Does Pervasive Corruption Matter For Firm's Demand for Good Governance in Developing Countries?

Abstract : This paper investigates empirically the relationships between the corruption climate and the demand for good governance by focusing on firms' behaviors in developing countries. The concept of demand for good governance is conceived in terms of a firm's willingness to comply with regulatory norms measured through the firm's perception of the level of public accountability as well as the firm's behavior in terms of corruption practices. While there is a growing theoretical literature on the importance of externality mechanisms of corruption phenomena, little empirical evidences has been highlighted. This paper contributes to fill this gap by using firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey. We show that when corruption is found to be a very important constraint for a firm's business, its willingness to comply decreases and the probability of the firm's corrupting officials increases. These results support arguments according to which the demand for good governance is likely to be influenced by the perception of the existence of pervasive corruption. Moreover, the results are conditioned on countries' institutional features and the type of regulation. Some evidence is also found for firms' environmental overcompliance.
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Gaoussou Diarra, Sébastien Marchand. Does Pervasive Corruption Matter For Firm's Demand for Good Governance in Developing Countries?. 2011. ⟨halshs-00588191⟩

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