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Coordination with Communication under Oath

Abstract : Herein we explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment via a truth-telling oath can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic sequential coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap-talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment-via-the-oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.
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https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00635801
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Submitted on : Saturday, May 5, 2012 - 5:56:28 AM
Last modification on : Friday, April 29, 2022 - 10:13:02 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Monday, August 6, 2012 - 2:20:36 AM

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DTGREQAM2011_49_version2.pdf
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  • HAL Id : halshs-00635801, version 2

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Nicolas Jacquemet, Stephane Luchini, Jason Shogren, Adam Zylbersztejn. Coordination with Communication under Oath. 2011. ⟨halshs-00635801v2⟩

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