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Implementing steady state efficiency in overlapping generations economies with environmental externalities

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Abstract
We consider in this paper overlapping generations economies with pollution resulting from both consumption and production. The competitive equilibrium steady state is compared to the optimal steady state from the social planner’s viewpoint. We show that any competitive equilibrium steady state whose capital-labor ratio exceeds the golden rule ratio is dynamically inefficient. Moreover, the range of dynamically efficient steady states capital ratios increases with the effectiveness of the environment maintenance technology, and decreases for more polluting production technologies. We characterize some tax and transfer policies that decentralize as a competitive equilibrium outcome the social planner’s steady state.

Resumé
On étudie dans ce papier des économies de générations imbriquées avec pollution provenant aussi bien de la consommation que de la production. L’état stationnaire d’équilibre concurrentiel est comparé à l’état stationnaire optimal du point de vue du planificateur. On montre que lorsque le ratio capital-travail excède à l’état stationnaire de l’équilibre concurrentiel celui de la règle d’or, alors le premier est dynamiquement inefficace. De plus, l’intervalle d’états stationnaires dynamiquement efficaces s’accroît avec l’effectivité de la technologie de maintien de l’environnement, et diminue lorsque la technologie de production est plus polluante. On caractérise des politiques fiscales qui décentralisent l’état stationnaire du planificateur comme équilibre concurrentiel.

Keywords: overlapping generations, environmental externality, tax and transfer policy.
Mots clés: générations imbriquées, externalités environnementales, politiques fiscales.

JEL Classification: D62, E21, H21, H41
1 Introduction

Environmental externalities in economies with overlapping generations have been studied since at least the 1990s. In particular, the effects of environmental externalities on dynamic inefficiency, productivity, health and longevity of agents have been addressed, as well, as the policy interventions that may be needed. While in most papers pollution is assumed to come from production, and the environment is supposed to improve or degrade by itself at a constant rate (Marini and Scaramozzino 1995; Jouvet et al 2000; Jouvet, Pestieau and Ponthiere 2007; Pautrel 2007; Gutiérrez 2008), other papers assume that pollution comes from consumption (John and Pecchenino 1994; John et al. 1995; Ono 1996). As a consequence of the differing assumptions, the effect of environmental externalities on capital accumulation vary widely across papers. Specifically, John et al. (1995) showed that when only consumption pollutes, the economy accumulates less capital than that what would be optimal. Conversely, Gutiérrez (2008) showed that when only production pollutes, the economy accumulates instead more capital than the optimal level. This is so because in John et al. (1995) agents pay taxes to maintain environment when young, so that an increased pollution reduces their savings; however, in Gutiérrez (2008) pollution increases health costs in old age, leading agents to save more to pay for them. The difference seems therefore to come from when the taxes are paid (when young or old) rather than from whether pollution comes from production or consumption. Another main difference between John et al. (1995) and Gutiérrez (2008) is their different assumptions about the ability of environment to recover from pollution. John et al. (1995) assumes that environment naturally degrades over time, while Gutiérrez (2008) assumes that environment recovers naturally.

This paper aims at disentangling the effects of both production and consumption on environment. Specifically, as in John et al. (1994, 1995), we assume that the environment degrades naturally over time at a constant rate and that young agents devote part of their income to maintain it. In this setup, we characterize the range

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1In John et al. (1994, 1995), only the consumption of old agents pollutes, young agents do not consume. In Ono (1996), it is assumed that consumption of both young and old agents degrade the environment but with a period lag. Here, we assume also that consumptions of both old and young agents and production pollute without decay.
of dynamically inefficient capital-labor ratios. Next, we introduce
taxes and transfer policies that decentralize the first-best steady
state as a competitive equilibrium steady state.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the model. Section 3 characterizes its competitive equilibria.
Section 4 presents the problem of the social planner, defines the effi-
cient allocation with and without discounting, and characterizes the
range of dynamically inefficient capital ratios (Proposition 1). The
competitive equilibrium steady state and the planner’s steady state
are compared in Section 5, where we introduce some tax and trans-
fer schemes that decentralize the planner’s steady state as market
outcome (from Proposition 2 to Proposition 9). Section 6 concludes
the paper.

2 The model

We consider the overlapping generations economy in Diamond
(1965) with a constant population of identical agents. The size of
each generation is normalized to one. Each agent lives two peri-
ods, say young and old. When young, an agent is endowed with
one unit of labor which he supplies inelastically. Agents born in
period \( t \) divide their wage \( w_t \) between consumption when young
\( c^0_t \), investment in maintaining the environment \( m^t \), and savings \( k^t \)
lent to firms to be used in \( t + 1 \) as capital for a return rate \( r_{t+1} \).
The return of savings \( r_{t+1}k^t \) is used up as old age consumption.
Agents born at date \( t \) have preferences over their consumptions when
young and old \((c^0_t, c^1_t) \in \mathbb{R}^2 \) and the environmental quality when old,
\( E_{t+1} \in \mathbb{R} \), represented by \( u(c^0_t) + v(c^1_t) + \phi(E_{t+1}) \) with \( u' > 0\),
\( v'' < 0 \), and \( u'(0) = v'(0) = +\infty, u'(+\infty) = v'(+\infty) = 0 \).

Environmental quality evolves according to
\[
E_{t+1} = (1 - b)E_t - \alpha F(K_{t+1}, L_{t+1}) - \beta(c^t_{0} + c^t_{1}) + \gamma m^t
\]
for some \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma > 0 \) and \( b \in (0, 1] \), where \( F \) is a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function \( F(K_t, L_t) = AK^\theta_t L^{1-\theta}_t \). Capital fully depreciates
in each period. Under perfect competition, the representative firm
maximizes profits solving
\[
\max_{K_t, L_t \geq 0} F(K_t, L_t) - r_t K_t - w_t L_t
\]
so that the wage rate and the rental rate of capital are, in each period $t$, the marginal productivity of labor and capital respectively. Since population is normalized to 1, period $t$ aggregate savings (i.e. period $t+1$ aggregate capital $K_{t+1}$) and labor supply are $k_t$ and 1 respectively, and the wage and rental rate of capital faced by the agent born at period $t$ are

$$r_{t+1} = F_K(k^t, 1) = \theta A(k^t)^{\theta-1} \quad (1)$$

$$w_t = F_L(k^{t-1}, 1) = (1 - \theta) A(k^{t-1})^\theta \quad (2)$$

Environmental quality converges autonomously to a natural level normalized to zero at a rate $b$ that measures the speed of reversion to this level. Nonetheless, production and consumption degrade environmental quality by an amount $\alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1)$ and $\beta(c_0^{t+1} + c_1^{t+1})$ respectively, while young agents can improve the environmental quality by an amount $\gamma m^t$ if they devote a portion $m^t$ of their income to that end.\footnote{One can thus interpret environmental quality as including any characteristic that make the environment more apt for human life, like the cleanness of rivers and atmosphere, and the quality of soil or groundwater, etc. It also includes the state of forests, agricultural lands, parks and gardens, which left on their own naturally revert to wilderness, unless subject to regular maintenance.}

The life-time utility maximization problem of the representative agent is

$$\max_{c_0^t, c_1^t, k^t, m^t \geq 0} u(c_0^t) + v(c_1^t) + \phi(E_{t+1}^e) \quad (3)$$

subject to

$$c_0^t + k^t + m^t = w_t \quad (4)$$

$$c_1^t = r_{t+1} k^t \quad (5)$$

$$E_t = (1 - b) E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) - \beta(c_0^t + c_1^t) + \gamma m^{t-1} \quad (6)$$
\[ E_{t+1}^e = (1 - b)E_t - \alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1) - \beta (c_0^{t+1}e + c_1^t) + \gamma m^t \]  

(7)

given \( E_{t-1}, c_1^{t-1}, k^{t-1}, m^{t-1}, w_t, r_{t+1} \) as well as the expected consumption of the next generation young agent \( c_0^{t+1,e} \). Since the representative agent is assumed to be negligible within his own generation, he thinks of the impact of his savings \( k^t \) on aggregate capital \( K_{t+1} \) to be negligible as well, ignoring that actually \( K_{t+1} = k^t \) at equilibrium. This assumption implies that he does not internalize the impact of the savings decision on environment via production.

Agent \( t \)'s optimal choice \((c_0^t, c_1^t, k^t, m^t, E_t, E_{t+1}^e)\) is therefore characterized by the first-order conditions

\[ u'(c_0^t) - \left[ \beta(1 - \alpha) + \gamma \right] \phi'(E_{t+1}^e) = 0 \]  

(8)

\[ v'(c_1^t) - \left[ \beta + \frac{\gamma}{r_{t+1}} \right] \phi'(E_{t+1}^e) = 0 \]  

(9)

\[ c_0^t + k^t + m^t - w_t = 0 \]  

(10)

\[ c_1^t - r_{t+1}k^t = 0 \]  

(11)

\[ E_t - (1 - b)E_{t-1} + \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) + \beta (c_0^t + c_1^{t-1}) - \gamma m^{t-1} = 0 \]  

(12)

\[ E_{t+1}^e - (1 - b)E_t + \alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1) + \beta (c_0^{t+1,e} + c_1^t) - \gamma m^t = 0 \]  

(13)

as an implicit function of \( E_{t-1}, c_1^{t-1}, k^{t-1}, m^{t-1}, w_t, r_{t+1} \) and \( c_0^{t+1,e} \) as long as the Jacobian matrix of the left-hand-side of the system above with respect to \( c_0^t, c_1^t, k^t, m^t, E_t, E_{t+1}^e \) is regular at the solution. The existence of the optimal solution is established in Appendix A1 and the regularity of the Jacobian matrix at equilibrium is established in Appendix A2. For these FOCs to be not only necessary but also sufficient for the solution to be a maximum, the second order conditions (SOCs) are shown to hold at equilibrium in Appendix A3.
3 Competitive equilibria

Perfect foresight competitive equilibria are characterized by (i) the agent’s utility maximization under the budget constraints, with correct expectations, (ii) the firms’ profit maximization determining factors’ prices, and (iii) the dynamics of environment. Therefore, a competitive equilibrium allocation \( \{c^t_0, c^t_1, k^t, m^t, E^{t+1}\}_t \) is solution to the system of equations

\[
\begin{align*}
    u'(c^t_0) - [\beta(1 - b) + \gamma] \phi'(E^{t+1}) &= 0 \quad (14) \\
    v'(c^t_1) - \left[ \beta + \frac{\gamma}{F_K(k^t, 1)} \right] \phi'(E^{t+1}) &= 0 \quad (15) \\
    c^t_0 + k^t + m^t - F_L(k^{t-1}, 1) &= 0 \quad (16) \\
    c^t_1 - F_K(k^t, 1)k^t &= 0 \quad (17) \\
    E^{t+1} - (1 - b)E^t + \alpha F(k^t, 1) + \beta(c^{t+1}_0 + c^t_1) - \gamma m^t &= 0 \quad (18)
\end{align*}
\]

Note that the feasibility of the allocation of resources is guaranteed by the agent’s budget constraints (16) and (17), since at \( t \)

\[
c^t_0 + c^{t-1}_1 + k^t + m^t = F_K(k^{t-1}, 1)k^{t-1} + F_L(k^{t-1}, 1) = F(k^{t-1}, 1)
\]

A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium steady state, in particular, is a \((c_0, c_1, k, m, E)\) solution to the system of equations

\[
\begin{align*}
    u'(c_0) - [\beta(1 - b) + \gamma] \phi'(E) &= 0 \\
    v'(c_1) - \left[ \beta + \frac{\gamma}{F_K(k, 1)} \right] \phi'(E) &= 0 \\
    c_0 + k + m - F_L(k, 1) &= 0 \\
    c_1 - F_K(k, 1)k &= 0 \\
    bE + \alpha F(k, 1) + \beta(c_0 + c_1) - \gamma m &= 0
\end{align*}
\]
The perfect foresight competitive equilibria of this economy follow a dynamics represented by a first-order difference equation, because of the regularity of the associated Jacobian matrix of the left hand side of the system of equations above with respect to $c_{t+1}, c_1, k^t, m^t, E_{t+1}$ (see Appendix A1).

4 The social planner’s choice with and without discounting

In this section, we consider the optimal allocation from the viewpoint of a social planner that allocates resources in order to maximize a weighted sum of the welfare of all current and future generations. The allocation selected by the social planner, which is optimal in the Pareto sense, is a solution to the problem

$$
\text{Max}_{\{c_0, c_1, k^t, m^t, E_{t+1}\}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1 + R)^t} \left[ u(c_0^t) + v(c_1^t) + \phi(E_{t+1}) \right]
$$

subject to, $\forall t = 0, 1, 2, ...$,

$$
c_0^t + c_{t-1}^t + k^t + m^t = F(k^{t-1}, 1)
$$

$$
E_{t+1} = (1 - b)E_t - \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) - \beta(c_{t+1}^t + c_1^t) + \gamma m^t
$$

given some initial conditions $c_{-1}, k^{-1}, E_0$, where $0 \leq R$ is the social planner’s subjective discount rate.\[3\] The first constraint (20) of the problem is the resource constraint of the economy in period $t$ requiring that the total output in that period is split into consumptions of the current young and old, savings for next period’s capital, and environmental maintenance. The second constraint (21) is the dynamics of the environmental quality.

The social planner’s choice of a steady state is a $(\bar{c}_0, \bar{c}_1, \bar{m}, \bar{k}, \bar{E})$ satisfying (see Appendix A4)

\[3\]The discount rate $R$ is strictly positive when the social planner cares less about a generation’s welfare the further away in the future that generation is, while $R$ equals to zero when she cares about all generations equally, no matter how far in the future they may be.
\[ u'(\bar{c}_0) = (1 + R) \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(\bar{E}) \]  
(22)

\[ v'(\bar{c}_1) = \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(-\bar{E}) \]  
(23)

\[ F_K(\bar{k}, 1) = \frac{\gamma(1 + R)}{\gamma - (1 + R)\alpha} \]  
(24)

\[ \bar{c}_0 + \bar{c}_1 + \bar{k} + \bar{m} = F(\bar{k}, 1) \]  
(25)

\[ b\bar{E} + \alpha F(\bar{k}, 1) + \beta(\bar{c}_0 + \bar{c}_1) - \gamma\bar{m} = 0 \]  
(26)

(the planner’s discount rate \( R \) cannot be arbitrarily high for the optimal steady state to be characterized as above, specifically \( \gamma > (1 + R)\alpha \) needs to hold, which requires \( \gamma > \alpha \), so that \( F_K(\bar{k}, 1) > 0 \). More specifically, in the case of the social planner caring about all generations equally, i.e. \( R = 0 \), the planner’s steady state is the so-called golden rule steady state \( \{c^*_0, c^*_1, k^*, m^*, E^*\} \) that maximizes the utility of the representative agent and is characterized by being a solution to the system

\[ u'(c^*_0) = \frac{\gamma + \beta}{b} \phi'(E^*) \]  
(27)

\[ v'(c^*_1) = \frac{\gamma + \beta}{b} \phi'(E^*) \]  
(28)

\[ F_K(k^*, 1) = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma - \alpha} \]  
(29)

\[ c^*_0 + c^*_1 + k^* + m^* = F(k^*, 1) \]  
(30)

\[ bE^* + \alpha F(k^*, 1) + \beta(c^*_0 + c^*_1) - \gamma m^* = 0 \]  
(31)

Note that, from (27) and (28), the marginal utility of consumption of the young agent must equal that of the consumption of the old agent.

Diamond (1965) shows that in the standard OLG model without pollution externalities, a competitive equilibrium steady state whose
capital per worker exceeds the golden rule level is dynamically in-
efficient. Notwithstanding, Gutiérrez (2008) shows that, when the
pollution externality is large enough, there are dynamically efficient
competitive equilibrium steady state capital ratios that exceed the
golden rule capital ratio. Specifically, Gutiérrez (2008) shows the
existence of a “super golden rule” level of capital ratio, beyond the
golden rule level, such that any economy with pollution external-
ities whose stationary capital ratio exceeds this level is necessar-
ily dynamically inefficient. Nonetheless, it should be noted that in
Gutiérrez (2008) (i) pollution externalities only from production are
taken into account; (ii) the environment recovers itself overtime at
a constant rate; (iii) no resource is devoted to maintaining the en-
vironment; and (iv) the pollution externality decreases the utility
of the agents only indirectly by requiring each agent to pay for ex-
tra health costs in the old age. In this paper, we consider instead
an economy with pollution externalities coming from both produc-
tion and consumption, in which the environment degrades itself over
time, and the quality of the environment can be improved through
maintenance. Also the quality of environment directly affects the
utility of the agents. As a consequence, this paper shows instead
that, as in Diamond (1965) and in contrast with Gutiérrez (2008),
in an economy with consumption and production pollution external-
ities, the golden rule capital ratio is still the highest level of capital
ratio that is dynamically efficient.

**Proposition 1:** In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations econ-
omy with consumption and production pollution, for an efficient
enough cleaning technology, compared to the marginal polluting im-
 pact of production (specifically, for $\gamma > \alpha$ in the model), the golden
rule (i.e. the planner’s steady state choice without discounting) is
the highest dynamically efficient capital ratio.

**Proof:** Since $F_{KK}(k, 1) < 0$ for all $k$, the planner’s optimal capital
ratio $\bar{k}$ is implicitly defined to be a differentiable function $\bar{k}(R)$ of $R$
by the condition

$$F_K(\bar{k}, 1) = \frac{\gamma(1 + R)}{\gamma - (1 + R)\alpha}$$
whose derivative, by the implicit function theorem, is

\[
\tilde{k}'(R) = \frac{1}{F_{KK}(k(R), 1)} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma - (1 + R)\alpha} \right)^2 < 0
\]  

(32)

So, \( \bar{k} \) is decreasing in \( R \). Hence, \( \bar{k}(R) \) is maximal when \( R = 0 \), which

is corresponds to the golden rule level of capital \( \bar{k}^* \).

Proposition 1 shows that any steady state capital ratio exceeding \( k^* \) is dynamically inefficient. From (29) the golden rule capital ratio \( k^* \) is decreasing in the production pollution parameter \( \alpha \). It is, however, increasing in the environment maintaining technology \( \gamma \). Hence, the more polluting is production, the smaller the range of steady state allocations that are dynamically efficient for some discount factor \( R \). Similarly, the more effective is the environment maintainance technology, the bigger the range of steady state allocations that are dynamically efficient for some discount factor \( R \).

5 Policy implementation of the planner’s optimal steady state

In this section, we provide tax and transfer policies allowing to implement the planner’s optimal steady state. Ono (1996) and Gutiérrez (2008) introduced also tax and transfer schemes to decentralize the golden rule steady state in the context of the pollution externalities they consider (from consumption and production only, respectively). However, their schemes uphold the golden rule once the economy is already at that steady state. Nevertheless, in this section we provide policies that lead the economy towards the social planner’s steady state and will keep it there once reached (for the golden rule, the social planner’s discount rate just needs to be set to \( R = 0 \)). The policies fulfill this in two stages. In the first stage, in the period \( t \), taxes and transfers are set in order to make the agent born in period \( t \) choose his savings and consumption when old to be equal to the optimal steady state capital ratio and optimal steady state old agent’s consumption, respectively, from the viewpoint of the social planner. Then in the second stage, taxes and transfers are reset to uphold the planner’s steady state. The first scheme based on the taxation of consumption is presented next in detail. The subsequent schemes work analogously.
5.1. Taxes on consumptions

Suppose that, at the beginning of period $t$, the social planner announces proportional taxes and lump-sum transfers. Letting $\tau_0^t$ and $\tau_1^t$ be the tax rate on agent $t$’s consumption when young and old respectively, $T_0^t$ a lump-sum tax (if positive) levied on agent $t$’s income when young, and $T_1^t$ a lump-sum transfer (if positive) to the same agent when old at date $t + 1$, the problem of agent $t$ is then

$$\max_{c_0^t, c_1^t, k^t, m^t \geq 0} u(c_0^t) + v(c_1^t) + \phi(E_{t+1}^e)$$

subject to

$$(1 + \tau_0^t)c_0^t + k^t + m^t = w_t - T_0^t$$

$$(1 + \tau_1^t)c_1^t = r_{t+1}k^t + T_1^t$$

$$E_t = (1 - b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) - \beta(c_0^t + c_1^{t-1}) + \gamma m^{t-1}$$

$$E_{t+1}^e = (1 - b)E_t - \alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1) - \beta(c_0^{t+1,e} + c_1^t) + \gamma m^t$$

given $c_1^{t-1}$, $k^{t-1}$, $m^{t-1}$, $E_{t-1}$, $w_t$, $r_{t+1}$ and $c_0^{t+1,e}$. Note again that in equation (37), the agent, being negligible within his generation, ignores the fact that $K_{t+1} = k^t$ and hence is unable to internalize the effect of the savings decisions on environment through the aggregate output. Hence, the first-order conditions characterizing agent $t$’s optimal choice are

$$u'(c_0^t) = \left[\beta(1 - b) + \gamma(1 + \tau_0^t)\right] \phi'(E_{t+1}^e)$$

$$v'(c_1^t) = \left[\beta + \gamma(1 + \tau_1^t)\right] \phi'(E_{t+1}^e)$$

$$(1 + \tau_0^t)c_0^t + k^t + m^t = w_t - T_0^t$$

$$(1 + \tau_1^t)c_1^t = r_{t+1}k^t + T_1^t$$
\[ E_t = (1 - b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) - \beta(c_0^t + c_1^{t-1}) + \gamma m^{t-1} \] (42)

\[ E_{t+1}^e = (1 - b)E_t - \alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1) - \beta(c_{0+1}^t + c_1^t) + \gamma m^t \] (43)

At a perfect foresight equilibrium the wage rate and capital return are given by the labor and capital productivities respectively, and forecasts coincide with actual values, i.e. \( E_{t+1}^e = E_{t+1} \) and \( c_0^{t+1} = c_0^t \).

The next proposition shows that the tax rates and lump-sum transfers can be set at levels that make agent \( t \) choose the planner’s steady state capital ratio and consumption when old.

**Proposition 2:** In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pollution from both consumption and production, for any given period \( t \), there exists a period by period budget balanced policy of consumption taxes, and lump-sum taxes and transfers, \( (\tau_0^t, \tau_1^t, T_0^t, T_1^t) \), that implements at \( t + 1 \) the planner’s steady state capital ratio \( \bar{k} \) and consumption when old \( \bar{c}_1 \) at a competitive equilibrium.

**Proof:** Let the tax rates be

\[ \tau_0 = \frac{[\gamma + \beta(1 + R)](1 + R) - [\gamma + \beta(1 - b)](b + R)}{(b + R)\gamma} > 0 \]

\[ \tau_1 = \frac{1 + R}{b + R} \cdot \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 - b)}{\gamma - \alpha(1 + R)} - 1 > 0 \]

then equations (38), (39) become equations (22), (23) when the equation (24) characterizing the planner’s steady state capital ratio, \( F_K(\bar{k}, 1) = \frac{1+R}{1-(1+R)\alpha/\gamma} \), holds. Therefore agent \( t \)’s chooses ice the planner’s steady state capital ratio \( \bar{k} \) and consumption when old \( \bar{c}_1 \) under the consumption tax rates \( \tau_0, \tau_1 \) above if, and only if,

\[ u'(c_0^t) = (1 + R)\frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(E_{t+1}) \] (44)

\[ v'({\bar{c}_1}) = \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(E_{t+1}) \] (45)
\[
(1 + \tau_0)c_0^t + \bar{k} + m^t = F_L(k^{t-1}, 1) - T_0^t
\]  
(46)

\[
(1 + \tau_1)\bar{c}_1 = F_K(\bar{k}, 1)\bar{k} + T_1^t
\]  
(47)

\[
E_t = (1 - b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) - \beta(c_0^t + c_1^{t-1} + \tau_0c_0^t + T_0^t) + \gamma m^{t-1}
\]  
(48)

\[
E_{t+1} = (1 - b)E_t - \alpha F(\bar{k}, 1) - \beta(c_0^{t+1} + \bar{c}_1) + \gamma m^t
\]  
(49)

given \(E_{t-1}, c_1^{t-1}, k^{t-1}, m^{t-1}, c_0^{t+1} = c_0^{t+1,e}\). Note that this is a system in \(\{c_0^t, T_0^t, T_1^t, m^t, E_t, E_{t+1}\}\) (note also that in the equation (48) the consumption when old of agent \(t-1\) is now \(\bar{c}_1^{t-1} = c_1^{t-1} + \tau_0c_0^t + T_0^t\) since he receives as a lump-sum transfer the tax raised from the young agent \(t\), \(\tau_0c_0^t + T_0^t\), so that the government’s budget is balanced.

The solution in \(\{c_0^t, T_0^t, T_1^t, m^t, E_t, E_{t+1}\}\) to the system of equations (44)-(49) is the following. Given that \(\phi'' < 0\), from (45) and (23)

\[
v'(\bar{c}_1) = \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b+R} \phi'(E_{t+1}) \quad \Rightarrow \quad E_{t+1} = \bar{E}
\]

then from (44), (22) and \(E_{t+1} = \bar{E}\),

\[
u'(c_0^t) = (1 + R)\frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b+R} \phi'(E_{t+1})
\]

\[
u'(\bar{c}_0) = (1 + R)\frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b+R} \phi'(\bar{E}) \quad \Rightarrow \quad c_0^t = \bar{c}_0
\]

Also from (47) it follows

\[
T_1^t = (1 + \tau_1)\bar{c}_1 - F_K(\bar{k}, 1)\bar{k}
\]

and from (46) and \(c_0^t = \bar{c}_0\) we have

\[
m^t = F_L(k^{t-1}, 1) - (1 + \tau_0)\bar{c}_0 - \bar{k} - T_0^t
\]

It can also be easily checked that, substituting \(E_{t+1} = \bar{E}, c_0^t = \bar{c}_0, m^t = F_L(k^{t-1}, 1) - (1 + \tau_0)\bar{c}_0 - \bar{k} - T_0^t\) and equation (48) into equation (49) we have

\[
\bar{E} = I - [\beta(1 - b) + \gamma]T_0^t
\]
where

\[ I = (1 - b) \left[ (1 - b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) - \beta c_1^{t-1} + \gamma m^{t-1} \right] - \alpha F(\bar{k}, 1) \]

\[ - [\beta(1 - b) + \gamma] (1 + \tau_0)\bar{c}_0 - \beta (c_0^{t+1} + \bar{c}_1) + \gamma \left[ F_L(k^{t-1}, 1) - \bar{k} \right] \]

so that

\[ T_0^t = \frac{I - \bar{E}}{\beta(1 - b) + \gamma} \]

and hence, from equation (48),

\[ E_t = (1 - b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) - \beta (c_1^{t-1} + (1 + \tau_0)\bar{c}_0 + \frac{I - \bar{E}}{\beta(1 - b) + \gamma}) + \gamma m^{t-1} \]

Therefore, the solution to the system of equations (44)-(49) is

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\bar{c}_0 \\
T_0^t \\
T_1^t \\
m^t \\
E_t \\
E_{t+1}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
\bar{c}_0 \\
\frac{\bar{c}_0 - F_L(\bar{k}, 1)\bar{k}}{\beta(1 - b) + \gamma} \\
F_L(k^{t-1}, 1) - (1 + \tau_0)\bar{c}_0 - \bar{k} - \frac{I - \bar{E}}{\beta(1 - b) + \gamma} + \frac{I - \bar{E}}{\beta(1 - b) + \gamma} + \gamma m^{t-1} \\
(1 - b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) - \beta (c_1^{t-1} + (1 + \tau_0)\bar{c}_0 + \frac{I - \bar{E}}{\beta(1 - b) + \gamma}) + \gamma m^{t-1}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

so that under the policy \((\tau_0, \tau_1, T_0^t, T_1^t)\) agent \(t\)'s chooses the planner's steady state capital ratio \(\bar{k}\) and consumption when old \(\bar{c}_1\).

The next proposition shows that there exist lump-sum transfers \(T_0^{t+1}, T_1^{t+1}\) that make agent \(t + 1\) choose, under the same tax rates \(\tau_0, \tau_1\), the planner's steady state \(\{\bar{c}_0, c_0^1, \bar{k}, \bar{m}, \bar{E}, \bar{E}\}\).

**Proposition 3:** In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pollution from both consumption and production the policy \((\tau_0, \tau_1, T_0^t, T_1^t)\) such that

\[ \tau_0 = \frac{[\gamma + \beta(1 + R)][1 + R] - [\gamma + \beta(1 - b)][b + R]}{(b + R)\gamma} > 0 \quad (51) \]

\[ \tau_1 = \frac{1 + R}{b + R} \cdot \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 - b)}{\gamma - \alpha(1 + R)} - 1 > 0 \quad (52) \]

\[ T_0 = F_L(\bar{k}, 1) - (1 + \tau_0)\bar{c}_0 - \bar{k} - \bar{m} \quad (53) \]
\[ T_1 = (1 + \tau_1)\bar{c}_1 - F_K(\bar{k}, 1)\bar{k} \]  

(54)  

implies at \( t + 1 \) the planner’s steady state, after the first stage of taxation in period \( t \), and keeps the government budget balanced.

**Proof:** Given \( E_t, c^*_1 = \bar{c}_1, k^t = \bar{k}, m^t, c^{t+2}_0 = c^{t+2,e}_0 \) and the planner’s steady state capital ratio, \( \bar{k} \), the planner’s steady state consumption of the old, \( \bar{c}_1 \), and the consumption tax rates \( \tau_0, \tau_1 \), then at the perfect foresight equilibrium, \( \{ c^{t+1}_0, T^{t+1}_0, T^{t+1}_1, m^{t+1}, E_{t+1}, E_{t+2} \} \) is characterized by the following system of equation

Agent \( t + 1 \) will also choose the planner’s capital ratio and consumption when old under a policy \( (\tau_0, \tau_1, T^{t+1}_0, T^{t+1}_1) \) - with the same tax rates as before - if

\[
\begin{align*}
\tag{55}
&u'(c^{t+1}_0) = (1 + R) \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(E_{t+2}^e) \\
\tag{56}
&v'(\bar{c}_1) = \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(E_{t+2}^e) \\
(1 + \tau_0)c^{t+1}_0 + k + m^{t+1} = F_L(\bar{k}, 1) - T^{t+1}_0 \tag{57} \\
(1 + \tau_1)c_1 = F_K(\bar{k}, 1)\bar{k} + T^{t+1}_1 \tag{58} \\
E_{t+1} = \bar{E} = (1 - b)E_t - \alpha F(\bar{k}, 1) - \beta(c^{t+1}_0 + \bar{c}_1) + \gamma m^t \tag{59} \\
E_{t+2}^e = (1 - b)\bar{E} - \alpha F(\bar{k}, 1) - \beta(c^{t+2}_0 + \bar{c}_1) + \gamma m^{t+1} \tag{60}
\end{align*}
\]

The solution in \( \{ c^{t+1}_0, T^{t+1}_0, T^{t+1}_1, m^{t+1}, E_{t+1}, E_{t+2}^e \} \) to this system is the following. Given that \( \phi'' < 0 \), from (56) and (23) it follows

\[
\begin{align*}
\tag{55}
&u'(c^{t+1}_0) = (1 + R) \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(E_{t+2}^e) \\
&u'(\bar{c}_1) = \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(\bar{E}) \Rightarrow E_{t+2}^e = \bar{E} \\
\end{align*}
\]

From (55), (22) and \( E_{t+2} = \bar{E} \)

\[
\begin{align*}
&u'(c^{t+1}_0) = (1 + R) \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(E_{t+2}^e) \\
&u'(\bar{c}_0) = (1 + R) \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(\bar{E}) \Rightarrow c^{t+1}_0 = \bar{c}_0 \\
\end{align*}
\]
At a perfect foresight equilibrium, $c_{t+2} = c_{t+2} = \bar{c}_0$ holds. Substituting $c_{t+2} = \bar{c}_0$ and $E_{t+2} = \bar{E}$ into equation (60) and comparing with equation (26) we have

\[
\begin{align*}
&\begin{cases}
    b\bar{E} + \alpha F(\bar{k}, 1) + \beta(\bar{c}_0 + \bar{c}_1) - \gamma m_{t+1} = 0 \\
    b\bar{E} + \alpha F(\bar{k}, 1) + \beta(\bar{c}_0 + \bar{c}_1) - \gamma \bar{m} = 0
\end{cases} \\
\Rightarrow m_{t+1} = \bar{m}
\end{align*}
\]

Substituting $c_{t+1} = \bar{c}_0$ and $m_{t+1} = \bar{m}$ into (57) we have

\[T_{t+1} = F_L(\bar{k}, 1) - (1 + \tau_0)\bar{c}_0 - \bar{k} - \bar{m} = T_0\]

Equation (58) gives us

\[T_{t+1} = (1 + \tau_1)\bar{c}_1 - F_K(\bar{k}, 1)\bar{k} = T_1\]

So, by implementing the taxes and transfers policy, $(\tau_0, \tau_1, T_0, T_1)$, the optimal choice of agent born at date $t + 1$ will coincide with the planner’s optimal steady state.

We know the old agent in period $t + 1$ also receives a transfer $T_1 = (1 + \tau_1)\bar{c}_1 - F_K(\bar{k}, 1)\bar{k}$. It is obvious that

\[T_1 = \tau_0\bar{c}_0 + \tau_1\bar{c}_1 + T_0\]

So, at such steady state, under this taxes and transfers policy, the government budget is kept balanced every period. ■

### 5.2. Taxes on consumptions and capital income

In the section 5.1, we introduced taxes on consumptions in which the tax rates differ between consumptions of the old and the young. In the reality, however, this tax scheme seems to be difficult to apply because it may violate the equity among generations. In order to avoid the discrimination between the old and the young, a unique rate of consumption tax $\tau^t$ should be applied. Beside that, a capital income tax $\tau^t_k$ and a system of lump-sum tax $T_0^t$ (if positive) and lump-sum transfer $T_1^t$ (if positive), levied on agent $t$’s incomes, are introduced to show that the best steady state allocation can be achieved. The problem of agent $t$ is then

\[
Max_{c_t, e_t, k_t, m_t \geq 0} u(c_t) + v(c_t) + \phi(F_{t+1}^e)
\]  

(61)
subject to

\[(1 + \tau^t)c_0^t + k^t + m^t = w_t - T_0^t \quad (62)\]

\[(1 + \tau^t)c_1^t = (1 - \tau_k^t)r_{t+1}k^t + T_1^t \quad (63)\]

\[E_t = (1 - b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) - \beta(c_0^t + c_1^{t-1}) + \gamma m^{t-1} \quad (64)\]

\[E_{t+1}^e = (1 - b)E_t - \alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1) - \beta(c_0^{t+1,e} + c_1^t) + \gamma m^t \quad (65)\]

given \(E_{t-1}, c_1^{t-1}, k^{t-1}, m^{t-1}, w_t, c_0^{t+1,e}\) and \(r_{t+1}\). Note again that in equation (65), the agent, being negligible within his generation, ignores the fact that \(K_{t+1} = k^t\) and hence is unable to internalize the effect of the savings decisions on environment through the aggregate output. Hence, the first-order conditions characterizing agent \(t\)’s optimal choice are

\[u'(c_0^t) = \left[\beta(1 - b) + \gamma(1 + \tau^t)\right]\phi'(E_{t+1}^e) \quad (66)\]

\[v'(c_1^t) = \left[\beta + \frac{\gamma(1 + \tau^t)}{(1 - \tau_k^t)F_K(k^t, 1)}\right]\phi'(E_{t+1}^e) \quad (67)\]

\[(1 + \tau^t)c_0^t + k^t + m^t = w_t - T_0^t \quad (68)\]

\[(1 + \tau^t)c_1^t = (1 - \tau_k^t)r_{t+1}k^t + T_1^t \quad (69)\]

\[E_t = (1 - b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) - \beta(c_0^t + c_1^{t-1}) + \gamma m^{t-1} \quad (70)\]

\[E_{t+1}^e = (1 - b)E_t - \alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1) - \beta(c_0^{t+1,e} + c_1^t) + \gamma m^t \quad (71)\]

At a perfect foresight equilibrium the wage rate and capital return are given by the labor and capital productivities respectively, and forecasts coincide with actual values, i.e. \(E_{t+1}^e = E_{t+1}\) and \(c_0^{t+1,e} = c_0^{t+1}\).
Proposition 4: In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pollution from both consumption and production, in any period \( t \), there exists a period by period budget balanced policy of consumption tax, capital income tax and lump-sum taxes and transfers, \((\tau^t, \tau^t_k, T^t_0, T^t_1)\), that supports to attain the planner’s steady state capital (saving) ratio, \( \bar{k} \), and the planner’s steady state consumption of the old, \( \bar{c}_1 \), at the competitive equilibrium.

Proof: The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for proposition 2. ■

Proposition 5: In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pollution from both consumption and production, after finishing period \( t \) (the first stage of taxation), the economy can achieve the planner’s steady state from period \( t + 1 \) onward by implementing the following combination

\[
\tau = \frac{[\gamma + \beta(1 + R)][1 + R] - [\gamma + \beta(1 - b)](b + R)}{(b + R)\gamma} > 0
\]

\[
\tau_k = 1 - \frac{(b + R)(\gamma - (1 + R)\alpha)(1 + \tau)}{(1 + R)(\gamma + \beta - \beta b)}
\]

\[
T_0 = F_L(\bar{k}, 1) - (1 + \tau)\bar{c}_0 - \bar{k} - \bar{m}
\]

\[
T_1 = (1 + \tau)\bar{c}_1 - (1 - \tau_k)F_K(\bar{k}, 1)\bar{k}
\]

At such the steady state the government’s budget is kept balanced every period.

Proof: The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for proposition 3. ■

5.3. Taxes on consumptions and production

We still keep the non-discriminatory tax rate \( \tau^t \) on consumptions and the system of lump-sum tax \( T^t_0 \) (if positive) and lump-sum transfer \( T^t_1 \) (if positive). However, we now introduce a Pigouvian tax on production instead of tax on capital income. In any period, let \( \tau_p \) be the tax paid by firms per one unit of output produced. We will
design taxes and transfers policy ensuring the government’s budget to be balanced and achieving the planner’s steady state through competitive markets.

Under the production tax, the problem that the firm much solve is

$$\max_{K_t} (1 - \tau_p)F(K_t, 1) - r_t k_t - w_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (72)

The return of capital and the return of labor at the equilibrium are

$$r_t = (1 - \tau_p)F_K(k_t^{-1}, 1)$$  \hspace{1cm} (73)

$$w_t = (1 - \tau_p)F_L(k_t^{-1}, 1)$$  \hspace{1cm} (74)

Under the taxes and transfers policy, the agent $t$’s problem is

$$\max_{c_t, c_t^1, k_t, m_t \geq 0} u(c_t^0) + v(c_t^1) + \phi(E_{t+1}^e)$$  \hspace{1cm} (75)

subject to

$$ (1 + \tau^t)c_t^0 + k_t + m_t = w_t - T_0^t$$  \hspace{1cm} (76)

$$ (1 + \tau^t)c_t^1 = r_{t+1} k_t + T_1^t$$  \hspace{1cm} (77)

$$E_t = (1 - b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k_t, 1) - \beta(c_t^0 + c_t^{t-1}) + \gamma m_t^{t-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (78)

$$E_{t+1}^e = (1 - b)E_t - \alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1) - \beta(c_t^{t+1,e} + c_t^1) + \gamma m_t^t$$  \hspace{1cm} (79)

given $E_{t-1}, c_t^{t-1}, k_t^{t-1}, m_t^{t-1}, w_t, c_t^{t+1,e}$ and $r_{t+1}$. Note again that in equation (79), the agent, being negligible within his generation, ignores the fact that $K_{t+1} = k_t^t$ and hence is unable to internalize the effect of the savings decisions on environment through the aggregate output. Hence, the first-order conditions characterizing agent $t$’s optimal choice are
\begin{align*}
u'(c_t^0) &= \left[\beta(1-b) + \gamma(1+\tau^t)\right] \phi'(E_{t+1}^e) \quad (80) \\
v'(c_t^1) &= \left[\beta + \frac{\gamma(1+\tau^t)}{(1-\tau^t_p)F_K(k^t,1)}\right] \phi'(E_{t+1}^e) \quad (81) \\
(1+\tau^t)c_0^t + k^t + m^t &= w_t - T_0^t \quad (82) \\
(1+\tau^t)c_1^t &= (1-\tau^t_p)r_{t+1}k^t + T_1^t \quad (83)
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
E_t &= (1-b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k^{t-1},1) - \beta(c_0^t + c_1^{t-1}) + \gamma m^{t-1} \quad (84) \\
E_{t+1}^e &= (1-b)E_t - \alpha F(K_{t+1},1) - \beta(c_0^{t+1,.} + c_1^t) + \gamma m^t \quad (85)
\end{align*}

At a perfect foresight equilibrium the wage rate and capital return are given by the labor and capital productivities respectively, and forecasts coincide with actual values, i.e. \( E_{t+1}^e = E_{t+1} \) and \( c_{t+1}^{t+1,.} = c_t^0 \).

**Proposition 6:** In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pollution from both consumption and production, in any period \( t \), there exists a period by period budget balanced policy of consumption tax, production tax, lump-sum taxes and transfers, \((\tau^t, \tau^t_p, T_0^t, T_1^t)\), that supports to attain the planner’s steady state capital (saving) ratio, \( \bar{k} \), and the planner’s steady state consumption of the old, \( \bar{c}_1 \), at the competitive equilibrium.

*Proof:* The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for proposition 2. ■

**Proposition 7:** In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pollution from both consumption and production, after finishing period \( t \) (the first stage of taxation), the economy can achieve the planner’s steady state from period \( t+1 \) onward by implementing the following combination

\[ \tau = \frac{[\gamma + \beta(1+R)](1+R) - [\gamma + \beta(1-b)](b+R)}{(b+R)\gamma} > 0 \]
\[ \tau_p = 1 - \frac{(b + R)(\gamma - (1 + R)\alpha)(1 + \tau)}{(1 + R)(\gamma + \beta - \beta b)} \]

\[ T_0 = F_L(\bar{k}, 1) - (1 + \tau)\bar{c}_0 - \bar{k} - \bar{m} \]

\[ T_1 = (1 + \tau)\bar{c}_1 - (1 - \tau_p)F_K(\bar{k}, 1)\bar{k} \]

At such the steady state the government’s budget is kept balanced every period.

Proof: The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for proposition 3. ■

5.4. Taxes on consumption, production and labor income

We now modify the tax and transfer policy introduced in section 5.3 by using the labor income tax rate \( r_w \) to replace the lump-sum tax \( T_0 \) on wage. All other things are kept the same as in the section 5.3. Under this policy, the agent \( t \)'s problem is

Max \[ u(c_t^t) + v(c_{t+1}^t) + \phi(E_{t+1}) \]  
subject to

\[ (1 + \tau_c)c_0^t + k^t + m^t = (1 - \tau_w^t)w_t \]  
\[ (1 + \tau)c_1^t = r_{t+1}k^t + T_0^t \]

\[ E_t = (1 - b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k_{t-1}, 1) - \beta(c_0^t + c_1^{t-1}) + \gamma m^{t-1} \]  
\[ E_{t+1} = (1 - b)E_t - \alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1) - \beta(c_0^{t+1} + c_1^t) + \gamma m^t \]  
given \( E_{t-1}, c_1^{t-1}, k_{t-1}, m_{t-1}, w_t, c_0^{t+1} \) and \( r_{t+1} \). Note again that in equation (90), the agent, being negligible within his generation, ignores the fact that \( K_{t+1} = k^t \) and hence is unable to internalize the
effect of the savings decisions on environment through the aggregate output. Hence, the first-order conditions characterizing agent $t$’s optimal choice are

$$u'(c^t_0) = \left[ \beta - b + 1 \phi(E^e_{t+1}) \right]$$

$$v'(c^t_1) = \left[ \beta + \frac{\gamma(1 + \tau^l)}{(1 - \tau^l) F_K(k^t, 1)} \right] \phi(E^e_{t+1})$$

$$E_t = (1 - b) E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) - \beta(c^t_0 + c^{t-1}_1) + \gamma m^{t-1}$$

$$E^e_{t+1} = (1 - b) E_t - \alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1) - \beta(c^{t+1}_0 + c^t_1) + \gamma m^t$$

At a perfect foresight equilibrium the wage rate and capital return are given by the labor and capital productivities respectively, and forecasts coincide with actual values, i.e. $E^e_{t+1} = E_{t+1}$ and $c^{t+1}_0, c^t_1$.

**Proposition 8:** In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pollution from both consumption and production, in any period $t$, there exists a period by period budget balanced policy of consumption tax, production tax, lump-sum taxes and transfers, $(\tau^t, \tau^l, \tau^w, T^l_1)$, that supports to attain the planner’s steady state capital (saving) ratio, $\bar{k}$, and the planner’s steady state consumption of the old, $\bar{c}_1$, at the competitive equilibrium.

**Proof:** The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for proposition 2. ■

**Proposition 9:** In a Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with pollution from both consumption and production, after finishing period $t$ (the first stage of taxation), the economy can
achieve the planner’s steady state from period \( t + 1 \) onward by implementing the following combination

\[
\tau = \frac{\beta + (1 - b)(\gamma - \beta b) + \beta R(1 + b + R)}{(b + R)\gamma}
\]

\[
\tau_p = 1 - \frac{(b + R)(\gamma - (1 + R)\alpha)(1 + \tau)}{(1 + R)(\gamma + \beta - \beta b)}
\]

\[
\tau_w = 1 - \frac{(1 + \tau)\bar{c}_0 + \bar{k} + \bar{m}}{(1 - \tau_p)F_L(\bar{k}, 1)}
\]

\[
T_1 = (1 + \tau)\bar{c}_1 - (1 - \tau_p)F_K(\bar{k}, 1)\bar{k}
\]

At such the steady state the governement’s budget is kept balanced every period.

Proof: The proof for this proposition is similar to the proof for proposition 3.  ■

6 Conclusion

We have presented a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with environmental externalities from both production and consumption. For such a model we proved that the competitive equilibrium steady state is not the efficient steady state, for any discount rate the social planner may use. The pollution externality from consumption does not affect the range of dynamically inefficient capital ratios, whereas the pollution externality from production does. The higher the production pollution parameter \( \alpha \), the larger the inefficient range. The environmental maintaining technology \( \gamma \) also plays a role in determining the best steady state capital ratio \( \bar{k} \). The cleaner the environment maintaining technology, the smaller the range of the dynamically inefficient allocations. By comparing the competitive steady state and the best steady state, we designed a balanced budget taxes and transfer policy that decentralizes the planner’s steady state.

This paper makes many simplifying assumptions, such as the technology being exogenous, the population growth rate being zero and there being only one production sector. Further developments
including endogenous technology and fertility, as well as the impact of human capital accumulation are left for future research.

Appendix

A1. Existence of the agent’s optimal solution

By substituting (10), (11), (12) and (13) into (8) and (9) the existence of solution to the system of the first order conditions (8)-(13) is equivalent to the existence of solution to the system of two following equations

\[ u'(c^0_t) - [\beta(1-b) + \gamma] \phi'(E^e_{t+1}) = 0 \] (97)

\[ v'(c^1_t) - \frac{\beta + \frac{\gamma}{r_{t+1}}}{\beta(1-b) + \gamma} u'(c^0_t) = 0 \] (98)

where

\[ E^e_{t+1} = (1-b) \left[ (1-b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k_{t-1}, 1) - \beta(c^1_t + c^{t-1}_t) + \gamma m^{t-1} \right] - \alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1) - \beta c^1_t + \gamma w_t - \beta c^1_t + \gamma w_t \]

From (98), by implicit function theorem we can treat \( c^1_t \) as a function of \( c^0_t \), \( c^1_t = \varphi(c^0_t) \) where \( \varphi'(\cdot) > 0, \varphi(0) = 0 \) and \( \varphi(+\infty) = +\infty \). We rewrite

\[ E^e_{t+1} = Q - [\beta(1-b) + \gamma] c^0_t - (\beta + \frac{\gamma}{r_{t+1}}) \varphi(c^0_t) \]

where \( Q = (1-b) \left[ (1-b)E_{t-1} - \alpha F(k_{t-1}, 1) - \beta c^1_t - \gamma m^{t-1} \right] - \alpha F(K_{t+1}, 1) - \beta c^1_t + \gamma w_t \). Now the system of equations (97) and (98) leads to the following equation

\[ u'(c^0_t) - [\beta(1-b) + \gamma] \phi'(Q - [\beta(1-b) + \gamma] c^0_t - (\beta + \frac{\gamma}{r_{t+1}}) \varphi(c^0_t)) = 0 \] (99)

The existence of the agent’s optimal solution is equivalent to the existence of solution to equation (99). In effect, set

\[ \Delta = u'(c^0_t) - [\beta(1-b) + \gamma] \phi'(Q - [\beta(1-b) + \gamma] c^0_t - (\beta + \frac{\gamma}{r_{t+1}}) \varphi(c^0_t)) \]

is a continuous function of \( c^0_t \). We have,
\[ \lim_{c_t^0 \to +\infty} \Delta = -\infty < 0 \]

and

\[ \lim_{c_t^0 \to 0^+} \Delta = +\infty > 0 \]

We also find that \( \Delta \) is a monotone function of \( c_t^0 \) since

\[
\frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial c_t^0} = u''(c_t^0) + [\beta(1-b) + \gamma] \left[ \beta(1-b) + \gamma + (\beta + \frac{\gamma}{r_{t+1}}) \phi'(c_t^0) \right] \phi''(E_{t+1}) < 0
\]

So there exists a unique solution \( c_t^0 \) to (99), meaning that there exists a unique optimal solution of the agent.

A2. Competitive equilibrium dynamics

The competitive equilibrium conditions impose on \((c_{t+1}^0, c_t^1, k^t, m^t, E_{t+1})\) a dynamics described by a first-order difference equation, since

\[
u'(c_t^0) - [\beta(1-b) + \gamma] \phi'(E_{t+1}) = 0
\]

\[
u'(c_t^1) - \left[ \beta + \frac{\gamma}{F_K(k^t, 1)} \right] \phi'(E_{t+1}) = 0
\]

\[c_t^0 + k^t + m^t - F_L(k^{t-1}, 1) = 0
\]

\[c_t^1 - F_K(k^t, 1)k^t = 0
\]

\[E_{t+1} - (1-b)E_t + \alpha F(k^t, 1) + \beta(c_{t+1}^0 + c_t^1) - \gamma m^t = 0
\]

implicitly define it to be a function of its lagged value \((c_{t+1}^0, c_t^1, k^{t-1}, m^{t-1}, E_t)\).

In effect, the associated Jacobian matrix with respect to \((c_{t+1}^0, c_t^1, k^t, m^t, E_{t+1})\)

\[
J = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & G \\
0 & u''(c_t^1) & D & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & -C & 0 \\
\beta & \beta & \alpha F_K(k^t, 1) & -\gamma & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\]

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where

\[ C = F_K(k^t, 1) + F_{KK}(k^t, 1)k^t = \theta^2 A(k^t)^{\theta-1} > 0 \]

\[ D = \frac{\gamma F_{KK}(k^t, 1)}{F_K(k^t, 1)^2} \phi'(E_{t+1}) < 0 \]

\[ G = -[\beta(1-b) + \gamma] \phi''(E_{t+1}) > 0 \]

\[ H = -\left[ \beta + \frac{\gamma}{F_K(k^t, 1)} \right] \phi''(E_{t+1}) > 0 \]

is regular, since

\[
\det(J) = G \begin{vmatrix} 0 & v''(c^t_1) & D & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & -C & 0 \\ \beta & \beta & \alpha F_K(k^t, 1) & -\gamma \end{vmatrix}
\]

\[
= -G\beta \begin{vmatrix} v''(c^t_1) & D & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -C & 0 \end{vmatrix}
\]

\[
= -G\beta \left( D + C v''(c^t_1) \right) > 0
\]

Since, the Jacobian matrix is regular for all \((c_0^{t+1}, c_1^t, k^t, m^t, E_{t+1})\) then it is evidently regular at the solution. This implies that for all competitive equilibrium \((c_0^{t+1}, c_1^t, k^t, m^t, E_{t+1})\), there exists, for all \(t\), a function \(\psi : \mathbb{R}^5 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^5\) such that

\[
\begin{pmatrix} c_0^{t+1} \\ c_1^t \\ k^t \\ m^t \\ E_{t+1} \end{pmatrix} = \psi \begin{pmatrix} c_0^t \\ c_1^{t-1} \\ k^{t-1} \\ m^{t-1} \\ E_t \end{pmatrix}
\]

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A3. Checking the SOCs for the maximization problem of the agent

For the FOCs to be sufficient conditions to characterize a (local) maximum to the optimization problem, we have to check the sufficient SOCs. The Lagrangian of the maximization problem is

\[ Z = u(c_0^t) + v(c_1^t) + \phi(E_{t+1}) + \lambda_1(c_0^t + k^t + m^t - w_t) + \lambda_2(c_1^t - r_{t+1}k^t) \]

\[ + \lambda_3 \left( E_t - (1 - b)E_{t-1} + \alpha F(k^{t-1}, 1) + \beta(c_0^t + c_1^{t-1}) - \gamma m^{t-1} \right) \]

\[ + \lambda_4 \left( E_{t+1} - (1 - b)E_t + \alpha F(k^t, 1) + \beta(c_0^{t+1} + c_1^t) - \gamma m_t \right) \]

whose bordered Hessian will appear as

\[
\tilde{H} = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & -r_{t+1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \beta & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \beta & 0 & -\gamma & b - 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & \beta & 0 & u''(c_0^t) & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & \beta & 0 & v''(c_1^t) & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & -r_{t+1} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & -\gamma & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & b - 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \phi''(E_{t+1})
\end{pmatrix}
\]

The sufficient SOCs for a maximum are

\[
(-1)^5 |\tilde{H}_5| = - \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & -r_{t+1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \beta & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \beta & 0 & -\gamma & b - 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & \beta & 0 & u''(c_0^t) & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & \beta & 0 & v''(c_1^t) & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & -r_{t+1} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & -\gamma & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & b - 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{pmatrix}
\]

\[= - (\beta(1 - b) + \gamma)^2 r_{t+1}^2 v''(c_1^t) - (\beta r_{t+1} + \gamma)^2 u''(c_0^t) > 0\]
which guarantees that the solution to the agent’s problem is a maximum indeed.

**A4. Solving the problem of the social planner**

The Lagrange function for this problem is

\[ L = \sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} \frac{1}{(1+R)^t} \left[ u(c^t_0) + u(c^t_1) + \phi(E_{t+1}) \right] \]

\[ + \sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} \frac{\mu_t}{(1+R)^t} \left[ F(k^{t-1},1) - c^t_0 - c^{t-1} - k^t - m^t \right] \]

\[ + \sum_{t=0}^{+\infty} \frac{\eta_t}{(1+R)^t} \left[ E_{t+1} - (1-b)E_t + \alpha F(k^t,1) + \beta(c^t_0 + c^t_1) - \gamma m^t \right] \]

The FOCs of the maximization problem are

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial c^t_0} = \frac{u'(c^t_0)}{(1+R)^t} - \frac{\mu_t}{(1+R)^t} + \frac{\beta \eta_{t-1}}{(1+R)^{t-1}} = 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial c^t_1} = \frac{v'(c^t_1)}{(1+R)^t} - \frac{\mu_{t+1}}{(1+R)^{t+1}} + \frac{\beta \eta_t}{(1+R)^t} = 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial E_{t+1}} = \frac{\phi'(E_{t+1})}{(1+R)^t} + \frac{\eta_t}{(1+R)^t} - \frac{\eta_{t+1}(1-b)}{(1+R)^{t+1}} = 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial L}{\partial k^t} = - \frac{\mu_t}{(1+R)^t} + \frac{\mu_{t+1} F_K(k^t,1)}{(1+R)^{t+1}} + \frac{\eta_t \alpha F_K(k^t,1)}{(1+R)^t} = 0
\]
\[ \frac{\partial L}{\partial m_t} = -\frac{\mu_t}{(1 + R)^t} - \frac{\eta \gamma}{(1 + R)^t} = 0 \]

that is to say

\[ u'(c_t^0) - \mu_t + \frac{\beta \eta_{t-1}}{1 + R} = 0 \]

\[ v'(c_t^1) - \frac{\mu_{t+1}}{1 + R} + \beta \eta_t = 0 \]

\[ \phi'(E_{t+1}) + \eta_t - \frac{\eta_{t+1}(1 - b)}{1 + R} = 0 \]

\[ -\mu_t + \frac{\mu_{t+1} F_K(k^t, 1)}{1 + R} + \eta_t \alpha F_K(k^t, 1) = 0 \]

\[ -\mu_t - \eta \gamma = 0 \]

At the steady state,

\[ u'(\bar{c}_0) = \mu - \beta \eta(1 + R) \]

\[ v'(\bar{c}_1) = \frac{\mu}{1 + R} - \beta \eta \]

\[ \phi'(\bar{E}) = -\eta + \frac{(1 - b) \eta}{1 + R} \]

\[ F_K(\bar{k}, 1) = \frac{\mu(1 + R)}{\mu + \alpha \eta(1 + R)} \]

\[ \mu = -\eta \gamma \]

Therefore,

\[ u'(\bar{c}_0) = (1 + R) \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(\bar{E}) \]

\[ v'(\bar{c}_1) = \frac{\gamma + \beta(1 + R)}{b + R} \phi'(\bar{E}) \]

\[ F_K(\bar{k}, 1) = \frac{\gamma(1 + R)}{\gamma - (1 + R)\alpha} \]
References


