ideopolis follows in the wake of work on the recomposition of social stratification linked to globalization and the postindustrial revolution³. In this way it recalls the work of Richard Florida (2002, 2005a, 2005b) on the emergence of a new social class: the “creative class”, present mainly in large cities whose economies are based on the knowledge economy and innovation. So our definition of the ideopolis would be *an attractive regional metropolis integrated in the*

³For a synthesis of the mutations relating to the postindustrial revolution, see (Cohen, 2006).

networks of the globalized economy—both from economic and a cultural point of view—and primarily based on sectors of the knowledge economy.

The Ideopolis Index

On the basis of this definition we first identified a sample of 34 cities by their demographic weight. The cutoff of 100 000 inhabitants was chosen as the critical size because at this population level French cities can claim a regional, national or international influence. In general in France, only cities of more than 100 000 inhabitants concentrate administrative, political, economic and cultural functions. They possess notably: a diversified administration (municipal, prefectural, and judiciary), a wide array of educational and university options, health infrastructure (hospitals, medical specialists, etc.), many services offered to individuals and companies and numerous cultural and leisure facilities. Our sample is limited to cities with more than 100 000 inhabitants in metropolitan France⁴ based on the 1990 population census.

On this selection of 34 cities we constructed an ideopolis index composed of 10 variables (see Table 1 in Appendix). The choice of variables was guided by the four pillars on which rest the concept of the ideopolis, that is the status of a regional metropolis (critical size), the knowledge economy (economic profile), a qualified population (sociological profile) and the attractiveness of the region.

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Definition and cutoff</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Source</i>
Connectedness	Airport traffic (passengers) <i>Cutoff: > 1 000 000 million passengers annually</i>	2010	Union des aéroports français, <i>Résultats d'activités des aéroports français 2010</i> , traffic statistics
University center	Student enrollment <i>Cutoff: > 40 000 students</i>	2009-2010	« Les étudiants inscrits dans les universités publiques françaises en 2009-2010 », <i>Note d'Information Enseignement Supérieur & Recherche 10.09</i> , MESR-SIESI, février 2010
R&D center	Percentage of jobs involved in conception–research*	2007	INSEE, Recensement de la population (RP) 2007,

⁴ For this reason we have excluded the city of Saint Denis de la Réunion from our sample. Nor are the communes Boulogne-Billancourt and Villeurbanne part of our sample because of their too great proximity with the cities of Paris and Lyon.

	among the active population (in %) <i>Cutoff: > 2.8% of the active population (average for metropolitan France)</i>		Analyse fonctionnelle des emplois
Competitiveness	Presence of a center of worldwide competitiveness or global scale	2011	DGCIS, DATAR, « La carte des pôles de compétitivité »
Qualification	Percentage of holders of a degree superior to a BAC+2 (2 years of college) among the 15-64 age group (in %) <i>Cutoff: > 20% of the 15-64 age group</i>	2007	INSEE, RP, exploitation principale
Management and advanced intellectual professions	Percentage of executives and superior intellectual professions among the active population (in %) <i>Cutoff: > 20 % of the active population</i>	2007	INSEE, RP 2007, exploitation complémentaire lieu de travail
Metropolitan Functions	Percentage of jobs involving metropolitan functions** among the active population (in %) <i>Cutoff: > 9.1 % of the active population (average for metropolitan France)</i>	2007	INSEE, RP 2007, Analyse fonctionnelle des emplois
Standard of living	Percentage of taxable households (in %) <i>Cutoff: > 54.2 % of households (average for metropolitan France)</i>	2008	INSEE, DGFIP, Impôt sur le revenu des personnes physiques
Cultural offer	Number of museums, theaters (national theaters, national and regional dramatic centers, national stages, public stages) and cinemas <i>Cutoff: 15 total museums, theaters, cinemas</i>	<u>Museums:</u> 2011 <u>Theaters:</u> 2011 <u>Cinemas:</u> 2010	<u>Musées:</u> Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication, MUSEOFILE, Répertoire des musées français <u>Théâtres:</u> Centre National du Théâtre (CNT), Annuaire des équipes et des lieux <u>Cinéma:</u> Centre National du Cinéma et de l'image animée (CNC), « La géographie du cinéma », <i>Dossier du CNC</i> , n° 316, septembre 2010
Tourism	Number of hotel rooms <i>Cutoff: > 2.000 hotel rooms</i>	2010	INSEE, Direction du tourisme, hébergements

			touristiques
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*The INSEE performed a functional analysis of employment based on 15 functions. The function *conception-research* groups professions of conception, research and innovation. In industry, these cover the preliminary phases of production.

**The INSEE defines five metropolitan functions:

- conception-research (cf. infra);
- intellectual services: professions putting specific knowledge into use for advice, analysis, expertise, etc.;
- inter-enterprise commerce: professions that are directly related to wholesale commerce and commerce between companies, both sales and purchasing;
- management: professions of company management, banks and insurance;
- culture-leisure: professions of culture and leisure, athletic or otherwise

After the analysis (see table 2 below), nine cities can be classified as an ideopolis (index ≥ 7): Paris (10), Lyon (10), Toulouse (9), Montpellier (9), Strasbourg (8), Grenoble (8), Nantes (7), Lille (7) et Aix-en-Provence (7). The cities of Bordeaux and Rennes are considered as secondary ideopolises (index=6).

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

THE ELECTORAL DYNAMIC OF THE PS IN THE IDEOPOLISES

Looking at the results obtained by the PS in the French ideopolises over the past 15 years, we can confirm on the one hand the over-representation of the PS in these cities and on the other hand a positive dynamic of this vote over time, in particular in the second half of the decade 2000. This general observation must be strongly nuanced, however, according to the nature of the elections that we tested.

–**At the level of municipal elections**, we have already emphasized the methodological difficulties posed by these polls. It is nevertheless true that in cities where the Left, when it can gather its forces, does so under the socialist banner, an incontestable dynamic is at work, with the exception of Aix-en-Provence whose passage to the Right in 2001 was subsequently confirmed in the following years.

First of all, while the capture or loss of large cities seems to follow national tendencies of local elections, net gains of ideopolises by the Left have never been negative (even when the Left ceded 15 large cities in 2001), and rather show a regular progression over the past 15 years. Even if these gains are not, in the absolute value, remarkable, their increase is all the

more notable over the course of time (and in particular in 2008), in that it is taking place on the limited basis of the 15 of the largest cities of France. While in 1995 the Left already controlled six out of nine ideopolises, this was true of eight among them in 2008. Besides Strasbourg, lost in 2001 than recaptured in 2008, each newly gained ideopolis was retained in the following elections, most often with an increased percentage of the vote. The city of Grenoble, won in 1995 by Michel Destot, thus resisted the powerful movement in favor of the Right in 2001, confirming its position on the Left in spectacular fashion in 2008: not content to simply gather more than 42% of the vote in the first round (an improvement of about a third compared with previous elections), the PS and its allies (among them MoDem, centrists) barely missed obtaining an absolute majority in the second round, due to a three-way contest with the Right and the ecologists who passed 22%. Elsewhere, the conquest of Paris and Lyon – two of the three most populated French cities – ended in 2001 two long traditions of domination by the Right. But in 2008, the electoral supremacy of Bertrand Delanoë and Gerard Collomb was confirmed in spectacular fashion. The lists led by the Lyonnais socialists gained an absolute majority already in the first round with all arrondissements taken together, which corresponded to a victory in six out of nine of them, and explains a slight dropping off in the second round calculated on the three arrondissements still in play. As for the socialist mayor of the French capital, the lists supporting him improved their average score, guaranteeing him a comfortable majority.

In other cities, we see more simply the confirmation, sometimes amplified, of domination by the Left. For example, the Socialist anchorage in Lille has not been challenged since 1995, reaching an all-time high in 2008, when the rallying of the Left and the center of MoDem allowed them to attain a record score of 66% in a left–right duel that was not disturbed by the Front National. The cities of Montpellier and Nantes show the same pattern. Finally an important progression can be seen in Toulouse, which was finally won by Pierre Cohen in 2008. As for the city of Aix-en-Provence, is not insignificant to remark that the Left won the city in 1995 against a list of the Right and another of the Far Right, and was defeated in 2008 by a list of the Right and another of the Center.

Table 2. Results for municipal elections in the ideopolises (in % of recorded votes)

Cities / Ballots	M 95 R1	M 95 R2	M 01 R1	M01 R2	M 08 R1	M 08 R2
Lille	40,84	48,53**	34,53	49,60**	46,02	66,56
Paris*	29,96	46,47	29,38	49,04	40,36	54,88
Nantes	57,88	elected	54,94	elected	55,71	elected
Toulouse	25,93	competitor elected	27,89	44,87	39	50,42
Strasbourg	52,51	elected	29,1	40,4	43,9	58,33
Lyon*	26,27	35,8	29,49	49,16	52,84	49,8
Grenoble	29,26	54,09	29,87	51,04	42,73	48,01**
Montpellier	47,02	56,1**	38,76	56,34	47,11	51,88**
Aix en Provence	34,99	48,62**	41,27	49,39	29,09	42,94**
<i>Net gain of ideopolises</i>		<i>1</i>		<i>0</i>		<i>2</i>
<i>Net gain of large cities</i>		<i>1</i>		<i>-4</i>		<i>11</i>

*Elections held by arrondissement (the score is the average of scores obtained in the arrondissements where a head of the PS list or the United Left was a challenger).

**Second round with three - or four - way contest with the Left, Ecologists, FN or others.

In bold: swings or elections on the Left.

-At the level of presidential elections, we can see a clear rupture with the election of 2007, in which Ségolène Royal was candidate. Regarding the Socialist candidate in the first round, the gap between the recorded vote on a national level and the average among the ideopolises speaks volumes. While it oscillated between 3.5 and 2.5 points in 1995 and 2002, it more than doubled in 2007, gaining more than 6 points, and thereby reaching a markedly higher level (by almost 2 points) than the gap between the large cities and France as a whole. In terms of the progression of Royal over Jospin, the candidate of 2007 improved the socialist score by nearly 13 points compared with 2002 in the ideopolises (compared with nearly 10 nationwide) and more than five points compared with 1995 (compared with 2.5 nationally, that is half). *These different measures confirm that in the first round, Royal did better than simply maintaining socialist positions in the cities having acquired the status of ideopolis, including in comparison with other large French cities. The value of the index expresses an increasing gap between the socialist vote in France and the socialist vote in the ideopolises, which appear as territories more and more favorable to French social democracy.*

Results of the second round confirm this dynamic. In 2007, Ségolène Royal, the Socialist candidate representing the entire Left, obtained on average 52.41% of the vote in the ideopolises, that is nearly 5.5 points higher than her national score. As if in parallel, the vote for Lionel Jospin was on the contrary under-represented in the second round of 1995 in

ideopolises (unlike in the first round), which as a result shows an important progression for Ségolène Royal compared with the former prime minister: the vote of the Left increased by 5.4 points compared to 1995, while decreasing by half a point on the national level. Even in the second round where the socialist electorate is combined with the entire electorate of the Left, candidates carrying the banner of the PS had more success in the ideopolises than in the rest of the country. Though the gap is slightly reduced in the second round, still the dynamic is unmistakable compared with the previous election of the same type in which a PS candidate ran. Once again, the evolution of the index from nearly neutral to positive gives us additional proof. We should add that *as in the first round, the over-representation of Ségolène Royal in the ideopolis vote is superior to her over-representation in the large cities. The gap ideopolis/France is higher by more than a point than the gap large cities/France, while the inverse situation held in 1995.*

Table 3. Results of presidential elections in the ideopolises (in % of recorded vote)

Cities / Ballots	P 95 R1	P 02 R1	Evolution	P 07 R1	Evolution	P 95 R2	P 07 R2	Evolution
Lille	27,5	20,21	-7,29	32,98	12,77	53,2	55,9	2,7
Paris	26,02	19,94	-6,08	31,75	11,81	39,9	49,8	9,9
Nantes	29,08	20,74	-8,34	34,8	14,06	50,2	56,6	6,4
Toulouse	30,12	20,23	-9,89	36,15	15,92	51,8	57,6	5,8
Strasbourg	24,27	17,27	-7	29,03	11,76	45,9	48,9	3
Lyon	22,76	15,35	-7,41	27,29	11,94	40,7	46,9	6,2
Grenoble	31,12	20,59	-10,53	36,31	15,72	52,4	58,1	5,7
Montpellier	27,59	19,31	-8,28	34,58	15,27	48,6	55,2	6,6
Aix en Provence	23,24	15,33	-7,91	25,36	10,03	40,17	42,7	2,53
<i>National average</i>	23,3	16,18	-7,12	25,87	9,69	47,4	46,9	-0,4
Ideopolises Average	26,86	18,77	-8,09	32,03	13,26	46,99	52,41	5,42
Gap IDP/France	3,56	2,59		6,16		-0,41	5,51	
Index	1,15	1,16		1,24		0,99	1,12	
<i>Large cities average</i>	24,78	18	-6,78	30,36	12,36	47,9	51,4	3,5
Gap large cities/France	1,48	1,82		4,49		0,5	4,5	

– **On the level of European elections**, however, the results obtained by socialist lists are hardly convincing for our hypothesis. We can see a difference between the PS vote nationally and the PS vote in ideopolises, in favor of the latter. But on the one hand the gap is slight, and on the other hand we see no temporal dynamic. One possible explanation would be in the nature of this election, which as a second-order (Reif, Schmitt, 1980) election favors new configurations vis-à-vis the large traditional parties, including within the ideopolises. In line

with this observation, the 2009 election was a model that moreover took place in a phase of electoral realignment in France that began in 2007 (Martin, 2009), favorable to chaotic movements of electoral support. Moreover, this election was marked by the strong performance of the Europe Ecology list, a part of whose electoral base comes precisely from large French cities where the stakes of “quality-of-life” are strongly felt. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the over-representation of the Ecologist vote in the ideopolises (7.5 points above the national average) as well as by the analysis of this election by Pierre Martin who identifies a “massive [...] transfer of socialist vote to the list of Europe Ecology [...] without precedent and sociologically restricted”, since it concerns primarily “middle and upper management of a liberal cultural orientation” (2009: 743). However, beyond the second-order nature of the election, an important phenomenon is illustrated by this result: the domination of the PS in the ideopolises is susceptible to being called into question by a party with an even more clear position on stakes of a cultural nature. The three-way contest faced by Michel Destot in Grenoble in 2008 is meaningful from this point of view. We consider that if the Ecologist party does not yet represent a serious threat in local and presidential elections, this is due largely to a double lack of anchored support on the one hand and credibility concerning a major election of French political life on the other. In the end, if the PS continues to reap the benefits of its status as governing party and its ability to dominate the local options, the progression of Europe Ecology in the last regional elections (2010) and cantonal elections (2011) tend to show that this advantage could well be of limited duration.

Table 4. Results of the European Elections in the Ideopolises (in % of recorded votes)

Cities / Ballots	E 94	E 99	<i>Evolution</i>	E 04	<i>Evolution</i>	E 09	<i>Evolution</i>
Lille	19,09	24,91	5,82	33,51	8,6	25,57	-7,94
Paris	18,29	20,21	1,92	26,87	6,66	14,69	-12,18
Nantes	19,8	25,91	6,11	35,09	9,18	17,95	-17,14
Toulouse	16,76	24,99	8,23	32,47	7,48	16,96	-15,51
Strasbourg	22,4	21,77	-0,63	31,18	9,41	23,36	-7,82
Lyon	15,97	20,24	4,27	29,26	9,02	15,51	-13,75
Grenoble	20,99	25,15	4,16	36,21	11,06	19,09	-17,12
Montpellier	18,08	24,02	5,94	31,25	7,23	17,1	-14,15
Aix en Provence	12,52	20,31	7,79	30,92	10,61	14,32	-16,6
<i>National average</i>	14,49	21,95	7,46	28,9	6,95	16,48	-12,42
Ideopolises average	18,21	23,06	4,85	31,86	8,8	18,28	-13,58
Gap	3,72	1,11		2,96		1,8	
Index	1,26	1,05		1,1		1,11	

Beyond the simple electoral results, we must take into account another observation in the analysis of the emergence of a social democracy of the ideopolises. On the one hand it regards the importance of national responsibilities assumed by socialist mayors of ideopolises, and on the other hand their positioning as a major force weighing in on public debate in general and within the PS in particular. For instance, the mayor of Lille, Martine Aubry, has been the secretary of the party since the Congress of Reims in 2008, Jean–Marc Ayrault, the Mayor of Nantes, has been the president of the Socialist group in the National Assembly since 1997, and Michel Destot, the Mayor of Grenoble, has presided over the National Council of the PS as well as the Association of Mayors of Large Cities of France (AMGVF) since 2007. It is true that the first two cited are not considered representative of the “social–liberal” tendency in the PS. Nevertheless, Martine Aubry currently incarnates a “center-Orthodox” position in the party, which signifies that in *practice* she is, or will be, more reformist than her *discourse* suggests. The movement that she represented at the Congress of Reims, moreover, gathered partisans of Laurent Fabius and Dominique Strauss-Khan, who as Ministers for the economy under Lionel Jospin incarnated a social-democracy that can be easily qualified as moderate. It remains true that at the same Congress, political orientations more markedly “social–liberal” were presented. This was the case of the motion defended by Bertrand Delanoë, Mayor of Paris, one of the principal supports of whom was notably Michel Destot, known for his loyalty to Dominique Strauss–Kahn. And even if the motion of Ségolène Royal sought to reconcile these contradictory sensibilities, it is significant that she was supported by Gerard Colomb, author of the contribution *La Ligne claire (The Clear Line)*⁵. Presented along with Manuel Valls, representing the right wing of the party and favorable to a “Democrat” mutation in the American style, as well as with Jean–Noël Guérini, Socialist candidate in the city of Marseille in 2008, this contribution advocated an adaptation to economic globalization and the passage to an economy based on innovation and new information technologies. Having marked his distance from Ségolène Royal, Gérard Colomb has since intervened many times in the press and recently published a book (Colomb, 2011), in order to advocate a non-Jacobin socialism, more favorable to entrepreneurs and favoring innovation, promoting sustainable development without renouncing growth. For his part, Michel Destot founded a think tank, “Inventing the Left” with a reformist and pro-European identity, gathering many

⁵ The *contributions* are the texts preparing the Congress, of which the signatories are traditionally grouped in *motions*, which are voted on by adherents to determine the equilibrium between the leaders of the party.

personalities from the former circle of influence of Michel Rocard and the followers of Strauss-Kahn.

Finally, this overview would be incomplete without mentioning the reopening by a collective of 26 mayors of the debate on the right of foreign residents to vote in local elections : among them, five of the eight Socialist mayors of an ideopolis signed the appeal, among whom the mayor of Strasbourg Roland Ries, the principle promoter of this political initiative on cultural grounds. Whether by intervening in the public debate or by running directly for responsibilities within the party apparatus, socialist mayors of ideopolises are therefore looking to weigh in on the party line of the PS, modulating in a direction that will allow them to carry off electoral victories, and that corresponds to the first alternative of “integration/demarcation” cultural cleavage that, according to Kriesi *et al.* (2008), is changing the landscape of political competition. This is true culturally, through an open attitude vis-à-vis the “diversity” and liberty of morals—which is not unique to them—but also economically, through the emphasis of the opportunities created by economic globalization rather than its negative effects. On this last point, the difference with the liberal Right comes from the fact that they admit the necessity of a strategic and ambitious State, and from their preference for supply-side policies based on non-price competitiveness (rather than price competitiveness).

* * *

Together, our results and observations attest to a mutation of the ideological and electoral profile of the French PS, linked with the emergence of new social and territorial demarcations. Conscious of the necessity of extending our method to other European countries, we find in the case of France an initial encouragement of a research agenda common to political scientists, sociologists and geographers, with the objective of better understanding the consequences of evolutions in the world economy.

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APPENDIX

Table 1. Variables and ideopolis index

	Connectedness	University center	R&D center	Competitiveness	Qualification	M&AIP	Metropolitan functions	Standard of living	Cultural offer	Tourism	Ideopolis index
Paris	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10**
Lyon	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10**
Toulouse	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	9**
Montpellier	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	9**
Strasbourg	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	8**
Grenoble	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	8**
Nantes	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	7**
Lille	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	7**
Aix-en-Provence	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	7**
Bordeaux	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	6*
Rennes	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	6*
Marseille	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	5
Nice	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	4
Orléans	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	4
Nancy	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Toulon	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Dijon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Angers	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Mulhouse	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Reims	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Le Havre	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saint-Etienne	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Le Mans	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nîmes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Limoges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clermont-Ferrand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tours	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Amiens	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Metz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Besançon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perpignan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rouen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0