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Manuel Rebuschi

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Low Cost *De Se* Attitudes

Manuel Rebuschi

L.H.S.P. – Archives H. Poincaré (UMR 7117)
MSH Lorraine (USR 3261)
Université Nancy 2, France

The issue

De se attitudes are generally regarded as special cases of *de re* attitudes, and tokens of "I" as denoting genuine individuals (see e.g. [4].)

Can semantic considerations alone dictate such an ontological commitment? This seems to be rather a matter a philosophical dispute [6].

Objective: Provide a semantic analysis appropriate for *de se* attitude reports, and *neutral* regarding ontology.

The Self as an intentional object

General idea: The first-person pronoun "I" behaves like a rigid designator: "I" denotes the same individual (the Self) in every world where it denotes at all. Thanks to *de objecto* attitudes, we can account for rigid designation with no commitment to an actual referent of "I". The Self is thus conceived of as a mere intentional object.

Logical form: First-person assertions are construed as involving an implicit attitude operator. So: "I am a spy" is rephrased by "I believe that I am a spy" (or "I think that I am a spy".) For simplicity, let us consider that Bel is the appropriate operator for the attitude. Then the corresponding formula is:

$\text{Bel} (\exists x/\text{Bel}) (x = i \ \& \ x \text{ is a spy})$

where i is an individual constant standing for "I" and denoting The Self in every Bel-accessible possible world.

Good news: The Self need not exist in the actual world. What is required is that it exists in every Bel-accessible world; of course, the Self can also exist in the actual world. Hence the analysis neither rejects nor entails antirealism about the Self.

Bad news: *De objecto* amounts to mere *de re* in the case of factive attitudes, i.e. attitudes A such that for any φ : $A\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$. So antirealism about the Self would not be consistent with self-knowledge, but only with self-belief, self-desire, and other non-factive attitudes!

Self-knowledge

A neutral account: First-person assertions express the speaker's intentional perspective on herself (and on the world). As (implicitly) relative to an interpretation, we formalize the corresponding sentences in the scope of the *Int* operator, with a *de objecto* attitude about the Self. E.g., "I am angry" is formalized by $\text{Int} (\exists x/\text{Int}) (x = i \ \& \ x \text{ is a spy})$. Depending on our metaphysical options, the Self can be either a mere intentional (non-actual) individual, or a genuine actual individual. The next figure represents the first option (the Self being represented by a red guy); the second option would assume factivity for *Int* (or equivalently, reflexivity for R_{Int}), with no more separation between the actual world w and its intentional alternatives w' and w'' – the red guy would then stand up in w too.

Minds and bodies: Like in Castañeda's [1] account, mental predicates are applied to the Self, and physical predicates are applied either to the body (the grey guy), or to a structured pair made of the Self and the body (e.g. in "I weigh 160 pounds"). Since in our physicalist figure nearby, the agent is a grey physical guy in w , a specific and subtle transworld relation [8] is required so that the agent identify herself with the Self in w' and w'' [5]. This transworld relation is represented by the dotted red line. It is one intentional relation among many others, that are expected to relate an agent to as many persons through the *Int* filter.

De objecto attitudes

[7]

Standard contrast: (Bel stands for "it is believed that")

- **de dicto**: $\text{Bel} (\exists x) (x \text{ is a spy})$
- **de re**: $(\exists x) \text{Bel} (x \text{ is a spy})$

Problem: One cannot account for attitudes focused onto nonexistents like James Bond. However, it makes sense.

Solution: Use Hintikka's IF (*independence-friendly*) extension of first-order (modal) logic [3].


General idea (based on Game-theoretical Semantics):

in $(\forall y)(\exists x)(x > y)$ the choice of a value for x depends on that of a value for y – and the formula is true relative to natural numbers; by contrast, in the IF-formula $(\forall y)(\exists x/\forall y)(x > y)$, the existential quantifier is independent from the universal one: the choice of a value for x is required to be *uniform* relative to that of a value for y – which makes the formula untrue in the same model.

In fact, the second formula is equivalent to the first-order one: $(\exists x)(\forall y)(x > y)$. But other IF-formulas are beyond first-order logic.

Back to modal logic:


- **de objecto**: $\text{Bel} (\exists x/\text{Bel}) (x \text{ is a spy})$
- Modalities like Bel are hidden universal quantifiers. Hence an existential quantifier can be made independent from Bel.



De dicto

$\text{Bel} (\exists x) (x \text{ is a spy})$


Starting at w , one goes to any Bel-accessible possible world (w' or w''), and then chooses an individual that is a spy.



De re

$(\exists x) \text{Bel} (x \text{ is a spy})$

One chooses an individual (in w) then goes to any Bel-accessible world (w' or w'') and checks whether the individual is a spy.



De objecto

$\text{Bel} (\exists x/\text{Bel}) (x \text{ is a spy})$

One goes to any Bel-accessible possible world (w or w') then chooses an individual, *regardless of the current world* (w' or w''), that is a spy. I.e., the individual must be chosen *uniformly* with respect to the world chosen for Bel. It can, but need not exist in w .

Knowledge of intentional objects


Factivity: If an attitude A is factive, then the actual world w belongs to the class of A-accessible worlds from w ; while processing $(\exists x/A)$ in the *de objecto* case $A (\exists x/A) \varphi(x)$, an individual must be uniformly chosen relative to all the A-accessible worlds, including w ; so the individual must exist in the actual world; hence the *de objecto* formula is equivalent to the corresponding *de re* one $(\exists x) A \varphi(x)$.

Combining knowledge and belief: There can be genuine knowledge about intentional objects, like in "Mary knows that the monster she fears is blue".

This can be formalized using two attitude operators, e.g.:

$\text{Know Bel} (\exists x/\text{Bel}) (x \text{ is a monster} \ \& \ x \text{ is blue})$.

An intentional operator: Let us introduce a new operator, *Int* (a box modality like Bel or Know), and R_{Int} the corresponding accessibility relation. The formula $\text{Int} \varphi$ is read "According to one's intention [or interpretation], φ ". The operator roughly regimentes Dennett's [2] *intentional stance*. It cannot be factive (i.e., $\text{Int} \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$ does not obtain in general), but it can conform to a weaker axiom coming from deontic logic: $\text{Int} (\text{Int} \varphi \rightarrow \varphi)$.



Conclusion

Low cost *de se* attitudes require a clear notion of intentional identity: identity is pivotal for *de se* attitudes, and intentionality, if separated from actuality, can get them low cost. Based on IF modal logic, the concept of *de objecto* attitudes does the job.

The resulting picture has a Wittgensteinian flavour. As Castañeda [1] says of his own account (different from the present one): the Self is not "an entity in the world, but an entity outside the world that must be identifiable in terms of entities in the world."

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