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Opportunisme ou équité ? Le cas des contrats d'approvisionnement de défense

Abstract : How are extra costs resulting from the occurrence of unanticipated risks allocated in a procurement setting? This paper develops a theoretical framework combining transaction cost economics with equity theory in order to explain why parties endorse cooperative strategies, basically a 50-50 sharing rule, that prevail over their propensity to behave opportunistically. We derive two propositions that we test on a dataset of 48 contracts in the French defence procurement. We find that perception of equity turns out to be a key factor in the contractual relationship. This interpretation challenges the prevailing interpretation of a key assumption in transaction cost economics.
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Contributor : Claude Ménard <>
Submitted on : Friday, September 16, 2011 - 11:54:11 AM
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Claude Ménard, Jean-Michel Oudot. Opportunisme ou équité ? Le cas des contrats d'approvisionnement de défense. Revue Française d'Economie, Association Française d'Économie, 2010, 24 (3), pp.196-226. ⟨halshs-00624280⟩



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